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
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Passions *arraing'd by* Reason *here you see,*
As shee's Advis'd *therein by* Grace Divine:
But this, (yow'll say) 's but in Effigie!
Peruse this Booke, *and you in ev'ry line*
There of will finde this truth so prov'd, that yow
H. sculp: *Must* Reason *contradict, or grant it* True.



THE USE OF PASSIONS.

VVritten In

FRENCH

BY

J. F. Senault.

And put into

ENGLISH

BY

HENRY

Earl of Monmouth.

An. Dom. 1649.

London, Printed for *J. L.* and *Humphrey Moseley*, at the Prince's Arms in St. *Pauls* Church-yard. 1649.

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THE AVTHORS Dedication of his *Work*, To our Saviour Jesus Christ.

IT is not without reason, (adored Jesus) that I offer up unto *thee* this Work, wherein I endeavor to teach *thy* Servants how to use their *Passions*: For to boot, that all our thoughts are due unto *thee*, because *thou* art the *Eternal Thought* of the *Father*

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ther, and that whatsoever our soul produceth, are as so many *Images* of *thine*; This belongs to *thee* by a *double Title*, and cannot without some sort of *Injustice*, be Dedicated to any other then *thee*. *Passions*, in that state whereunto they are brought by sin, are monsters which ought to be immolated upon *thy Altars*; this *Sacrifice* succeeds those of the *Old Testament*: As *thou* delightest in receiving a *heart* struck through with *sorrow*, and consumed with *love*, so dost *thou* with *joy* receive such *Passions* as *Grace* and *Reason* do consecrate unto *thee*; neither dost thou despise the *Motions* of our soul, when they are *enlightned* by *Faith*, and *inanimated* by *Charity*; *thou* art well pleased, that being *Priests* and *Victimes* for *thy Glory*, as *thou* hast been for *our salvation*, we finde some

some *feelings* in our selves, which we may *immolate* unto *thee*; that in obedience to thy just *Laws*, we sacrifice unto *thee* our *love*, and our *desires*; and that courageously suffocating our *anger*, and our *hatred*, we appease thy *Justice* by the *death* of a part of our *selves*.

Thou likewise dost permit, that without shedding the *blood* of these savage Beasts, we *tame* them, to make them serviceable to *thy designes*; and that we employ our *hopes* and *fears*, to overcome *Vice*, and acquire *Vertue*. But assuredly, we cannot undertake this *combat*, nor hope for *victory* therein, without *thy* assistance; for *Passions* hold of *thy Empire*: and since these *slaves* are become *rebels*, they are onely to be reduced by *thy Grace*.

Thou, by *thy eternal Birth*, art the *Primitive Reason*; and the same

term which we make use of in all *languages*, to express *thy Personal proprieties*, teacheth us, that *thou* art as well the *Reason*, as the *Word* of *thy Father*: To *thee* it belongeth to regulate all the *Passions*; and if *wisemen* have any command over theirs, 'tis for that their *Reason* flows from *thine*: They are onely *wise*, in that they are *reasonable*; and they are *reasonable* onely, in that they have the honor to be *thy Images*: *Grace* it self, whence the *strength* and *light* of thy *Saints* do derive, flows from *thy divine Person*: those great *ones* are not onely *Gods*, but *Sons* of *God*; they bear *thy Character* in their Souls; and the *Father*, who looks upon them as *thy Brethren*, loves them as *his Children*. This *divine quality* makes them triumph over their *Passions*; they ow all their victories to *thy Alli-*

ance;

ance; and if they tame the *motions* of their souls, 'tis because they have the honor to *unite*, as *thou* dost, *Reason* and *Grace* in their personages, and to be by *priviledg*, that which *thou* art by *Nature*.

Thy Actions, since *thou* hast vouchsafed to become *Man*, serve us for *Instructions*; and we finde *examples* in *thy life*, which we may securely imitate. Before *thy* temporal *Birth*, we had no *model* which was not *imperfect*: *Vertue* and *Vice* were intermingled in *all* men; and the greatest *Saints* did no *good works*, which were not accompanied with some *defects*. Their *Passions* out-ran their *Wisdom*; the first *motions* of them were so *sodain* and so *violent*, that they could neither *foresee* them, nor *hinder* them: When they were once *up*, and that *Reason* gathering her forces together,

ther, gave them *battle*; these *rebels* joyned *Insolence* to *Fury*, and argued *Authority* with their *Soveraign*. Thus *thy* faithfulest Servants needed *forgiveneſs* in the *war*, which they made against their *Paſſions*; and it behoved *thy goodneſs* to give *light* to illuminate these *blinde men*, *Wiſdom* to conduct these *giddy-headed* people, and *Fortitude* to overcome these *rebels*. But in *thy* sacred *Perſon Paſſions* have no *defect*: These *wilde Beasts* are *tamed*, these *troubleſome Seas* are always *calm*, these *revolted Subjects* are always *obedient*; and by a *miracle*, as *Rare* as *Illuſtrious*, these *enemies* of *our Reaſon*, do always agree with *thine*: They raised themselves when *thou* ordainedſt them so to do; their *firſt motions* were in *thy power*, they waited *thy leave* to be troubled: *Sorrow* seiz-

ed

ed not on *thy heart*, *Tears* distilled not from *thine eyes*; and red-hued *Anger*, or pale *Fear*, appeared not in *thy face*, before *thy will*, which ruled all their *motions*, had given them *Permission*. They were so well instructed in all *thy designes*, as they seemed to be indued with *Reason*; and *Reason* found such *Obedience* in the *Inferior* part of *thy Soul*, that no *clouds* were gathered together there, which *she her self* had not there *formed*. In the World *tempests* are raised from the *lower Elements*: *Thunder-claps* which make so hideous a noyse in the *Clouds*, take their original from the *Valleys* or the *Rivers*; and all those *Storms* that trouble the *cleerness* of the *Ayr*, proceed from *vapors* of the *Sea*, or *exhalations* of the *Earth*: In *men* that are composed of *mud* and *dirt*, their *Passions* arise from

their

their *bodies*; their *Revolts* proceed from the *sences*; and all these *Tempests* which molest their *quiet*, take their vigor from *flesh* and *blood*; but in *thy divine soul* it fares clean *otherwise*; *thy Passions* sprung from *thy Reason*; it was the *soul* that wrought upon the *body*; it was the *Superior* part that inanimated the *Inferior*; and it was the *primum mobile* that gave *motion* to all the *other* sphears, which did *depend* thereon.

Hence came it, that *thou* didst enjoy a profound *peace*, that *thy victories* were without *combat*, or *thy triumphs* without *victories*: *Thou* felt'st no *disorders* in *thy Person*, all was *calm* in *thy soul*; and even when *sadness* was grown to such a *height*, as it was able to cause *thee* to *die*, it was so submiss to *Reason*, that to *obey her*, it agreed

with

with *Joy* its enemy. *Thou* wert the most *content*, and the most *afflicted* of all men: *Thou* wert able to cause *Envy* in the *most happy*, *Compassion* in the *most miserable*, and *Astonishment* in them *both*. *Love* and *Hatred* were never at *odds* in *thy heart*: These two contraries bare respect to each other. *Thy Reason* had such absolute *power* over them, that they preserved their *opposition*, without losing their good *Intelligence*; and men were astonished to see, that *thy soul*, which was the *Theater*, where two so *violent motions* were formed, should enjoy *peace* amidst *war*. In fine, *Fear* and *Audacity* ended their differences in *thy Person*; thou didst suffer these two affections to *possess* thy heart without *dividing* it; whilest *thou* wert in *thine Agony* in the *Garden*, *thou* gavest *confidence*

to

to *thine Apostles*; and when the thought of *death* made such havock in thy *soul*, *thou* didst *encourage Martyrs* to the *combat*; *thou* prepareſt *crowns* for their *victories*; and procuring them *ſtrength* by *thy weakneſſes*, *thou* ordainedſt them to be the *champions* of thy *Church Militant*.

But what ever help they received from *thy Grace*, their *victories* were never like *thine*; they found more obedience in the World, then in *themſelves*; and have confeſſed, it coſt them leſs to overcome *wilde Beaſts*, then to vanquiſh their own *Paſſions*. Famous *Martyrs* have been known, who having overcome *Lyons*, could not quell their *own choler*; and have ſuffered themſelves to be borne away with *Impatience*, after they had endured *tortures*: Their *combats* were not

always

always followed with good *success*; they were oft-times in one and the same day, both *conquered* and *Conquerors*: They gave way to *Voluptuousness*, after they had triumphed over *Grief*; and having had courage enough to be *Martyrs*, they wanted resolution to be *continent*. How often have they wisht for *death*, that they might be freed from these *domestick* enemies? and to that end, *sighed* and made *vows*? When *thy Providence* gave them over to their own *weakness*, they despaired of their *salvation*; finding no support save in *thy goodness*, they begun all their wrestlings by *Prayer*, and professed, that to overcome their *Passions*, they must be animated by *thy Spirit*, and assisted by *thy Power*. *Thou* art the sole *Conqueror*, that wert never worsted in this *war*; *thy Affections* never be-

betraid *thy Reason*; and *thy Power* hath been as absolute in *thy Person*, as in *thy Kingdom*: These *Passions* of *our soul* changed nature in *thine*; by the use *thou* madest of them, they became *Vertues*: Thou conceivedst no *love* which did not turn it self into *Charity*; *thou* didst excite no *Choler* that was not *just Indignation*; and *thou* feltest no *Pity*, but it was transformed into *Mercy*. All that in *our nature* is *Humane*, was *Divine* in *thine*; and the unconfused *mixture* of *two Natures*, whereof *thou* art composed, made thy *Passions* to be rather *Miracles* then *Vertues*: *Thy Anger* served as an *Officer* to *thy Fathers justice*; *thy Compassion* was the *Interpreter* of *His Mercy*, and *thy love* an *earnest* of *His Good will*. How *happy* was that *distressed* man that drew *tears* from *thine eyes*? how *rich* was that

poor

poor one, whose wants *thou* didst *bewail?* how *puissant* was the *oppressed*, whose interests *thou* maintainedst? how *innocent* was that *offender*, whose conversion was wrought by *thy tears?* and how *glorious* was the *infamous sinner*, to whom *thou* witnessedst *thy love* by *thy complaints* and *sighs?* Heaven had a regard to *all* the *motions* of *thy Soul*; the *eternal Father* never denyed any thing to *thy tears*; and *his thunder-bolts* never failed to fall upon their heads, on whom *thy just Anger* called for *punishment*. *Thy Passions* were the *Organs* of thy *Divinity*; *thy Sighs* were no less powerful, then *thy Words*; and without using either *Prayers* or *Vows*, *the Desires* were sufficient to make known *thy Will*. What *admiration* did these *motions* of *thy Soul* cause in the *Seraphim?* with

what *astonishment* were those pure *Intelligences* strucken, when they considered that *God* taking *our nature* upon *him*, took part of her *feelings*, and no part of her *weaknesses*? That *he wept* with the *wretched*, without interessing *his happiness*? That *he* was *Angry* at those that were injured without *troubling his quiet*? That with the *needy he* formed *desires* without *loss* of *his abundance*? And that with *lovers*, *he* felt the *flames* of *love*, without enduring their *disturbances*? What a *miracle* was it, to see that *Anger* should be kindled in *thy Soul*, without *trouble* thereunto? That *Pity* should wound *thy heart*, without *weakening it*? That *it* should be *inflamed* with *love*, yet not *consumed*? That *it* should be *eaten* up with *Sorrow*, yet not *disquieted*? What can *I* do less in

honor

honor of so many *Wonders*, then to *consecrate* our *Passions* unto *thee?* What less *submission* can I make to *thy* adored *Power*, then loudly to avouch, that there is none but *thou*, who can teach us the *use* of these *Motions?* And that it appertains onely to *thy Wisdom*, to change our *Anger* into *Indignation*, our *Pity* into *Mercy*, and our *Love* into *Charity?*

Indeed, it is *thou* alone who canst *rule* our *Passions*; *thou* art *he onely* who workest our *good* out of our *evil*, and of *Poysons* composest *Antidotes*. *Thou* knowest men by their *Inclinations*; *thou* seest, without studying them, the *motions* of their *hearts*; and making *benefit* thereof, dost wisely conduct them to *thy* end. *Thou* employest *Fear*, to take off a *covetous* man from those perishable riches which possess

him; *thou* makest a *holy use* of *Despair*, to withdraw from the *World* a *Courtier*, whose youth had been mis-imployedin the service of some Prince; thou makest an admirable *use* of *Disdain*, to extinguish therewith a *lovers flames*, who is inslaved by a *proud beauty*; thou employest *Choler*, to disabuse a *Souldier*, whom a dissembling *General* feeds with vain hopes; *thou* makest excellent *use* of *Grief* to cure a *sickman*, who sought for his *souls happiness* in his *bodies health*, and lost the remembrance of *Heaven* by being too strongly fastened to the *Earth*. In fine, *thou* makest *chains* of all our *Passions*, to unite *our wills* to *thine*; *thou* mingleſt *Grace* with *Nature*; and makest *Angels* by the same disorders, as they would have been made *Devils*. *Sin* is the *Theater* of *thy Power*, as well as *Nothing*; *thou* makest

makest *thy* greatest *Works* issue out of *two Subjects*, whereof the one is *Barren*, the other *Rebellious*: Out of *Nothing* thou drawest *Existence*, and out of *sin* thou extractest *Grace*; *thou* findest every thing in its *contrary*, and by an effectual *violence*, which can proceed onely from an *infinite Power*, *thou* compellest *Nothing* to produce *men*, and *sin* to make *Saints*: But after these *two Miracles*, which are *thy masterpieces*, we see not any thing more *wonderful*, then the *use* which *thou art* able to make of our *Passions*, for the *changing* of our *Wills*; *thou* makest that serve *thy designes*, which did serve *thine* enemies; *thou* savest men by those *weaknesses* which would have been their *undoing*; and bestowing on them a little *Divine love*, *thou* turnest all their *Passions* into *Vertues*. For, when once

Charity begins to reign in their *souls*, they *fear* nothing but *sin*; they *wish* for nothing but *Grace*. *Thou* art the *end* of their *Desires*, as *thou* art the *object* of their *Love*: They change *Condition*, without changing *Nature*; though they have *Passions*, they commit no more *Offences*; and losing neither *Hope*, nor *Despair*; neither *Audacity* nor *Fear*; neither *Love* nor *Hatred*; they are free from all the *mischiefs* which accompany these *Passions*, when they are *Faulty*.

But certainly, if *thy Mercy* appear in well husbanding the inclinations of *thy Friends*, to their *salvation*; *thy Justice* shines forth no less, in making good use of those of thine *Enemies*, to their *Destruction*: For they become *chains* in *thy hands*, to binde these *Malefactors* with; *thou* forgest out of them *Irons* to punish

these

these *slaves*; and *thou* changest their *Desires* into *Aversions*, and their *Pleasures* into *Pain*. *Thou* abandonest every *sinner* to the *Passion* which possesses him; *thou* commandest this domestick *fury* to revenge *thee*, and correct *him*; *thou* turnest his *sin* into his *punishment*, without imploying either *Hell* or *Devils*; *thou* ordainest every sinner to be his own *executioner*; and makest him taste as many *torments*, as he nourisheth *Passions* in his *soul*: Thus we see by experience, that the irregular *desire* of *Honor*, is the *punishment* of the *ambitious*; that the shameful *love* of *voluptuousness*, is the *torment* of the *Incontinent*; and that the *insatiable thirst* after *riches*, is the *penalty* of the *covetous*. Those chastisements which astonish us with their outward *appearance*, are not the most *rigorous*: those *plagues* which sweep away whole *Kingdoms*, those *wars*

that unpeople the world, those *thunders* which grumble over our *heads*, and those *Abysses* which gape under our *feet*, are but the *flourishes* of *thy anger*; *thou* makest *thy children* feel those scourges, when *thou* wilt correct them; and these disorders of *Nature*, are oftentimes rather *favors* from *thy Mercy*, then *chastisements* of *thy Justice*. But when *thou* wilt punish the *guilty* who have long offended *thee*, and that *thou* desirest to continue them in their *sins*; that *thou* mayest satisfie *thy* just *fury*, *thou* givest them over to their own *Lusts*; *thou* commandest their *Passions* to be their *executioners*; *thou* permittest all the *inclinations* of their souls to be turned into so many *sins*; and that delighting in their *offence*, they no longer think of appeasing *thee*, or of their *own conversion*.

Since then *thou* doest so *justly* imploy

ploy the *Passions*, both of *thy friends* and *enemies*, vouchsafe to let me offer up these unto *thee*; and that to do *homage* unto *thine*, I may sacrifice to *thee* mine: Suffer me to propound *thy life* for an *example* to *thy faithful ones*; that not abusing them with *false Vertues*, whereof *vain glory* was the *soul*, and *honor* the *reward*; I represent to them, those which *thou* didst *practise*, during those happy yeers, *thou* wert pleased to converse with men. Give me *grace* to explain to them, the *morality* which is learnt in *thy School*: And since the *Passions* are the *Seeds* of *Vertues* and *Vices*, favor me so far, that I may so well express their *Nature*, and their *Motions*, as that I may make all the *Readers* of this my *Book*, *Vertuous*: *Dissipate* the darkness of my *understanding*, that in handling this *Matter*, I may penetrate the *depths* of mens hearts, I may discover the extent of their *jurisdiction*; and that I

may

may bring all men to observe, how *Passions* are *raised* in them, how they *rebel* against *Reason*, how they seduce the *Understanding*, and what sleights they use to *enslave* the *will*: After I have known the *Malady*, teach me the *Remedy*, that I may cure it; teach me how a *Passion* is to be *stifled* in its *birth*; what *means* I must use to subdue a *Passion*, which findes *her strength* in *her old age*; and which (O the *wonder!*) is never more *vigorous*, then when most *ancient*. Teach me the dexterity we are to use, for conquering those *Passions* that *flatter* us with their *Promises*; those which *corrupt* us with their *subtilties*; those which *daunt* us with their *threats*; and those which *enchaunt* us with their *allurements*: That being *illuminated* by *thy Light*, and *assisted* by *thy Grace*, I may by *one* and the *same Work*, inspire mens souls with the *Love* of *Vertue*, and *Hatred* of *Sin*.

THE

THE TRANSLATOR, upon the BOOK.

I.

IF to command and rule ore others be
The thing desir'd above all worldly pelf,
How great a Prince, how great a Monarch's he,
Who govern can, who can command Himself?
If you unto so great a Pow'r aspire,
This Book will teach how you may it acquire.

II.

Love turn'd to Sacred Friendship here you'l finde,
And Hatred into a Just Indignation:
Desires (when moderated and not blinde)
To have to all the Vertues neer relation:
Flight or Eschewing, you will finde to be,
The chiefest Friend to spotless Chastity.

III.

III.

You'l finde how Hope incites to Noble Acts,
And how Despair diverts Rash enterprises;
How Fear from Wisdom nought at all detracts;
But is of use to her through just Surmises:
How Boldness may in hand with Valor ride,
How hair-brain'd Choler may with Justice (side.

IIII.

How harmless Joy we may Fore-runner make,
Of that Eternal never-ending Bliss,
Whereof the Saints in Heaven do partake;
And how our earthly Sorrow nothing is,
But a sharp Corrosive, which, handled well,
Will prove an Antidote to th'pains in Hell.
Thus, Rebels unto Loyalty are brought,
And Traytors true Allegeance are taught.

THE

THE
Translator to the *Reader.*

I *Had it once in my thoughts to have dedicated this my product of some* Leasure-hours, *to an exactly accomplished* Lady *of* Honor; *but considering that my* Author *hath chosen our Saviour* Jesus Christ *for his* Patron, *I thought I should go less, should I chuse any other, for my* Patroness, *then the* Kings daughter, *his* Spouse *the* Church, *who is* all glorious within. (*For though these be days wherein the* Church *may be compared to a* Coppice, *in which the* Underwood *grows much* thicker *and* faster, *then do the* Oaks; *and though she may be thought to suffer much in* Dilapidations; *yet (as Master* Fuller *saith) hath she some* Inner-more Chappel *well in* repair.) *And truly, when I considered the like coherence, which is between a* wife *and her* husband, *as between a* Translation *and its* Original; (*for if the one be* Bone of the same bone, and flesh of the same flesh, *the other*

are composed of the same matter; *and as the* woman *is acknowledged to be the* weaker vessel, *a* Translation *will never vy for worth or precedency with its* Original; *) I was somewhat confirmed in my opinion; yet when upon* second thoughts (*which are, or ought to be the best,*) *I called to minde the many* Rivals *she hath in these days, which might peradventure cause both* me *and* her *to suffer, should I say any thing of* her, *or undertake* her quarrel; (me, *by* doing *it*; her, *by my so* ill doing *it:*) *I resolved to pass over all* Dedications *(yet could not forbear the Englishing of my* Authors; *being thereunto invited both by the* Piety *and* Elegancy *of it, as also by the like Dedications of* Alstedius *in his* Encyclopædia, *and other* Protestant *Writers, though I finde it left out in some French Copies) to content my self with* thinking, *and to address my self in* words, *onely to* thee, *my* Reader, *and to tell* thee, *that the* Conde de Gondomar *(a Spanish Minister of State, with whose name and fame this our Nation hath been well acquainted) had wont to say:* If you will make a small inconsiderable Present, to any great man of the Court, or to your Mistress, you may do well to usher it in with some Preamble, whereby to excuse the Meanness, and make the Fancy or Workmanship thereof plead Acceptance; marry,

marry, if you will present him or her with a thing of Real value, as (*for that was it he instanced in*) with a bag of Gold, amounting to some three or four thousand pound, you need not use any Circumlocutions, but bring it in, lay it down, and say, Take it, there it is: The thing it self will purchase its welcome. *So I, were I to present* thee *with some* ordinary Work, *I should according to* Custom, *and his* Counsel, *trouble both my* self *and* thee, *with making some excuses to beg thy* approbation *and* acceptance; *but since I offer to thy perusal, a piece of such* extraordinary worth, *as is this, the like whereof I have seldom or never met withal, be it either for the matter of the* Subject, *or for the* Authors handsom handling *of it; wherein such quaint* Philosophy, *and such strong* Divinity *are so dexterously interwoven; and no syllable of the* Divinity *therein* (*though written by a* Romish Priest) *which contradicts the* Religion *I have been brought up in* (*and hope, through* Gods mercy, *to die in*) *I will not* injure *it, by* fawning *on thee for thy* approbation, *but build with* confidence *upon thy* acceptance.

Yet let me not be mistaken; *when I mention any thing of* worth *in this* Treatise, *it is in relation to the* Original: *I am not ignorant how great an* allay *it suffers by my* Translation; *yet*

you will finde the matter *the same*, *though not the* cloathing; *the difference being no more then what is in the* same man, *when in his* holy-day, *and when in his* working-day apparrel: *and you know*, Cucullus non facit Monachum. *When I have made this* acknowledgment, *I know not*, *notwithstanding*, *why it may not hold between a* Translation *and an* Original, *as it doth between the two great* Luminaries; *whereof*, *though the* Moon *borrow all her light from the* Sun, *yet is not the* Sun *any whit prejudiced thereby*; *nor doth he thereby lose any of his* lustre: *Neither know I why an* original Author *should be thought to* suffer, *though peradventure he be not too much* righted *by his* Translator. *For my part*, *I have done my* self *so much right*, *as to do the like* (*according to my* Talent) *to my* Author; *who appears throughout all this* work *to be too* ingenuous, *not to pardon such a* Delinquent. *As for* thee, *my* Reader, *if what I have done shall please thee*, *I shall think this a* labor *well bestowed by*

Thy hearty well-wisher,

H. Monmouth.

THE

The AUTHORS PREFACE.

THough *all Philosophy* be *beautiful*, and that this great *Body* hath no *parts* in it which are not *noble*; yet I confess, that that part thereof which treats of *morality*, is one of the least *illustrious*; and did not the *utility* thereof heighten its *valuation*, it would meet with no *Disciples*. Indeed, there goes no *great glory* to the fighting with *Passions*, and the vanquishing of them, since they are but *Monsters*: There needs be no great *boasting* in the acquisition of some *Vertues*, and in being more *Innocent* then the *Faulty*; since a man is not accounted the more *Vigorous* for being *sounder* then one that is *sick*. 'Tis no great advantage to overcome *Avarice*, since she exerciseth her *fury* against her *self*,

Quamdiucum affectibus colluctamur, quid magni facimus? etiamsi superiores sumus, portenta vicimus. Senec. quæst. natural. lib. 1. præfat.

and deprives her *self* of that wealth which she hath deprived others of: 'Tis no very *glorious* action to have triumphed over *Luxury*, since it repairs its own *profusions* by *unjust acts*, and *gathers* riches more unjustly then it *scatters* them. In fine, it is no great wonder to despise *Ambition*, since if it raise us up to *Honors*, 'tis by *Affronts*; and that it is by *Servitude*, that she makes us rise to *Greatness*. Yet this part of *Philosophy* hath its *advantages*; and if it make less *show*, it brings more *profit* then do the rest: For it is she that makes *Philosophers*, and which purifying their *understanding*, makes them capable of *considering* the wonders of *Nature*: 'Tis she that instructeth *Politicians*, and teacheth them by governing their *Passions* to govern *Kingdoms*: 'tis she that makes *Fathers of families*, and who managing their *inclinations*, teacheth them to bring up their children, and to command their servants; so that she is to *Philosophy*, the same as *Foundations* are to *Buildings*; and she may boast that in laboring to make an *honest man*, she makes at once, a good *Father* of a *Family*, a wise *Politician*, and an understanding *Philosopher*.

Ethica in universum componit hominem, & suadet marito, quomodo se gerat adversus uxorem; patri, quomodo educet liberos; Domino, quomodo servos regat. Senec. Epist. 95.

But as she hath several ways to lead to one and the same end, I have always thought that the most *humble* was the most *certain*;

and

and that taking that way, which teacheth us to regulate the *motions* of our *ſoul*, I ſhould withſtand all *Vices*, and defend all *Vertues*. For although our *Paſsions* be out of *order*, and that *ſin* hath brought them to a condition, wherein they are rather *Faulty* then *Innocent*; yet *Reaſon* joyn'd with *Grace*, may make good *uſe* of them; and without flattery, I dare ſay in their behalf, that there is none of them ſo deſpicable, but it may be changed into a *glorious Vertue*: That may be taken from them which they have contracted from *corrupt nature*; and they may be reſtored to that *purity* which they had in the ſtate of *Innocence*: No *occaſion* can preſent it ſelf, where they may not fight, and bear away the victory in behalf of *Vertue*; and, provided a man can *tame* them, he may with them eaſily overcome all *Vices*; for *Vice* proceeds from their *Diſorders*; and we commit no *ſin*, which oweth not his birth to their *Revolt*: I can therefore affirm, that *all Moral Philoſophy* is compriſed in *this part*, and that by teaching how to *uſe Paſsions*, I ſhew all the ways of making a man *Vertuous*.

But to lead on ſucceſsfully ſo glorious an enterprize, we muſt take a clean differing path from that of the *Philoſophers*, and fol-

low other manner of *Maximes*, then those which they have left in their writings: For these *blinde* men would have no other *rule* then *Nature*, no other *help* then *Reason*; they thought there was no *Vice* which they might not expel, no *Vertue* which they might not acquire, by the means of these two guides: They were encouraged by their *vain-glory*, they endeavored things exceeding their *Abilities*; and out of a vain *Confidence*, imagined that they could submit the *body* to the *soul*, and re-establish this *Soveraign* in her ancient authority; it being more easie to *know* what is good, then to *follow* it; they wrote worthily of *Vertue*, they filled all their *Discourses* with the *praises* thereof; and had there needed no more then *Reasons* or *Words* to perswade us, they might have made us vertuous by their *Writings*: But our *malady* was grown too *great* to be cured by such *weak* remedies; and it behoved, that *Grace* should be mingled with *Nature*, to make *Vertue* meritorious.

Natura duce utendum est: hanc Ratio observat, hanc consulit: idem est ergo beatè vivere, & secundùm Naturam. Senec. de vita beata. cap. 8.

In hoc morum studio multa delectant, pauca vincunt. Senec. 7. Benefic. cap. 7.

Man had freedom enough to *undo* himself, by his *own proper motion*; but he had not enough thereof to *save* himself by his *own strength*: his *ruine* came from his *will*, and his *welfare* could proceed from nothing, but from *Grace*: All the actions he did without

without *her assistance* were *faulty*; and, if we will believe Saint *Austin*, all his *good Works* were *sins*; for he failed both in the *beginning*, and in the *end*: not working by *Grace*, he must needs work by *Concupiscence*; and being possest with *self-love*, he could propose no other end to himself, but himself: He labored either after *Glory*, or *Pleasure*; and in all his actions raised himself no higher then his *own interests*. The *Philosophers*, though they had a little more *light* then *others*, had no more *Righteousness*; and whatsoever *names* they gave unto their *Vertues*, one might easily finde, that they were *animated* onely by the desire of *Honor* or *Voluptuousness*: All their *Opinions* likewise, might be reduced to those of the *Epicureans*, and of the *Stoicks*, both which do *infinitely* differ from the belief of *Christians*: For as saith Saint *Augustine*, the *Epicureans* acknowledged no other *Pleasure*, then *Sensuality*: The *Stoicks* thought *Vertue*, the onely *happiness*; and *Christians* allow of no *felicity* but *Grace*: The first submit the *soul* to the *body*, and reduce *men* to the life of *beasts*; the second fill the *soul* with *arrogance*, and in the misery of their condition, they imitate the *pride* of *Devils*; the last, acknowledg their *weakness*, and finding by experience,

Interrogemus singulos. Dic Epicure, quæ res faciat beatum? respondet, voluptas corporis. Dic Stoice, respondet, virtus animi. Dic Christiane, respondet, donum Dei. Aug. in tract. de Sectis Philos. c. 7.

that *Nature* and *Reason* cannot deliver them, they implore ayd from *Grace*, and undertake not to withstand *Vices*, nor to acquire *Vertues* without *Heavens assistance*. Therefore is it that in this Work, I presuppose, that *Charity* is absolutely necessary for the governments of our *Passions*; and I acknowledg *Christianity* to be the onely *Moral Philosophy*: I very well know, *Philosophers* have helped us to some *maximes*, which may further our designe; but I likewise know very well, that we cannot make *use* thereof, to our *advantage*, without the *Grace* of the *Holy Ghost*. The *goodliest truths* are unuseful to us, if *he* who is the *eternal Light*, do not scatter them abroad in our *souls*; and the best *Reasons* cannot prevail with us, if *he* that holdeth our *hearts* in *his* hand, do not touch them with *his inspirations*: The very *helps* of *Nature*, which we may call the *ruines* of *Innocence*, cannot produce *Vertue*, unless enlivened by *Charity*: All those good *inclinations* which remained in *us*, after the loss of *original Righteousness*, are out of *order*; and man is become so *wholly corrupt*, that his very *advantages* make against him: The *Beauty* of the *Understanding*, the *Goodness* of the *Iudgment*, and the *Faithfulness* of the *Memory*, are favors which have undone

the

the *Philosophers*; and if we *now reap* any *profit* thereby, we owe it to *Grace*, and not to *Nature*: It fares with *our soul*, as with the *Earth*; the *one*, and the *other*, are *accursed* since *sinne*; and as the later bears nothing but *Thorns*, unless it be *Cultivated*; the other produceth nothing but *sin*, unless she be *Illuminated* by some *Supernatural light*.

To understand this Truth, which is the pure Doctrine of the *Gospel*; we must know that *Grace*, be it in the *state* of *Innocence*, or in that of *Christianiiy*, makes up *one* part of *man*; he is not *accomplished* when he is *robbed* thereof; and though he have *Reason*, he is *imperfect* if he want *Righteousness*: In *both* these estates, he must be *Righteous* to be *Perfected*, and *Innocent* if he will please *God*: *Reason* is not his *chief advantage*; and (if I may be permitted to say it) she is not his *final Difference*; he was never created to be onely *Reasonable*; and he cannot be saved unless, together with *Reason*, he possess *Righteousness*. From so rare a *Priviledg* an extream *Misfortune* hath ensued: For as *Nature* and *Grace* were united in the *first man*, they could not be *divided* but by *sin*; and he could not lose *Righteousness* but by *Concupiscence*; being no longer under the *Empire* of *God*, he fell under the *Devils*

Sanè habuit Gratiam Adamus, in qua si permanere vellet, nunquam malus esset: Et sine qua etiam cum libero arbitrio bonus esse non posset. August. l. de correp. & grat. c. 11.

Tyranny; and forsaking his *lawful Soveraign*, he threw himself into the *arms* of an *Usurper*: As he acted heretofore by the *motions* of the *former*, he works now by the *motions* of the *second*; and as he did nothing *then*, which was not *Innocent* and *Rational*, he doth nothing *now* that is not *Irrational* and *Sinful*: *Reason* is become a *slave* to *sin*; and *Nature* losing *Grace*, hath lost her *Primitive Purity*. To deliver us from this shameful and cruel servitude, *Jesus Christ* must quicken us with his *Spirit*, he must unite us to *his Body*, and must restore those *advantages* to *Reason*, which *sin* hath bereft her of. Whosoever works not by this *principle*, is *faulty*; and who hath not put off the *old man*, cannot put on the *new*: Therefore doth Saint *Augustine* condemn all the *Vertues* of the *Pagans*; he confounds their *good works* with their *sins*; and knowing that a man cannot be *Rightcous* without *Grace*, he assures us that their *best actions* were *sinful*: All his Books are full of these Truths; and his Doctrine which is drawn from the *Gospel*, obliegeth us to confess, That to withstand *Vice*, and govern our *Passions*, we must of *necessity* have *Charity*. Who acts by the *motions* of this *Vertue*, cannot do amiss; and who follows those of *Concupiscence*,

Omnis infidelium vita peccatum est, & nihil est bonũ sine Summo Bono: ubi enim deest agnitio æternæ & incommutabilis veritatis, falsa virtus est, etiam in optimis moribus. Sentent. 106. August.

Concupiſcence, cannot be ſaved: *Charity* raiſeth us up to *Heaven*, *Concupiſcence* faſtens us to the Earth; *Charity* joyns us to *God*, *Concupiſcence* unites us to our ſelves; *Charity* reſtores us our *Innocence*, *Concupiſcence* detains us ſtill in ſin.

Morality then, if it will be *Profitable*, muſt be *Chriſtian*; and the *Vertues* which ought to govern our *Paſsions*, muſt be inanimated by *Charity*, if they will diſcharge their *duty*; yet may they have their *particular employments*; and conducted by their *Soveraign*, they may do their utmoſt to quell theſe *Rebels*, and to teach them *obedience*: They ſweeten them by their *dexterity*; they make uſe of *cunning* when *force* faileth; they take them by their *intereſts*, or win them by their *inclinations*: When they cannot make them capable of the *pure Myſteries* of *Religion*, they deal with them as with *Infidels*, and perſwade them by *Intereſſed Reaſons*; if they be not touched with the *Glory* of *Heaven*, they propoſe to them *earthly glory*; and if they are not to be wrought upon by *Rewards*, they endeavor to frighten them with *Puniſhments*. For theſe *motions* of our *Soul* are too much faſtened to the *Earth*, to be heightned to the purity of *Divine love*; they feel not the *heat* thereof,

thereof, but by *reflection*; and this *Monarch* is contented to reduce them to their *duties*, by the *interposition* of *Vertues*, that hold of his *Empire*: He employes *Temperance* and *Continence*, to *overcome* these *Rebels*; he teacheth them how to *reclaim* these *slaves*, and gives them forces to *tame* these savage *Monsters*: So that you must not wonder, if I have sometimes followed the example of profane *Philosophers*, and made use of the *Reason* of *Infidels*, to make the *Passions* obedient; they are so engaged in their *Senses*, as they can conceive nothing that is not *sensible*; and they have so little commerce with *Reason*, that they understand not her *Commandments*, unless *Imagination* serve them for *Interpreter*: 'Tis *this Faculty* that governs them; if you will *reduce them*, you must *win her*; and 'tis in vain to endeavor to make them *docible*, if you have not made their *Guide reasonable*: therefore, 'tis that whilest I treat with *them*, I am bound to accommodate my self to their *weakness*, and to lessen my self beneath the *Majesty* of *Religion*: I forgo the *severity* of our *Faith*; and not being able to make them comprehend *Christian verities*, I perswade them by *humane considerations*: I incite them, either with *ho or* or *shame*; as the

Temperantia est moderatio cupiditatum Rationi obediens. Cicer. lib. 2. de finib.

the *Fathers* of the *Church*, when they disputed with *Infidels*, beat them with their *own Weapons*, and convinced them by *Philosophers Reasons*; so do I take the *Passions* by their *own* proper *Interests*, and make use of their *Inclinations*, to allay their *fury*. I couzen them to cure them, and make use of their *weakness* to submit them to *Vertue*: But in these harmless stratagems, I mean not to injure *Charity*; I leave to her the *sincerity* of her *Intentions*; I suffer her to seek out *God* for his *own* sake; and I obliege *Justice*, *Fortitude*, and *Temperance*, which are capable of *Reason*, to follow as much as they can, the *purity* of her *motions*.

Hic prudentia prosit, hic robore evidentem quoque metum respue. Si minus, vitia vitium repelle, spe metum tempera. Senec. Ep. 13.

After all these *Advertisements*, nothing remains, but that I inform the *Reader* of the *Method* of this *Work*; which is so apparent, as the very *Titles* of the *Book* may serve to instruct him therein; and to conceive my *designe*, it will suffice if he read the *Table* that follows this *Discourse*.

I treat of *Passions*, in *General* and in *Particular*: In the *General*, I represent their *Nature*, their *Disorders*, their *Guidance*, their *Affinity* with *Vices* and *Vertues*, and the *Power* they have over *mans Liberty*: In the *Particular*, I oppose one of them to another, that they may be the more clearly seen; and

and after I have explained their *Nature*, their *Proprieties*, and their *Effects*, I discover the *bad use* of them, that it may be *shunned*; and their *good use*, that it may be *followed*. He that will reap *Profit* by these *Advices*, shall finde by experience, that in governing his *Passions*, he shall combate with all *Vices*, and exercise all *Vertues*.

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The

The Use of PASSIONS.

The first Part, *Of Passions in General.*

The first Treatise, *Of the Nature of Passions.*

The first Discourse.

An Apologie for Passions against the Stoicks.

AS there is no man so temperate, but that he sometimes experienceth the violence of Passions, and that the disorder thereof is a fate from which very few can fence themselves; so it is the subject where-

upon *Philosophers* have most exercised their brains, and is the part of Moral Philosophy which hath oftest been examined; But if I may speak my sence with freedom, and if I may be permitted to censure my Masters, I am of opinion, that there is no point in the whole body of Philosophy, that hath been treated of with more ostentation, and lesse of profit; for some of them have satisfied themselves with having described passions unto us, and in discovering unto us their causes, and their effects, not teaching us how to govern them; so as they may be said, to have been more careful in making us know our malady, then in applying remedies thereunto; Others more blinde, but more zealous, have confounded them with vices, and have put no difference between the motions of the sensitive appetite, and the misgovernment of the will, so as according to them, a man cannot be passionate without being criminal.

Their discourses which ought to be instructions unto vertue, have onely been invectives against passions. They have made the malady greater then it was; and their desire of healing it, hath onely served to make it incurable.

Others little differing from the last, have endeavoured

endeavoured to stifle Passion, and not considering that man is indued with a body, from the materiall part whereof the soul is not disingaged, they will highten him to the condition of Angels. These last being the Nobleſt enemies that Passion ever met withall, and who have made use of reason to graple with her; It is fit we lend them an eare, that we may answer them, and confute their Error before we establish the Truth.

No man is ignorant, how that Pride hath alwaies accompanied the Sect of the *Stoicks*, who, that they might raise up man, have labored to abase God, and who ofttimes have made their Wiseman somewhat more happy then their *Jupiter*. They have given him the upper hand of Fortune and Destiny, and will have his happiness to depend wholly upon his will. Vertue is too modest to allow of so unjust praises: and Piety will not suffer her to agrandis her self to the prejudice of that Divinity which she adores; but the vanity of these insolent Philosophers never appeared more, then in the defiance they have given to Passion; For as she is the motion of the most inconsiderate part of our Soul, Pride hath made them eloquent in their invectives, and Am-

bition hath furnish'd them with reasons, which are fairly entertained by such men, who are offended that they have a body, and afflicted that they are not Angels. They say, that rest cannot consist with Passions, that it is easier to destroy then to regulate them; that such Souldiers must never be made use of, as spurn at the orders of their Commanders; and that such are readier to justle reason out of doors, then to fight in her behalf; That Passions are the sickness of the soul. [a] That the very weakest is not without danger, and that health is not wholly recovered, when any spice of the feaver doth remain, that that man is in a very sad condition, who cannot finde his safety, save in the losse thereof, who cannot be couragious unless cholerick; Who cannot be advised without some sort of fear, and who dares undertake nothing, unless egged on thereunto by his desire. Briefly, they conclude, that to be a slave to Passion, is to live under tyranny, and that a man must renounce his liberty, if he obey such insolent Masters.

[a] Quatiatur necesse est fluctuetúrque quisuis malis tutus est, qui fortis esse, nisi irascitur, non potest, industrius nisi cupit, quietus nisi timet: In tyrannidi illi vivendum est in alicujus affectus venienti servitutem. *Senec. lib. 1. de irâ. cap. 1.*

These reasons so eloquently expresst by the *Stoicks*, have as yet framed a wiseman onely in *Idea*. Their admirers have reaped nothing but confusion; after having courted

ted so Proud and so Austere a vertue, they are become ridiculous to all ages. And the wisest amongst them have found, that whilest they would go about to make so many Gods, the product hath been so many Idols.

Seneca himself, whom I look upon as the most eloquent and haughtiest Disciple of that proud Sect, forced thereunto by the weakness of nature, and the efficacy of reason, hath betrayed his party, and forgoing his own Maximes, confesseth that the wiseman [b] feels sometimes some commotions, and that though there be in him no true Passions, yet hath he the shadows and appearances of them. He who is acquainted with the humor of this Philosopher, will be satisfied with this attestate, and he who shall well examine the sence of his words, will finde that Saint *Augustine* had reason to say, the *Stoicks* differed from other *Philosophers* onely in their manner of speech, and that though their words were more lofty, their conceptions were not so. For they blame not all Passions, but onely their excess, and though they have had a minde to stifle them, they never could hope to do it.

[b] Sentiet itaque Sapiens suspitiones quasdam, &c. Umbras affectuum, ipsis quidem carebit. *Senec. lib. 1. de Ira. cap. 16.*

To part the soul from the body, so to

exempt it from these agitations, were to overthrow the Fabrick of man; As long as this illustrious Prisoner shall be obliged to the same functions, as are the souls of irrational creatures, she shall be constrained to entertain Passions; And as long as she shall make use of sence, in her operations, she shall use hope, and fear, in the practical part of vertue. It is no more dishonorable for the soul to fear a danger, to hope for good, or to strengthen it self against evill, then it is to see by the Organs of the eyes, to hear by those of the ears; the one and the other shares of servitude, but both are necessary. It is also more easie to rule Passion then the senses; Fear, Choler, and love are more capable of reason, then is hunger, thirst or sleep. Therefore if we shall make the sences subject to the Empire of Reason, we may well submit our passions thereunto, and make our fear and our hope praiseworthy, as well as our Fasting and Watching meritorious.

Reason is the proper utinsill of man; all other things are but as strangers to him, he may lose them without impoverishing himself, and as long as he is master of Reason, he may still vaunt himself to be man.

Since this is the chief of all that is good,

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we must disperse it through all the parts of man, and make even the meanest faculties of our soul capable thereof; doubtlesly it may make for our security, if it be well husbanded. Hope, if well governed, doth encourage us to generous and difficult enterprizes; Audacity, if well guided, makes Souldiers invincible. In fine, our most insolent Passions may be subject to Reason, and not to imploy them in the course of our life, is to render useless one of the most beautiful parts of our soul. Vertue her self would become idle, had she no passions, either to subdue or regulate. And he who shall consider their chief imployment, will finde they have a relation to the managing of our actions. Fortitude is made use of to subjugate fear, and this couragious vertue would cease to operate, if man did cease to fear. We measure our desires and hopes by moderation, and were there no ambitious Passions, no man would be moderate in his good successes. Temperance and Continency bridle sensuality, and had not Nature ordained pleasure in all actions, these two vertues which go to the composure of a chaste and continent man, would be likewise of no use. Clemency sweetens choler, and did not this Passion animate

Princes to revenge, the vertue whereby it is moderated would not deserve praise.

But if Passions be so much befriended by so many several vertues, they are not——thereof unthankful, for when instructed in their whole, they repay them with use, and serve them faithfully; The best part of circumspection is composed of fear, which though it be accused to seek out the evil before it happen, it prepares us either quietly to undergo it, or happily to evade it. Hope is serviceable to Fortitude, and tis she that by her promises doth encourage us to the undertaking of gallant actions. Boldness is valours faithful companion, and all great Conquerors owe the glory of their generosity to this Passion. Choler maintains Justice, and animates Judges to punish the guilty. Briefly, there is no Passion which is not serviceable to vertue, when they are governed by reason, and those who have so cryed them down, make us see they never knew their use, nor worth.

The second Discourse.

What the Nature of Passions is, and in what Faculty of the Soul they reside.

GODS greatness is so elevated, as man cannot attain to the knowledg thereof without abasing it, and his Unity is so simple, as it is not to be conceived unless divided. *Philosophers* gave him different names, to express the diversity of his perfections; and by calling him sometimes Destiny, sometimes Nature, sometimes Providence, they introduced a plurality of Gods, and made all men Idolaters. The Soul being the Image of God, the same *Philosophers* did likewise divide it, and not being able to comprehend the simplicity of its Effence, they believed it was corporeal. They imagined it had parts as well as the body, and though they were more subtle, they were not less veritable. They multiplyed the cause with its effects, and taking her divers faculties for different natures, they contrary to the law of reason,

gave

gave divers forms to the same composure. But truth, which together with faith, came down upon earth, teacheth us that the soul is but one in its essence, and that it hath undergone several names only, to express the variety of its operations; for when it gives life unto the body, and when by natural heat, which proceeds from the heart as from its center, it preserveth all the parts thereof, it is called form; [c] when it discerns colours by the eye, and distinguisheth of sound by the eare, sence. When she raiseth her self a little higher, and by discoursing infers one truth by another, she is called understanding. When she preserves her thoughts, to imploy them about her own affaires, or that she draws from forth her treasury, the riches which she had lockt therein, men stile her memory; when she loveth that which pleaseth her, or hates that which nauseates her, she is termed will; but all her several faculties, which differing in their imployments, do notwithstanding agree in their substance, make but one soul, and are like so many Rivulets, derived from the same spring-head.

[c] Anima Secundum operis sui officium diversis nuncupatur nominibus; dicitur namque anima dum vegetat, spiritus dum contemplatur, sensus dum sentit? ratio dum discernit, memoria dum recordatur, voluntas dum consentit: istæ non differunt in substantia, quemadmodum in nominibus, quoniam omnia ista Una anima est, proprietates quidem diversæ sed essentia una. August. lib. de Spiritu & anima.

Prophane *Philosophy* arriving at length to the knowledg of this truth, makes use of divers comparisons to express her. Now she

she represents the soul in the body, as an Intelligence in the Heavens, the vertue whereof is displayed through all the Spheres thereof. Anon they figure her out unto us as a Pilot, who guides his vessel; Sometimes as a King who governs his state. But Christian *Philosophy* hath been more fortunate, when coming even to the original of the soul, it hath made us know, what effects she produceth in the body, by the very same which God produceth in the world. For though this infinite essence depends not upon the world which he hath created, and that without interessing his might, he may undoe his own workmanship, yet is he shed abroad in all the parts thereof; there is no intermedium which he fils not up. He applies himself to all creatures, in their operations, and without dividing his unity, or weakning his power, he gives light with the Sun, He burneth with the fire, he refresheth with the water, and he brings forth fruit with the trees. He is as great on earth as he is in Heaven, though his effects doe differ; his power is alwaies equal, and the stars which shine above our heads cost him no more then the grass which we tread under our feet. So is the soul dispersed in the body, and penetrates all the parts thereof;

thereof; It is as noble in the hand as in the heart; and though applying her self to the disposition of the Organs, she speaks by the mouth, seeth by the eyes, and heareth by the eares, yet is she but one Spirit in her essence; and in her differing functions, her unity is not divided, nor her power weakned. Tis true, that not finding the same dispositions, in every part of the body, she produceth not the same effects; and in this point this Illustrious Captive is infinitely inferiour to God; for as he is infinite, and was able to make all things out of nothing, he can likewise make all things out of every creature, and without any respect to their Inclinations make them serve his will. So we see he hath used the fire to sweeten the paines of his servants: that he hath used the light to blind his enemies; that he hath made the flouds turn back to give passage to his friends. And that he hath made the earth open to swallow those that rebel against him. But the soul, whose power is limited, cannot operate without dependance upon the organs; and though she be spiritual in her nature, yet is she corporeal in her operations.

a Voluntas tanti utique Conditoris rei cuiusque natura est; Augustin. Lib. 21. de Civit Dei. cap. 8.

This is that which hath made the *Philosophers* consider her in three several estates, which

which are so different the one from the other, that if in the first she approach neer the dignity of the Angels, in the second she is in no better condition then beast of the field, and in the last she differs not much from the nature of Plants, for in this acceptation she hath no other imployment, then to nourish the body she is in, to digest food, to convert it into blood, and by a strange *Metamorphosis* to make one and the same matter thicken into flesh, stiffen into Nerves, harden into bones, extend into branches, and lengthen into grisles; she augments her parts by nourishing them, she in time perfects her workmanship, and by her pains brings it to its just greatness. Solicited by providence she takes care to maintain the world; she thinks how to restore what she hath received, and to preserve her species produceth the like. In this acception her workmanship is not more noble then that of plants, which nourish themselves by the Influences of Heaven, grow up by the heat of the Sun, and get root downward by their succors and moisture.

Alba lilia ijsdem omnibus modis seruntur quibus rosa, & hoc amplius lachryma sua.' Plin. cap. 5. Lib: 21. hist. naturalis.

In the second estate, she becomes sensible and begins to have inclinations and notions, she sees objects by the sence which their

their reports make unto the Imagination, this trusts them or commits them to memory, which obliegeth her self carefully to keep them, and faithfully to represent them. From the lights of the soul arise her desires, and from her knowledg, her love or hatred, she betakes her self to that which is agreeable unto her, shuns that which likes her not; and according to the diverse qualities of good or evil which present themselves, she excites differing motions, which are called Passions: in this degree she hath nothing of more lofty then the beasts, which discover objects by sence, which receive the sorts thereof in their Imagination, and preserve them in their memory.

In the third estate, she quits the body, and coming to her self she entertains her self with more truths; she treates with Angels, and mounting by degrees even to divinity it self, she knows perfections and admireth greatness; she reasons upon such subjects as present themselves, she examines their qualities that she may conceive their essence, she confers the present with what is past, and from the one and the other of them draws conjectures for what is to come.

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The faculty which doth all these wonders is termed Understanding; Imagination and sence acknowledge her for their Mistris, but she is not so absolute, but that she dependeth upon a soveraign, and takes the law from one, that is blinde, whom she serves for a guide. This which is called will, and which hath no other object then good, to follow it, and evil, to shun it, is so absolute as Heaven it self, bears a respect unto her freedom; for it never useth violence when it hath to do therewithall, it husbandeth the consentment thereof with adress. And its efficacious graces, which never fail in producing their effects, may well undertake to convert, but not to force will. Heavens orders are alwaies observed within its Empire; the Subjects thereof may well be froward, never rebellious, and when it commands absolutely, 'tis alwaies obeyed.

True it is that motions or agitations are formed in the second acception of the soul which exercise her power; for though they hold of her, they forbeare not to pretend to some sort of liberty; they are rather her Citizens then her slaves, and she is rather their judg then their soveraign. These Passions arising from the senses side alwaies

alwaies with them; when ever Imagination presents them to the understanding, he pleads in their behalf, by meanes of so good an Advocate they corrupt their Master, and win all their causes. The understanding listens unto them, weigheth their reasons, considereth their inclinations, and lest he may grieve them, oft times gives sentence to their advantage; he betraies the will, whereof he is the chief officer; he Cozens his blind Queen, and disguising the truth makes unfaithful reports unto her, that he may draw unjust commandements from her; when she hath declared her self, Passions become crimes, their sedition begins to make head, and man who before was but unruly, becomes wholly Criminal; for as the motions of this inferior part of the soul are not free, they never begin to be vitious but when they become voluntary. As long as they are awakened by objects, solicited by the senses, and protected by Imaginations self, they have no other craft then what they draw from corrupted nature; But when the understanding overshadowed by their obscurity, or won by their solicitations, perverts the will, and obliges this soveraign to take upon her the interest of her slaves, she makes them

them guilty of her sin, she changes their motions into rebellion, and of the insurrection of a beast, makes the fault of a man. It is true, that when the understanding keeps within the bounds of duty and is faithful to the will, he suppresses their seditions, and reduceth these Mutineers to obedience: she husbandeth their humors so well, as taking from them all their unrulines, he makes rare and excellent vertues of them. In this estate they are subservient to reason, and defend the party which they were resolved to fight against. The good or the evil that may be drawn from them binds us to consider their nature, to observe their proprieties, and to discover their original, to the end that arriving at the exact knowledg of them, we may make use of them in our affaires.

Passion then is nothing else, but a motion of the sensitive appetite, caused by the Imagination of an appearing or veritable good, or evil, which changeth the body against the laws of nature. I tearm it motion, because it hath a respect to good or evil as the objects thereof, and suffers it self to be born away by the qualities which she observes therein; this notion is caused by the Imagination, which being

fild with sorts of things, which she hath received from all the sences, sollicits passions, to discover unto her the beauties or deformities of such objects as may move her. The sensitive appetite is so partial to her as it sooths her in all her inclinations, let her be never so little agitated, she draws after her all other passions, she raiseth tempests as winds do waves, and the soul would be at quiet in her interiour part, were she not moved by this power; but she beares so great a sway in this Empire, as she there doth what she pleaseth. Nor is it requisite that the good or evil which she represents to the appetite be true, which relyeth on her fidelity, and believes her councels without examining them, having no other light but what is borrowed from her, he follows hoodwinckt all the objects which she proposeth, and let them be but cloathed with any appearance of good or evil, he impetuously either rejects or embraceth them. He behaves himself so vigorously, as he alwaies causeth alteration in the body; for besides that his motions are violent, and that they do hardly deserve the name of passions, when they are moderated, they have such access unto the senses, and the senses have so much of communication with

with the body, as it is impossible but that their disorders should cause an alteration therein. In briefe passion is against the law of nature, because she sets upon the heart; which cannot be hurt, without resentment of all the parts of the body; for they are looking-glasses wherein one sees all the motions of him that animates them; And as Physitians judg of his constitution by the beating of his Pulse, and Arteries, one may judg of the passions wherewith he is transported by the colour of his face, by the flame which sparkles in his eyes, by the shaking of his joynts, and by all such other signes, as appeare in the body, when the heart is Agitated.

Now these are the Passions which we undertake to reclaime and bring under the Empire of reason, and by the assistance of grace, to change them into vertues. Some have been satisfied with describing them unto us, not shewing how to regulate them, and have imployed their eloquence only in making us know our miseries. It may be they believed that the knowledg of our evils was sufficient to cure them, and that the desire of health obliged us to seek out remedies; But they should do well to remember that there be pleasing evils, of

which these that are sick covet not to be cured.

Others have fought with Passions as with so many Monsters. They have given us reason to destroy them, not considering that to execute the design a man must destroy himself: Others knew very well that Passions making up a part of our soul, they were not to be extirpated but by death; but they knew not that good use might be made of them, and tacitly blaming him who hath indowed us with them, they have laboured to sweeten them, not seeking out to manage them; they imagined Passions were not otherwise requisite to vertue, save only to exercise her courage, they thought they were no otherwise useful for men, save only for trial; And that man could reape no other advantage by them, save only patiently to bear with them, or to oppose them with resolution; but I pretend to defend their cause by defending Gods cause, and to make it appear in the pursuit of this work, that the same providence, which hath drawn our safety from our detriment, or loss, will have us to work out our rest from out of the disorders of our Passions; that by his grace we may tame these wild monsters, that we may reduce these rebels under

under obedience, and that we make such souldiers march under the banners of vertue, as have oftnest fought in the behalf of vice.

The third Discourse.

Of the number of Passions in men.

TIs a strange thing that the soul knows all things, yetknows not her self; there is nothing so hidden in nature, which she discovers not, she is acquainted with all its secrets, and all that passeth through the bowels of this common mother is apparent to her; She knows how Metals are formed, how the Elements do court, and wage war each with other, how vapors ascend in the aire; how they thicken in the clouds, melt into raine, and break forth in Thunder; finally she knows of what parts her body is composed, and by a cruel piece of art she dissects it, she takes it in pieces, that she may know the properties thereof; yet notwithstanding she is ignorant of what passeth within her self; she cannot attain to the knowledg of her

essence, which is altogether spiritual; and she hath weak conjectures of her most excellent qualities, because she fetches her light from the senses, and depends in her noblest operations upon the species which the Imagination represents unto her, She doubts of her immortality, and to be the more secure thereof, she is bound to call in faith to the succor of reason, and to believe through a blind piety, what she cannot with certain evidence comprehend; But of all things that are in her, there is nothing more concealed from her then are her passions, for though by their violence they make an Impression upon the senses, yet do not the *Philosophers* agree upon their subject, nor their number. Some think they are framed in the body. Some think they reside in the nethermost part of the Soul; others divide the soul into two faculties which they term concupiscible and Irascible, and place the softer passions in the former, and the more rigid in the second. For they will have love, and hatred, desire, & eschewing joy and sorrow to be comprehended in the concupiscible appetite & that fear and boldness, hope and dispair, choler & remisness reside in the irascible appetite. To make good this difference, they say, that

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the the Passions of the concupiscible appetite have a regard to good and to evil, as absent, or as present; And that those of the irascible consider them as hard and difficult; that the one makes but onsets, and retreats; that the others give battle, and either win or lose the victory; that the one takes part with the body, the other with the understanding; that the one are remiss, and the other generous; and that considering the opposition of so many contrary qualities, it must be concluded that they cannot reside in one and the same part of the soul.

Were it not a error in morality to dispute this maxime, and were it not rashness to contradict an opinion generally received for so many ages; I should be much inclined to believe that all these passions are lodged in one and the same appetite, which is divided by the motions thereof, as the understanding is divided by its opinions, or as the will is parted by love and hatred. And I would say with Saint *Augustin*, that these differing conceits, do not presuppose differing faculties, since one and the same man doth often times desire contrary things, and preserveth the unity of his person in the variety of his desires. He experienced this

f Ego enim deliberabam ut servirem domino meo, Ego etiam qui volebam, Ego eram qui nolebam: Ego eram nec plene volebam, nec plene nolebam, ideo contendebam & dissipabar a me ipso, et ipsa dissipatio me invito quidem fiebat, nec tamen offendebat naturam mentis aliena, sed pœna mea. August. Confession. Lib: 8. Cap. 10.

combat in himself, when he would become a convert; he saw his soul divided by differing opinions, and wondered that having but one will, It could form out so contrary resolutions. But not to engage my self in a warr wherein a man purchaseth more enemies then he reconcileth, and where both parties think alwaies to have had the better; I will content my self with having insinuated my opinion, instead of staying upon the defence therof, and not concluding any thing of the Subject where the Passions do reside, I will speak of their number; and will tell you what the *Philosophers* have written thereof.

g Hinc metuunt, cupiunt, gaudentque, dolentque. Virgil.

The *Academicks* thought there were but four principal Passions, desire, and fear joy and sorrow; and g *Virgil* who in all his works appeares to be of this ancient sect; when he describes the motions of the soul, mentions none but these; in effect it seems these comprehend all the rest; that dispaire and aversion are ranked under fear; that hope, audacity, and choler are ranked under desire; and that all of them together do terminate in joy, or sorrow. But let them indeavor to colour over this division, by what reasons they please, it will still be defective since it comprehendeth not love, and hatred,

tred, which are the two first originals of our Passions; for this reason the *Peripatetiques* did multiply them and grounded their number upon the diverse motions of the soul; for the soul hath (say they) either an inclination, or an aversion to the objects wherewith she is either pleased or displeased; and this is love or hatred; or else she shuns them, and this is eschewing, or she draws neer unto them, and this is desire; or she promiseth unto her self the fruition of what she wisheth, and this is hope; or she cannot defend her self from the evil which she apprehends, and this is despaire; or she indeavors to withstand it, and this is audacity; or she cheers her self up to overcome them, and this is Choler. Finally she either possesseth the good, and this is joy; or suffereth the evil, and this is sorrow: some others that are of the like opinion, prove the diversity of Passions another way, and affirm that good and evil may be considered in themselves, without any circumstances; and that from hence arise love and hatred; or that a man may look upon them as absent; and that then they produce either fear or desire; or as difficult, and that then they cause hope, audacity and Choler; or as impossible, and that

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then they raise dispaire; or in fine, as present, and that then they pour into the soul either delight or pain.

Though these reasons may content the understanding; yet do they not vanquish her; and without offence to *Philosophy*, a man may differ from the opinions of *Plato*, or *Aristotle*, for as it appeares to me, they give several names to one and the same thing, they divide the unity of love, and take her different effects for different Passions. So after having well examined this business, I am enforced to embrace the opinion of Saint *Augustine*, and to maintain with him, that love is the only passion which doth agitate us, or hath operation in us. For all the motions which molest our soul are but so many disguised loves; our feares and desires, our hopes and dispaires, our delights and sorrows, are countenances which love puts on according to the events of good or bad success: and as the Sea carries diverse names according to the different parts of the earth which are thereby watered, so doth love change her name according to the different estates wherein she findes her self. But as amongst the Infidels every perfection of God hath past for a several Deity; so amongst *Philo-*

sophers

sophers the different qualities of love have been taken for different Passions. And these great Masters have opinioned that as oft as love hath changed guidance, or imployment, she ought also to change nature and name; but if this their reasoning were good, the soul must lose its unity as oft as it produceth different effects: and the soul which disgests meate, and distributes the blood into the veines, must not be the same which speaks by the tongue, and lissens by the Eares.

Reason therefore will have us to believe, that there is but one Passion; and that hope and fear, sorrow and joy are the motions or properties of love; and that to paint her in all her colours, we must term her when longing after what is loved, desire [h]; when possessing what is desired, pleasure or delight; when shunning what is abhorred, fear; And when after a long and bootless withstanding, inforc'd to suffer grief or sorrow. Or to express the same thing more clearly, desire, and eschewing, hope and fear, are the motions of love, by which that which is agreeable is endeavoured, and the contrary shunned. Boldness and Choler, are the combatants which are made use of to defend that which is loved, joy is loves triumph,

[h] Amor ergo inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est: idem habens eòque fruens, lætitia est; fugiens quod ei adversatur, timor est: idque cùm acciderit, sentiens tristitia est. August. lib. 14. de Civitate dei. cap. 7.

[i] Amor est delectatio cordis per desiderium currens & requiescens per gaudium. Aug. de substantiâ dilectionis cap. 1. & 2.

triumph, dispaire her weakness, and sadness her defeate. Or to make use of Saint *Augustins* words, desire is the course of love, fear is her flight, sorrow is her torment, and joy her rest; Love draws neer to good by desiring it, flies from evil by fearing it, is sad by resenting sorrow, rejoyceth in tasting pleasure, but in all her different estates or acceptions she is alwaies her self, and in the variety of her effects, preserves the unity of her essence.

But if it be true that love causeth all our Passion, it follows that she must sometimes transform her self into her contrary: and that by a Metamorphosis more incredible, then that of the Poets, she converts her self into hatred, and produceth effects which will give the lye to her Humour. For love delights in oblieging, Hate in the contrary; Love is generous and takes pleasure in pardoning, Hate not so, and studies nothing but revenge; love gives life unto her enemies, hatred endeavours the death of her most faithful friends; and it seems more easie to reconcile vice with vertue, then love with hatred. This objection hath much of appearance, but little of solidity; and those who frame it do not remember that oft times one and the same

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cause doth produce contrary effects. That heat which makes wax melt, dries mud and durt; that the motion which draws us nearer Heaven, draws us the further from earth: that the inclination we have to preserve our selves, is an aversion from any thing that may destroy us. So the love of good is the hatred of evil; and the same passion which useth sweetness to those who oblieg it, useth severity to those who offend it. It imitateth justice, which by the same motion punisheth sin, and recompenseth vertue. It resembles the Sun, which by the same light makes the Eagles see, and blinds the Owls. And if it be lawful to mount up into the Heavens, it hath an influence upon God himself, which only hates a sinner, out of love unto himself; If so many good reasons cannot perswade to so manifest a truth, they ought at least prevail thus much with our adversaries, that if there be diverse Passions, love is the soveraign thereof, and that she is so absolute in her kingdome, as that her subjects undertake nothing but by her directions. She as the *primum Mobile* which carries them about; and as she gives them motion, so she gives them rest; she by her aspect doth irritate and appease them: and her examples do prevaile so much over

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[k] Amor cæteros in se traducit affectus Bernard.

all the [k] affections of our soul, that her goodness, or her malice renders them either good or evil.

The fourth Discourse.

Which is the most violent of all the Passions of man.

IF the knowledg of a disease be requisite to the cure, it is no less necessary to know the Passions, that we may the better govern them, and to know which of them doth assaile us with most fury. *Philosophers* who have treated hereupon, agree not in their opinions, but are so divided upon this subject, that reason hath not been able to reconcile their difference.

Plato hath left us in doubt, and sounding the question to the bottome, he contents himself with saying, there are four Passions which seem to surpass the rest in violence. The first is voluptuousnes, which belyes its name, and which breathing forth nothing but sweetnes, ceaseth not to be extream furious; and to fight against reason with more violence then doth grief or anguish.

guish. The second is Choler, which being nothing else according to its definition, but a boyling of the blood about the heart, cannot be but excessively violent; and did not nature, which is careful of our preservation, make it dye as soon as it is born, there were no mischief whereof it were not capable; nor do I know whether the world were capable to defend it self against the fury thereof, or no. But let us attribute what violence we please unto it, I esteem it more reasonable then voluptuousness; for as Lyons are sooner tamed then fish, an angry man is sooner appeased, then a voluptuous man converted; and experience teacheth us, that of these two Passions the more milde is the less tractable, and the more furious the less opinionated. The third is the desire of honor, which is so powerfully imprinted in the heart of man, as there is no difficulty which it overcomes not. Tis this that makes conquerors, which inspires courage into souldiers, which maketh Orators eloquent, and *Philosophers* knowing. For all these different conditions are enlivened by the same desire; and though they take several wayes, they ayme at the same end. The fourth is the fear of death, which by its frequent Alarmes troubles all the quiet of

[1] Fervor sanguinis circa cor. Aristot.

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our life. It produceth such strange effects, as the nature thereof is not to be discovered though it be timerous, and that the shadow of an evil is sufficient to astonish it; yet doth it render men couragious, and make them seek out a certain death, to shun an uncertain one; it giveth strength to the vanquished, and assisted by despaire, it regains battels which it had lost. 'Tis hard to judg which of these two Passions is the stronger, for they have oft times triumphed over one another, and as the fear of death hath made the desire of honor be forgotten, sometimes the desire of honor hath despised the fear of death.

Though I have a noble esteem of *Plato*, and that his very ravings seem more noble, and more heightned to me then *Aristotles* discourses, yet cannot I side with him in this, and notwithstanding all the good reasons he alledgeth to defend his opinion, I cannot approve thereof. For voluptuousness is not so much a perticular Passion, as it is the spring-head of all those that give us any contentment, nor is it so violent, but that it may easily be repress'd by grief and anguish. Its only advantage lyeth in the absence of its enemy, nor doth it corrupt men but when it findeth nothing to oppugn it,

it, as soon as any opposition is made, it yields the victory; and experience teacheth us that a small hurt makes us forget an extream pleasure. Choler is indeed the more ardent, but it is not of durance: If it turn not into hatred, the effects thereof are not to be dreaded; 'tis more suddain violence, and to express its nature, we must say, that it may well do an ill action, but it cannot conceive a mischievous design. The desire of glory is an eternal Pasion; age which weakeneth all other, maketh this the stronger; and this melody seems to have no cure but death; yet ill success will cure it; and the loss of two or three battels will turn it into melancholly. *Hannibal* after his defeat, fed no more upon honour. If he went from Kingdome to Kingdome to solicite Princes to form a party against the Romans, he was led thereunto rather by dispaire, then by ambition; and this unfortunate Commander sought not so much the increase of glory, as the preservation of his life. I know that *Marius* was haughty after his defeat, and that being prisoner he aspired to be Consul; his humour changed not with his condition; whilest in Irons, he dreamt of Diadems, and when he had lost his liberty, he yet continued

m Novissima omnium cupido gloriæ exuitur. Tacit. in Agric.

his design of oppressing the liberty of the Republique, but this Passion was sustained by an other ; when he rallyed his troopes to bring them again unto the battel ; he was not so much edg'd on by glory, as by dispite, and who could have seen too within his heart, would have found there more of choler then of courage, more of hatred, then of Ambition.

This Passion subsists only of hope, and when fortune turns her back, it becoms fearful. *Alexander* would have been contented with *Greece*, if he had found any resistance in *Persia* ; one bad succes, would have taught him to have bounded his desires. That great heart to which the world seemed too little, would have confined it self within his fathers dominions, had not so many happy victories, which did even out-do hope, blown up his ambition, and promis'd him the conquest of the whole earth.

The fear of death is a Passion only belonging to the vulgar ; more generous people set it at nought ; the more effeminate sort defend themselves from it only out of hope, which is the faithful companion of the unfortunate. And when the face of mischief enforceth her to abandon them, she

she is succeeded by despaire, which in its effects exceeds the firmest constancy of *Philosophers*. All thesereasons obliedg me to quit *Plato*'s opinion, that I may examine those with which *Aristotle* defends his. For he seemeth in some of his writings, to maintain; that hatred is the most violent Passion wherewith we are transported. In effect choler which but now seemed so dreadful unto us, is but a disposition to hatred, and she cannot arrive at her malice unless nourished by suspitions, fomented by evil speeches, and entertained by process of time; but when she is once changed into hatred, there is no evil which she is not capable of. Her residence is in the heart, as wel as is that of love, and seated in a throne belongs to love, she gives out her orders as a soveraign and imployeth all other Pasions to satisfie her fury; choler furnisheth her with weapons, boldness fights in her behalf, hope promiseth her good success, and despaire gives her often times the victory; but that which passeth all belief is, she gathers strength from love, though it be her enemy, and by an effect which doth sufficiently witness her power, she enforceth the mildest of all Pasions, to be subservient to her detestable designes.

she imitateth her motions, she marcheth in her steps, and misinterpreting her maximes she will do as much harm, as the other hath done good, and leave as many marks of her fury, as the other hath left of its goodness. But if it be true that copies never equal the original, let hatred do what she can, she shall never come neer the power of love; and since she is ruled by love, love will alwaies have the advantage over her.

Si quæris odio misera quem statuas modum, imitare amorem. Seneca in Medea.

There have also been some *Philosophers*, who have not been of *Aristotles* opinion, and who attributing more to reason then to his authority, have perswaded themselves that Ielousie is the most violent of all Passions; and certainly it is to be granted, that if this opinion be not the truest, it is at lest the most specious; for jealousie is composed of love and hatred. And as contraries cannot lodg or habit together without fighting, it must necessarily follow, that these two enemy-Passions, make warr one upon another, and that all other that are subject unto them take up armes to defend their interests, in so much as a jealous man findes himself seized on by fear, and audacity, by hope and despaire, by joy and sadness, because he is struck with love, and

and hatred; likewise the Holy Scripture, the very simplicity whereof is eloquent, not finding any thing that can express the fury of jealousie, goes to seek out death, amongst the sepulchres, and hell in the bowels of the earth, to give us a picture thereof; according to this maxime we must conclude that the jealous are the damned of this world, and that the Passion which torments them is a punishment which equals that of the divels. After the authority of Scripture, a man must be very rash to oppose this opinion, which it seems all things conspire to make veritable; yet may it be replied upon; and the very self same reasons which it produceth for its defence may serve to condemn it; for though jealousie be a mixture of love and hatred, it follows not that she must be most violent of all our Passions; the very same whereof she is composed, would not agree together, were they not sweetned. And as the Elements cannot make one and the same body, unless their qualities be moderated, so cannot all these Passions form out jelousie unless they be tempered; and it must necessarily ensue that love weakens hatred, that joy moderates sorrow, and that hope sweetens despaire. It

o Fortis ut mors dilectio, dura sicut infernus æmulatio. Cantic. Cantic.

hath been observed that two Passions taken together lose their force, and that serving as an Antidote one against another, they do no mischief; or if they do any, they cure it again. So in jealousie love is the Antidote to hatred; the jealous man suffers little harm, because he hath many Passions, and he may boast, that by a strange destiny, he ows his welfare to the number of his enemies.

But since after having worsted a falshood a truth must be established, let us say that according to our principles this question is not hard to resolve; for as we acknowledg but one Passion, which is love, and that all the rest are but effects of her producing, we are bound to confess, that they borrow all their efficacy from their cause; and that they have no other violence then what is hers. Love is a soveraign which imprints his qualities in his subjects; a captain which imparts part of his courage to his souldiers: and t'is a *Primum Mobile* which beares about all the other heavens by its Impetuosity; in so much as morallity ought only indeavour how to govern love, for when this Pasion shall be handsomely ruled, all other will imitate her. And he who knows well how to love, or how

how to love well, shall have no evill desires, nor vain hopes to moderate.

The fift Discourse.

Whether there were any Passions, in the state of Innocency, and whether they were of the same nature as are ours?

TIs so long since we lost our Innocency, as there remains nothing unto us but a weak *Idea* thereof; and did not divine justice punish the fathers fault in the children, we should likewise have lost the sorrow for it. Every one discribes the felicity of that state according to his Imagination; methinks a man may say that as many as speak thereof, guide themselves according to their inclinations; and that they place there, such pleasures as they are acquainted with, and do most desire. Some say the whole earth was one Paradise; that of the seasons, whereof our years are composed, there was only Autumn, and the Spring: that all trees

had the property of oreng trees, and that they were at all times loaded with leaves, flowers, and fruit; others perswade themselves that no wind blew there, but the South-West; and that the ground uncultivated prevented our need, and brought forth all things. I think that without maintaining these opinions a man may say, that in this happy condition bad was not mingled with good, and that the qualities of the Elements were so well tempered, as that man did thereby receive all contentment; and felt no displeasure. He had no disorders to reform; no enemies to fight withall, nor mischiefs to eschew; all creatures conspired towards his felicity; the beasts bare respect unto his person; and it may be that even those which remained in the forrests were not wilde; as the earth bare no thorns, and all the parts thereof were fruitful and pleasing, so had not the Heavens any malign influences, and that constellation which dispenseth life and death in nature, had no aspect which was not innocent, and favourable. If there be so little certainty touching the state of man, there is no more assurance for what regards his person; we argue according to our understandings, and as in the first ages Idols were

were made of all particulars, every one shapes out a felicity for *Adam*, and gives him all the advantages that may be imagined.

Amongst so many opinions or errors, I see nothing more consonant to reason then that which *Saint Augustine* writes concerning this; for though he determine nothing in particular, he resolves so well for the general, as there is none that appeals from his opinion.

p Absit enim ut illa beatitudo ut possit aut in loco illo non habere quod vellet, aut in suo corpore vel animo sentire quod nollet. August.

Though we cannot describe (saith he) neither the beauty of the place, where man made his residence, nor the advantages of his minde and body, we are bound to believe he found in his habitation, whatsoever he could wish; and that he felt nothing in his body which could incommodiate him. His constitution was excellent, his health was unalterable, and if time could weaken it, he prevented that mischief, by making use of the tree of life, which repairing his forces, furnisht him with new vigor. He was immortal, not by nature, but by grace; and he knew that sin could not bereave him of life, without making him lose his innocence. His soul was no less happily constituted then was his body; for besides that he was infused with

with all sciences, that he knew all the secrets of nature, and that he was not ignorant of any thing which could contribute to his felicity; his memory was happy, his will had alwaies good inclinations, his affections were regulated, and though he were not insensible, he was of so equal a temper, as nothing could trouble his repose. The Passions, which by their violence, do anticipate reason, waited his directions, and never shew'd themselves till they had received commandement from him. In fine, his Passions were no less natural then are ours, but they were more tractable; and as his constitution made him capable of all our motions, originall justice exempted him from all our disorders. I know not whether I fall foul on the opinion of Divines, but, for as much as a man may see in this darkness, I think I injure not the truth; for if man as being composed of a body was mortal, and as being honored with original grace, Immortal, me thinks one may consequently inferr, that not being a pure spirit, he had Passions, but that being sanctified in all the faculties of his soul, all his Passions were innocent. To give all the force that is requisite to this assertion, we must inlarge its

Principal,

Principal, and prove with *Saint Augustine*, that man might dye, losing original justice; and that Immortality was rather a grace from Heaven then a property of his nature; for if he had been truly immortal, he had needed no sustenance, and if death had not been natural unto him, he had needed no priviledg to have secured him from it; since he did eate to preserve life, it follows he might lose it; and since he was oblieged to defend himself against old age, by the means of a miraculous fruit, it, follows necessarily he might dye, and that his life as wel as ours needed remedies against death. I confess that they being better then are ours, he repaired his strength more advantagiously, and that by prolonging the course of his life, they kept the hour of his death farther off; I affirm likewise that they kept away corruption from his body, and that they kept him in so perfect a health, as that it could not be altered; but then they must likewise grant me, that if man had not used these remedies, his natural heat had consumed his *Humidum Radicale*; and that old age succeeding this disorder, he must inevitably have dyed. All these maximes are to serve, as *Saint Augustine* is

oblieged

obliged to confess, that if the use of the tree of life were permitted unto us in the condition wherein we are, death would no longer domineer in the world, and that man, sinful as he is, would not cease to be immortal. If then *Adam* were capable of death, because he had a body, and if he were incapable thereof because he had grace, me thinks by like proportion one may say, he had Passions, since his soul was ingaged in a material subject, but that they were tractable, for original justice did repress their motions; and that in this innocent condition, he had only just feares and rational desires.

q Nec enim corpus ejus tale erat quod dissolvi impossibile videretur, sed gustus arboris vitæ corruptionem corporis prohibebat. Denique etiam post peccatum potuit indissolubilis manere, si modo permissum esset ei edere de arbore vitæ August. lib. 1. quæst. novi et veteris testamenti, quæst. 19.

I verily conceive there may be some Passions, the use whereof were interdicted him, and that though he were capable thereof, he was not therewithall agitated; because they would have troubled his quiet. I am easily perswaded that all evil being banished from off the earth, sadness and despaire were likewise exempted from his heart; and that during so high a pitch of felicity, reason was not bound to excite such Passions as only belong unto the miserable; but assuredly I am confident he made use of all others, and that thinking upon the laws that were imposed upon him by

by his Soveraign Lord, he was sometimes flattered by hopes, sometimes astonished by fear, and by them both joyned together kept within his duty. I doubt not likewise but that in the unhappy conference which our unwise mother had with the divel in the shape of a Serpent she was seized upon by as many Passions as usually people are, who consult upon any important affaires; that the divels promises did stirr up her hope, that God Almighties threats did cause fear in her, and that the lovelines of the forbidden fruit did irritate her desire. I know not whether some other may Imagine this dialogue could pass without some dispute, but I know very well that *Saint Augustine* (with whom I believe a man cannot be mistaken) doth argue thus upon this subject; and that he believes so great a bickering was not made in the earthly Paradise, without the womans making use of all her Passions either to defend her self, or to suffer her self to be overcome. Tis true this authentical man seems to be of another opinion in his ninth chapter of the city of God, but he who shall well examine his reasons, will finde that he indeavours not so much to exclude Passions from out the soul of *Adam*, as their disorder

der, judging aright that their disorder could not accord with original justice. Therefore I am perswaded that man had our agitations in the state of innocency, and he feared punishment, and hoped for reward; that as he made use of his senses, inasmuch as they made up a part of his body, he also used his Passions in asmuch as they were a part of his soul, and that in brief they did not differ from ours in nature, but in obedience.

The sixth Discourse.

whether there were any Passions in our Saviour Christ, and wherein they differ'd from ours?

NOt to know that the Son of God was pleased to take upon him our nature, with all the weakness thereof; and that, set aside ignorance, and sin; (which could not corresponde with the sanctity of his person;) he hath vouchsafed to bear our miseries, conversing with men in the likelihood of a sinner, were to be ignorant

[f] In similitudinem carnis peccati; Paulus.

ignorant of all the principles of Christian Religion. Hence it came that during his term of mortal life, it behoved him to preserve himself by nourishment; to repair his strength by rest, to suffer his body to sleep; and to use all means which providence hath ordained for these natural maladies. He was subject to the injuries of time, to the unseasonableness of seasons. Men have seen him benummed with cold during the violence of winter, and bedewed with sweat during the heat of Summer: the Elements spared him not, and if they reverenced him as God, they persecuted him as man. The same creatures which obeyed his word, warred against his body; the waves which grew calm at his awaking, had assaulted the ship wherein he was; hunger which he had overcome in the deserts, assailed him Towns. And upon the cross he tasted the terrors of death, from which he had delivered *Lazarus*. Then as Passions are the most natural weaknesses of man, he would not exempt himself from them, and he would have them to be as well witnesses of his love unto us, as assurances of the truth of his incarnation. He mingled his teares with those of *Magdalen*; though by his power he might have remedied

died her evils, he would out of compassion resent them. Before the doing of a miracle he would undergo a weakness, and weep over a dead man, whom he went about to revive; He suffered sadness, often to seize upon his heart, and by a strange wonder, he accorded joy with sorrow in his all-blessed soul. In fine, according to the incounterrs of his life, he made use of Passions. He taught us that there was nothing in man which he contemn'd since he had taken his infirmites upon him, and that he loved well the nature of man, since he did cherish even the defects therof. For to believe that his resentments were but Imaginary, is in my opinion to clash against the mystery of the Incarnation, to give the lye to truth it self, and (to give *Jesus Christ* a bootless honor) make us doubt all the assurances of his love. Since he had a true body he could have no false Passions; and since he was veritably man, he ought to be veritably afflicted. A man cannot gainsay this truth without weakening our belief. If it be permitted to suffer the tears of the Son of God to pass for illusions, one may make his sorrow pass for Impostureisme, and under the pretence of reverency a man may overthrow the ground-work of our souls welfare.

[Ipse dominus in forma servi, vitam agere dignatus humanam adhibuit passiones ubi adhibendas esse judicavit: neque enim in quo verum erat hominis corpus, et verus homini s animus, falsus erat hominis affectus; August. Lib: 14. de civitate dei. cap-9.

welfare. But we must have a care lest whilest we establish the love of the Son of God, we commit no outrage upon his greatness, or omnipotency, and that whilest we allow him Passions, we free them from their disorders; for we must not believe that they were unruly as are ours, nor that they required all those vertues to tame them, as are necessary for us. He was their absolute Master, and they in their birth, progress and continuance depended upon his will. In their birth because they never raised themselves, but by order from him, but alwaies waited that Reason might make them serve his designs.

Ours for the most part do surprise us, and are so ready to be moving, that the wisest men cannot keep back their first motions: they are so given to disorder, as the least occasion sets them on fire; their sleep is so unquiet, as the least matter will awaken them; they are so given to war, that upon the least provocation they take up armes, and make more spoyl upon their own territories, then would an enemies army do. Their disorder proceeds not so much from their objects as from their humour; and it fares with their storms as it doth with those, who being at the bottome

of the Sea, mount up again by their proper motion. But they caused no tempests in *Jesus Christ*, or if sometimes their waves went high, they were led on by Reason, which always kept the power to appease the trouble she had caused. As their birth depended upon his Will, so made they no Progress, or advancement, but by his permission, and their moving proceeded always from some reasonable cause.

ε Turbavit semet ipsum. Joann. 11. cap

Men betake themselves to things which merit not their love, and have oft times strong Passions, for weak and woful subjects. Imprudency seeks them in choler; and not weighing the difference of faults, they punish a word as rigourously as they do a murderer: their ambition is blind, their desires unruly, their sadness ridiculous; and who shall compare all their Passions with the causes which produce them, will finde them all to be unjust. A *Consul* made a slave be eaten up by Lampreys for having broken a glass? A Princes anger caused a town to be drowned in the bloud of its Inhabitants; and to revenge an injury done to an Image of brass or marble made 7000 men, the lively Image of God, lose their lives. Sorrow hath made Idols to comfort her; fathers not able to raise again their

their dead children, have deified them; and through an excess of love and sorrow have built temples unto them, after they had taken them out of their graves. In fine, all the motions of our souls are irrational; we cannot measure or bound our joys nor our displeasures; our hatred exceeds our injuries; our love is more ardent then the subject which sets it on fire, and we ground firm hopes upon perishable things. But the Passions of the Son of God were so regulated, as in their motions a man might observe the worth of the subject which caused them to arise; he was not angry save only to revenge the injuries done unto his father, or punish the impieties of those who prophaned his Temple; he had no affection save for those that did deserve it; if he saw no perfection in his friends, he loved such as he would place there, and loving them he made them worthy of his love: he never sorrowed save upon great occasion; and though the cross was a sufficient object of grief, I verily believe his soul was more narrowly touched with the horror of our sins, then with the shame or cruelty of his punishment. Such regulated Passions ceased when he pleased, and their continuance, was no less subject to his em-

pire, then was their progress.

We are not masters of our Passions; as in their birth they set at nought our advice; they laugh at our counsels during their course; they never stay till they be weary, and we owe not our quiet so much to their obedience, as to their weakness. When they are violent, our care cannot overcome them, and there are some of them so stiffnecked as they will not dye, but together with us, therefore we ought to suppress them in their brith, and to advise with Reason, whether it be to any purpose to draw souldiers into the field, who when they have their weapons in their hands despise the authority of their chief commander. The beginning of war depends oft times upon two parties, but the end thereof depends alwaies upon the victory; and he is not easily brought to a peace, when he findes his advantage lies in the continuance of war. All these rules prove false in the Passions of *Jesus Christ*. He did even exceed therein when the subject did deserve it, and though they were chafed, they became calme, as soon as he would have them so to be. Their heat as it was reasonable, so was it as soon extinguished as kindled, so as joy did immediately succeed sadness, and one might

Tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem.

might at the same time see pleasingness take the same place in his countenance, which choler had possest.

It is peradventure for this reason that Saint *Jerome* could not resolve to call the agitations of the soul of our Saviour *Jesus Christ*, Passions; believing that to name them as criminals, was to injure their innocence, and that there was injustice, in giving the same name to things, the conditions whereof were so different. But every one knows that qualities change not nature; and that the Passions of the Son of God were not less natural for being more obedient then are ours. In my opinion it is a new obligation which we have to his goodness, that he hath not despised our weakness; he will eternally reproach us if we desire not his glory, since he coveted our welfare; If we fight not against his enemies, since he hath overcome ours; if we shed not tears for injuries done unto him, since he hath shed his blood for our sins. And he will have just occasion to complain upon our ingratitude, if our Passions serve not to witness our love to him, since he hath imployed all his to assure us of his charity.

The second Treatise.

Of the disorder of Passions in man.

The first Discourse.

Of the corruption of nature by sin.

» Homo Medium quoddam est inter pecora et Angelos, inferior Angelis, superior pecoribus habens cum pecoribus mortalitatem; rationem verò cum Angelis.

THough there be many wonderful things in man, which deserve consideration, and that his qualities witness unto us, the greatness and power of his Creator, there is nothing more remarkable in him, then is his constitution; for he is composed of a body, and soul: he in his person, unites Heaven and Earth; and being more monstrous then are the centaures inthe fable, he is both Angel and Beast, as the power of God appeareth in the uniting of these two, so different Parties; his wisdome

dome is no less evidently seen in the good intelligence they hold; for though they had contrary inclinations, that the one should bow downward towards the earth whereof it was formed, and that the other should raise it self up towards Heaven from whence it had its original, yet God did so well temper their desires, and in the diversity of their conditions so streightly united their wils by original justice, as the soul shared in all contentments of the body, without any injury to her self, and the body served to all the designs of the soul, without doing any violence to its self. In this happy estate, the soul commanded with mildness, the body obeyed with delight, and whatsoever object presented it self, these two parties did alwaies agree. But this happiness continued no longer then our first father was obedient to God; as soon as he listened to the divel, and that inticed by his promises he had took part with him, his punishment was answerable to his fault, and his disobedience was punished by a general rebellion; for to boote that his creatures revolted against him, and that his subjects, that they might serve Gods justice, became his enemies, the revolt passed from his condition to his person; the

* Animal rationale, mortale. Auguſt: Lib. 9 de Civitate dei. cap. 13.

elements divided themselves in his body, and his body mutined against his soul. This intestine war was the sooner kindled, between these two parties, for that their peace was not so much an effect of nature as of grace; the hatred which succeeded their love was so much the more violent, for that it was animated by sin, which being but a meer disorder, causeth divisions every where, and satisfieth its own fury in executing the decrees of divine justice; so as we must not wonder if the rebellion which man suffers, be so great, since it takes its rise from two so puissant principles, and that the parties which compose it are incouraged to the combate by the contrariety of their inclinations, and by the malice of sin, which doth possesse them. This mischief hath caused the greatest Saints to sigh. The Apostle of the Gentiles, finding no remedy for this malady, but death, wisht for it as a favour, and as, such a one, made suite for the most rigorous of our punishments; he in his writings, hath prepared all Christians to this war, and hath made them know that a man cannot hope for peace in this life, since the body made enterprises upon the soul, and that the soul was oblieged evilly to intreate her body.

Caro enim concupiscit adversus spiritum, spiritus autem adversus carnem. Galat. cap 5.

From

From this great disorder the like of our Passions have ensued; for though they be the of-spring of the soul and body and that being equally produced by these two parties, they should indeavour their agreement, yet these unnatural children, augment their division, and according as they hold more of the soul, or the body, take part with the one, or with the other of them, and perform no act of obedience wherein there is not somewhat of rebellion. The concupiscible Appetite doth all most alwaies hold intelligence with the body, and the Irascible Appetite sides alwaies with the soul. The first engages us in delights, and keeps us in a shameful idleness; the second arms us against sorrow, and incourageth us to generous actions; in this continual bickering the soul of man is never at quiet, and man is constrained to nourish vipers which do devour him.

Philosophers have indeed found this mischief, but they thought it lay only in the will and not in the nature of man. They were perswaded, that opinion and ill breeding caused these disorders, and that as one evil is cured by its contrary, this might be remedied by wholsome doctrine and good education. They founded Academies, wherein

wherein they disputed about the *Summum bonum*. They made *Panegyricks* in the behalfe of vertue, and invectives against vice. They declaymed against the unrulinesse of Passions; and measuring their abilities by their desires, they promised victory and triumph to themselves. But not finding the original of the malady, by consequence they could never light upon the remedy; amidst the weakness they underwent, and their vain indeavours, they were enforced to accuse nature, and to complain even of that soveraign Power which hath composed man of pieces, which could not be made agree. A glimpse of light would certainly have rectified them, and a Chapter of Saint *Pauls* would have made them know the truth; for since they agreed with us that God cannot be defective in his workmanship, and that he is too just to require things at our hands which exceed our power, they must have concluded that our disorder was the punishment of our sin, and that the infirmity which we lament was not an effect of our nature, but the correction of Gods Iustice; by thinking thus they would have endeavoured to appease him whom they had injured, and confessing their infirmity, they would have implored

implored his assistance; but pride blinded them, and to make use of *Seneca's* words against himself, they would rather accuse providence, then acknowledg their own misery; and rather impute their disorder to Gods rigour, then to their own offences. They either could not, or would not comprehend, what reason taught them before, that faith had published by the mouth of Saint *Paul* and of Saint *Augustine*, that the rebellion of the flesh against the Spirit, is not a condition of nature, but the punishment of sin. From what hath been said 'tis easie to infer, that since man is sinful, since his Passions have revolted, since the soul, which ought to govern them, is darkned, and that the will which ought to moderate them is depraved, he must of necessity have recourse to grace, and beg that of mercy; which justice hath bereaved him of. The same power which formerly accorded our soul with our body, must now end these differences. If the condition of this miserable life be such as will not suffer us to enjoy a perfect peace, we must seek for forces wherewithal to fight; so if we cannot shun the misfortunes of war, we may hope for the advantages of victory.

† Quod caro concupiscit adversus spiritum, non est præcedens naturæ hominis instituti, sed consequens pœna damnati. August. Lib: de vera Innocentia. cap. 26.

THE

The ſecond Diſcourſe.

That nature alone is not ſufficient to rule the Paſsions of man.

THough the Stoicks be declared enemies unto Paſſions, and that they cannot be judged in a cauſe wherein they are a party, yet me thinks their judgments have ſome colour of juſtice, and that it is with reaſon that they do mix our Paſſions with our vices. For in the condition whereinto ſin hath reduced us, our apprehenſions are no more pure, our nature being corrupted, all the inclinations thereof muſt needs be out of order, and the rivers which run from a polluted ſpring muſt needs be troubled.

I know *Philoſophers* will not agree of this truth, and they never permit us to accuſe nature of an error, ſince they take her for their guide, nor that we diſhonour her, all whoſe motions they eſteem ſo regular. They profeſs to follow her in all things, and hold

hold that to live happily, a man must live according to nature. The Libertines plead this maxime, and will excuse their disorders, by a doctrine which they understand not; for had they studied in the *Stoicks* schools; they would finde that those *Philosophers* presuppose that nature was in her first purity, and that they took her not for their guide, but for that they imagined she had preserved her innocency. So banished they from their Sages, and even from their disciples all those affections, which they would have pass for natural, and by a generous but a useless endeavour, they would have us to be as well governed in the state of sin, as in that of original justice.

But Christians who have learnt by the holy Scripture, that nature is fallen from her first purity; are bound to confess, that the Passions have revolted, and that to bring them again into subjection Reason must be assisted by grace; for there is no man, but sees that the understanding is engaged in the error, and that it confusedly receives falshoods, and truths: that the will applies it self more to appearing, then to reall good; that her interests are the rules of her inclinations, and that she loves not that which is good, save that she is therewithal

withall delighted ; that by experience she finds, she hath lost much of her liberty; and that if sin hath not taken from her, all the love she had to good, it hath left her but weak helps, and useless desires to come by it. As her forces are but small, to achieve what is good, she hath yet smaller power to rule her Passions ; and though she approve not of their disorders, she knows not how to remedy them. Oft times by a strange misfortune, she foments their sedition, which she ought to hinder, and that she may not afflict her subjects, she becomes guilty of their crimes. The Christian *Philosopher* is therefore bound to imploy aide from Heaven to overcome these rebels, and confessing that his Reason is weakned, he must look for help from without himself, and beg favour from him, who hath permitted the unrulines of nature for the punishment of sin.

But that we may not be said to be enemies to the greatnes of man, and that we make his disaster greater then it is, we confess that nature is good in her foundation, and that very sin is an excellent proof thereof ; for as it is but a *Non ens*, it cannot subsist by it self, for its preservation it must needs fasten it self to some subject that may uphold

uphold it, and which may impart unto it part of its essence. So evil is ingraffed upon good, and sin is upholden by nature; which is much endamaged by so evil a guest, but doth not therefore lose all the advantages thereof. For since she conserves her own being, she must likewise conserve unto her self some goodness, since she is not anihilated for being become criminal, she must amidst her misery enjoy some good fortune, and amidst her faultiness some tincture of innocence must remain. And this is it which Saint *Augustine* affirms in, as learned as, eloquent terms. The being of man is certainly praised, though the sin thereof be blamed; and no better reason can be given, for the blaming of sin, then by making it appear that by the contagion thereof, it dishonoureth what was honorable by nature. If we consider her then in her ground-work or foundation, she hath lost nothing of her goodness; but if we look upon her, under the tyranny of sin, she hath almost lost her use, and she can make no more use of her faculties, unless freed from the enemy which possesseth her; methinks she may be compared to the birds that are taken in nets; they have wings but cannot fly, they love liberty but cannot regain

Cuius rectè vituperatur vitium procul dubio Natura laudatur: nam rectè vitij vituperatio est, quòd illo de honestatur natura laudabilis. Augustin. lib. 12. de Civitate dei. cap: 1.

gain it. So men in the state of sin, have good inclinations, but they cannot pursue them, they have good designs but cannot put them in execution; and more unfortunate then the a forenamed birds, they love their prison, and agree with the Tyrant that doth persecute them. In this sad condition, they have need of grace to comfort them, and to strengthen them, if not totally to free them, from the enemy which pursueth them, at least to give them liberty of operating, and to put them into a capacity of practising vertue, of contesting with vice, and of ruling their Passions.

Natura humana etiamsi in illa integritate in qua condita est permaneret, nullo modo seipsam creatore suo non adjuvante servaret. Cum ergo sine dei gratia salutem non posset custodire quam accepit, quomodo sine dei gratia posset reparare quam perdidit? August. lib. de vera Innocentia, cap. 337.

This necessity which we impose upon man of receiving grace, ought not to appear so harsh, since even before his disorder he stood inneed of a forraign succour; and that in his natural purity, he could not avoid sin, without a supernatural aide. For he is so composed, that in all his motions he is forced to have recourse unto God; and since he is his Image, he cannot operate but by his Spirit. Though humane nature (saith Saint *Augustine*) had continued in the integrity wherein God created it, yet could it not have preserved it self against sin without grace; and drawing a consequence from this first truth, he with a great deal

deal of reason adds; since man without grace, could not preserve the purity which he had received; how can he without the same recover the purity which he hath lost? he must then resolve to submit himself to his Creator, if he will assubject his Passions; and he must become pious if he will be reasonable. For ought there to be any relation between our welfare, and our loss? Passions did not revolt against the understanding till that had revolted against God: there is reason to believe they will never obey the understanding, till that be obedient to God, and as our mischief hath tane its rise from our rebellion, our good must take its beginning from our assubjection.

If prophane *Philosophers* object unto us, that Reason was in vain allowed us to moderate our Passions, if she have no power over them; and that nature is a useless guide, if she her self have need of a Conductor, we must satisfie them by experience, and teach them without the holy Scripture, that there are disorders in man which Reason alone cannot regulate, and that we are subject unto maladies, which nature without grace cannot cure.

The third Discourse.

That the disorder of our Passions considered, Grace is requisite to the government thereof.

Those who are instructed in the mysteries of Christian Religion, confess that the grace which *Jesus Christ* hath merited, for us doth infinitely surpass that grace which *Adam* by his fall deprived us of. The advantages thereof are such, as do exceed all our desires; and the most ambitious of mankinde, could never have wished for the good which we hope for thereby. For to boote that we are thereby raised to a pitch far above our condition, and that we are thereby promised an happiness equal to that of the Angels, we have *Jesus Christ* thereby given us, for our head; and we are thereby so straightly joyned unto him, as that his Father is bound to admit us for his children. But all these priviledges regard rather the future then the present.

And

And though we have the pledges of these gracious promises, we do not as yet enjoy all the effects thereof. The grace which purchaseth this right for us, resides in the depth of our soul, the which she sanctifieth, leaving the body engaged in sin. She begins the work of our salvation, but doth not finish it; she divides the two parts whereof man is composed, and giving strength unto the Spirit, she leaves the flesh in its weakness. But by a stranger miracle she parts the soul from the Spirit and worketh a division in their unity, for to take her aright; 'tis only the superior part of the soul which doth fully resent the effects of grace, and which in Baptisme receives the vertue of that divine character which gives us right to Heaven, as to our inheritance. Hence it is that one Apostle tearms us but imperfect workmanship, and the beginning of a new creature. We belong unto *Jesus Christ*, only for what belongs unto the soul. He is the father only of this noble part which he hath inriched with his merits; but the other part, which is ingaged in the body, and which by an unfortunate necessity, sees it self bound to animate the disorders, and to foment the Passions thereof, is not altogether delive-

Vt simus initium aliquod Creaturæ ejus. Jacob. cap. 1.

red from the tyrrany of sin; she groaneth under the weight of her Iron; and this glorious Captive, is constrained to bewail the rigour of her servitude, whilest her sister enjoys the sweets of liberty. For as Saint *Augustine* teacheth us, Baptisme takes not away concupisence, but doth moderate it; and notwithstanding any strength that it giveth unto our soul, it leaves a kinde of languishment, whereof the soul cannot be cured till in glory. 'Tis true that this weakness or defection is not a sin; and though it be the spring-head from whence all the rest do derive, it cannot make us blameable, unless when by reason of our remisness we follow the motions thereof. And it cannot be said with honour to our soul, that this disorder is in our body, and that the soul is not affected therewithall, save only out of pity, or infected but by contagion: for besides that original sin, (whereof this misgovernment is an effect) abideth in her substance, all the world knoweth that the body is capable of operating by its self, and that necessarily the soul which animates it, must be that which makes it revolt; and that that which gives it life, must give it irregular motions and desires. 'Tis she that raiseth the flesh against the Spi-

Concupiscentia carnis in baptismo dimittitur, non ut non sit, sed ut in peccatum non imputetur, non autem ei substantialiter manet, sicut aliquod corpus aut spiritus, sed affectio quædam est malæ qualitatis, sicut languor. Aug. Lib: 1. de nuptiis et Concupiscent. cap. 25.

Non enim caro sine anima concupiscit, quamvis caro concupiscere dicatur, quia carnaliter anima concupiscit. Aug: Lib: de perfectione hominis. cap. 17.

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rit, and which, as not being intirely posseſt by grace, doth obey ſin. 'Tis ſhe that awakens Paſſions; 'tis ſhe who through a ſtrange infatuation, or blindneſs, affoords them weapons wherewithall to hurt her ſelf, and who excites the ſedition wherewithall to trouble her tranquility. This is Saint *Auguſtines* doctrine; and if we had not ſo great a Doctor for our warranty, all Philoſophy would ſerve us for caution, ſince according to the principles thereof we muſt believe, that the body doth nothing without the ſoul, and that even then when the body ſeems to undertake any thing maugre the ſoul, it is effected by the ſuccour which the body receiveth from the ſoul. Inſomuch as ſhe is the riſe of the evil, and without reaſon ſhe complains of the bodies revolt, ſince ſhe is the chief therein, and that of all the faults which ſhe imputeth to the body, the body is not the author, but only the confederate.

Now as the Paſſions reſide in that part of the ſoul which is infected by ſin, we muſt not wonder if they rebell, ſince their mother is diſobedient. And we muſt not once think they ſhould be ſtifled by grace, ſince ſhe ſuffers the very power which produceth them, to remain in rebellion. All that a

man can wish for in her guidance, is, that she may moderate their aptness to rage, that she suppress their violence, and that she prevent their first motions. This is one of her chiefe imployments; for when she hath obliged the understanding to know God, and the will to love him, she inlargeth her care to the inferior part of the soul, and indeavours to calme the Passions thereof. She goes not about to destroy them, because she very well knows, it is a work reserved for glory; but she imployeth all her forces to regulate them; as she makes good use of sin, to humble her, she wisely makes use of their revolt to exercise us. She propounds unto them objects of innocency to make them be serviceable to her vertue: And makes them (as Saint *Paul* saies) ministers of Justice; for Christian humility is an enemy to the vanity of the *Stoicks*; and knowing very well that we are not Angels, but men, she doth not in vaine indeavour to destroy one part of us, but she obligeth us to make advantage of our defaults, and to manage our Passions so dexterously, as that they may obey Reason, or that they wage not war against her, save only so far as she may obtain the victory. I should injure this Imagination, if I should render it in

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other words, then doth Saint *Augustine*. We consider not in a pious man whether he be offended or not, we weigh not the measure of his sorrow, but the subject. And we labour not so much to know whether he be afraid, as to know why. For if we be angry with a sinner, intending so to correct him; If we afflict our selves with one that is in misery, out of an intention of comforting him; and if through fear we divert a man from the mischief he was about to do unto himself, I do not believe there is any so severe Iudg as will condemn so useful Passions; and he must necessarily want judgment, did he not defend so harmless affections.

In disciplina nostra non tam quæritur utrum pius animus irascatur, sed quare irascatur, nec utrum sit tristis, sed unde sit tristis, nec utrum timeat, sed quid timeat: irasci enim peccanti ut corrigatur, contristari pro afflicto ut liberetur, timere periclitanti ne pereat, nescio utrum quisquam sana consideratione reprehendat. Aug: Lib: 9. de civitate dei. cap. 5.

Their excess is then only blameable, and Reason assisted by grace ought to imploy all her industry to moderate them. But because concupiscence is the spring-head from whence they derive; Reason must indeavor to dry it up, and use her uttermost means to obviate the wicked effects thereof, by stifling the cause which produceth them. The enemy, which we undertake, is born with us, he draws his forces from ours, he grows greater as we do, and weakens as we grow old, We have this of obligation to old age that it taketh from the vigor of

concupiſence, by diminiſhing our bodily ſtrength, and that by leading us to death, it likewiſe leadeth this rebell inſenſibly thither. We muſt notwithſtanding leave all for age to do; in a buſineſs which ſo much imports our ſalvation, we ought ſooner to begin a war, which ends not but with our life, and diminiſh our own forces, thereby to weaken thoſe of the enemy. You are born (ſaith Saint *Auguſtine*) with concupiſence; take heed leſt by giving him ſeconds through your negligence, you raiſe not new enemies againſt you; remember you have entred the courſe of this life accompanyed with her, and that your honour is concerned in making her dye, before you, who was born with you.

Cum concupiſcentia natus es ut eam vincas, nolo tibi hoſtes adero, vince cum quo natus es, ad ſtudium vitæ hujus cum illo veniſt, congredere cum eo qui tecum proceſſit. Auguſt. in Pſalm. 57.

This victory is rather to be wiſhed for, then hoped for; you will not finde a Saint who hath deſtroyed this monſter but, at the coſt of their life; for though they withſtand concupiſence, that they appoſe the deſires thereof, and that they minde not her motions, ſave how to hinder her, yet in this combat, they are ſometimes conquered; their advantages are not pure, and their beſt ſucceſſes, are mingled with ſome diſgraces. To kill this enemy, they muſt dye, and they are neceſſitated to wiſh their own

own death that they may hasten the like of this their enemy. Perfection (as Saint *Augustine*) observes, consists in having no concupisence; not to follow her is to fight against her. Nevertheless by continuance of courage one may hope for victory, but certainly it cannot be obtained, but when death is happily consummated by life in the kingdome of glory. Hence I inferr, that since grace cannot extinguish concupiscence, she cannot ruine Passions, and that all the assistance that man can hope for from grace, is so handsomely to manage Passions, as that they may defend vertue and oppugne vice.

Non concupiscere omnino perfecti est, post concupiscentias suas non ire pugnantis est, luctantis est, laborantis est. ubi fervet pugna, quare desperetur victoria, quando erit victoria quando absorbebitur mors. August: de verbis Apost: serm. 5.

The fourth Discourse.

That opinions, and the senses do cause the disorder of our Passions..

THough sin be the original of all our mischief, and that all the miseries we undergoe are the punishments for

for our faults: we seem to take pleasure in increasing them by our evil guidance, and that we invent every day new penalties, to which divine justice had not condemned us; we are not contented to know our Passions are revolted, and that without the assistance of grace, Reason cannot regulate them; we nourish their disorder, and to make them the more insolent, we admit of opinions which raise them up at their pleasure. For of a thousand Passions which are raised in our soul, there are not any two that take truth for their guide; and the evil which they apprehend, or the good which they desire, appear rather so to be, then that they are so indeed. To mend this disorder, we must take cognizance of opinion, mark her birth and progress. Opinion is not so much a judgment of the understanding, as of the Imaginations, whereby she doth either approve of, or condemn things which the senses represent unto her. This is the most usuall evil of our life, and if it were as constant as it is common, our condition would be very sad; but it changeth at every moment, that which is the cause of its birth, causeth likewise the death thereof. And Imagination forsakes it with as much ease as she gave it entertainment.

ment. It taketh its rise from our sences, and from the reports of the world, so as it is no marvel if the best grounded opinion cannot subsist long, since the foundations thereof are so bad; for our sences are lyars, and like enchaunted glasses, they present disguised objects unto us. Their reports are seldome unintersted; and as they fasten themselves to objects, they indeavor to ingage Imagination.

When I consider the soul as a prisoner in the body, I bewail her condition, and I wonder not if she so oft takes falsehood for truth, because it entereth by the gate of the sences; this divine Spirit is inclosed in the body, not having any other cognizance save what she borroweth either from the Eies or the Eares thereof; and these two sences which by nature seem so particularly appropriated to knowledg are such deceivers, as their devices are for the most part but impostures; blindness is to be preferred before their false lights, and they had better leave us in our ignorance then help us to such malignant and so doubtful knowledg. They consider only the appearances of things; they stop at accidents, their weakness cannot penetrate into substances; they are like the Sun, and as they take all

their

their light from him, they endavor to imitate him in their actions. Every one thinks that this goodly Planet is extreamly usefull to us when it comes about our horizon; and that it affords those beauties to nature which darkness had bereft it of. But the *Platonicks* have found that the advantage we receive thereby, equals not the prejudice it bringeth along with it; for when it discovers the earth unto us, it hides the Heavens from us; when it exposeth lillies and roses to our sight, it hinders us from seeing the stars, and takes from us the sight of the most beautiful part of the world. So the sences take from us the cognizance of divine things to furnish us with the like of what is humane. They make us only see the appearances of objects, and hide their truth from us. We remain ignorant under these bad masters, and our Imagination being informed but by their reports, we can only conceive false opinions.

I finde therefore that nature is more severe unto us, then is religion, and that it is much more difficult to be rational then to believe aright; for though the truths which religion proposeth unto us, are of so high a nature as our understending cannot comprehend them, though she demand of us a blind

blind obedience, and that to believe her mysteries, we must subdue our reason, and give the lye to all our sences; yet this commandement is not injurious; If she take from us our liberty, she preserves our honnor, she frees our nnderstanding from the tyrrany of our sences, she submits it to the legitimate Empire of the supreame Intelligence, which she illustrates unto us by her light, she takes us from earth that she may raise us up to Heaven, and takes not from us the use of Reason, save only to make us acquire the merit of faith. But nature ingaging our soul in our body, makes her a slave to our sences, and obliegeth, her in her noblest operations, to consult with those that are blinde; and to draw her light from out their darkness. Hence it is that all our knowledg is full of error, and that truth is never without falsehood, that our opinions are uncertain, and that our Passions which obey them, are alwaies out of order.

The worlds report is no surer a guide; and those who listen thereunto, are likely never to enjoy true rest; for this rumour is no thing els but the opinion of the people, which is not the truer for being the more common. That which seemeth to

authorize

authorize it doth condemn it; and nothing ought make it more suspected then the great number of its partakers. The nature of man is not so well regulated, as that the best things be those that please most people; ill opinions, as well as good ones, ground themselves upon the number of their approvers; and when we would side with any opinions, we ought not to number but to weigh the votes. The common people who gape after liberty, delight to live in servitude, never make use of Judgment, and in wordly affaires, which of all others ought to be the most free, they are rather led by example then by Reason; they follow those who go before, and not examining their opinions, they embrace, they defend them; for after having received them, they desire to divulge them; as in factions, they indeavor to engage others on their party, and to make their malady prove contagious. In so much as *Seneca's* maxime proves true, that man is not only fayling to himself, but unto others, and that he communicates his errors to all those that come nigh him. When our Imagination is filled with ill opinions, she exciteth a thousand disorders in the inferior part of our soul, and raiseth up Passions according

Nemo sibi tantùm errat, sed alijs erroris causa & author est: de vita beata. cap 1.

to

to her pleasure; for being blinde, they cannot discern whether the good or bad which is proposed to them, be only likely or true; and abused by the Imagination, whose empire they reverence, they either draw nearer unto, or fly further from objects; their blindness serves them for excuse, and they lay their faults upon that hath deceived them. But to prevent this disorder, the understanding must keep it self in its authority, it must assubject Imagination to its laws; it must take heed lest opinion endeavour to establish her self, and must consult with Reason to defend it self against error and falsehood; thus will Passions alwaies be peaceable, and their motions being regulated, they will be serviceable unto vertue.

The fifth Discourse.

That there is more disorder in the Passions of man, then in those of beastes.

BEfore we resolve this question, we must discuss another, and examine whether beasts

beasts be capable of these motions which we call Passions. For as our adversaries confound them with vices, and as they will have all the affections of the inferiour part of our soul to be criminal; they hold that beasts are exempt from them, and that having no freedom or liberty, one cannot impute unto them either vertue, or sin. That they are led on by an instinct which cannot erre, and if sometimes they seem to do amiss, we must attribute it to providence, which disordereth them for our punishment, or which suffereth their unruliness, to put us in minde of our wickedness; 'tis therefore that their motions serve for plagues to all people, and that the Infidels took counsell by the flying of birds, and the entrails of victims, that they might know what was to come, or what Heaven had decreed. But though beasts be exempt from sin, and that they owe their innocency to their servitude, they are not notwithstanding insensible. All *Philosophers* acknowledg they have inclinations, and aversions, and that according as objects give against their eyes, or ears, they excite desire or fear in their Imaginations. In effect, the neithermost part of our soul, hath such correspondency with our senses, as that she

she borrows her name from them, and is called *sensitive*; insomuch, as it is almost impossible, but that any thing that entereth by those passages, with any contentment or detestation, should cause, either pleasure, or pain in the soul. As beasts have these two faculties, which give them feeling and life; we must necessarily conclude, That they have Pasions, that they approach to what is good, out of desire, and shun what is evil, out of dislike; that they taste the one with joy, and suffer the other with sorrow. This reason is confirmed by examples; for we see every day how horses are brought to manage through the fear of punishment, That the Spur quickens their memory, that the noyse of Trumpets puts them in good humor, and that very hurts do animate their courage: Bulls fight for glory, and joyning craft with strength, dispute as hotly for the leading of an herd, as Princes do for the conquest of a Kingdom: Lyons in their fighting covet not so much revenge as honor; when they see their enemy on the ground, their choler is appeased, and having taken up arms onely for glories sake, they content themselves with this advantage, and give life to what yields the victory. In fine, they are netled as well by jealously,

as by love, they love faithfulness, punish adultery, and wash this fault in the blood of the guilty. It cannot then be doubted, but that beasts have Passions, and that they are agitated with those furious motions which trouble our quiet; but the difficulty is to know, whether theirs or ours be more violent, and whether they or we be less regulated in our motions.

Truth it self obliegeth us to confess, That our advantages are prejudicial to us, and that when very Reason becomes a slave unto our sences, it serves onely to make our affections more unreasonable. Beasts apprehend not evil, but when it is nigh at hand, they discern not what is to come, and do not mch remember what is past; the present onely can make them unhappy. But men go about to finde out casualties before they happen, they seem to have a designe to hasten their misadvantages, and that to enlarge Fortunes empire, they will prevent the evils to which she hath not yet given birth. Their fear is imployed both in what is past, and in what is to come; and as they tremble at a misfortune which hath ceased to be, so they grow pale at a disaster, which hath yet no being.

Nemo tantùm præsentibus miser est. Senec. Epist. 5.

There are but few objects wherein Beasts are

are concerned, set aside those things which are necessary for the maintainance of their life, and you shall finde they consider all other things as indifferent. But men cannot bound their desires, either by reason, or necessity; they extend them to beyond what is useful, and seek out superfluities to increase their punishments: all their Passions are so out of order, as that nothing can content them. That which ought to appease them, incenseth them; and that which is given them to satisfie their hunger, serves often times onely to provoke it: so as one may not be said to lye, if he affirm, That man is onely ingenuous to his own loss, and that he imploys the goodness of his wit, onely to make himself more unfortunate, or more faulty. Beasts are stupid, their temperature, which holds of the earth, makes them insensible, and happily exempts them from all those evils, which hurt not the body; save in as much as they have hurt the Imagination. Bulls must be goaded on, to make them furious, and these heavy lumps, whose soul is but a body, do little unirritated. Elephants endure all things at their masters hands; they think not themselves hurt unless they see their blood; when the pain is over, their choler

Quidquid illis congesseris, non finis cupiditatis erit sed gradus, Senec.

is appeased, and they become as tractable as they were before; but man is of so delicate a constitution, as the slightest pain offends him; his blood which is of the nature of fire is easily moved, and being once moved, it hurries fury throughout all his parts. This fury doth its greatest outrages about the heart; for she furnisheth it with such spirits, as oftentimes she causeth that to die which gives life to the whole body, and to revenge her self of a particular injury, she hazards the publike welfare. To compleat this mischief, this Passion is so shie in man, as the least matter is sufficient to provoke it. A word troubleth it, a motion of the head offendeth it, silence sets it going; not finding any thing to entertain it, it devours her own entrails, and by an excess of despair, turns all her rage against her self.

In fine, The life of Beasts being uniform, and nature having given them bounds narrow enough, they have but a few Passions; almost all their motions, are caused out of a fear which possesseth them, or a desire wherewith they are affected. But as the life of man is more mingled, and that in the course thereof it is subject to a thousand different inconveniencies, his Passions rise up

up in a croud; and whereſoever he goes he findes ſubjects of choler, and of fear, of pleaſure, and of ſorrow. Therefore it is, that the Poets have feigned, That his ſoul paſſeth into the body of divers creatures, and that taking all their evil qualities, he uniteth in his perſon the guile of Serpents, the fury of Tygers, Choler of Lyons; teaching us by this fiction, That man alone hath as many Paſſions, as have all Beaſts put together.

'Tis therefore that Philoſophers propound them unto us for examples, and that the *Stoicks* after having raiſed our nature to ſuch a height of greatneſs, are oblieged to reduce us to the condition of Beaſts, and to place the happineſs and reſt of their wiſeman, in a ſtrange kinde of ſtupidity. This ſenſe differs not much from that of the proud ſpirits, which being deſirous to ſit on the throne of God, demanded leave of Jeſus Chriſt to withdraw themſelves into the bodies of Swine; and that not being able to reign with the perſons of the Diety, they were contented to live with infamous Beaſts. So our proud *Stoicks*, after having raiſed their wiſeman, even unto Heaven, and given him titles, unto which the accurſed angels in their rebellion durſt never

Dæmones autem rogabant eum dicentes: ſi ejicis nos hinc, mitte nos in gregem porcorum, Math: cap. 8.

pretend, they brought him down to the condition of Beasts, and not able to make him insensible, they endeavored to make him stupid. They accuse Reason to be the cause of all disorders, they complain of the disadvantages we have by nature, and would lose both memory and wisdom, That they might neither foresee the evils that are to come, nor muse of those that are past. This folly is the punishment of their vanity: Divine justice hath permitted that understanding which had been their Idol, should become their torment; and that they should every where divulge, That since they could not live like gods, they were resolved to live like Beasts. But not immediating their dispair; we are onely to implore ayd from Heaven; and acknowledging the weakness of Reason, seek out another light to conduct us, and borrow new forces to vanquish our Passions. This is that which Christian Religion hath taught us, and that which we shall examine in the pursuit of this work.

The third Treatise.

Of the government of Passions.

The first Discourse

That there is nothing more glorious nor more hard to come by, then the government of Passions.

NAture by a wise providence hath united difficulty with glory, and lest glorious things might become too common, her pleasure is, they should be hardly come by. There is nothing of greater lustre amongst men then the valour of conquerors all Orators would have been mute, had not battels been fought, and victories been had. But to acquire this title of honour, a man must des-

pise death, forgoe pleasures, overcome troubles; and often times purchase glory by the loss of his own life. After the valour of conquerors, there is nothing more illustrious then the eloquence of Orators; she ruleth states without violence; she governs people without weapons, she works upon their wils with sweetness, she fights and obtains victories without blood-shed; but to arrive at this great height, one must overcome a thousand difficulties, accord art and nature together, conceive strong thoughts, express them in good words, study the humor of the people, learn the secret of forcing their liberties, and of winning their affections. This truth appeareth evidently in the subject we treat of, and every one confesseth, there is nothing harder nor yet more honourable, then for a man to overcome his Passions. For to boot that we are not assisted by any others in this conflict; that fortune which rules as chief in all other combats, cannot favor us in this; that men partake not of glory with us, and that we do at once the office of a common souldier, and of a commander: there is this of anger and some difficulty in it, that we fight against a part of our selves, that our forces are divided, and that nothing

thing encourageth us in this war, but duty and integrity. Upon other occasions men are spurred on by honor, and envie. Oft times choler, when it hath to do with vertue makes up the greatest part of our valour; hope and boldness assist us: and their forces being united, it is almost impossible to be overcome. But when we assail our Passions, our troops are weakned by division; we operate but by one part of our selves: let vertue or worth animate our courage with the best reasons she can; our love to our enemies, makes us faint-hearted, and we are afraid of a victory which must cost us the loss of our delights. For though our Passions be irregular, and that they trouble our quiet; these cease not to make up a part of our soul; though their insolency dislike us, we cannot resolve to tear out our bowels; unless we be assisted by grace; self-love doth betray us, and we spare rebels because they are our Allies. But that which augments the difficulty, and which makes the victory more uncertain, is the power of our enemies; for though they held no intelligence with our soul, though they should not by their cunning, divide her forces, and though she should set upon them with all her might, they are

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of such a nature as they may be weakned and yet not overcome; they may be worsted, yet not routed, for they are so streightly joyned with us, as they cannot be parted from us. Their life is bound up with ours, and by a strange fate, they cannot dye unless we dye with them. So as this victory is never intire, and these rebels are never so much quelled, but that upon the first occasion they will frame a new army, and give us battel again. They are *Hydra's* which thrust up as many heads as are cut off, they are so many *Antæusse's* who gather strength from their weaknes, and who rise up the stronger, after they have been beaten down; all the advantage which one can expect upon such unruly subjects, is to clap irons upon their hands and feet, and leave them no more power then what is requisite for the service of Reason. We must treat them as we do gally-slaves, who draw alwaies their iron chains after them, and who have only the use of their armes to row; Or if you will deal with them more favourably, you must be well assured of their fidelity, and remember a maxime which I approve not of, save in this case, that reconciled enemies ought alwaies to be had in suspition.

If

If the difficulty which accompaineth this combate astonish us, the glory which ensues thereupon ought to incourage us; for the Heavens behold nothing of more Illustrious, nor doth the earth bear any thing of more glorious, then a man who commands his Passions; No crown is sufficient to adorn his head, all praises come short of his merit, nothing but eternity can recompense so exalted a vertue; the very shadows thereof, are pleasing, and the truth thereof is so beautiful, that men adore the semblance. We do not reverence *Socrates*, nor *Cato*, but for that they had some tincture thereof, nor do we place them in the number of the Sages, save for that they have triumphed over our weakest Passions. The glory of these great men is purer then that of *Alexander* or *Pompey*; their victory never made widow or orphan, their conquests have not layed kingdoms waste, their combats have neither caused the shedding of blood, nor of teares; and in the gaining of their liberty, they have neither taken prisoner nor made slave; a man reads all their actions with delight, and in all the course of their harmless life, one meets not with any objects of horour. They are born for the worlds

good,

good, they have laboured for the quiet of all men; there is not any nation that maligns their happiness, nor which rejoyceth at their death. What honor can a conqueror hope for, who owes all his greatness to his injustice? who is only famous for being criminal; and of whom no mention would have been made in history, had he not slain men, burnt towns, ruined provinces, and dispeopled whole kingdoms.

Those who have only warred with their Passions enjoy a much more reall good, and these innocent conquerors receive more glorious praises from us. We raise them above all Monarcks; and if they have lived in the Church, we place them in Heaven when they are dead; we take their actions for examples to our selves, we borrow their weapons to fight with the enemies which they have vanquished, we reade their lines, as conquerors do those of the *Cæsars*, we conform our selves to their vertue, and we observe the good maximes which they have held, the innocent wils that they have practised, and the high design which they have undertaken, that we may obtain like famous victories. Their most-assured maximes, were not to trust

to

to their own strength, to implore aide from Heaven, and to hope for more from grace, then from nature. If thou wilt overcome (saith Saint *Augustine*) presume not upon thy self, but give the honour of the victory to him from whom thou expectests the crown. Their more ordinary wils were to prevent their Passions, to take from them their strength, that they might take their courage from them, to set upon them in their birth, and not to expect till age had made them stronger. Their most memorable enterprises, were to over run their enemies grounds, to consider their countenance, to mark their designs, and to cut off all objects that could make them move. These means would succeed happily unto us, if we would make use of them, and we shall not want assistance; since all the morall vertues, are so many faithful allies; who fight for our liberty, and which furnish us with weapons to subdue our Passions.

Si vis vincere noli de te præsumere, sed illi assigna victoriæ gloriam qui tibi donat ut victoriæ referas palmam. August Serm: 2. de catechismo.

THE

The second Discourse.

That there is no more miserable slave then he who suffers himself to be guided by his Passions.

Liberty is so pleasing, and servitude so irkesome, as a man may say without fear of exaggeration, that as the one is the chiefest of all that is good, the other is the chiefest of all that is bad: the people have fought for the preservation of the one, and to defend themselves from the other, nature seems to have perswaded them, 'tis better to dye in liberty, then live in servitude. Our Ancestors were so tender in this point, as they could not endure the Roman authority. They were the last that subjected themselves thereunto, and the first that free'd themselves from it. Had not the Heavens made *Julius Cæsar* of purpose to conquer them they had never been slaves to Rome; but yet they had this of consolation in their misfortune, that under

under the conduct of that great *Prince*, they revenged themselves of the Republique that had opposed them, and made her suffer servitude, which had made them lose their liberty. Though this evil be so tedious, and the good it deprives us of so pleasing, it is not comparable to that which the tyrranny of Passions causeth in us. And it must be granted, that of as many slaves as are in the world, there is none more unhappy, then those who obey such cruell Masters.

For the rest are free in their noblest part, 'tis only their bodies which gron under the irons, and which feels the rigour of slavery; their wills are not constrained; when they are commanded any thing that contradicts their honour, or which offends their conscience, they may defend themselves from it by a noble refusal, and buy their liberty with the loss of their life. But these are slaves even in the bottom of their souls, they cannot dispose either of their thoughts, or their desires, they lose; in this infamous servitude, that which captives preserve in prisons, and that which tyrants cannot rob their enemies of.

Corpus est quod dominio fortuna tradidit, hoc emit, hoc vendit, interior illa pars mancipio dari non potest. Senec. benefic. lib. 3. cap. 20.

The others may quit their masters, and leaving their houses, or their territories,

go

go into places of freedom, where they may breathe the ayr of liberty: But these, though they change countreys, change not condition; they are slaves under Crowns, they serve their Passions whilest they command their subjects, and whithersoever they go, they drag their chains after them, and carry their masters with them. The others long after liberty, and employ their credit to obtain it: If this fail them, misery opens their understanding, and necessity, which is the mother of Invention, furnisheth them with means to free themselves; but these wretches have so far lost theirs, as they have not so much as retained the desire thereof. They love their servitude, they kiss their irons, and being strangely blinded, they fear the end of their imprisonment, and dread their deliverance.

The others have but one master, and amongst so many mischiefs which afflict them, they hope to sweeten their captivity, by gaining the favor of him who commands them: they promise unto themselves, that by their assiduous service, they may regain their liberty; they flatter themselves in the thought thereof, and think that a slave who hath but one man to content, cannot be always unhappy: But these have as many masters

masters to serve as Passions to satisfie; the end of one servitude, is the beginning of another; and when they think they have escaped a surly government, they fall under an insolent tyranny; for their change is never advantageous to them: the last Master is always more cruel then the former: Oft times they command altogether, and as their designes do not agree, they divide these unhappy slaves, and force them to serve their wills, and to tear out their bowels, to obey rather contrary, then differing orders. Sometimes ambition and love unite their flames to devour them, fear and hope set joyntly upon them, sorrow and delight are reconciled together to afflict them; and one may say, That every Master is a Hangman which torments them, and that every order they receive, is a new punishment unto them. They have not one quiet hour, their Passions persecute them day and night: And these revengeful furies, change all the delights of these miserable men into cruel torments.

Malus etiam si regnet servus est, nec unius hominis sed quod gravius est, tot dominorum, quot vitiorum. August. lib. 4. de Civitate Dei. cap. 3.

What more deplorable thing can there be, then to see *Alexander* possest by his ambition, and see him lose his judgment, to satisfie this irregular Passion. For can one think he was indued with Reason, who be-

An tu putas sanum qui à Græcia primũ cladibus in qua eruditus est, incepit, qui Lacedæmoniã servire jubet, Athenas tacere. Senec. Epist. 94.

gan his exploits, by the ruine of *Greece*, and who more unjust then the *Persians*, silenced the Town of *Athens*, made that of *Lacedemon* serve, and ruinated the Country, which (to no purpose) had taught him Philosophy?

This very fury made him overrun the world, commit spoyls throughout all *Asia*, penetrate the *Indies*, pass the Seas, be angry with nature, which by the limits thereof did bound his conquests, and force him to end his designes, where the Sun finisheth his course. Who is not affected with pity, to see *Pompey*, who drunk with love of a false greatness, undertakes civil and forreign wars? Sometimes he passes into *Spain* to oppress *Sertorious*, sometimes scoures the Seas to free them from Pyrats, sometimes he flies into *Asia*, to fight with *Mithridates*. He ransacks all the Provinces of that great part of the world; makes himself enemies, where he findes none: After so many fights and victories, 'tis he alone that thinks himself not great enough; and though men give him that name, he thinks he deserves it not, unless *Julius Cæsar* confess it. Who hath not compassion for this man, who was not so much the slave, as martyr of ambition? For he prostituted

stituted his honor, to get power; he became slave to his army, that he might be master of the Senate; he vowed the destruction of his Countrey, to revenge himself of his son in law: Seeing no other State, 'gainst which he could exercise his cruelty, he imployed it against the *Republike*, and would merit the name of *Patricide*, that he might obtain that of Soveraign. He never had any motions, save those that ambition gave him. If he pardoned his enemies, 'twas but onely out of vainglory; and if he bewailed the death of *Cato*, and *Pompey*, it was perhaps for that the honor of his victory was lessened. All his thoughts were ambitious. When he saw the Image of *Alexander*, he wept not, save onely for that he had not yet shed blood enough. Whatsoever offered it self to his eyes, awakened his Passions; and Objects which would have taught others modesty, inspired him with pride and insolency. Briefly, *Cæsar* commanded over his army, and ambition commanded over *Cæsar*, she had such power over him, as the foretelling of his death did not make him change his designe; and doubtlessly, he would have answered for himself to the Soothsayers, as *Agrippina* answered for her son to the A-

strologers, Let him kill me, provided, he may raign.

If servitude be so irksome in ambition, 'tis much more shameful in obscenity. It must be confest, That a man who is possest by this infamous Passion, hath neither Reason nor liberty, and that being inslaved to love, he is no more master of himself. Did not *Cleopatra* govern *Mark-Anthony*? might not this *Princess* boast her self to have revenged *Egypt* upon *Italy*, and to have subjected the *Roman* Empire, by putting him under her laws, who governed it? This unfortunate man lived only at the pleasure of this stranger, he did nothing but by her motions; and never did slave labour so much to win the good will of his master, as this effeminate Prince to win the like of his proud mistris. He gave all his charges by her directions, and the best part of the *Roman* Empire, groaned under the government of a woman. He durst not overcome in the battel of *Actium*, and rather chose to forgoe his army then his love. He was the first commander that abandoned his souldiers, and who would not make use of their courage to defeat his enemy; but what could one expect from a man who had no more any heart, and who far enough from

from fighting, could not so much as live, if parted from *Cleopatra*. In brief read the story of all the great ones, and you will finde their Passions have enflamed them, and that in the height of their fortune, they have made use of all the punishments that tyranny could invent, to afflict those that she oppresseth. Therefore ought all men to make use of Reason and grace, to shun the fury of these insolent masters; every one ought resolve in his particular, rather to lose his life, then his liberty, and to prefer a glorious death before a shameful servitude. But without coming to these extreams in this combate; a will to overcome is sufficient to be victorious; for God hath permitted, that our good fortune depend upon our will together with his grace; and that our Passions should have no further power over us, then we shall give them, since in effect experience teacheth us that they beat us not but by our own weapons, and that they make us not their slaves, but by our own consent

The third Discourse.

That to govern Passions a man must moderate them.

THough Passions be ordained for the service of vertue and that there is not any one of them, the use whereof may not be advantageous to us, we must notwithstanding confess, that we need dexterity to govern them, and that in the state whereinto sin hath reduced our nature, they cannot be useful to us, unless moderated; that unhappy forefather of ours, who made us to inherit his fault, hath not left us so pure a being as he had when he received it from God. The body and soul suffer pain, and as they were both guilty, so are they both punished. The understanding hath its errors, the will her irregular inclinations, the memory her weakness. The body, which is the channel through which original sin passeth into the soul

soul, hath its misery, and though it be the less faulty, yet is it the more unfortunate; all that is in it, is out of order; the senses are seduced by objects, these help to abuse Imagination, which excites disorders in the inferior part of the soul, and raiseth Passions, so as they are no longer in that obedience, wherein original justice kept them; and though they be subject to the Empire of Reason, yet they so mutiny, as they are not to be brought within the compass of their duty, but by force or cunning. They are born to obey the understanding, but they easily forget their condition; and the commerce which they hold with the senses, is the cause why they oft times prefer their advises at the commandements of the will. They raise themselves up with such might, as their natural motions are for the most part violent. They are horses which have more of fury then of force. They are seas which are oftner troubled then calm. In fine they are parts of our selves, which cannot serve the understanding till it hath allayed or tamed them.

This ought not to seeme strange to those that know what spoyl sin hath made in our nature; and the very *Philosophers*, who confess that vertue is an art which must be

learnt, will not finde it unjust that the Passions be not obedient, unless governed by Reason.

To execute so great a designe, a man must imitate nature and art, and consider what means they use to finish their work. Nature which doth all by the Elements, and who of these four bodies composeth all others, never imploys them till she hath tempered their qualities. As they cannot suffer together, and that their natural antipathy ingages them to fight: this wise mother, by allaying their aversions, appeaseth their differences, and never unites them, till she hath weakened them. Art, which is not invented so much to perfect nature, as to imitate her, observes the same rules, and imploys nothing in her workmanship, till it be tempered by her industry. Painting would not be so cryed up, had it not found out the secret of reconciling black with white, and so pacifie the natural discord of these two colours, to compose all others thereof. The riders of the great horse, have no service from their horses, till they have broke them; and that they may be useful, they must be taught to answer the bridle and the spur. Lyons were never made use of to draw triumphant, Chariots till they were

were tamed; and Elephants bore not Towers upon their backs in fights, till they were rid of the savage humor which they brought from the woods.

All these examples are documents for the government of our Passions, and Reason ought to imitate nature if she will be advantaged thereby. They must not be imployed till moderated; and he who shall think to make them serviceable to vertue, before he hath subjugated them by grace, will ingage himself in a perilous designe. In the state of innocency, when they had nothing of unruly in them, one might make use of them as they were born; they never surprised the will: As original justice was as well shed throughout the body, as throughout the soul; The senses made no false reports, and their advices being uninterressed, they were always conformable to the judgment of Reason. But now, that all things in man are faulty, that the body and the soul are equally corrupted, that the senses are subject to a thousand illusions, and that imagination favors their disorders; we must have great precaution in the use of Passions.

The first is to consider, what troubles their revolt hath caused in our soul, and in how

how many mischiefs these mutineers have ingaged us, when they have onely been led on by our eyes or ears: 'Tis a piece of wisdom to reap advantage by our losses, and to become wise at our own cost. The justest choler flies out sometimes, if not withheld by Reason; though her motion was lawful in its birth, it becomes criminal in the progress thereof. It turns a good cause into a bad one; for not having consulted with the superior part of the soul; and thinking to punish a slight fault, it commits a great one. Fear hath oft times astonished us, for having onely listened to the senses, she maketh us look pale upon a thousand occasions, without any just cause; and sometimes she hath engaged us in real dangers, to make us shun those that were but imaginary. As then our Passions have deceived us, for our not having askt counsel of our Reason, we must resolve never to believe them any more, till we have examined, whether that which they desire, or that which they fear, be reasonable, and whether the understanding, which sees further then our eyes, cannot discover the vanity of our hopes or fears.

The second precaution, is to obliege Reason, to watch always over such subjects as may

may excite our Passions, and to consider their nature, and motions, to the end that she may never be surprised. Harms foreseen hurt but a little, and we are but seldom astonished at such accidents, against which we are prepared. A Pilot who sees a storm coming, withdraws into the Haven; or if he be too far from it, he launcheth into the deep, and keeps aloof from coasts, or rocks. A father who knows that his children are mortal, and that life hath no longer term then what it hath pleased God to give, will never take on too much at their loss. A Prince who considers, that victory depends more upon Fortune then his Wisdom, and more on chances then on the valor of his Souldiers, will easily be comforted though he hath been beaten: But we make not use of our understanding, and methinks, if our Passions be out of order, Reason ought to be accused thereof, for not having foreseen the danger, and for not having prepared our fences against their surprisals.

The third precaution is, to study the nature of such Passions, as we take in hand to moderate or govern. For some must be rudely delt withal; and to reduce them to their duty, severity and violence must be made use of; others will be flattered, and they

they must be gently delt withal, to make them obedient to Reason. Though they be subjects, they are not slaves, and the understanding which governs them, is rather their father then their Soveraign. Others would be cousened; and though Vertue be so generous, she is tyed to accommodate her self to the weakness of Passions, and to make use of wiles; when force will not prevail. Love is of this nature, we must divert it; not being able to banish it from out of our hearts, we must lay before it legitimate objects, and make it vertuous by an innocent cousenage: Choler would be flattered, and who thinks to oppose this torrent by making a dam, hath but augmented its fury. Fear and sorrow ought to be rudely delt withal; and of these two Passions, the former is so faint-hearted, as it is not to be overcome but by force; and the second is so opinionated, as it is not to be brought within rule, but by provocation. These means being well observed, the affections of our soul may be sweetened. These savage beasts become domestick: When they have lost their natural fierceness, Reason makes good use of them, and Vertue shapes no designe which she executes without their mediation.

The

The fourth Discourse.

That in what condition soever our Passions be, they may be governed by Reason.

THough nature be so liberal, she ceaseth not to be a good housewife, and to imploy with profit that which she hath abundantly produced; all her parts have their use, and amongst the infinite number of creatures which do compose the world, there is not any one which hath not its use. Those which do us no service, contribute to our pleasures; the most beautiful, and most delightful serve to adorn the world, and the very deformed entertain her variety.

As shadows set off colours; uglines gives a lustre to beauty, and Monsters which are the defect of nature, make her chiefest works and miracles be esteemed. There is nothing more pernitious then poison; and were not sin barren, one would take

take it for one of its production, since it seems to agree with the other, to make all men dye. Yet hath it its use; Physick makes Antidotes thereof, and there are certain sicknesses which cannot be cured but by prepared poisons: use hath turned them into nourishment. And if there have been Princes whom poison could not kill; beasts who bear it about in their bodies, cannot live without it; that which is pernicious to us, is so necessary to them, as they cannot be bereft of it without loss of life. This is that which makes all *Philosophers* grant with Saint *Augustine*; that venome is no evil, since it is natural to scorpions and vipers, and that they dye when they lose it, as we do when we take it.

Si Scorpionis venenum malum esset, prius scorpionem perimeret; ac contra si ei aliquo modo detrahatur, sine dubitatione interiret, ergo illius corpori malum est amittere quod nostro malum est recipere, et illi bonum est habere id quo nobis bonum est cavere. August. lib: de moribus. cap. 8.

If our adversaries would have the motions of our soul, to pass for poisons, or monsteous; this Reason will enforce them to confess, that they are not so absolutely evil, but that they may be prepared as wel as poysons, and Antidotes made thereof to cure our maladies; or to continue our health. For consider them how you please, and give them what countenance you like best to make them hideous, Reason will alwaies finde a way to make use of them; and this great steward of our good and bad,

bad, can so wisely husband them, that in despight of sin, which hath disordered them, she will draw advantage and glory from them.

If we look upon them in their birth, they are tractable affections, and but of weak resistance, and which by a little instruction become docile, and obedient. They are children which are frighted with words; and who for fear of a small punishment, amend their evil inclinations, and advantage their masters councels. They are young grafts, which an ill wind hath made crooked; but which are easily set aright with a little care, and which not being yet become inflexible, will be bowed contrary to their natural inclination. Neither would the Platonists have the name of the Passions given to these disorders in their birth; and knowing, that they were easily governed, they were contented to call them affections, without giving them a more injurious title.

If we consider them when they are grown older, when making use of our weakness, they have gotten new forces, and of simple affections, are become violent Passions; we must treat them in order to their proper interests, and feeding them with

with hope of pleasure, or glory, draw them to what is good, and divert them from evil. For in their greatest revolt, they reserve always an inclination to vertue, and an abhorrition to sin; they are only faulty as they are abused: Take away the fillet wherewith their eyes are blinded, and that will suffice to redress their motions, and correct their errors. Sin hath not been able so far to dishonor nature, but that she hath always kept the grounds of her inclinations; she always loves what is good, and hateth evil eternally; she pursues glory and shuns infamy; she wisheth pleasure, and fears pain; all her motions are as natural as innocent. The divel, who very well sees this disorder is pernitious to his designes; and that this impression, which is set on by the hand of God, cannot be defaced, changeth our Passions; and not being able to corrupt them, he endeavoreth to abuse them; he propounds unto them appearing good, for what is real; he disguiseth sin, and puts upon it the cloak of Vertue. And as thus hoodwinkt, they cannot discern falshood from truth, they confound evil with good, and by a deplorable misfortune, they love what they ought to hate, and hate what they ought to love. Their cure consists in disabusing

disabusing them; for how firmly soever they be tyed to these disguised objects, they will flie from them as soon as they shall be made to know, what is beautiful, and what is il-favored; and following their first inclinations, they will abhor their blindness, and will forgo the appearing good to embrace the true one. We ought to comfort our selves in our misfortune, since that the nature of Passions is not altogether changed; that since the disobedience of our forefathers, and the hatred of his enemy, they retain notwithstanding some purity; and that in all their disorder, there is more of error, then of malice.

If in fine, we consider them in their extream violence, and in the condition wherein they throw about so much smoke and flame, as they darken Reason, and force her to give over the government of them, 'tis hard to make good use of them; for they seem to have changed condition, as having sided with sin, they deserve to carry her name, and rather to be termed troubles and commotions then Passions. They are so insolent, as they despise all counsel; insteed of taking law from the understanding, they will give it; and of natural subjects, become insupportable Tyrants. When the

mischief is risen to this height, 'tis very hard to remedy it; and one may be said to have made all desperate, through too long expectation; for Passions will listen no longer, and Reason is so troubled, as she can prescribe them further rules; the waves rise up even unto Heaven: that part of man which ought always to be at quiet, is ingaged in the storm, and had need of others help to appease the troubles she is agitated withal. Truly I do not believe, any Philosopher dare undertake to cure a man in this phrensie; remedies will make his malady the worse: There is nothing but time that can lessen it; and it is to be wisht for, that this torrent may finde room enough wherein to extend in waters, and to dissipate the fury thereof. But when this tempest is appeased, when the Passions are a little calmed, and when Reason hath gotten a little light and strength, the evilness of his condition must be laid before him; he must be made blush for his offence, and these slavish rebels must be roundly chid; but above all, he must humble himself before God, inrich himself by his losses, and become wise at his cost. He ought also to look, by what part the enemy hath entred; what cunning he hath used to exercise sedition,

and

and debauch his subjects; thus we shall be bettered by our greatest misfortunes: We shall learn by experience, that storms may bring into the Haven; and that if there be some waves that drown men, there are some which throw them upon the bank: But as there is no Saylor, who will run this hazard, to obliege the Heavens to do a miracle in his behalf; no man ought to expose himself to this disorder, that he may reap profits thereby; and it is better to want an uncertain good, then to buy it by an assured loss.

In consideration of these truths, we may affirm our condition is not so deplorable as those imagine it to be, who will excuse their sin upon their misery: Since our good fortune is in our own power, and that we sail upon a Sea, the calm or tempest whereof depends upon our will; we may shun the Rocks the Sea hides, asswage the fury of the winds which make it go high, bring low the waves which it raiseth, and make a calm succeed a storm; or by a more lucky application, we may make those Rocks hide their heads, those Seas to bear our Vessels, and those winds to conduct them. But to leave this figurative maner of speech, let us say, there are no Objects which we may not

set at naught, no opinions which we may not correct, nor no Passions which we may not overcome. Thus our fortune is at our own disposal, the victory depends upon our own weapons, our good fortune is fastened to our desire, and a little courage onely requisite to compass all these goods.

The fifth Discourse.

What meanes a man must use to moderate his Passions.

AMongst many other means, which Reason may make use of to govern our Passions, the most ordinary seem to be those, which she hath learnt from hunting, where men make use of beasts already tamed to take wild ones; and where to sport themselves, they use the courage of dogs, against the rage of wolves. So may it seem to be lawful to imploy such Passions, as are most submiss, against those which are most rebellious, and to make use of our reconciled enemies, to vanquish

vanquish those which yet war against us. Men oppose joy to sorrow, surpress fear by hope, moderate delights by the pain which ensues thereupon. Sometims also men consider such Passions as produce others. To drayn Rivers, men endeavour to dry up the spring-heads from whence they derive; and to destroy causes that they may ruine their effects. Who ceaseth to hope ceaseth to fear; who bounds his desires, bounds his hopes, and who covets not riches, will not be disquieted, nor have any fears for them. Sometimes also a man may set upon that particular Passion which bears most sway with him, that he may vanquish those that fight under the others colours, and the victory is had by one blow; by the Generals death the whole army is defeated. But though all these be specious means, and that they promise unto us, either a sound peace or a long truce, yet are they deceivers, and make us undertake things either unjust, impossible, or dangerous. For there is danger in fortifying one enemy to destroy another, and there is no great assurance in furnishing a Passion with weapons, which may as well make use of them to oppose Reason, as in her behalf. 'Tis unjust to oppose the

Desines timere si sperare desieris Senec. Epistola 5.

Cum affectus repercussit affectum, aut metus aut cupiditas aliquid imperavit non rationis beneficio tunc quievit, sed affectuum infida et mala pace. Seneca de Ira, lib. 1. cap. 8.

one against the other, since they ought to hold intelligence together. For though a *Polititian* be permitted to make war, that peace may ensue, and to put division amongst such enemies, whose agreement may prove prejudicial to us, morality is not suffered to sow discord amongst her subjects under a vain hope of according them when they shall be weakned. In fine, to endeavor to choak one Passion, thereby to overcome the rest which proceed from thence, is to attempt an impossibility: they may well be moderated, not destroyed; they proceed from the union of our soul with our body; and to take away their life, the like must be done to man who produceth them. Our Passions are much more intimate to us then are our members; a man may cut off these when they are infected, he cannot cut off the others when they are disobedient. Also the greatest part of these advises are given us by suspected persons: these bad Reasons come from the *Stoicks* school, who look upon Passions as enemies to our quiet, and who indeavour not to regulate, but to annihilate them. They are perswaded it fares with them, as with savage beasts, which are never so well tamed, but that they alwaies preserve

preserve somewhat of their first fierceness, and that to reduce the soul into perfect tranquility, they ought not to be allayed, but destroyed.

To resolve these difficulties, we must remember that Reason is king over Passions; that their Government is one of her chief employments, and that she is bound to watch more particularly over those which by their motions carry others along with them: For as their revolt is followed by an universal Rebellion, their obedience seems likewise to cause a general peace, and that they never acknowledg Reason, but when they reduce together with themselves, all those Passions which they had raised up.

One may very well sometimes oppose pleasure to grief, hope to fear, and inclination to aversion; but in this combate Reason must take heed, lest by weakening one Passion, she adde too much strength unto another; and that whilest she would reduce a mutineer to obedience, she do not augment the number of Rebels. When she undertakes these affairs, she must hold the Scales in her hand, and remember that God (whom she imitateth) doth all his Works by weight and measure; and

when he tempers the qualities of the Elements, to the end that he may agree them, he doth no advantage to one whereby another is prejudiced. We may likewise well assail the Passion that masters us, and which we acknowledg to be the cause of our disorders: For it is a Familiar which possesseth us; 'tis a Tyrant which useth not his power, save in order to his own interest; and who is so much the more dangerous, as that he endeavors to become welcome. Reason is bound to oppugne him as a publike enemy, and to imploy all her might, if not to destroy him, at least to weaken him.

I see not notwithstanding how she can with security make use of other Passions to tame him; for they are too neer allyed unto him, to set upon him; and when men shall think to make use of them to his destruction, he will have dexterity enough to make them serve, for his own preservation.

But not to leave so dangerous an evil without a remedy, I should think it good to cut off the objects which nourish it, and to get the upper hand of an enemy, by starving him, whom we could not over-

come

come by force. For though our Passions are born with us, that they borrow their strength from our constitution; and that those which are the most natural, are hardest to overcome; yet they draw their nourishment from exterior things; and if they be not entertained by Objects, they either die or pine away.

Ambition doth not greatly torment us in solitude; and when she sees not the greatness of Towns, the pride of Buildings, the pomp of Triumphs, she forgets the memory of glory; and this fire not having wherewithal longer to nourish it, consumes and goes out of it self: Grief and sadness are strengthened in darkness; her obscure Chambers hung with mourning, conspire with her to afflict us.

Men who make use thereof, seem to be afraid to forget their sorrow; and that they would have all things they cast their eye upon, to call to minde their loss: If we put these sad Objects far from us, Nature will grow weary of weeping; and though she be irregular, by reason of sin, she will solace her self when she shall see nothing which entertains her dislike.

What

What hath been said of Sadness and Ambition, may be affirmed of all other Passions, which are not stubborn, but as being ayded by our own cunning; and as we labor to increase them, so to become more miserable.

The

The fourth Treatise.

Of the commerce of Passions with vertues and vices.

The first Discourse.

That Passions are the Seeds of Vertue.

Since most men consider but the appearances of things, we must not wonder if the *Stoicks* have had so many admirers; and if their proud maximes have been received with so much approbation and applause: For nothing of more noble or generous can be imagined, then is their Philosophy, as it appears to be. She promiseth to change men into Angels, to raise

raise them above a mortal condition, and to put storms and thunder under their feet. She boasts to cure them of all their evils, and to free them from those vexatious disorders, which molest the souls tranquility: all those fair promises have brought forth none effects, and these proud billows, after having made such noyse, are turned to fome. Certainly we ow thanks to Providence, which hath rendered their endeavors vain; For if they had made good their words, they had deprived us of all those ayds which nature hath endowed us withal, to make us vertuous; and the inferior part of our soul had remained without, either exercise, or merit; for the Passions are the motions thereof, they carry her whether she mindeth to go, and without loosening her from her body, they joyn her to the Objects which she looks after, or keep her aloof from those she desires to shun. Joy is her blooming and displaying, sorrow is her contraction and pain, desire is her seeking, and fear her eschuing; for when we are merry our soul dilates it self, when afflicted, she contracts her self, when we desire, she seems to advance, and when we fear, she seems to retire, insomuch, as those who will take the Passions from the soul, take away all her motions,

Affectiones nostræ motus animorum sunt, lætitia animi diffusio, tristitia animi contractio, cupiditas animi progressio: Diffunderis enim animo cùm lætaris, contraheris animo cùm molestaris, progrederis animo cum appetis, fugis animo cum metuis. Aug. super Joan. Serm. 5.

motions, and under colour of rendring her happy, make her unprofitable and unable. I know no rational man that would purchase felicity at so deer a rate, and I know no true man that would promise it upon so hard a condition: For if happiness consist in action, and if to be content, a man must taste the good which he possesseth; there is none but will avow, That Passions are necessary to our soul, and that joy must perfect the felicity which desire hath begun.

Those who side with the *Stoicks*, will tell us peradventure, That these Philosophers condemn not such desires as arise from the love of vertue, nor the joy that accompanies the fruition thereof; but that they blame onely those irregular wishes, that we make every day for riches and honor; and that consequently they blame the vain contentment which their accomplishment brings us.

This answer weakens their Maximes, and confirms ours; for it admitteth of Passions, and onely forbids their excess: It admits of desires and hopes, and onely rejects their disorder; and to end all in few words, It healeth the malady of our affections, and doth not destroy their nature. But the *Stoicks* were

were not so just, and their Philosophy had in it so much of severity, and so little of reason, as it would have a man seek out vertue, without wishing for it, possess it without relishing it, and that being as happy as God himself, he should be voyd of desire, hope or joy. In brief, it had vowed the death of our Passions, and yet this proud Sect did not consider, that in destroying them, they caused the death of all Vertues; for they are the seeds thereof, and by taking a little pain in trimming and pruning of them, they may be made advantageous to us.

In optimo quoque antequam erudias, virtutis materia non virtus est, Senec. Epist. 91.

Though man be not born vertuous, and that art which teacheth him to become so, be as difficult as it is glorious; he seemeth notwithstanding to know before he learneth it, that his understanding hath the principals of truth, and his will the seeds of Vertue. That as science (according to the Platonicks) is but a remembrance, or calling to minde; her good habits, are but natural inclinations. For all his Passions are budding Vertues, and if he take a little care to perfect them, they become compleat Vertues: Is not fear which foresees evil and shunneth it, natural wisdom? Is not choler, which takes up arms in the behalf of good

against

against the enemy thereof, a shadow of Justice? Is not desire which serves us from our selves, to joyn us with somewhat that is better, an image of Charity, which takes us from the earth to raise us up to Heaven? What must be added to boldness, to make thereof true fortitude? And what difference is there between sorrow and repentance? Save onely, that the one is the meer workmanship of nature, and the other the production of Grace; but both of them are afflicted with evil, and they oft times mingle their tears to bewail the same sin.

In fine, There are no Passions which may not become Vertues; and as they have inclinations to what is good, and aversions from what is evil, they need but a little Government to make them change Conditions.

The good Application of a mans love, is sufficient to make all his Passions Innocent; and without taking so much pain to love aright, is onely requisite to make us happy in this world.

Since Vertue (saith St. *Augustine*) is the habit of a well governed minde: We are but to moderate our affections, that they may be changed into Vertues: For when our

Quoniam virtus est habitus mentis bene composita, componendi, instituendi, atque ordinandi sunt animi affectus ad id quod debent, ut in virtutes proficere possint: Cum ergo prudenter, modeste, fortiter, & juste amor & odium instituuntur, in virtutes exurgunt, scilicet prudentiam, temperantiam, fortitudinem & Justitiam. Auguſt. lib. de Spiritu & anima, cap. 1.

our hatred, and our love, which are the spring-heads of all other Passions, shall be wisely, modestly, strongly, and justly guided, they will become rare Vertues, and will be converted into wisdom, temperance, fortitude, and justice. Is it not then a barbarous thing, to go about to strangle Passions, which have such affinity with Vertue, and which without much labor may be raised to so noble a Condition? Is it not ingratitude to mistake the advantages, which we have received from Nature; and is it not injustice to give infamous names to these innocent Subjects, which being well managed by Reason, might merit such glorious Titles?

'Tis then an indubitable maxime amongst the Philosophers, That Passions are the seed of Vertues, and that they have no more noble imployment, then to arm themselves in their behalf, to fight their quarrels, and to revenge them of their enemies. As mothers are never more couragious, then in the defence of their children; the affections of our soul are never more vigorous, then when they defend their products against Vices. This praise puzzels the brains of all the *Stoicks*. And *Seneca* could not endure that Vertues Army should be composed of souldiers

souldiers that could mutiny; he will not have us imploy Passions in her service, because some few have been found which have injured her authority. Certainly if all Princes were so obdurate as is this *Philosopher*, they would finde few souldiers, and they must cashier all their troops, because formerly they have found some of them unfaithful. The negligence of Princes is oft times cause why the souldiers mutiny, and the weakness of Reason is almost alwaies the cause of the revolt of Passions.

In true *Philosophy* the soul must be rather accused then the body, and the Soveraign rather blamed then the subjects. Who sees not that fear is watchful for vertue, that she alwaies mingles her self as a spy amongst the enemies, to finde out their designs; that all her reports are faithful, and that we are for the most part unhappy only for having neglected them? who knows not that hope strengthens us, and that she encourageth us to the understanding of glorious and difficult designs? who doth not confess that boldness and choler despise danger, suffering hardness, and setting even upon death, that they may be serviceable to Patience and fortitude? What vertues would

not become weak, were they abandoned by Passions; how oft hath the fear of infamy infused courage into souldiers who were seeking how shamefully to run away? how oft hath shamefastnes preserved Chastity, and kept both maids and married women within their duty, when avarice and wantonnes hath endeavoured to corrupt them? how oft hath indignation encouraged judges against the guilty, who were made insolent in their misdemeanor, by the protection of great ones?

Nunquam virtus vitio adjuvenda est, se contenta, Seneca. lib. 1. de ira, cap: 9.

Let the *Stoicks* then confess, that vertues owe their welfare to Passions; and let them not tell us any more that they are too generous to implore aide from their slaves. But let us tell them, they are too full of acknowledgment, to despise such faithful friends; and that they will never make a difficulty in accepting them for their allies, when ever they will assail the common enemy, vice. I had rather follow *Aristotles* opinion then *Seneca's*, and rather govern Passions then destroy them. This man out of an excessive pride will not have vertue to stand in need of any thing; and that the wiseman who is thereof possest, may be happy, even contrary to the will of God himself; he will have his happines to be so firmly grounded

grounded, that the heavens cannot overturn it; and to judg by his words, it seems that insolency and impiety are the first requisite dispositions for the acquiring of wisdome; the other on the contrary acknowledgeth his weakness, useth such help as nature hath afforded him; and knowing very well that he is composed of a soul and body, he endeavoureth to imploy them both in the exercise of vertue. He confesseth we cannot undertake any thing of generous, unless chafed by choler, and that we faint and droop when we are not irritated. But as he very well knows likewise that this Passion hath need of a bridle to hold it back, he ranks it under Reason and makes not use thereof, as of a General, but as of a private souldier. Let us use our Passions thus, let us teach the *Stoicks*, that nature hath made nothing in vain; and that since she hath endued us with fears and hopes, she intends we shall make use of them to acquire vertue, and fight against vice.

Ira necessaria est, nec quidquam sine illa expugnari potest nisi illa impleat animum et spiritum attendat. Aristot. in Senec. lib. 1. de ira, cap. 9.

Utendum autem illâ est, non ut duce sed ut militem. idem ibidem.

The fourth Discourse.

That Passions are the seeds of vice.

IT were to flatter Passions, and deceive men, if after having shewed the good they are capable of doing, we should not shew the evil they can do; and our draught would be partial, if having drawn their perfections we should not likewise set forth their defaults. But that we may not be mistaken in so important a subject, and whereupon our happiness seemeth to depend, we must know that Passions are neither good nor bad, and that, (to speak properly) these two qualities are onely found in the superior power which governs them. As that is only free, it is only good or evil, and as it is the original of merit, it is also the spring-head either of wickedness or goodness. But as the Sun spreads forth his light in the world, and enlightens solid bodies, though it penetrate them not; So doth

doth the will dispence abroad wickedness and goodness, amongst the Passions: and though she do not communicate them fully unto them, yet giveth she them a slight tincture thereof; which is sufficient to make them either innocent or criminal.

For if we examine the qualities that they have received from nature, and if we consider them in that estate which pleads the use of the will, we must acknowledg that they are as well the seeds of vice as of vertue; and that those two contraries are so confused in them, as they are hardly to be discerned. They have an inclination to good; and thus they hold with vertue: They are easily seduced, soon moved, and thus they resemble vice. For we are now no longer in that happy estate of innocency, where the Passions expected their orders only from Reason, and where they never raised themselves, till they had obtained leave; they are become disloyal, and no longer acknowledging the voyce of their soveraign; they obey that first that commands them, and take part as soon with a tyrant as with their legitimate Prince. This error whereinto they often fall, obliegeth us to confess, that they are not much less inclinable to vice, then to vertue; and that

Anima affectus omnium sunt virtutum et virtum quasi quedam principia et communis mater. a. Augustin. lib. de spiritu et anima, cap. 4.

if we may hope for great advantages by them, we ought also to fear notable mischiefs from them. For the same desires which raise us up to Heaven, fasten us to the earth; that which nature hath given us to set us at liberty, casts us in prison, and claps boults upon us. The same hope which flatters us, abuseth us; and that which ought to sweeten our past misfortunes, procureth us new ones; the same choler which bringeth the couragious to the combate, animates the faint-hearted to revenge, and what is generous in war, becomes cruel in peace.

In fine, Passions are not farther distant from vices, then they are from vertues, as in the confusion of the Chaos fire was mingled with water, so is evil mingled with good, in the affections of the soul; and from those fatal mines, iron is as well drawn out, as gold; man ought therefore to keep himself alwaies upon his guard, and knowing that he carryeth about in his bosome, both life and death; it behoveth him to be as circumspect in his comportments, as those who handle poyson, or who walk upon the edge of a precipice.

But that which makes the danger the greater, is; that when these unruly Passions, have

have brought forth a vice, they put themselves in arms to defend it, and serve it with more courage, then do the innocent Passions obey vertue. They are servants which are more cruel then are their masters; Officers which are more furious then the tyrants that set them on work; and they commit more of outrage upon vertue, then doth vice it self. All wars are occasioned by these insolent affections, and he who shall banish love and hatred from off the earth, will finde neither murther, nor adultery there. They furnish the subject of all Tragedies; and though men accuse Poets of fictions, they have committed more errors then the others have invented. But they are never more prejudicial then when they meet in the person of a Prince, and when they abuse soveraign power, to exercise their fury; for then whole States groan under their tyranny, the people are oppresst by their violence, and all parts confess that neither the plague nor the sword are so pernicious, as are Passions when they have got the supream power.

An unlawful love put all *Greece* in Arms; and the flames thereof reduced the goodliest citie of all *Asia* to Ashes. Jealousy between *Cæsar* and *Pompey*, was the loss of

the lives of more then a million of men; the world was divided in their quarrel; their ambition put arms into hands of all people; their unjust war was the ruin of their country, and the loss of the liberty thereof. The world doth yet bemoan this disaster; the spoils of this shipwrack are yet seen; and the states of *Europe* are but so many peeces which did compose the body of that puissant Republique. Ambition when confounded with vertue, is guilty of more murthers then revenge and Choler; though this passion pretend to be generous, she is always stained with blood; whatsoever delight she takes in pardoning, her greatness is grounded upon the ruine of her enemies; she is cause of more deaths then she procureth pardons; and she is the loss of more innocents, then safety of those that are guilty. She astonisheth all the world, when she is seen in the person of an *Alexander*. And it seems nature produced him to no other end, then to teach us what ambition can do, when assisted by fortune: He ruined all Princes who would defend their own States; he treated those as enemies who refused to be his subjects; he could not permit an equal in any place through which he passed: He complained of the Seas that

stopt

stopt the current of his victories, and wisht for a new world, that he might conquer it; If his vain-glory caused so many disorders; his Choler committed no less ransack; and if by the one he revenged himself of his enemies, he rid his hands of his friends by the other; the least suspitions incouraged these passions to revenge; one indiscreet word provoked it; an honest freedom set it a going; and his Choler grew to be so nice, as there was as much danger in doing well, as in saying ill; As he was possessed by all these violences, so did he obey them; he dipped his hands in the blood of his favorites; he took upon him the office of a hangman; and that he might taste all the pleasures of revenge, he himself would be the minister thereof, and with his own hands kill him who had saved his life.

But amongst all the cruelties whereunto his choler oft did perswade him, I know none more infamous then that which he exercised upon Innocent *Calisthines* his condition was a sanctuary to him, and professing Philosophy, it seemed he ought not fear the fury of *Alexander*; the very fault for which he was condemned, was glorious; and had it happened in the time

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of true religion, it would have passed for an eminent vertue; For he defended the cause of his gods, and was of opinion that Temples could not be built to his Prince without provoking the gods against him; he guided himself so dextriously in so tickliſh a busineſs, as that whileſt he preſerved the honor of Heaven, he flattered *Alexanders* humor, and by an admirable peece of cunning, he accorded flattery with piety: for if the reaſons which *Quintus Curtius* alleageth, be true, he repreſented unto the *Macedonians*, that ſince men could not diſpoſe of Crowns, they ought not to diſpoſe of Altars; that ſince they made not kings, they ought not goe about to make Gods; and that when humane vanity would attribute unto it ſelf that power, ſhe could not make uſe thereof till after the death of ſuch as ſhe would deify; that to receive adoration from men, one muſt keep far from any commerce with them, and loſe his life to purchaſe a divinity. That *Alexander* was yet neceſſary to them, and that he ought not to mount into the heavens, till he had conquered all the earth. This ſhort Oration was able to have oblieged the moſt ambitious of mankinde; yet did it offend the vain-glory of

Intervallo opus eſt ut quis credatur Deus, ſemperque hanc gratiam magnis viris poſteri reddunt: Ego autem ſeram immortalitatem precor Regi, ut vita diuturna ſit et æternam ajeſtas: hominem conſequitur aliquando, nunquam comitatur Divinitas. Curtius, l. 8. circa medium.

of this Prince, and so far provoked his Choler, as not many dayes after he caused this Philosopher to be put to death, not allowing him liberty to defend himself. This murder drew upon him the hatred of all *Greece*; and as *Parmenio's* death had exasperated all the souldiers, this of *Callisthines* did much more all the Orators; and these men who revenge themselves with their Tongue, have spoke so oft of this excess, as it is yet dishonor to him that did commit it.

All the praises that can be given to his gallant actions, are darkened by the murder of *Callisthines*. And that I may make use of *Seneca's* eloquent words, this irregular proceeding is *Alexanders* everlasting fault, which neither his fortune nor his valor will ever be able to blot out. For if a man shall say he defeated the *Persians* in three picht Battels; another will say he slew *Callisthines*; If men put a valuation upon him for having overcome *Darius*, the most puissant Monarch of the world, they will blame him for having killed *Callisthines*. If men praise him for having carried the bounds of his Empire to the utmost parts of the East, they will add, he was guilty of the death of *Callisthines*. If finally, to end his

Hoc est Alexandri crimen aternum, quod nulla virtus, nulla bellorum fælicitas redimet. Senec. quest. natural. lib. 7. cap. 23.

his *Panegyrick*, a man shall say he hath stained the glory of as many *Princes* as preceded him: another will reply, his fault is greater then his valor, and that all his actions of memory are sullied by *Calisthines* his blood.

This example ought to instruct and teach all Princes, that, if irregular Passions are maladies in Private men, they are Plagues and contagious diseases in publique personages, and that, if well guided by Reason they may become glorious vertues, they may by the Tyranny of our sences, degenerate into most infamous vices.

The third Discourse.

That there are no Passions which may not be changed into Vertues.

WE have said in our former discourses, that Passions are the seeds of Vertues and that by having a care of husbanding them well their

their effects were very advantageous to us. But proceeding on further, my intention is in this discourse, to teach Christians the secret, how they may change them into vertues, and to take from them whatsoever they have of savage or monstrous. This Metamorphosis is certainly very hard, but not impossible; and if we advise with nature she will furnish us with inventions, for this wise mother is continually working of strange alterations.

Her power never appears to be greater then when she alters the Elements, or metals; and when she takes from them their former qualities, that she may give them others more excellent, and more noble. But she observes therein an admirable method which well deserves consideration; for though she be all-powerful, and that holding the place God, she may act as a soveraign, and do what she pleaseth with the Elements or metals, yet doth she never use violence; and she seemeth rather to accommodate her self to their interests, then to her own inclinations; she observeth their sympathies, and worketh no alteration which is not agreeable unto them.

Thus we see she rarifies ayr, to change it into fire, and conduceth water to turn

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it into earth; thus we observe she purifies silver, to give it the tincture of gold, and labors whole ages to finish without violence this useful Metamorphosis.

Now as morality is an imitation of nature, her chiefe care ought to be imployed in observing the proprieties of our passions, and in converting them into vertues which are not contrary unto them; for he that would go about to change Choler into mildness, or fear into generousness, would endeavour an impossibillity, and would have ill success in all his labors: but that his designes may succeed well, he must study the nature of every passion, and use all his means to turn each passion into such a vertue as it hath least aversion unto: and this ought not to seem strange, since the most rational of all men, hath been of opinion, that in the opposition which nature hath placed between vice and vertue, they had notwithstanding some what of resemblance one with the other; for all men will confess, that prodigallity hath more relation to liberality, then to avarice, and that it is not hard to reduce a prodigal man, to be a liberal man; every one is bound to confess that rashness sides more with courage then with Cowardice, and that it is easier

easier to make a rash man, then a coward, courageous.

Therefore doe Philosophers agree, that of the two extreams which do environ vertue, one of them is alwaies more favorable unto her; and a little care being had will easily take her part, and defend her interest.

Following the same maxime, we must confess that there are some passions which have more of affinity with some vertues, then with some others, and which by the help of morality, may easily become vertues.

That fear which foresees dangers, which laboreth how to shun them, which looks far into what is to come, that it may finde a remedy, may easily be changed into wisdom, provided the distraction which accompanieth it, and which doth most commonly abuse us in our deliberations, be taken away. That hope which makes us taste a good which we do not yet enjoy, which comforteth us in our misfortunes, and which through our present Evils shews us a future happiness, may easily be converted into that vertue which we call assurance. That Choler which punisheth faults, and arms us to revenge our friends injuries,

Metuamus ergo ut non metuamus, hoc est, prudenter metuamus, ne inaniter metuamus. August. serm: 15. De Martyribus.

injuries, differs not far from justice; for provided it be not too violent, and that the self interests thereof leave it light enough to guide it self, it will wage war with all the wicked, and take all that are innocent into its protection.

That boldness, which encourageth us to the combate, which gives assurance in danger, and which makes us prefer a glorious death before a shameful retreat, will become exact valor, if we suppress its inclination to fury, and if we mingle a little light with the too much heat thereof. Love and hatred, desire and eschewing, are rather Vertues then Passions, when governed by Reason. Provided they love nothing but what is lovely, and hate nothing but what is hateful, they deserve praise rather then reproach.

Sadness and despaire, Jealousy and envy, are indeed more cried down; they seem to be enemies to our quiet, that the heavens have made them ministers of their Justice, and that they supply the places of those revengeful Furies which Poets feign to punish the faulty. Yet may they be useful to Reason if well managed, and under those hideous faces wherein they appear, they hide good meanings, which

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are of use to vertue. A good emulation may be framed out of a well-regulated Envy. Discreet zeal may be shapened out of moderated Jealousie; without which neither prophane nor yet sacred love undertakes any thing of generous. Sorrow hath so many praises given her in the holy Scripture, as it is easie to judg, that if she be not amongst the number of the vertues, she may be advantageously made use of to their service. She loosens us from the earth; and by a despising all the contentments of the world, she makes us thirst after eternal delights; she appeaseth Gods anger, she furnisheth us with teares, wherewithal to wash away our sins and to water his altars; She is alwaies a faithful companion to repentance; and no sin in Christian Religion was ever forgiven, before sorrow and repentance had obtained pardon. Despair hath but the name of terible; but who shall well consider her effects, will avow 'tis a wise invention of nature which cures the greatest part of our maladies, by taking away from us the hope of remedy; for then we make vertue of necessity, we draw force from our weakness; we turn our fear into fury, and our desires into contempt; we set upon enemies whose aproach

Melior est tristitia iniqua patientis, quam lætitia iniqua facientis. August. lib. de vera Innocentia.

Ratio terrorem prudentibus excutit; Imperitis fit magna ex desperatione securitas. Senec. quæst. natural. lib. 6. cap. 2.

we dare not expect; and we misprize objects which we cannot abandon. Thus shall we finde many men who owe their quiet more to despair then to hope; and who shall well examine the humor of these two affections, will be forc'd to acknowledg, that the one makes us miserable by her promises, the other happy by her refusals; that the one nourisheth our desires, the other causeth them to dye; that the one couzeneth us, and the other disabuseth us; that we are lost by the flatteries of the one, and saved by the others affliction. This is the Reason why the greatest Poet in the world hath affirmed that despair is that which raiseth up the courage of the conquered, and which restores unto them the victory which hope and rashness had bereft them of.

But what ever advantage I attribute to these Passions, I confess they have their errors, and that to make them vertuous they must be carefully cleansed. And because so profitable an affair cannot be too often treated of, I shall willingly observe their chiefest innormities; to the end that discerningthem, as in a looking glass, every one may be careful how to efface them. Take blindness from love, and he will be no more faulty, for it is permitted to love such subjects

subjects as deserve love, and there is no lesse injustice in denying it to personages of excellency, then to grant it to deformed persons. Exempt error from hatred, and hatred will become consonant to Reason; for it is not just to confound the sinner with his sin; and who can make this distinguishment, may boast to hate with justice; desire and eschewing are innocent, provided they be moderated; joy and sorrow are only blameable in their excess; and the same Reason which permits us to taste with pleasure a good which we wish for, doth not forbid us sorrowing for an evil which we apprehend. Hope is only then unjust, when she measureth not her forces, and despair is only then faulty when it takes its rise rather from our remisness, then from our weakness. Boldness is then praise worthy, when it grapples with a danger which it may overcome; and fear is wisdome, when it shuns a danger it cannot overcome. Choler is an act of justice, when born against sin, and provided it be not judge in its own cause, it pronounceth none but lawful decrees. Envy is generous, provided it excite us unto vertue, and that it lay before us the good qualities of our neighbour, only so far forth as that we may imitate them.

Amor est motus cordis, qui cum se inordinate movet, id est, ad eaquæ non debet, cupiditas dicitur, cum verò ordinatus est, charitas appellatur. Aug. lib: de Substantia electionis cap. 2.

them. Iealousie is only hateful, because it hath in it too much of love; yet this fault is pardonable when not accompanied with suspition, and if the beloved cannot cure it, they are bound to indure it. But to put an end to this discourse with Saint *Augustine*; Christians make good use of their Passions, if they imploy them for the glory of *Jesus Christ*, and for the salvation of their own souls. Their fears correspond with Reason when they consider Gods judgments, and the punishment of the damned; Their desire is just when they aym at the happiness of the blessed. Their sorrow is harmlese when they afflict themselves for all the evils which our first father hath left us to inherit; and when oppress with grief, they sigh after the liberty of the children of God. Their joy is a holy joy when they expect the fruition of the good which is prepared for them, and when by a firm hope they already taste the effects of their masters promises. Briefly, if they fear unbelief, if they desire perseverance, if they sorrow for their evil actions, and rejoyce when they do well, they turn all their Passions, into holy and glorious vertues.

Metuunt enim pænam eternam, cupiunt vitam æternam, dolent in re quia adhuc ingemiscunt adoptionem filiorum dei, expectantes redemptionem corporis sui; gaudent in spe, quia mors absorbebitur in victoriam: Aug. l. 13. de civit. dei. cap. 3.

Metuunt peccare, cupiunt perseverare, dolent in peccatis, gaudent in operibus bonis. Idem ibid.

The

The fouth Discourse.

That the government of Passions is vertues chief imployment.

MAn is brought into so happy a condition by sin, as his very advantages reproach his misery unto him, and he is made to know his faultiness by what is most excellent in him. Those noble qualities which beautifie his soul, and which restore unto him the glory which he had lost, have but unpleasing imployments, and are engaged in combats, which though they be difficult, cease not to be shameful. For mans most illustrious vertues, have no other imployment then to make war upon vice, and the necessity he hath to make use thereof is one of the chiefest proofs of the irregularity of his nature. Prudence which serves him for a guide, advertiseth him that he walketh in darkness, and that he is in an enemies country. Fortitude teacheth him that he ought to fight, and that

in all the course of his life he tastes no pleasure which is not mingled with pain; temperance gives him to understand, that his constitution is out of order, and that he hath delights which flatter him only, that they may destroy him.

Lastly, justice obliegeth him to believe, that not any thing which he possesseth is his, and that having a soveraign who hath given him all that he enjoyeth, he is only the steward to distribute them. These vertues do what they say, their imployments answer their counsels; they act not, without going about to stifle some disorder, and to overcome some vitious inclinations. Prudence chooseth the arms and the enemy; temperance rejects pleasure; Fortitude sets upon sorrow; justice sits president in all these combats; she takes care that the conqueror be not insolent in his victory; that the soul take not such advantage over the body, that in thinking to tame it, it destroy it, and that whilest it would revenge it self of a disobedient vassal, it lose not a faithful friend. So as we must conclude, that the exercise of vertue, is a continual warfare against vice. And that these glorious qualities, have no more noble imployment then to charge upon monsters,

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and fight with infamous enemies.

'Tis therefore that Saint *Augustine*, with all the Divines, do acknowledg that they were onely given us to assist us dureing this miserable life, and that they are steps whereby to arrive at that height of felicity which consists in the enjoyment of the *Summum bonum*. For then our prudence will be no more necessary, since we shall have no evils to shun; our justice will then be superfluous, for we shall possess all our riches in common. Temperance will then be useless, for we shall have no more unlawful motions to suppress. Then our fortidude will have no imployment, since we shall suffer no further evils. 'Tis true I have much adoe to banish those Vertues from heaven, which have opened us the way thither. But as nothing can be received there which is imperfect, we must say that they shall be cleansed before they get aemittance thither, that they shall lose what they have of earthly to become wholly heavenly, and that the glory which makes men spiritual, will make them Divine, and will take from them what they have of impurirty; they shall have all their beauty, and shall have no more defects, they shall triumph, and fight no more,

Hic enim sunt virtutes in actu ibi in effectu: Hic in opere, ibe in mercede: hic in officio, ibi in fine August. Epistola:

more, they shall serve for ornaments, and no longer for defence to the happy; they shal receive the recompence of their labors; and that wearisome exercise which held them employed whilest on earth, shall be turned to an honorable rest in heaven. Now amongst a thousand different imployments which the vertues have here below, one of the most advantageous is the government of Passions. For it seems nature hath destined them to tame these savage subjects, and so reduce them under the Empire of reason. Some have dexterity to win them, others strength to beat them down; some use threats to astonish them, others promises to allure them, and tall of them together use several means to arrive at the same end.

Prudence never comes to handy-blows, but as she is the Queen of moral Vertues, she contents her self with giving orders, with providing for our souls peace, with stifling seditions in their birth, and with suppressing unruly motions which threaten her with an intestine war. If the match be already made, she endeavors to break it by her dexterity, and not medling in the fight, she opposeth to every Passion that Vertue which is contrary to it, she sends succours to the weakest places, or to such as are most

briefly

briefly assailed. She foresees the evils that are to come, or if she think sometimes that the rebels are capable of Reason, she exhorts them to obedience; and to reduce them to their duty, she layes before them their own interests; she makes them know, that all the pleasures which they seek after, are fatal to them, and that all the evils which they so fear, are honorable. Temperance is a little more exposed to danger; for she is oblieged to come to handy blows, and to defend her self against her enemies, which are so much the more dangerous as they are more the more pleasing.

she resisteth all those Passions which flatter our sences, and which propound nothing unto our mindes, but voluptuousness and delights; she regulates desires and hopes, she moderates love and joy, and as oft as any motions rise up with us, which promise unto us unlawful pleasures, she furnisheth us with weapons to overcome them; when she thinks her self not strong enough to vanquish them, she cals in Penance and austerity to her aide; and with these severe vertues she defeates these dissolute enemies: Fortitude takes care to govern the most violent Passions, to set upon fear, sorrow, despair, and hatred; as soon as any danger troubles

troubles the peace of our soul, or that any angersome object which doth astonish us, presents it self, this Heroick Vertue imployes al her courage to enhea rten, and by a noble piece of art, she makes use of choler and boldness to overcome sorr owand despair. If these courageous Passions are not puissant enough to purchase an assured peace, she puts us in minde of honor, she chargeth constancy and fidelity to make our duties known unto us; and to encourage us by recompences which are ordained for the honor of glorious and difficult actions. Justice enters not the lists, but she weigheth the right of all parties, she prepareth crowns for the conquerors, she keeps the conquered from being oppressed, and she doth so well moderate the victory, as that she is neither cruel nor insolent; she keeps Reason in authority, she obliegeth Pasion to acknowledg it for their soveraign; she makes the body subject to the soul, without inslaving it; and she submits the soul to God, without taking from it its liberty. This Vertue being just, is an enemy to all disorders, and whilest she rules in chief in man, one may say, he hath no Passions but such as are consonant to Reason; but when she is banisht, peace and tranquility

quility retire with her; during her absence man is like a State without policy, where Rebels are permitted to do what they list, where vice is honored and vertue despised, and where every one, without advising with his duty, considers onely his own interest, or pleasure. He therefore that loseth justice, loseth all the Vertues, and who possesseth her, may boast to possess them all; it may be 'tis out of this reason that a Philosopher hath affirmed, that every Vertue was a particular Justice, and that Justice was a general Vertue, which of it self was sufficient to fight against all Vice, and to regulate all Passions.

But as the multitude of souldiers cannot be harmeful when there is no confusion therein; the like of vertues cannot be prejudicial, when disorder is banisht. And though those that our Saviour *Christ* hath taught us, are of a much more sublime condition then are the moral vertues; they conspire altogether for our felicity. We ought therefore imploy them in our affaires, and when one alone is not sufficient to rule a Passion, we must borrow ayde from the rest; and augment our forces to overcome our enemies. When temperance cannot regulate our unjust desires; we may

may call modesty, and humility, into our assistance, who will perswade us that the glory of the world is not due to us, if we be criminal; and that it is not worthy of us if we be innocent; when fortitude cannot overcome fear, or despaire, we are permitted to have recourse unto hope, to listen unto her promises, and to incourage our selves to victory by calling to minde the rewards which she propoundeth unto us; when hatred and envy gnaw our hearts and when to revenge our selves of an injury they advise us to make use of sword and poyson, 'Tis fit that justice implore the assistance of charity; and that to stop the impetuosity of these two head-strong Passions, she joyn divine maximes with humane; Thus nature shaking hands with grace to destroy sin, man will become victorious; the motions of his soul being regulated by vertue, he will enjoy perfect peace, and he will taste pleasures, which shall not come much short of those which our first father *Adam* tasted in the state of innocency.

The

The fifth Treatise.

Of the Power that Passions have upon the will of man.

The first Discourse.

That to know, and win upon men, we must study their Passions.

NOt without reason did that great king, who knew so well how to joyn in his own person, Pietry, Poetry, and Prowess, compare the heart of man to the Depths; for they are so profound, as no thing can fill them, and the heart of man is so vast in its desires, as it is not to be satisfied with whole kingdomes. The depths are the depositaries of the Treasures

Ponens in Thesauris abyssos. Psal. 32

sures of nature ; and God, to exercise our industry, or to punish our avarice, hath hid riches in the bowels of the earth. So likewise are all the goods of man shut up within his heart ; that part which hath the advantage of forming thoughts, hath the care to preserve them ; and 'tis from thence that we do borrow them, either to perswade, or move our Auditors. But as the depths are obscure places which are not lightned by the light of the Sun, and where horror and night seem to sojourn, or to have made their aboad, so is the heart of man invironed with darkness, which is not to be dissipated, and whatsoever it conceiveth is so hidden, as we can guess thereat but by weak conjectures. For words are not alwaies faithful representations of the hearts conceptions ; 'tis God alone who hath the priviledg of knowing them. Humane wisdome (which vaunts it self to see far into what is to come) is much troubled to discover the intentions thereof ; and the greatest work a statesman can undertake, is, when by his dexterity he endeavors to expound a dissembling heart, and there to observe such thonghts as are endeavoured to be kept concealed.

I know very well that policy teacheth

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us how to arrive at this knowledg, and that she gives us rules how to sound these depths which seem to have no bottome. Men judg of meanings by actions, and read in the eyes, and face, the most secret motions of the soul. One may observe their nature by their designes, and may studdy men so well, as that he may guess at their thoughts, and by one piece of cunning discover that which they by an other seek to conceal. But of all these wayes I finde none more easie, nor more certain, then that of the Passions; for they escape us against our will, they betray us by their promptnes and likeness; We daily finde that it is much more hard to withhold a mans choler then his hand, and to impose silence to his sufferings, then to his mouth. They mutiny without our leave, and by an Impression which they make in our countenance, they teach our enemies all that lies within our hearts. I therefore much value that Poets invention, who tearms Passions, tortures, not only for that they torment us through their rigour, but because they force us by their violence to confess the truth. A man must be very faithful to himself, if he do not declare himself either by hatred or vanity.

Nulla vehementior intrà cogitatio est, quæ nihil moveat in vultu. Senec. lib. 1. de ira cap: 1.

Sicut æquor profunda, sic consilium in corde viri: Sed homo Sapiens exhauriet illud; Proverb. cap. 20.

Vino tortus & Ira: Horat.

And

And one must have great authority over his Passions, if he can suppress them when a skilful man undertakes to move them.

The wisest men forget their resolutions, and oft times a praise, or a reproach, draw a truth from them, which wisdom had a long time kept concealed.

Never was Prince a greater dissembler then was *Tiberius*; all his words and actions were so hidden, as a man could not discover his intentions. He uttered nothing but Enigmaes, and the *Senate* trembled as oft as they were to treat with so close a man.

One word of *Agrippina* did notwithstanding incense him, and made him say a thing, whilest so agitated, which doubtless he would have concealed, had he continued in his ordinary temper; for finding fault with her, he said her discontentment arose onely because she did not raign; thus was the most concealed man of the world betrayed by the heat of Passion; and did by an indiscreet answer discover the bottom of his heart. Polititians are likewise never more troubled then when they treat with a man that is reserved in his speeches, and who doth so well master his affections, as that they appear not in his visage, nor

Hæc raram occulti pectoris vocem elicere, correpta tamque græco versu admonuit, ideo lædi quia non regnaret, Tacit. annal.

spark

nor sparkle out in his words nor actions, for all the doors of his soul are shut up, and not being able to fathom this depth, they are enforced to consult with such as come neer unto it, or els to believe report. But all these are uncertain wayes, and who builds his belief only upon the report of others, is in danger to be deceived; for Fame is fickle, enemies are lyars, friends flatterers, and those of the household are interressed. Yet of as many people as accost great ones, the testimony of their domesticks is least suspitious; and as they are by their conditions bound to study their masters humor, they are better acquainted with their inclinations; their enemies know only their weakness; the hatred wherewith they are blinded, will not suffer them to see their vertues; and their judgments, as being passionate, are for the most part unjust; their friends see only what is good in them, and their love makes them take faults for perfections. Their domesticks are better informed then the rest, because they know their inclinations; and reade in those faithful glasses, the secretest motions of their hearts; for when Princes appear in publique, they study their countenance; they conceal their thoughts,

and are ashamed to do that upon a theater which they do in their closets. But when they have none but their domestiques for witnesses, they do not constrein their nature, but afford their Passions all the liberty they can desire.

Therefore it behoveth that they moderate them; lest discovering their own weaknesses, they give advantages to such as shall converse with them: and all particular men ought to take the same care, if they will preserve their freedom; for if any one Passion be out of order, 'tis impossible to conceal it; and when it shall have discovered it self, it will be hard to keep our enemies from making use thereof to our prejudice. If women did not discover how much they are delighted with idle discourse, they would not run so much danger in their honor; but when a man shall have discovered their weakness, and shall observe that they are pleased in being praised, he insinuates himself into their likeings by flattery, and makes himself beloved by them, by approving of what they love. An ambitious man hath no fence against one who hath discovered his Passions; as he esteems nothing more then vain-glory, he forgoes any thing he hath, to acquire it, and thinks

thinks to be a great gainer by the exchange, wherein he parts with reall goods for applause; finally, all the world must confess, that our Passions are chains, which make us slaves to all such as know how to manage them well.

When the *Paricide Cateline* had vowed the ruine of his country, and had resolved to change the Roman Common-wealth into a cruel tyranny, he corrupted all the young men by accomodating himself to their desires. he appeased confederates by flattering their humour; he won their good wils, by following their inclinations; and by promising preferment to such as were ambitious, women to such as were lascivious, and riches to the avaritious, he framed an assotiation whereinto Pretors, Counsellors, and Senators did enter. This is also the divels most usual cunning, and the most dangerous wile with which he usethto seduce sinners; for as he hath great lights, (though he be the Prince of darkness;) and as he knows all mens tempers, he fits all his suggestions to their desires, and propounds nothing unto them which is not conformable to their inclinations. To the proud he proffers honor, he awakens the Passion which possesseth them, and ingageth

Ut cujusque studium ex ætate flagrabat, aliis scorta præbere, aliis canes atque equos mercari, postremò neque sumptui, neque modestiæ suæ parcere, dum illos obnoxios fi losque sibi faceret. Salust. in Catilin.

Novit quem mœrore conturbet quem gaudio fallat, quem admiratione seducat: omnium discutit mores, omnium scrutatur affectus, & ibi quæritcausam nocendi, ubi viderit quemquam diligentius occupari. D. Leo, Serm.

ingageth them in unlawful wayes, to compass pernitious designes; and endeavors to perswade them, that any whatsoever sin, is glorious, when it is committed that reputation may be won thereby. He solicits the voluptuous by infamous pleasures; If he cannot commend their sins, he seeks out names to excuse them; he tearms that natural which is irrational; and, as if nature and Reason were at enmity, he counsels them to follow the former, and forsake the latter. He incourageth the furious to revenge, he gives gallant titles to shameful Passions, he endeavours to make the resentment of an injury pass for an act of justice; and contradicting all maxims of christianty, he establisheth the greatness of courage, in hatred and murther. He perswades the avaritious that there is nothing more generally sought after then riches; that our aunceſtors have reverenced it, that our succeſſors will honour it, that people who differ in other opinions, agree in the reputation they put hereupon; that fathers wish it to their children, that children desire it from their fathers; that those who profess piety, offer thereof to God, and appease his anger by presents, That poverty is infamous; that it is the contempt of rich men,

men, and the punishment of the poor. In fine, this colloguing enemy, undoes all men by flattering them, he gains upon their understanding by their affections, he beats them with their own weapons, and by a dangerous piece of cunning, he imploys their Passions to corrupt their wils. All men ought therefore to suppress such inclinations as are so prejudicial to us; and submit unruly motions to grace, which give so much advantage over our liberty, to our most powerful enemies.

The second Discourse.

That Arts seduce men, by the means of Passions.

THe government of Passions is of such importance, and so difficult, as the better part of sciences seem only to have been invented to regulate them. Though the minde of man makes use of them to serve their vanities, they in their first institution intended only the government

vernment of our affections; and *Philosophers* made use thereof only to cure our souls with delight. Musick which doth only tickle our eares, and wherewithal our heart is not affected, save only so far as thereby to let in impurity thereinto, labor'd formerly only to suppress the disorders thereof; as it is an harmony composed of different voyces, it produced harmonious effects; and agreeing the difference between the body and the soul, it renewed their friendship, and made them keep perfect intelligence together; It calmed the fury of Passions, and by the pleasantness of its accords, it tamed such wild beasts as devour men when they are irritated. In these happy dayes musitians were *Philosophers*; this art which is become a slave to sensuality, was vertues servant; It imployed all its industry in the service of Reason, whereas now it seduceth the soul by the sences; it did then charm affections through the ears, and by pleasing tones, which were no less powerful then words, it perswaded to good things, and kept men within their duties. Thus 'tis said that *Agistus* could never corrupt *Clitemnestra*, till he had made him be made away, who defended her chastity by the sweetness of his harpe, and who

who overthrew all the designs of this unchaste lover, by the sweet accents of his voyce. History (which is more to be believed then fables) teacheth us, that a player upon the flute, wrought so powerfully upon the minde of *Alexander*, that when he sounded with a loftier tone then ordinary he made this conqueror besides himself; and did so encourage him to the combate, as he would call for his arms to set upon his enemies; but when he play'd in a softer tone, *Alexanders* fury grew more calm, as if it had been but a false Allarm; he resumed his former countenance, and was wholly intent upon him who did inchant his ears; the Holy Scripture (the words whereof are oracles) assures us that *David* with his harp appeased the evil spirit in *Saul*; which lost his power, when the humors which he had stirred up, were allayed by harmony. But musick hath, now, no more such vertue; she who formerly did dispossesse people possessed with evil spirits, doth now give them over to the divel; or if she produce not so bad effects, she awakens our Passions, and by a strange, but true misfortune, she increaseth the malady which she intended to cure. I very well know, that the musick used in churches holds in-

Alexandrum aiunt xenophanto canente manum ad arma misisse. Senec. lib: 2. de ira. Cap. 2.

telligence with Piety, and that by a sweet violence it frees our souls from our bodies, and raiseth them up to Heaven; but truly I suspect all other sorts of musick; though some will have them pass for harmless, I esteem them dangerous or useless; and I should willingly say with *Seneca*, to *Musitians*, that instead of teaching us how to tune a lute, or to govern our voyce, they ought to teach us how to regulate our Passions; that instead of flattering our sences, they would work upon our hearts, and inspire our souls with the detestation of vice, and love of vertue.

Voces quomodo inter se acutæ & graves voces consonent, quomodo nervorum disparem reddentium sonum fiat concordia; sac potius quomodo animus secum meus consonet, nec consilia mea dissentiant. Senec. Epist. 88.

Poetry (which we may stile the daughter of musick) did in former times imitate her mother; and imployed all her comelinesse in incouraging men to glorious enterprises; she sung the victories of Conquerors, and by praising their valour, made their souldiers valiant; her very forgeries were usefull; the revengful furies which she introduced in her works, infused fear into the wicked, and kept people in their duty: the pleasing number and cadence of her verse was able to sweeten the most savage humours, and she abused us not when she would perswade us that her *Orpheus* tamed lyons, made trees to walk, forced

rocks

rocks to listen unto him, and to follow him, since he produced all these effects in the heart of man, and that he banished from thence, choler and stupidity. But this brave art never appeared more glorious then when it got upon the theater, and when infused with a new fury, it represented the punishment of the faulty, the direful death of tyrants, and the ill success of injustice or impiety. For it infused fear into Princes, it astonished subjects, and by sad examples taught the one respect, the other clemency, and to both of them, justice and religion. Then all comœdies were as so many instructions; one looked upon the places where they were acted, as upon the academies of *Philosophers*, and auditors never departed with the dislike of vertue. But men who corrupt the best things, did at last abuse Poetry; and did unjustly submit her unto their Passions, who had reformed them by her advice. This innocent art which had always courted vertue, is become a slave to vice; and wanton people have prophaned all her chaste decencies; making them serve uncleanness. Since these unhappy dayes Poetry was cried down throughout the world, *Philosophers* who had alwayes been the Poets friends,

became

became their enemies, and imployed all their credit to get them banisht. In effect they corrupted all men, and fearing lest their verses were not of power enough to authorize obscœnes, they erected altars thereunto; and by the Incest of their Gods, they excused the adulteries of men. I am not ignorant that true religion hath reformed Poetry; that it hath done its utmost to restore her to her former use, and auncient beauty: I know very well that our Poets are chaste in their writings; and that comœdies, though they be licentious, mount not the stage but only to condemn vice; the very rules imposed upon them, will not suffer them to be obscœne; and by a happy necessity it behoves that those who infuse a soul into the scene, take part alwaies with vertue; yet it unfortunately fals out (the which I rather attribute to the disorder of nature, then to the like of Poetry) that chastity appears not so beautiful in verse, as does uncleanness; and that the obedience of the Passions seems not so pleasing as their rebellion. Men betake themselves more usually to violent affections, then to such as are answerable to Reason; And as the Poets do express them with greater eloquence, their auditors listen unto

unto them with more delight. In fine, let what care soever will be had, comœdies are only Schools of vertue for such gallant men, as can discern between appearances and truth, and who abhor vice even then when it comes presented in vertues ornaments. But if you will examine the Common people, they will confess that stage-Poetry doth strangely move them, and that it imprints in their souls the feelings of those personages which they represent.

Rhetorick is somewhat more happy in her designs then is Poetry; and let men object what fault they will to Orators, I finde them more blameless then Poets. For as their chiefe end is to preserve the truth, they are inforced to imploy all their cunning to beat down such Passions as are contrary thereunto; and in discharging themselves of their duty, they play the part of the Physitian, curing their auditors of all their maladies; If their choler be too much irritated, they appease it; If their courage be too much suppresst, they raise it up; they make love exceed hatred, Piety revenge; and repressing one motion by another, they draw a calm from out a storm. This imployment is so fixt to the condition of Orators, as they do therein only differ from *Philosophers*

sophers; for these have no other design save onely to convince the understanding they propound naked truths unto it; and knowing that it cannot behold them without reverence, they take more care how to discover, then to adorn them. But Orators who will work upon the soul by the sences, cloath their good reasons in handsome language, tickling the ear, that they may touch the heart, and using Tropes and figurative speeches, to move affection. They set upon the two parts whereof man is compoied, they make use of the weakest to subdue the stronger; and as the divel undid man by the means of the woman they gain Reason by the means of Passion.

By this harmless cunning, they formed Townes, governed common-wealths, and for a long time commanded Monarchies: for they studied their inclinations, and did so handsomely handle them, as it seemed the hearts of Princes were in the hands of Orators, and that Monarchy was become a slave to Eloqence; they committed notwithstanding gross faults in their government, and by having too oft excited the motions of the souls inferior part, they overthrew the Empire of the superior; and could

could not cure the wounds which they had made, nor quench the flames which they had kindled. For thinking to flatter a Prince in his vanity, they made him insolent, and whiest they though to move him to revengethey made him cruel and fierce. They could not keep the mediocrity whereof Vertue is composed, and desiring to raise up one Passion that they might abase another, they gave it so great strength, as it was no longer in their power to assubject it to Reason. This, in my opinion, is the misfortune which they run into, who, that they may be pleasing unto Princes, flatter such an inclination as doth Tyrranize over them; and not considering the evil that may ensue thereon, oppose that inclination, to all others, and by victories make it insolent. The contrary way had been the better; for since the Passion which they endeavored to raise, was most violent, they should have imployed all the rest to weaken it, and have made them all conspire together, to bring it low. But because eloquence is oft times interessed, she neglects the good of her auditors, and is not troubled though her praises wound their souls, so long as she may obtain what she desires. Thus did *Cicero* treat with *Cæser*; and being desirous to save a guilty

guilty person whose cause he pleaded, he opposed the pride of this conqueror to his revenge; to destroy one Passion which was prejudicial onely to one particular man, he awakened that which had rruined the Republique, and oppresst the liberty of *Rome*. Wherein certainly he was to blame, and sind against the laws of eloquence, which was not so much invented to perswade men, as to make them Vertuous, and which ought not indeavor so much to move affections, as to re-establish Reason in her Empire. Policie seems to have better intentions then Rhetorick; for when she excites fear or hope, in man, by promises or by threats, she endeavors the wellfare of particulars, as the publique quiet; if she sometimes punish the faulty by dreadful punishments, tis but in desperate evils, and when she hath, to no purpose, tryed all mild means; yet I believe she might handle Passions better then she doth, and that without violating the respects which is due to sovereignty, too easie to gain the hearts of the subjects by hopes, and to reduce them to their duties rather by love then fear. This is that which we shall consider in the following discourse, after having concluded in this, that all sciences are defective

fective in the government of Passions; that to regulate them well, they must implore help from morality, and that they must consider the precepts she giveth us to overcome Enemies, which are as opinionated as insolent.

The third Discourse.

That Princes win upon their Subjects either by love or fear.

ALL Politicians agree, that recompence and punishment are the two Pillars which uphold all States; and that, to the end the people may be peacefully governed, their hopes or their fears must be excited by promises or threats; to say truth, we never yet heard of any Republique or Monarchy, which from its beginning did not ordain honors and chastisements, for Vice and Vertue. He who feared to instruct Vice by forbidding it, and to teach subjects Paricide, by punishing it, was forced to have recourse to this common remedy and to propose recompences, and sufferings

ings to men, thereby to awaken their hopes or their fears. Experience shewed that to gain their good will, their Passions must be won upon, and that the lower part of their souls must be mastered, so to assubject the higher part thereof.

God himself governs the world by this harmless peece of cunning; for though, being infinitely more absolute then all kings, he may treate with the soul without the interposition of the sences, he rules himself according to mans condition; and knowing that they are composed of a soul and body, he undertakes nothing upon the former but by the means of the latter; he renounceth his own rights that he may adopt himself to the weakness of his creatures, and not using the power his soveraignty affords him he terrifieth them by threats, or comforteth them by promises. His bare will should serve us for a law; and the knowledg of his intentions obliege us to form whatsoever design: notwithstanding he allureth us, by proposing a paradise unto us; he terrifieth us in representing us with a hell; and as if he were much interessed in our souls health, or in our damnation, he imploys all his graces to purchase our love, and to shun our hatred.

When

when he treated with the Jews as with his subjects; when through his excessive goodnesse he disdained not to own the qualitie of their soveraign; when he gave them laws by the mouth of *Moses*, and when he governed them by the wisdome of their Judges, who were but his images, he terrified them many times by his chastisements, and sent plagues and famine into their habitations, to reduce them to obedience by fear. He many times also promised them to enlarge their borders, to assist them in their battels, and to give them advantage over their enemies, to the end that soliciting their hopes by his promises, he might by their passions win their good wills. In fine, all the world confesseth, that Politicians, like Orators, cannot more violently, nor yet with more sweetnesse win mans consent, then by awakening the motions of his soul, and by dexterously insinuating themselves into him by the hopes of honour, or fear of punishment: but they do not agree which of these two passions ought to be imployed to reduce him the more assuredly to his duty.

Inter Principem & Subditos non est amicicia. Aristot. 1. Politic.

Those who take part with fear, say, that this passion, being by nature servile, seems to be the portion of subjects, that this their

relation cannot be taken from them without taking away their condition, and without reducing them into the qualitie of children or friends; they adde, that it is in the power of the Soveraign to make himself be feared, not to make himself beloved; that punishments make greater impression upon the souls of such as obey, then rewards; that love is alwayes voluntarie, and that fear may be inforced; that contempt, which is the capitall enemie to Monarchie, may proceed as well from love as from familiaritie: that fear can only produce hatred, which injureth more the reputation, then the power of Kings; that since wisdome will have us to chuse the lesser of two evills, we must resolve to lose the love of the people, to preserve their respect, and say with that ancient Author; Let him hate me, provided that he fear me. They confirm all these reasons by examples, and make it appear, that the most severe Empires have flourished the most, that punishments have alwayes exceeded rewards, and that in the *Roman* Common-wealth, where they gave but an oaken garland to such souldiers as had mounted a breach, they made them passe the pikes for having gon out of their rank, or forsaken their Colours; that God himself

himself (whose government ought to serve for an example to all Princes) governed his people with more severitie, then lenitie, that he had been constrained to expresse himself by the voyce of thunder to worke obedience to him, that he had not preserved his authoritie by the death of rebells, and that notwithstanding whatever inclination he had to mercy, he was inforced to have recourse to Justice. Briefly, they say, Soveraigntie is somewhat hatefull, that love and Majestie agree not well together, that one cannot rule over men and be beloved, that men are so jealous of their libertie, as they hate all things that obviate it, and that Princes according to the maxime in the Gospel, have no greater enemies then their subjects.

Inimici hominis domestici ejus. Matth. cap. 10.

Those who take part with love have no lesse specious reasons, and much more true ones; for they say that the Soveraign being the Father of his people, he is bound to treat them as his children, that fear makes them only masters of the body, and that love makes them rule over the heart. That such as fear their masters, seek an end of their servitude, and that such as love them dream not of recovering their libertie. That such Princes as govern with rigour,

Necesse est multos timeat quem multi timent. Senec.

cannot live securely, that of necessitie those who cause fear, must themselves be subject thereto, and that they must fear their peoples revolt, who only obey them through constraint. That if nothing that is violent be of continuance, an Empire which is only grounded upon violence, cannot long subsist; and to answer the reasons objected unto them, they reply that love enters much better into the heart then doth fear; that if there be angersome wayes to make a man be feared, there be innocent charms to make him be beloved; that in generously-minded men, recompences make greater impressions, then punishments; and that the promises of a Prince more animates his subjects then doth his threats; that contempt cannot arise from love, since love ariseth from valuation, and is alwayes accompanied by respect; that the justest Monarchies, and not the severest, have flourished the most; and that if in the *Roman* Commonwealth punishments exceeded recompences, it was not, for that fear made deeper impression in the souls of men, then love; but because vice hath not so much of uglinesse as vertue hath of beautie; and that it is not necessarie to propound honour unto her, who finding all her glorie within her

Semper in authores redundat timor, nec quisquam metuitur, ipse securus. Senec. 2. De ira. cap. 13.

In eo loco ubi servitutem esse velint, fidem sperandam esse. Livius. 8.

self,

self, is as well satisfied with silence, as amidst all acclamations and applause. That if God dealt rigorously with his people, 'twas contrarie to his inclination, and that his levitie hath been greater then his severitie, because the latter could not purchase him all *Judea*, and the former hath submitted unto him the whole world. St. *Paul* represents us with the difference between these two laws, often, in the holy Scripture; the one of which hath made slaves; the other hath produced children; the one of which hath fortified sin, the other hath destroyed the tyrannie thereof. They adde, that Soveraignte is not odious, since it was consecrated in the person of Jesus Christ, who desirous to serve as an example to all Kings on earth, never used his power, but in order of service to his mercie; and never did any miracle, unlesse to help the afflicted: In fine, that subjects did not repine at the losse of their libertie, since that being voluntarie they like it; that Princes are not the objects of fear, since they are the images of God; and that some Princes have been found even among Infidells, who have been their peoples delight whilst alive, and their sorrow, when dead.

Though these answers be so pertinent, as

Pertransit benefaciendo & sanando omnes oppressos a diabolo, quoniam Deus erat cum illo. Actorum cap. 10.

Titus delicæ generis humani Suet. in Tit.

they are not to be gainsaid; yet methinks both the parties may be reconciled, and their difference so taken away, as that each of them shall therein finde their advantage; for though lenitie be to be preferred before rigour, and that a State be better grounded upon love then upon fear, there are occasions wherein a Prince ought to let his clemencie give place to his severitie, and wherein he is oblieged to quit the qualitie of a father, that he may exercise the like of a Judge. He ought to govern his humor according to the humor of his subjects; if they be giddy-headed or proud, he must use rigour, to teach them obedience and fidelitie; if troublesome, and prone to rebellion, he must make examples, and by the punishment of a few, frighten more; if unquiet and desirous of noveltie, he must punish them by keeping them in continuall imploiment; but amidst all these punishments, he must not forget that he is the head of his State, that his subjects are a part of himself, and that he ought to be as sparing in punishing them as a Physitian in cutting off the arme or legge of a diseased person. If nothing be done in his Kingdome which inforceth him to rigour; if all things be peaceable, and if the people under his government

vernment have no other motions then his own will; he ought to deal gently with them, afford them just liberty, which may perswade them that they are rather his children then his subjects, and that reserving to himself the marks only of Soveraigntie, he permits them to gather all the fruits thereof. In briefe, he ought not to use rigour but when clemencie is bootlesse: in his government, as well as in the like of God, mildnesse must precede severitie, and all the world must know that he punisheth not the faultie out of his own inclination, but forc'd therunto by necessitie. The power of a Prince is sufficiently dreadfull by reason of his greatnesse, he need not make it odious by his crueltie. One word of theirs terrifies all their subjects, the punishment of one guiltie person, astonisheth all the rest; their anger makes even the innocent to quake: and as a thunderbolt does little harm, yet frightens much; so great men cannot punish a particular personage, without infusing terrour throughout their whole Dominions. I therefore am of opinion with the wisest Politicians, that Soveraigntie ought to be tempered with lenitie, and that being accompanied with all qualities that may make it be feared, it ought to seek

Divus Nerva res olim insociabiles miscuit, Imperium & libertatem. Tacit.

out all such means as may make it be beloved.

The fourth Discourse.

What Passions ought to raign in the power of a Prince.

ONe of the geatest misfortunes which can befall Religion, is the libertie which men take to frame unto themselves such a Divinitie as liketh them best; In the first age every one adorned the workmanship of his own hands, and made an idoll unto himself, which had its worth from the industrie of the workman, or from the excellencie of the materialls; in pursuit of time, as mens spirits grew more refined, Poets made the gods sensible, and gave them all such affections as make us faultie or miserable: one might see them make love in their Writings, fight in Fables; and one might observe in them all the chiefe affections of those that had invented them; Philosophers not able to endure so unjust gods, formed more rationall Dieties,

and

and proposed unto the people the Idols of their own mindes; every one figured out unto himself a god according to his own inclinations, and gave him what advantages may be imagined: Some placed him in idleness, and that they might not trouble his rest, bereft him of the knowledg, or government of our affaires; some made him so good as that he suffered all faults to go unpunisht, and dealt as favourably with the guilty as with the innocent; others made him so rigorous, as it seemed he had created man only to destroy him, and that he found no contentment but in the death of his subjects; this disorder hath passed from Religion into State-government, and according to the ages wherein men have lived, they have framed unto themselves divers *Ideas* of Kings personages, and have placed in their Princes such perfections only as they were acquainted withall: for in the beginning of the world, when people preferred the body before the soul, they chose such Kings as were of an extraordinarie stature, and who were as strong as gyants: Nay, it seemed that God would apply himself to this humor, when he gave *Saul* unto the *Israelites*; for the Scripture sayes, *He was higher by the head then all his subjects*; and when

Ab humero & sursum eminebat super omnem populum. 1. Reg. cap. 9.

when the Poets describe unto us their *Heroes*, they never fail in giving them this advantage; but when time had taught us that our good resided not in the body, men begun to consider the minde of such men as they would make their Kings, and cast their eyes upon such as had most of government in them, or most of courage; they observed their inclinations, and knowing what power their inclinations have over their wills, they esteemed them no lesse then vertues.

But opinions do so differ upon this subject, as a man may say that every Politician fancies unto himself a Prince according to his humor, and indues him with that Passion which is most agreeable unto himself. Some have wished that their Prince had no Passion at all, and that being the Image of God, he should be raised above the creatures, he should see all the motions of the earth without any alteration of spirit; but we know very well, that his being in a higher condition then his subjects, makes him not be of another nature; and that since he is not exempt from the diseases of the body, he cannot defend himself against the passions of the soul. Others have been of opinion that he ought to have all Passions; that like unto the Sun and constellations,

stellations he should be in a perpetuall motion, and imploy all his care, and all his thoughts upon the welfare of his State. Some have thought that the desire of glory was the most lawfull Passion in a King, and that since Fortune had indued him with all the goods she could conferr upon him, he should only labour how to atchieve honor. That vertue was only preserved by this desire, and that he who valued not reputation, could not love Justice. That a Prince ought not to indeavour the eternizing of his memorie by the pompe of glorious buildings, but by the gallantrie of his actions; that setting all other things at nought, he should only study how to leave a happy memory of his reign after his death. That nothing could more further him in this generous design then an insatiable desire of glorie; that riches were the goods of particular men, but that glory was the humor of Kings; and that he might well hazard all other things to compasse it. Others lesse glorious, but more rationall, have thought that fear ought to reign in the soul of Princes, and that as their wisdome exceeded their valour, the apprehension of danger should in them also surpasse the desire of glorie; for to boot that

Contemptu famæ, contemni virtutes. Tacit. 4. annal.

Cætera principibus statim adesse, unum insatiabiliter parandum, prosperam sui memoriam. Tacit. 4. annal.

that their fortune is exposed to a thousand mischiefs; that the greater it is, it runs the greater danger; that it is the more brittle by how much the more glorious; they are bound to prevent accidents by their watchfulnesse, to withstand storms by their constancie, and to forgo their own happinesse, to share in the miserie of their subjects.

All these opinions are upheld by examples; for there have been some Kings who have known so well how to moderate their passions, as they seemed not to have any; they have not been troubled at ill successes, and they would receive the news of a defeat, with the same countenance as the tidings of victorie. The quiet of their minde was not altered by the diverse functions they were oblieged unto; they punished faults with the same easinesse as they rewarded vertue; and whatever alteration befell their States, you should finde none in them; they seemed to be raised to so high a pitch of perfection, as one might say, in the weakneſse of man they had the assurance of a god. There have been others, whose government hath been no lesse happy, and who have yet been of a quite different disposition: for as their Empire was no lesse dear unto them then were their own bodies,

Quid majus est quàm in infirmitate hominis, habere securitatem Dei? Seneca.

no

no alteration could happen therein which might not be read in their faces; good successe put them in good humor, they were afflicted at unhappy accidents, they were touched to the quick even with evills that threatned them from afarre off, and every thing that befell their State made so strong an impression in them, as they seemed to live in two bodies, and that having two lives to lose, they had two deaths to fear. I dare not blame this their restlesnesse, since it was occasioned by an extream love; and a body must be unjust to condemn a Prince that makes himself miserable, for no other cause, but that he may make his subjects happy. *Augustus Cæsar* was of this humor, & though he had endeavoured to compasse so much constancie, as not to be troubled at any thing, yet could he not hear of any good or bad successe which befell his Common-wealth, without witnessing his resentment thereof by his word and actions: *Varrus* his defeat cost him tears, and this accident which he was not prepared for, made him say such things as I do rather impute to his affection then to his weakenesse, since upon other occasions he had given so good proof of his courage.

Their number is great who have laboured

boured after glory, and who have had no other Passion but how to acquire honor. Nothing seemed difficult unto them which bare with it the face of glory, insomuch as by an inevitable misfortune; they neglected vertue, when in obscuritie; and put a valuation upon a glorious vice. According to their tenets it was as lawfull to overthrow a State as to found one, to oppresse a Republique, as to defend it; and to undertake a warre against allyes, as well as against enemies. They run after glory by unlawfull wayes, and as some make fortunate faults passe for vertues, these tooke glorious pieces of injustice for heroick actions. The first *Cæsar* held this maxime; his ambition perswaded him that nothing was infamous that could purchase him honor, and that he ought not to consider whether an enterprise were just or unjust, provided that it might adde unto his reputation, and make his name looke bigge in story. His son in law was of the same opinion, and though he had fairer pretences for his designs, his motives thereunto were no better; for under colour of preserving the Common-wealth, he increased his particular authoritie, and by a detestable piece of art, he made use of the Senat, to establish his tyrannie. There needs

Prosperum ac Fœlix scelus virtus vocatur. Senec. Tragæd.

Pompeius occultior non melior. Tacit. Ore probo, animo inverecundo. Salust.

no

no great policy go to the observation, that so unruly a passion is disadvantageous to States, and that this is not that which ought to precede in the soul of Princes.

I shall therefore willingly side with those who attribute this honor to the zeal of Justice, and who will have the hearts of Monarchs animated by this harmlesse affection; for since the welfare of their people is the end of all their labours; the justice that must produce and preserve it, must be the scope of their desires, and they must maintain a well-grounded quiet in the varietie of conditions whereof their States are compounded. Who is not indued with this vertue, knows not how to raign; and though he have all the rest, he deserves not to bear a Scepter, since he wants that which makes Kings good, and Kingdomes happy. I cannot end this Discourse without taking notice of the excessive obligation which we have to divine providence, who hath given us a Prince of so pure inclinations, as he seems to have no part in this sin, which hath put our nature out of order; and who loveth Justice so passionately as he would be therewithall adorn'd, and chose the title of just, as the only recompence of all his heroick vertues. He might have assumed unto

to himself the title of happy as well as *Sylla*; since the Sea hath born respect unto his endeavours, that the Alpes have humbled themselves, and their snow dissolved to make way for his victorious forces; and that upon a thousand occasions the elements have fought in his behalf; he might have taken the title of great, as well as *Alexander*, since his actions have exceeded our hopes, and that he hath undertaken, and effected designs which all his predecessors have thought unpossible: Lastly, he might have challenged the name of victorious, as well as *Trajan*, since men may number his victories by his battells, since his souldiers were never worsted in his presence, and since good successe hath alwayes accompanied his enterprises. But knowing that justice is the vertue of Kings, he hath contented himself with the title of *Just*, and hath preferred it before those of Happy, Great, or Victorious; to teach all Monarchs, that zeal of the publique good, is the passion which chiefly ought to rule in them.

The end of the First Part.

The

The Second Part of the use of *PASSIONS.*

Of Passions in Particular.

The first TREATISE of *Love* and *Hatred.*

The first Discourse.

Of the Nature, Properties, and Effects of Love.

DIvinitie teacheth us that there is nothing more hidden, yet nothing more known then the God whom we adore; His Essence fills the world, and his Immensitie is such as he can produce nothing which he incloseth not; all creatures

are the Images of his greatnesse, and the proofs of his power: one cannot see them without knowing him; and they by their motions discover unto us what the Prophets have declared unto us in their Writings; yet is there nothing more secret then he, he is every where, and he is no where; he makes himself to be felt, yet will not suffer himself to be touched; he invironeth us, yet will not permit us to approach him; all people know he is, and no Philosophers know what he is. The beliefe that we have, that he is, is so ingraven in the very groundworks of our essence; as to efface it, were to annihilate our selves; yet cannot our understanding comprehend him; and this Sun casts about so much light as dazells the eyes that would behold him. Though love be but a Passion of our soul, yet hath it this advantage common with the Divine Essence, that it is as secret, as it is publique; and that there is nothing in nature more evident, yet nothing more hidden. Every one speaks of Love as of the soul that preserves the universe, and as the secret knot which entertaines the societie of the world; our desires declare it, and a man that wisheth, witnesses his love; our hopes divulge it, and all our Passions do discover it, yet

Qui ubique est, nullibi est.

is

is it retreated too within the bottom of our hearts; and all the marks that it giveth of its presence, are as many clouds which hide it from our understandings: men feel the power thereof, yet cannot explain its Essence; even they who live under its Empire, and who reverence the lawes thereof, are ignorant of its nature.

Poets who interest themselves in its greatnesse, will have it passe for a god; lest men may blame the violence of Love, they give it a stately name, and endeavour to excuse the true fury thereof by a false Pietie. The *Platonicks* make Love a Spirit, and attribute unto it so absolute a power over the Passions, as they will have even Hatred it selfe to obey its Will, and will have Hatred change all her rage into mildnesse, that she may please Love. The *Stoicks* terme Love a fury, and judging of its nature by its effects, they cannot beleeve that that motion of our soul be well ruled, which is as direfull to us as Hatred, and which hath so little government, as it most commonly offendeth even those whom it intendeth to obliege. The *Peripateticks* dare not give it any name at all, for fear of being mistaken; and *Aristotle*, who defineth the most hidden things, contents himself with the description thereof,

Deum esse amorem turpiter vitio favens finxit libido, quoque liberior foret, titulum, furori, numinis falsi addidit. Seneca in Hipolyto.

Odiumque perit, cum jussit amor, veteres cedunt ignibus iræ. Idem ibidem.

Idem est exitus odii & amoris insani. Seneca 6. benefic. cap. 25.

thereof, leaving us in a dispair how t
know a Passion which he knew not: Som
times he terms it sympathizing, sometim
an inclination, sometimes a complacenci
and teacheth us by these different term
that the nature of Love is no lesse obscur
then is the nature of the soul.

Amongst so many doubts, some Philo
sophers affirm, that it is the first impressio
which the *Bonum* sensible makes in the hea
of man, that 'tis a pleasing wound whic
man hath received from a fair object, tha
it is the beam of a Sun which warm
him, that it is a charm whose vertue is a
tractive, and that it is the first motion-whic
carries him, either to what appeares to b
good, or to what truly is so. But if I ma
be permitted to differ from common opin
ons, that I may follow the more true; I will
say that Love is all the Passions; that accor
ding to its different conditions it hath diffe
rent names, but that custome hath so pre
vailed, as in its birth it beareth the most
glorious name; for when an inclination is
formed in the heart, and that a pleasing ob
ject doth with delight stirr up the Will,
we call it Love; when it sallies forth from
its selfe to joyne with what it loves, we call
it Desire; when it grows more vigorous,

and

and that its strength promiseth good successe, we call it Hope: when it encourageth it self against the difficulties it meets withall, we call it Choler; when it prepares to fight, and seeks out weapons to defeat its enemies, and to assist its allies, we call it Boldnesse. But in all these conditions 'tis still Love; the name which Philosophers have given it in his birth, agrees not lesse with it in his progresse; and if when but a child it merit so honorable a title, it deserves it better when it is grown greater by Desires, and strengthened by Hopes. 'Tis true that Loves first condition is the rule of all the rest, and that as all rivers derive their greatnesse from their Spring-head, all the Passions borrow their strength from this first inclination which is termed Love; for as soon as it is taken with the beauty of an object, it kindles its desires, excites its hopes, and carries the fire into all the passions which hold of its Empire: 'tis in the Will as in a Throne, where it gives orders to its subjects; 'tis in the bottome of the soul as in a strong hold, from whence it inspireth courage into its souldiers; 'tis like the heart which giveth life to all the members, and the power thereof is so great as it cannot be well expressed by any example. Kings oft

times meet with disobedience in their subjects; the most valiant Commanders are sometimes forsaken by their souldiers, and the heart cannot always disperse its spirits throughout all the members of the body; but Love is so absolute in his dominion, as he never finds any resistance to his will; all the Passions get on foot to execute his commandements, and as the motion of the Moon causeth the ebbing and flowing of the Sea, so doth the motions of Love cause peace, or trouble in our soul.

Charitas Dei diffusa est in cordibus per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis Roman. 5.

Now this Love, the nature whereof is so hidden, hath divers branches; and may be divided into naturall, and supernaturall; the latter is that which God disperseth into our Wills, to make us capable of loving him as our Father, and of pretending unto glory as to our inheritance: the former is that which Nature hath imprinted in our souls, to fasten us to those objects which are delightfull to us; and this is divided into spirituall and sensible love: spirituall love resides in the Will, and rather deserveth to be stiled a Vertue then a Passion; sensible love is in the lower part of the soul, and hath so much commerce with the sences, from whence he borrows his name, as he always makes impression upon the body; and this it is

which

which is properly termed Passion. In fine, these two loves are divided again into two others; the one of which is called the love of friendship, the other the love of interest. The first is the more noble, and he who is touched therewith, respecteth nothing but what may be advantageous to whom he loveth; he wisheth him well, or procureth what is good for him; and having no consideration but honor, and his friends content, he sacrificeth himself for him, and thinks himself happy if he lose his life, to assure his friend of his affection. This noble Passion is that which hath done all the glorious actions which are observed in History: 'Tis she that hath filled Tyrants with admiration, and who hath made these enemies to society, wish to love, and to be beloved; judging aright that Soveraigns are better guarded by their friends then by their souldiers, and that all their forces were but weak, were they not supported by the love of their subjects. The second sort of Love, which we term the love of Interest, is as common as unjust: for the greatest part of affections is grounded upon utility, or upon pleasure; those who suffer themselves to be carried away thereby, have not so much friendship as self-love,

Amor amicitiæ & amor cõcupiscentiæ. In quid amicum paro? Ut habeam pessim, pro quo mori, ut habeam quem in exilium segnar, cujus me morti opponam & impendam. Epist. 9.

Qui amicus esse cæpit, quia expedit, placebit ei aliquod pretium contra amicitiam, si nullum in illa placet pretium præter ipsam.

Ista quam tu describis, negotiatio est, non amicitia, quæ ad commodum accedit. Seneca Epistola. 9.

and if they will speak their minds, they will confesse that they love themselves in their friends, and that they love them not so much for any vertue, which they observe in them, as for the good they hope to reape by them; thus we may see that such like affections last no longer then they are, either usefull, or pleasing; and that the same interest which gave them life, makes them die; they betake themselves to the fortune, not to the person, and these are commerces which last no longer then they are entertained by hopes of profit, or of pleasure.

Of so many sorts of love which Philosophy hath marked out unto us, we will here consider none but that which resides in the inferior part of the soul; let it have either vertue or interest for its foundation. And since we know the nature thereof, we will examin the qualities; the first whereof is, that it always seeks what is good, and never betakes it self to an object, which either is not good, or appears not so to be: for as nature is the workmanship of God, she cannot have strayed so much out of the way, but that she must preserve some remainder of his first inclinations, insomuch as having been destined to enjoy the *Summum bonum*, she longs after it; by an error which

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may very well be excused, she fastens her self to all that hath but the likenesse thereof, and by an instinct which remains in her, though in disorder, she suffers her self to be charmed by all things which have in them any thing of beauty or of goodnes. As if she had found what she seeks after, she indiscreetly betakes her self thereunto, and by a deplorable misfortune she oft times takes a falshood for a truth; she committeth Idolatry whilst she thinketh to perform actions of Piety; and attributing that unto the work, which is only due unto the workman, she runs into the same error which a lover should do, who by a strange mallady should forget the Mistriss which he vows service to, and passionatly adore her Picture. This fault ought rather to be imputed to man, then to his love; for love being blinde follows his inclination, not being able to discern between appearances and truth, he loves the good which offers it self unto him; that he may not miss of what he looks for, he betakes himself to what he finde; and is only to blame in being too faithfull: but man cannot excuse his sin, since Reason is his guide, and that he may learn by her, that all those goods which are touched by the sences, or are the objects of

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the sences, are but the shaddows of that which he ought to love. He must correct his love, and keep it from betaking it self to objects, which though they be indeed beautifull, are not the soveraign good, or *Summum bonum* which he seeks after. When he thinks the qualities they are indued withall may work a change in him, he might shun them as snares, and use violence upon himself, to get free from the creatures, lest they make him forget his Creator.

From this propriety of Love ariseth a second, which is, that he never is at quiet, but goes always in pursuit of what he loves; for seeing so many shaddows of that supream beauty which he adores, he is always in action, leaving one to take another, he seeks in all, what he cannot finde in one alone; and his change is not so much a proof of his ficklness, as of their vanity; he becoms wise at his own cost; when he meets not with what he expects in the beauty which he idolatrizeth, he repents him of his fault, and betaks himself to another subject, which he is forced to forgo again, because he enjoys but one part of that universall good wherewithall he is taken; his inconstancy would last as long as his life, did not Reason teach him, that what he covets is invisible,

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and that the abiding place wherein we are, is not destined for the passion, but for the hope thereof; he then sets at nothing what he so much esteemed, and considering that naturall beauties are but steps whereby to raise us to supernaturall beauty, he loves them with reservedness, and useth them as means whereby to purchase what he seeks after.

The powerfull impression which this beauty makes upon Love, causeth Loves third propriety, which is, that he cannot live in quiet, and that being solicited by his desires, he is always busie; he is of the nature of the constellations, which are in a perpetual motion; the end of one trouble is the beginning of another; and he hath not so soon ended his first design, but he frames a second; he is like those conquerors, who egged on by ambition, prepare always for new combats, never tasting the pleasure of victory. I cannot therefore approve of the Poets invention, who have feigned Love to be the son of Idleness; for if his genealogy be true, we must confess he is not of his mothers humour. That unfortunat Poet, who was Loves Martyr, and who saw himself justly persecuted for having forged weapons against womens chastity, avows that this

Habet omnis amor vim suam, nec potest vacare amor in anima amantis. Aug. in Psal. 121.

this passion is working; and that it is so far from being at rest, as it obliegeth its partakers to be souldiers; and that to love, a man must resolve to wage war. Hence it is that St. *Augustin* mixing sacred love with prophane, makes them both equally operative, and acknowledgeth that a true affection cannot be idle. Ambition, which is the love of honor, is a good proof of this, since it makes such impression upon the hearts of those that are ambitious, as they have not much more rest then have the damned, and that they are always cause of more trouble to themselves then to those whom they oppress. Avarice, which is the love of mony, doth authorize this truth no less then doth Ambitiõ, since those wretched men which are therewithall possessed, rend up the bowells of the earth that they may not be unusefull, and seek out hell before their death, that they may not be exempt from pain whilest alive. This propriety is so peculiar to Love, as it is not found in any other of the Passions. For though our desires be the first rivulets that derive from this Sping-head, yet do they give us some respit; and when they are weary of seeking after a far distant good, they suffer us to take a little rest: we oft-times drie our teares, and

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if we make not peace, we conclude a truce with our sorrow; we do not always meditate upon revenge, and choler as so much less lasting as it hath more of impetuosity and violence. Our hatred is sometimes laid asleep, and requires a new injury to awaken it; our joys are so short, as the longest of them indure but for a moment, and they love idleness so much, as they cease to be pleasing when they begin to be operative. But Love is always in action, it tarrys not till age give it strength to work, it formeth designs as soon as it is born; though abandoned by desirs and hopes, it ceaseth not to think of what it loveth, and to entertain it self to no purpose with the thought of good succesſe, which it never shall enjoy. In fine, activity is so naturall unto it, as the life thereof consists in motion; and as the heart, it ceaseth to live when it ceaseth to move.

From hence proceeds its fourth propriety, which is the strength which doth accompany it in all its designs; for though but new born, it is vigorous, if true; and giving proofs of its courage; it tameth monsters, which it is not yet acquainted withall; it measures its strength by its desires, & thinks it self able to do whatsoever it will; it is not astoni-

astonished with difficulties: If one propound them to Love, that they may stay the carreir thereof, he thinketh 'tis done to try its Will, and solicited by glory it endeavoureth to overcome them: Love neither accepts of, nor makes excuses. It will try all its forces before 'twill acknowledg an impotency, and it doth oft-times overcome enemies, which the most generous vertues durst never set upon. Hence it is that the holy Scripture compares it to death, not only for that it seperateth us from our selves, to joyn us to the things we love; but because nothing can resist it: for of so many pains which divine Justice hath found out wherewith to punish us, there is none, but death, which we may not defend our selves from. We save our selves from the injuries of the weather by cloaths and houses; we overcome the barrenness of the earth by our excessive labor; we correct nourishments by the help of Physick; we reduce wild beasts to our obedience by art, or force; we oft-times turn our pains into pleasure, and we draw advantages from the misery of our condition, which we should not have found in the state of innocencie. But nothing can resist death; and though Physitians have found out secrets to prolong

Magnum verbum, fotris ut mors; Dilectio, magnificentiusexprimi non potuit fortitudo charitatis; quis enim morti resistit? ignibus, undis, ferro, potestatibus, Regibus resistitur, venit una mors, quis ei resistit? nihil est illâ fortius, propterea viribus ejus charitas comparatur. Aug. in Psal. 121.

prolong our lives, yet do they in vain seek out means to defend themselves against death, which makes havock throughout the whol earth, pardons neither age nor sex; and Palaces, which are invironed with so many guards, cannot keep Kings from the reach thereof: So Love finds no difficulties which it overcomes not, no pride which it lays not low, no power which it tameth not, nor no rigour which it doth not allay.

Et quia ipsa charitas occidit quod fuimus, ut simus quod non eramus, facit in nobis quandam mortem dilectio: ipsa morti erant mortui quibus Apostolus dicebat, mortui estis. &c. Idem ibid.

Briefly, by annother propriety which is not less considerable then the former, Love charmeth troubles, mingleth peasur es with pain; and to encourage us to difficult actions, finds out inventions to make them either pleasing or glorious. Hunting is rather a business then a diversion, 'tis an image of war; and men who pursue wild beasts, seem as if they studied how to overcom their enemies; the victory is therein doubtfull, as well as in combats; and honor is therein purchased sometimes by the loss of life; yet all these troubles are the hunters pleasures, and their passion to this exercise makes them term that a pastime which Reason would term a punishment. There is nothing of delight in war, the very name thereof is odious; were it not accompanied with injustice, disorder, and fear, it would not-

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withstanding have horrors enough to astonish all men; death makes her self be there seen in a thousand different shapes; there is no exercise in war wherein the danger doth not exceed the glory; and it never furnisheth souldiers with any actions which are not as bloudy as glorious; yet those that love it make it their delight, they esteem all the deformities thereof beauties, and by an inclination which proceeds rather from their love then from their humour, they finde delight in dangers, and taste the pleasantness of peace in the tumults of war. This is it which made St. *Augustin* say, That lovers troubles are never troublesom, and that they never finde pain in serving what they love, or if they do, they cherish it.

Nullo modo sunt onerosi labores amantium, sed etiam ipsi delectant sicut venantium, piscantium: interest ergo quid ametur, nam in eo quod amatur, aut non laborantur, aut labor amatur. August.

But we shall never make an end if we would observe all the proprieties of Love; I therefore pass on to the effects thereof, which being so many pictures of Love will represent unto us its nature, and will discover unto us what it is able to do. The first of its miracles, is that which we call extasie, for it frees the soul from the body which she inanimates, that she may joyn to the object which she loveth; it parts us from our selves by a pleasing violence; and what the holy Scripture attributes to the

Extasim facit amor, amatores suo statu dimovet, sui juris esse non finit, sed in ea quæ amant penitus transfert. Dionis. de divin. Nominib. cap. 4.

Spirit

Spirit of God, befalls this miraculous division; so as a lover is never at home with himself, if you will finde him, you must seek him in the person that he adores. He will have people know that contrary to the Laws of wisdom he is always without himself; and that he hath forsaken all care of his own preservation; since he became a slave to love. The Saints draw their glory from this extasie, and truth it self, which speaks by their mouths, obliegeth them to confess, that they live more in Jesus Christ then in themselves. Now as a man must die to himself, to live in another, death accompanieth this life; and as well sacred as prophane lovers, cannot love unless they be bound to die. 'Tis true that this death is advantageous to them, since it procures unto them a life wherwithall they are better pleased then with that which they have lost: for they live again in those that they love; by a miracle of love, they, like the Phœnix, take life again from their ashes, and recover life in the very bosom of death. He who doth not conceive this truth, cannot understand those words, by which St. *Paul* teacheth us, that we are dead unto our selves, and alive in Jesus Christ.

Vivo autem jam non ego, vivit vero in me Christus. Galat. cap. 2.

Mortui enim estis, & vita vestra est abscondita cum Christo in Deo. Coloss. cap. 3.

This effect produceth another which is not much less admirable: for as lovers have

no other life then what they borrow from their love, it infallibly falls out that they transform themselves thereinto, and that ceasing to be what they were, they begin to be that which they love; they change condition as well as nature, and by a wonder, which would surpass all belief, were it not usuall, they become like unto that which they cherish. 'Tis true that this power shines much more gloriously in divine then in prophane love; for though Kings abase themselves in loving their subjects, and that they forgo their greatness, as soon as they engage themselves in friendship, yet do they not raise those up into their Throne whom they love. Jealousie (which is inseparable from Royalty) will not suffer them to give their Crown away to him who possesseth their heart. But if they should arrive at this excess, the maxim would only be true in them, and their subjects could not change conditions by the force of their love, for the love of greatness makes not a Soveraign, nor is a man the more accommodated though he love riches; the desire of health did never yet cure a sick man; and we have not found, that the bare Passion to know, hath made men wise. But divine Love hath so much power, as it raiseth us up above our selves, & by a strange Metamorphosis it

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makes us be that which it makes us love; It renders the guilty innocent, it makes slaves children, changeth Demons into Angels; and that we may not diminish the vertue thereof, whilest we think to heighten it, let it suffice to say, that of men, it makes gods.

It doth not therefore become us to complain of our misery, and to accuse our Creator, for not having equalled our condition to that of Angels; for though those pure spirits have great advantages over us, and that we hope for no other good then that which they possess, yet are we happy enough, since we are permitted to love God, and that we are made to hope, that our nature being by love transformed into his nature, we shall lose what we have of mortall, and perishable, to acquire what is incorruptible and eternall. This is the consolation of divine lovers, and this is the only means how to aspire, without blame, to that happines, which *Lucifer* could not do, but with impiety. I cannot end this Discourse without justly reproaching those that whilest they may love God, ingage their affections on the earth, or on earthly things, and deprive themselves of that immense felicitie which divine love promiseth them; for in loving of the creatures, they cannot share in

Quid enim refert natura esse quod potest effici voluntate. D. Chrysost. de laud. Paul. homil 6.

their perfections, without doing the like in their defaults; after having laboured much, they oft-times change an obscure and peaceable condition, into a more glorious, but a more dangerous one. So there is always hazard in the love of the creatures, and the advantage that may be drawn from thence, is never so pure, but that it is mingled with somewhat of misfortune. For whatsoever passion we have for the creature, we are not sure the creature hath the like for us; yet this miraculous change, which passeth for the Principal effect of love, is made in this mutuall affection, and in this correspondency of friendship. But we run not these hazards in consecrating our love to God; his perfections are not accompanied with faults; and we know it cannot be disadvantageous to us, to make a change with him. Our love is never without this acknowledgment, since it is rather the effect then the cause of his, and that we love not him, till he hath first loved us. He is so just as he never denies our affection the recompence which it deserves; he is not like those misbeleeving Mistresses, who amongst the numbers of their lovers, prefer him who is best behaved, before him that loveth best; in the commerce which we hold

hold with him, we are sure that he that hath most charity, shall have most glory, and that in his Kingdom the most faithfull lover shall be always the most honored.

The second Discourse.

Of the badnesse of Love.

SInce there is nothing so sacred but meets with some sacrilegious person which doth prophane it, we must not wonder if Love, which is the holiest Passion of our soul, meet with impious persons which corrupt it, and who contrary to its own inclination make it serve their designs; for love seeks only the *Summum bonum*, she is not without some sort of violence made to love her own particular good which is but the shaddow of what she desires: to abuse it therefore, sin must disorder nature, and turn naturall love into self love, making the Spring-head of good, the originall of all our evill. For during the state of innocencie, men had no love save only for good, and nature was so well temper'd with grace, as that all her inclinations were holy: In this happy condition, charity and self-love

Nihil in rerum natura tam sacrum quod sacrilegium non inveniat. Seneca.

were the same thing; and a man feared not to injure his neighbour by loving himself; but since his disobedience, his love changed Nature; he who looked upon another mans advantage and his own with the same Eie, began to separate them; and forgetting what he ought to God, he made a god of himself. He confounded all the laws of innocency, and as if he alone had been in the world, he forsook the sweets of society, he took a resolution to rule his affections by his own interests, and to love no longer any thing but what was usefull and pleasing unto him. This mischief, like poyson, disperst it self throughout the whole fabrick of Nature; and Reason cannot defend her self against it, without the assistance of grace. The gallantest actions lost their lustre by this irregularity; Philosophy by all her precepts could not reform a disorder, which was rather in the bottom of Nature, then in the Will. She put some of her might to fight against this monster, and spying a glimering of light amidst the darkness with which she was blinded, she confessed that man did not belong so much to himself as to his country, and that he ought endeavor more the glory of the State, then the good of his own family. She thought that the love

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of our neighbour should be formed upon the love of our selves, and beleeved that in willing us to treat them as our selves, she had corrected all the abuse of humane Nature. But this malady lying not only in the Understanding, her advice was not sufficient to cure it, so as she was enforced to confess that there was none could reform man but he that made him. Thus shall we finde no remedy for our misfortunes but by the assistance of grace; and our desires have had no freedom, save since Jesus Christ came into the world to banish self-love from out our souls; for his coming had no other motive, nor his doctrine any other end, then the ruine of this dreadfull monster. He setteth upon it throughout all his maxims, and hardly doth any word proceed from his divine mouth which gives it not a mortall wound. He protests he would admit of no disciples, who have not changed their self-love into an holy aversion; and that he will not suffer any subject in his Kingdom, who are not ready to lose their lives for the glory of their Soveraign. He condemns the excesse of riches, and the love of honor, only for that they nourish this inordinate passion, and he obliegeth us to love our enemies, only to teach us to hate our selves.

Si quis venit ad me, & non odit patrem suum, & matrem, & uxorem, & filios, & fratres, & sorores, adhuc autem & animam suam, non potest meus esse discipulus. Luc. 14.

selves. Mortification and Humility, which are the ground-works of his doctrine, tend only to destroy this inordinate affection which we bear unto our souls, or our bodies. In fine, he hath appointed us charity, only to overthrow self-love, and he died upon the Crosse, only to make this enemy die, which is the cause of all our quarrells and divisions.

Interficiens inimicitias in semetipso. Ephe. cap. 2.

We ought also to confess that this evill includes all others, and that there is no disorder in the world which doth not acknowledg this for its originall; and I am of opinion, that a man cannot only not make a good Christian of one that doth too excessively love himself, but I hold that according to the laws of Policy and Morality, one cannot make a good man, nor a good Statesman, of such a man; for Justice is absolutely necessary in all manner of conditions, and this vertue cannot subsist with self-love. Justice will have a man indued with Reason, to prefer the inclinations of the soul before those of the body, and that he preserve all the rights of authority to the Soveraign. Self-love (which leans always towards the flesh) will have the slave to govern his Master, and that the body command over the soul; Justice will have

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a good man not to wish for any thing which exceeds his merit, or his birth; and she instructeth him, that to be happy and innocent he must prescribe bounds to his designs. Self-love commands us to follow our own inclinations, and to govern our desires only according to our vanity; it flatters our ambition, and to insinuate it self into us, it gives us leave to do what we please. Justice will have a good Statesman prefer the publike interest before that of his own house; that he be ready to lose his wealth, and to sacrifice his own person for the preservation of his Country: she perswades him that there is no death more glorious then that which is suffered for the defence of a mans Country; and that the *Horatii* and *Scævola's* are famous in the *Roman* History, only for having sacrificed themselves to the glory of their Common-wealth; though there be nothing more naturall to a man then to love his children, some men have been found, whom Justice hath made to lose this affection to preserve the like of good Statesmen; who sollicited by this vertue, have butchered those whose fathers they were, teaching by so rigorous an example, that the love to a mans Country, ought to exceed the love to his own flesh and bloud.

Goatosque pater nova bella moventes,
Ad pœnam pulchra pro libertate vocabat. Eneid. 6.

A State cannot be happy wherein there is any doubt made of these maxims, as oft as the publique interest shall give way unto the particular, it shall always be neer ruin, and shall have no less trouble to defend it self against its subjects then against its enemies. Self-love, this mean while makes a man labour only for his own pleasure, or glory; it makes this the end of all his actions, and doth so binde man up within himself, as it suffereth him not to consider the publique; if he do his Country any service, it is in order to his own particular good; and when he seems most busie for the good of the State, he wisheth the slavery thereof, or conspires its ruine: *Marius* and *Scilla* do witness these truths; *Pompey* and *Cæsar* have made us see how dangerous such Statesmen are, who love themselves better then the Common-wealth; and who, so they may preserve their own power, fear not to oppress their Countries liberty.

In Religion this unjust Passion is yet more fatall, and Piety can never agree with Self-love. For there is no man that understands any thing, who will not affirm, that to be godly, a man must submit himself to the will of God. That with like submission we ought to receive punishments and rewards

wards at his hands; that we must adore the thunder wherewith he smiteth us, and have as great respect unto his Justice as to his Mercy; that we must be cruell to our selves, to be obedient to him. That it is Piety to immolate the innocent to him when he demands them; & that as there is no creature which ows not his being to his power, there is none who is not bound to lose it for his glory. Then what man is he who will submit to these truths, if he be a slave to self-love; and how shall he be faithfull to God, if he be in love with himself? I conclude then, that this inordinate affection, is the undoing of families, the ruine of States, and the loss of Religion; that to live in the world a man must denounce war to this common enemy of society, and that imitating the elements, which force their inclinations to exclude a *vacuum*, we must use violence upon our desires, to overcome a Passion so pernicious to nature and grace.

From this Spring-head of mischief flow three rivers which drown the whole world, and which cause a deluge, from the which it is very hard to save ones self; for from this inordinate love arise three other loves which poyson all souls, and which banish all vertue from the earth. The first is the love

love of Beauty, which we term Incontinencie. The second is the love of Riches, which we call Avarice. The third is the love of Glory, which we call Ambition. These three capitall enemies of mans welfare and quiet, corrupt all that belongs to him, and render him guilty in his soul, in his body, and in his goods. It is hard to say which of these three monsters, is hardest to overcome; for to boot with their naturall forces, they have auxiliaries which they draw from our inclinations, or from our habits, and which make them so redoubted, that they are not to be overcome without a miracle. To consider them notwithstanding in themselves; Ambition is the most haughty, and the strongest; Voluptuousnes, the most milde and soft; and Avarice the basest, and most opinionated.

These are fought against by divers means, and all morality is busied in furnishing us with reasons to defend our selves against them. The vanity of honor hath cured some that have been thereof ambitious: For when they come to know that they laboured after a good which happened not to them till after death, and that from so many dangerous actions they could only expect to have their sepulchres adorned, or some commen-

Quosdam cum in consummationem dignitatis, per mille indignitates erexissent.

mendation in History, they have ceased to covet an Idol, wch rewardeth ill the slaves that serve it; and that for a little applause which it promiseth them, obliegeth them many times to shed their own bloud, or that of their neighbour. The infamy of the voluptuous, the mischiefs which accompany them, the displeasures which follow them, and the shame which never forsakes them, have oft-times cured men to whom sin had left a little reason. Age may likewise be a cure for this; it is a disorder in nature to finde a lascivious old man; and it is no less strange to see love under gray hairs, then to see those mountains, whose heads are covered with snow, and whose bowels are full of flames. The misery of riches, the pain that is taken in accumulating them, the care in preserving them, the evils which they cause to their owners, the ease which they afford to content unjust desires, and the sorrow caused by their loss, are considerations strong enough to make those contemn them who are not as yet become slaves thereunto. But when they shall exercise their tyranny upon the spirits, I esteem their malady incurable: Age which cures other Passions, increaseth this. Covetous men never love riches more then when they are neer

Misera subiit cogitatio ipsos laborasse in titulum sepulchri. Seneca de brevit. vit. cap. 19.

Miser est omnis animus vinctus amicitiâ rerum temporalium, & dilaniatur cum eas amittit & tunc sentit miseriam qua miser est, & non ante quam amittat eas. Aug. confes. l. 4 cap. 6.

neer losing them; and as love is then most sensible when it apprehends the absence of the party beloved; Avarice is most violent, when it apprehendeth the loss of its wealth. But without medling with another mans work, I shall content my self with saying, that to preserve a mans self from all these evills, he must endeavour to forgo self-love. For, as naturall love causeth all the passions, inordinate love causeth all the vices; and whosoever shall be vigilant in the weakning of this Passion, by repentance and charity, shall finde himself happily freed from Avarice, ambition and incontinency. But to arrive at this high degree of happiness, we must remember, that in whatsoever condition Providence hath placed us, we are not for our selves but for the publique; and that we must not love our selves to the prejudice of our Soveraign. We are in nature a portion of the universe, in civill life a part of the State; in Religion we are the members of Jesus Christ. In all these conditions, self-love must be sacrificed to universall love. In nature we must die to give place to those that follow us. In the State, we must contribute our goods and our bloud for the defence of our Prince; and in Religion, we must kill the old *Adam*, that Jesus Christ may live in us.

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The third Discourse.

Of the good use of Love.

MOrality considers not so much the goodness of things as the good use of them, she neglects naturall perfections, and puts a valuation only upon their rationall employment; metalls are indifferent to her, nor doth she consider them otherwise then earth, whose colour the Sun hath changed. But she blames the abuse, and commends the good husbanding thereof; she is troubled when wicked men abuse them to oppress the innocent, to corrupt Judges, to violate the laws, and to seduce women. She is well pleased when good men make use thereof to nourish the poor, cloath the naked, to set captives at liberty, and to succour the miserable. There is nothing more glorious then the vivacity wherewithall Nature hath indued men nobly indued. 'Tis the key which opens unto them the treasury of Sciences, be it either to aquire them, or to distribute them to others

Tollat malus divitias, inopes opprimuntur, judices corrumpuntur: Tollat bonus, pauperes pascuntur, oppressi liberantur, captivi redimuntur. Aug. Serm. 3. de S. Cyprian.

thers; 'tis that which is acceptable to all companies, and 'tis a quality which is as soon beloved as seen. Yet doth not morality esteem it otherwise then as it is well husbanded; and St *Augustine* who acknowledged it for a grace, confesseth it hath been pernicious to him, by reason of his ill employment thereof, and because he had entertained it amongst his errors. Love without all question is the holiest of all our Passions, and the greatest advantage which we have received from Nature, since by the means thereof we may fasten our selves to good things, and make our souls perfect in the love thereof. 'Tis the spirit of Life, the sement of the whole world, an innocent piece of art, by which we change condition, not changing nature; and we transform our selves into the party whom we love. 'Tis the truest & purest of all pleasures; 'tis a shaddow of that happiness which the blessed enjoy. Earth would be a hell, if Love were vanisht thence; and it would be a great piece of rigor in God, if he should permit us to see handsom things, and forbid us to love them. But that we may the better govern this Passion, we must learn of Morality what laws to prescribe unto it, and what liberty we must allow it.

Celeritas intelligendi & acumen disputandi, donum tuum est; sed inde non sacrificabam tibi: Itaque mihi non ad usum, sed ad perniciem magis valebat. nam quid mihi proderat bona res non utenti bene? Aug. lib. 4. confess. 1. ult.

There

There are three objects of our Love, God, Man, and Creatures deprived of Reason. Some Philosophers have doubted whether we could love the first, or no; they were perswaded his greatness did rather require our adoration then our love; but though this be a religious opinion, and that it merits the greater esteem since it proceeds from the prophane; we cannot deny, but that we were indued with love, to unite us to God; for to boot, with our thorough sence of this inclination; to boot, that it is imprinted by Nature in the very groundwork of our wills, and that uninstructed by our Parents or our Teachers, we labour after the *Summum bonum*: Reason teacheth us that he is the Abysse of all perfections, and the Center of all love; so as a man need not fear committing any excesse, in loving him with all his might. He is so good as he cannot be loved so much as he ought to be; and let a man do his utmost, he is oblieged to confess, that the goodness of God doth far exceed the greatness of mans love. Such souls as are elevated, and approach neerer unto him, complain of their coolness; and wish that all the parts of their bodies were turned into tongues, to praise him; or into hearts to love him.

Deus nosteris est, quem amat id omne quod amare potest. Aug.

Omnia ossa, mea dicent: domine, quis similis tibi? Psal. 34.

They are troubled, that since his greatness is so well known, his goodness is no more loved; and that having so many subjects, he hath no more that love him. We must not then prescribe any bounds to this Passion when it hath respect unto God, but every one ought to make it his sole desire, and to wish that his heart were dilated, that he might infinitely love him, who is infinitely lovely; but we must take great heed, not to rob him of what doth so justly belong unto him; and we must remember, that though his goodness should not force his duty from us, we should be bound to render it unto him, in order to our own interest. For our love is never content but when it rests in God. It fears infidelity in the creatures, is never so assured of them, but that there remains some rationall doubts; and though it should have such proofs of their good will, as that it were constrained to banish all suspition, yet would it fear lest death might take from it what good fortune had given; and in one or other of these just apprehensions it could not shun being miserable. But it knows very well that God is immutable, and that he never forsaketh us till we have forsaken him; it knows that God is eternall, and that death being no less distant from him then change,

Modus amandi deum sine modo. Bern.

change, his affection cannot end but through our infidelity.

'Tis true there are carnall souls, who complain that he is invisible, and who cannot resolve to give up their hearts to a Divinity which doth not content their eyes. But all things are full of him, his greatnes is poured out in all the parts of the Universe; every creature is an Image of his perfections, he seems to have made these pictures only to make himself be thereby known and loved; and if he should not have used this piece of skill, we need only consult with our own Reason to know what he is. Error cannot corrupt her, and in the souls of Pagans she hath verified Oracles. Those very men who offered Incense unto Idols, knew very well that there was but one God; when Nature spake in their mouthes, she made them speak like Christians, and they confess'd those truths, for which they persecuted the Martyrs. For as *Tertullian* observes, their soul was naturally Christian; when they were surprized with a danger, they implored the succour of the true God, and not that of their *Jupiter*: when they took any oath, they raised up their eyes towards heaven, & not towards the Capitol so as we must not complain that God is invisible,

Anima licet carcere corporis pressa, cum tamen resipiscit, unum Deum nominat. Deus dedit, omnium vox est; ô Testimonium animæ naturaliter Christianæ: dicens hæc, non respicis capitolium, sed ad cœlum; novit enim anima sedem Dei vivi. Tert. in Apolog.

visible, but we must wish that he may be as much loved, as he is known. And moreover this complaint is no more to be admitted of, since the mystery of the Incarnation, where God became man, that he might treat with men; where he hath given sensible proofs of his presence, and where clothing himself with our nature, he hath suffered our eyes to behold his beauty, our hands to touch his body, and our eares to hear his voyce. Since that happy moment he is become our Allye, and he who was our Soveraign, is become our Brother, to the end that this double quality might obliege us to love him with more ardor, and might permit us to acrost him with more freedom; we cannot then fail in the use of that love which we owe unto him, but by being either too much reserved or too unfaithfull. But the love we render to men may be defective in two manner of ways, and we may abuse it either in loving them too much, or not enough, as shall be shewn in the pursuit of this discourse.

Friendship is certainly one of the chief effects of love, and the harmlesseſt delight which men can take in society. Very *Barbarians* did reverence the name thereof; those who despise the laws of civility, put an

an estimation upon the laws of friendship, and cannot live within their forrests without having some whom they trust, who know their thoughts, who rejoyce at their good fortune, and who are afflicted when any ill befalls them. Theeves who intrench upon the publique liberty, who make war in time of peace, and who seem desirous to stifle that love which Nature hath placed in mankind, cease not to bear respect to friendship; they have a certain shadow of society amongst them, they keep their word, though with prejudice to their condition; tortures cannot sometimes make them violate their faith; and they will rather lose their lives then betray their companions. In fine, people subsist only by vertue hereof; and who should banish friendship from off the earth, must raze towns, and send men into desarts. She is more powerfull then the laws, and who shall have well established her in kingdoms, need neither tortures nor punishments to contain the wicked within their duties. But to be just she must have her bounds, to be true she must be founded upon Piety; those who will love one another, must be united in faith, and must have the same sence of Religion; their friendship must be a study after vertue, and they must

Amicitia plurimas res continet; quocquo te verteris, præsto est, nullo loco excluditur, nunquam intempestiva, nunquam molesta est. Itaque non aqua, non igni, non aere (ut aiunt) pluribus locis utimur quàm amicitia. Cicer. in Lœl.

must labour to become better by their mutuall communication: their souls should rather be mingled then united; from this mixture a perfect community of all things must arise; their goods must be no more divided; and the words thine, & mine (which cause what ever there is of division in the world) must be totally banished; when their conditions meet together, friendship is not to be blamed; nay, the very excess thereof is to be praised, since being more divine then humane, & more grounded upon Grace then Nature, she should be freed from all those laws which are only made for common friendship. But in the one and the other of them, the pains which accompany them must be indured, and we must remember, that as there is nothing so perfect in the world, but hath its faults, there is nothing so pleasing which hath not its dislikes. Friendship is that which sweetens life, and who is not therewithall indued, cannot hope for happiness; It is the most rationall concord which this world can afford; and of as many pleasures as are, I finde none more harmless, nor more true. But it hath its incommodity, and who begins to love, must prepare to suffer. Absence is a short death, and death is an eternall absence, which entayles

Ejus enim nobis amara mors, cujus dulcis erat vita. Aug. lib. 19. de Civit. dei. cap. 8.

tayles upon us as much sorrow, as the presence of the beloved gives satisfaction. A man who loseth his friend, loseth one half of himself, he is at once both alive and dead; and death accords not with life, save only to make him more miserable. But say they should be so fortunate in their fate, as they should both die in one day, they could not shun the miseries which accompany life; they seem by being linkt together in affection, to have given fortune the greater hold of them, and their soul seems to be in two bodies, only that it may be the more capable of grief. *Aristotle* therefore would not have a man to have many friends, lest he should be bound to spend his whole life in bewailing their misfortunes, or that exacting the same duty from them, he might not trouble all their joy, and make his friendship fatall; 'Tis true that these pains are pleasing, and that by a just dispensation of love they are always mingled with some contentment. Teares are sweet when friendship is the cause of their shedding, if they ease him that sheds them, they comfort him for whom they are shed, and they make them both taste of true pleasure in a common misery; thus their malady bears the cure thereof about with it, and deserves

Ego sensi animam meam & animam amici mei, unam fuisse animam in duobus corporibus. Et ideo mihi horrori erat vita, quia nolebam dimidius vivere, & ideo forte mori metuebam, ne totus ille moreretur quem multum amaveram. Aug. lib. 4. Confess. cap. 6.

rather to be envied then pitied, since the sufferer and bemoaner are equally assured of their mutuall fidelity.

But 'tis much the harder matter to regulate the love between men and women, and to prescribe bounds unto a Passion which asks councell only of it self, and which thinks it self not true, if it be not in excess. Therefore the greatest part of our Divines do blame it; and though it be not faulty, but as it is dangerous, they forbid the use thereof, to shun the hazard. To say true, this vertue is never so pure, but that it hath some clouds, it easily slides from the soul into the body; and grant it could be without danger, it could never be without scandall. The age is too corrupt to judge uprightly of these communications; if they were publiquely allowed of, they would serve for a cloak to irregular affections; and under pretence of friendship every one would assume the liberty to make love. I know very well, there have been Saints in former ages, but they have not been exempt from calumnies. *Paulinus* bare no respect to the Empresse *Eudoxe*, save only for that she was learned; he was enamoured of her minde not of her body; and if he drew many times neer to this fair Sun, it was that he might be

Casuale est omne quod fœmina est, ejus societas semper infesta est, fœdere suo magnas molestias præstat, & cui adhæserit contrafas, insanabilem ingerit plagam: de carbonibus scintillæ dissiliunt, de ferro rubigo intritur, morbos aspides sibilant, & mulier fundit concupiscentiæ malum. Aug. lib. de singularit. Cleric.

be thereby enlightned, not heated. Yet their frequent conversation caused jealousie in young *Theodosius*; and an Apple as fatall as that of *Paris*, wrought the death of *Paulinus*, and *Eudoxes* banishment. I know there is no sex amongst souls, and that a mans minde may be found in a womans body. I know that vertue undervalues not the advantages of beauty, and that she is oft-times more eloquent in the mouth of a fair maide, then in the like of an Orator; I know there have been *Muses* as well as *Amazons*; and that men have no endowments which women possess not with as much or more of excellency. *Augustus* followed *Livias* councell, and consulted with her in his most important affaires, as oft as with *Mecænas*, or *Agrippa*. Great *Origens* School was open as well to women as to men; he thought them no less capable of the secrets of Learning, or mysteries of Religion, then men; so as a man may conclude, for these reasons, and out of these Examples, that the conversation of women is no less profitable then pleasing, and that if there be danger in their friendships, there is therein likewise advantage.

But notwithstanding whatsoever all these discourses may perswade us, I am firmely

of

of opinion, that, an honest woman ought to have no other friend then her husband; and that she gave a divorce of friendship when she engaged her self in marriage. She must have no more Masters, nor servants, since she hath given away her liberty: and she ought to suspect even the holiest affections, since they may serve for covers to lewd desires Such complacencies as are found in those who are not of the same sex, are seldome innocent; the same discourse which entertains, works upon their wills; and love glides into the heart under the name of suitableness of disposition, and of civility. The malady is contracted before it be known; men are oft-times in a fever, before they feel any distemper; and poyson hath already infected the heart, before we think the mouth hath swallowed it. Briefly, the danger is equall on all sides; men make strong assaults, and women weak defences. The freedom of conversation makes men more insolent, and the pleasingness thereof makes women less courragious. I shall therefore never approve of such friendships as may cause more harm then advantage, and which for vain satisfaction of the sence, hazards the souls health. We live under a Religion which commands us to forgo

Aculeus peccati est forma fæminea, & mortis conditio non aliunde surrexit quàm de muliebri substantiâ: Separamini deprecor à contagione pestiferâ. Quamtumcumque fuerit unusquisque longius ab adversis, tantùm non sentit adversa. Et minus voluptatibus stimulatur, ubi non est frequentia voluptatum, & minus avaritiæ molestias patitur, qui divitias non videt. Cypr. & Aug. de singularit. Cler.

go pleasures which are purely innocent; we are taught by a Master which commands his Disciples to pluck out such eyes, and cut off such hands as have been cause of scandall to them; we are brought up in a School where we are forbidden to look upon the face of women; yet under pretence of a naughty custome we will have it lawfull for us to win their affections, and to contract friendship with them, which beginning by irregular inclinations, are entertained by useless discourse, and end in criminall delights. Chastity runs hazards enough, and needs not to have new gins laid for her. The lustre of apparell, freedom of conversation, and that which is termed civility make sufficient open war against continency; there needs no addition of wiles, or cunning to surprize her. When men shall be Angels, it shall be lawfull for them to contract amity with women; when death shall have severed them from their bodies, they may without scandall converse together, and satisfie their inclinations; but as long as they shall have sense common with beasts, and that beauty shall make more impression on their senses then vertue, they must imitate the Prophet, which had sentenced his eyes not to look upon those innocent

nocent countenances, which seemed not to infuse other then chaste thoughts: In fine, they should resolve never to approach neer those maligne constellations, which burn more then they do enlighten, and which raise more tempests, then they shed light abroad.

To remedy these evills, we must implore aid from Charity; for it is she that purifies Love, that reforms the excesses, and amends the errors thereof; she will not have it to be excessive, neither will she that it be confined to our own persons, or to our families; she knows that Love is dispersed throughout all the world, & that when it goes from us, it passeth into our enemies; * It takes its birth (saith St. *Augustine*) in marriage, and inlargeth it self upon the children that proceed from thence. But in this condition 'tis carnall. That Passion is not to be commended amongst men, which is observed to be in Tigers, and a man cannot praise such naturall affections in reasonable creatures, as are seen in the most savage beasts. In its progress it extends it self to our kindred, and begins to be rationall; for though he that loves his Parents, loves his bloud, and that though his love forgo his own person, it doth not forgo his family, yet is his love more

* Incipit licitus amor conjugio, sed adhuc carnalis est, quia communis cum pecoribus. Secundus est amor filiorum, sed adhuc & ipse carnalis, non enim est laudandus qui amat filios, sed detestandus qui non amat filios suos; si vero non amaveris tuos, à serpentibus vinceris. Aug. lib. 15. Homil. 38.

Alius amor est propinquorum; iam esse videtur proprius hominis, si non consuetudinis, qui tamen amat propinquos adhuc sanguinem suum amat; amet alios qui non sunt propinqui, suscipiat peregrinum, jam multùm dilatatus est amor. Tantùm autem crescit, ut à

more expiated then is the love of fathers, and communicates it self to personages which are not so neer unto him as are his children; in the vigour thereof it passeth even unto strangers, it receives them into its house, it makes them share of what it hath, and not considering either their humors or their languages, their very having the aspects of men is sufficient to make them the objects of its liberality; in this acceptation Love is well waxen, but to be perfect it must descend even to our enemies, and induing us with strength to overcome our inclinations, it obliegeth us to do good to them who endeavor to do us harm. When it is arrived at this pitch, it may hope for reward; but if it stop in the middle of its carreir, it must expect nothing but punishment. These words comprehend all the use of this Passion, and I can add nothing thereunto which will not prove weak or useless; passing therefore forward, I come to the last object of our Love, which is creatures void of reason.

conjuge ad filios, à filiis ad propinquos, a propinquis ad extraneos ab extraneis, ad inimicos perveniat. idem ibidem.

I wonder that in this point all men joyn not with the *Stoicks*, and that their opinion passeth not for a law amongst all the people of the world: for they hold, that creatures which want reason do not deserve our love, and

and that our will is given us only to tie us to God, or to man. Truly if this maxime be a paradox, I hold it extreamly rationall; for what appearance is there that we should bestow our affection on creatures which not knowing it, cannot be oblieged to us for it, and having no obligation, cannot be conscious of our affection? In my opinion no man can be more prodigall then is the avatious man, since he engageth his affection to an unsensible metall, and that he loves without hope of being rebeloved. I think no man more irrationall, then he who ties his love to the beauty of a flower, which for all its odour and splendor, is not sensible of the odoration that is given it. I cannot indure those extravagant men, who place all their Passions upon a dogge, or a horse, which do them no other service then what they are carried unto, either by instinct, or by necessity. I therefore think the profit which we reap by them should be the rule of the affection we bear them; or, to speak more correctly, we must rather love our selves in them, then them for our selves; for they are too much beneath us to deserve our love; and though some shadow of fidelity be observed to be amongst dogges, and some sparks of love amongst horses, yet both

Apostolus Joannes non dicit, nolite uti mundo, sed nolite diligere mundum, qui enim non diligens utitur, quasi non utens utitur, quia non ejus rei causâ utitur, sed alterius quam diligens intuetur. Aug. lib. 5. contra Julian. cap. 16.

Utentis modestiâ non amantis affectu. Aug. lib. de Moribus Eccles. cap. 21.

both of them being void of reason, they are uncapable of friendship. To set our hearts on things insensible, is to prophane them. It is not just that the same soul, which may love the Angels, love dumb beasts; that the soul which may unite himself to God, joyn it self to metals; and that it lodg in the same heart, the noblest of all spirits, with the most imperfect of all bodies. I would then make use of gold, yet not love it; I would be master thereof, yet not slave thereunto; I would keep it for my occasions, not adore it; I would teach the whole world that it hath no valuation but what the good emploiment thereof bestows upon it, and that it is no less useless in the bowels of the earth, then in the coffers of the avaritious.

But not to be mistaken in so important an affair, we must use some distinction, and say that the creatures may be considered in a threefold acceptation; either as ways that lead us to our last end; and thus they ought to be loved: or as nets which stay as on the earth, and thus they ought to be shunned: or as instruments which divine Justice makes use of to punish us withall, and thus they ought to be reverenced: for when the creatures lead us unto God, that they expres

press unto us his beauty, and that their perfections raise us up to the consideration of him that is their fountain, there is no harm in loving them; and it were a piece of injustice not to acknowledg, in them, him, whose images they are; God himself hath invited us so to do; when he made them he praised them; and having given them his approbation, he obliegeth us to give them our love; yet this our love must be moderate, and must unite us no further to them then they may unite us to the Creator; we must look upon them as pictures which we love not, but only for his sake whom they represent; we must consider their beauties as the shadows of the like in God, and never permit that their perfections ingage us so strongly, that we reserve not freedom enough to forgo them, when our souls health, or the glory of Jesus Christ requires it. If the devill make use of them to seduce us, and if by the permission which he hath received from God, he imploy them to tempt us: If he will make the Stars serve to make us idolaters; if he will corrupt our innocence with gold; if he make our pride swell; or sooth our vanity with riches; and if by beauty he will rob us of our continencie, we must shun them as nets spred abroad

Viditque deus cuncta quæ fecerat; & erant valde bona. Genes. 1.

Respondent & singula quaque elementa clamantia, & ipsis suis operibus suum demonstrantia. artificem. Aug. lib. de Symbolo, tract.

in

in the world to surprise us: and as things, which since the fall of man seem to have changed their inclination; since they labour now to undo him, as they formerly laboured for his welfare. If, in fine, they be serviceable to the Justice of God, If through a zeal to his honor they pursue his enemies, if the earth quake underneath our feet, if the thunder roar above our heads, and if the fire and water agree to declare war unto us, we must suffer them with respect, and love them with so much ardency, as we may with less danger; for in this acceptation they have nothing of charm in them, which may flatter or abuse us; they are rather hatefull then loving, they cause in us rather a fear of God then love of our selves, and by an happy effect they loosen us from the earth, and raise us up to heaven; this councell comprehends all that Religion teacheth us touching the use of the creatures, and whosoever shall upon occasions make use thereof, will by experience finde that they are never lesse dangerous, then when most cruell, and that they never obliege us more, then when they punish us most severely.

Creaturæ dei in odium factæ sunt & in tentationem animabus hominum, & in mulcipulam pedibus insipientium. Sapient. cap. 14.

Aliquandò nos mundus dilectatione retraxit à deo; nunc tantis plagis plenus est, ut ipse nos jam mundus mittat ad deum.

Ipsas ejus amaritudines amamus, fugientem sequimur, persequentem diligimus, & labenti inhæremus. Greg. homil. 28. in Evangel.

The fourth Discourse.

Of the nature, Proprieties, and effects of Hatred.

THose who judge of things by their appearances, imagin there is nothing more contrary to man then Hatred, and that since he takes his name from humanity, he should not tolerate a passion which breathes forth nothing but bloud, and findes no delight but in murder. Yet it is a part of his being, and if he need love, to fasten him unto objects which may preserve him; he hath need of hatred, to drive him from those that may destroy him. These two motions are so naturall to all creatures, as they subsist not but by the love of their like, and by the hatred of their contraries.

The world had been ruined ere this, had not the elements, whereof it is composed, kept it in being, by their oppositions and accords; did not water by reason of the coldnes

coldness thereof resist fire, fire would ere this have reduced all into ashes, and having no further fuell to nourish it, it would have consumed it self; our humors which are nothing but tempered elements preserve us by their naturall antipathies; and choler would have dried up our whole body, were it not perpetually watered with flegm; so as the great and little world consist only by the contrariety of their parts; and if the author which hath produced them, should appease their difference, he would overthrow all his work, which would cease to love one another, if they ceased to hate their contraries. What is seen in Nature, is observed in Morality, where the soul hath her inclinations and aversions, to preserve and to defend her self, to fasten her self to things she likes, and to make her keep aloof off from what she likes not. And had not God indued her with these two Passions, she would be reduced to a necessity of suffering all the evills which assayl her, not having power to oppose them, or hope to defeat them. Hatred is then as requisite as Love; we should have reason to complain of Nature, if having given us inclinations to what is good, she should not likewise have given us an aversion from the contrary; and if she

had not indued our souls with as much vigour to shun objects which are prejudiciall to her, as to draw neer to these that are usefull. These two inclinations differ then only in their objects, and to speak exactly, we must say, that Love and Hatred make but one and the same Passion, which changes name according to their different uses; which is called Love when it hath a likeing to what is good, and Hatred, when it abhors what is evill. Leaving here the first effect of Hatred, which we have already considered, we will now examine the second, and will see what the nature, properties and effects thereof are.

Hatred in her birth is nothing els but a meer aversion in us from whatsoever is contrarie unto us. 'Tis an antipathy of our appetite to a subject which displeaseth it; 'Tis the first impression which a true, or an appearing evill makes in the lowest part of our soul, 'tis a wound which we have received from a displeasing object, and it is the beginning of that motion which our soul makes to keep aloof off, or to defend it self from an enemy which pursues it. She hath this in common with Love, that she oft-times prevents Reason, and shapes her self in our will, not consulting with our judgement.

ment. She takes offence at divers things, which are not unpleasing in themselves; and many times one and the same object causeth Hatred and Love in two different personages. Sometimes it so falls out, that according to the divers dispositions of our minds we like what formerly we have disliked; that which did hurt us, cures us, and becomes the remedy of the evill which it caused: she hath this of different with Love, that she is much more sensible. For Love is oft-times formed in our souls before we are aware; our friends must give us notice thereof, and those whose company we keep, must teach us that we do love; we must reflect upon our selves to know this Passion in its birth, and as it is extreamly delightfull, it wounds us so pleasingly as we do not feel the hurt, till by process of time it become an incurable ulcer. But Hatred discovers it self as soon as it is conceived, because it proceeds from an object wherein we are only concerned, as it hurteth us; it makes us suffer in its birth, and from the time that it possesseth us, it becomes our punishment.

It is as readily formed as Love, a moment serves to produce it in our wills, notwithstanding the little care we have to en-

tertain it; It dispoſeth its flames abroad into all the faculties of our ſoul; and as the moſt active of all the Elements its feeds upon what ever it encountereth; but it hath this of misfortune that it is not, ſo ſoon efaced as is Love; when it hath once taken root in the heart, there is no tearing of it out; time which hath produced it, preſerves it; and Philoſophy is defective of ſufficient reaſons, to cure a man who is affected with this troubleſome malady. Religion it ſelf is never more troubled, then when ſhe oppugns ſo opinionated a Paſſion; and the Son of God ſeems to have deſcended upon earth, only to teach us to ſubdue Hatred, and to pardon our enemies. Neither did he obliege us to this duty, till he had ſuffered death for his enemies; he beleeved that to eſtabliſh ſo ſtrange a doctrine, it muſt be confirmed by his example, authorized by his death, and ſigned by his own bloud. Thus did he declare war to a Paſſion which hath this advantage over other Paſſions, as that it endeth not with our ſelf; it is ſo dearly eſteemed of by men, as it is their ſole entertainment. It ſerves to divert them when they are diſpleaſed; and though it corrode their bowels, it gives content to their heart. I have heard of a Princeſs, who after having

having lost her Kingdom and her liberty, found comfort in the hatred she bore her enemies; and confessed she was not so much possess'd with sorrow for her past happiness, as by her desire of revenge. We see fathers, who having their souls hanging upon their lipps, and who being no longer able to live, do yet think how to continue their hatred; they leave it as an inheritance to their children, they obliege them to eternall enmity, and make imprecations against them, if they be ever reconciled to their enemies. In fine, this Passion is immortall, and as it resides in the bottom of the soul, it accompanieth her whithersoever she goeth; & doth not forgo her, no not when she is loosened from the body. This it is, which the Poets (who are the most excellent Painters of our affections) would represent unto us in the persons of *Eteocles*, and *Polenices*, who continued their hatred after death, and who went to end the combat in hell, which they begun on earth; this Passion lived in their bodies deprived of sence, it passed by a secret contagion into their funerall pile, and waged war in the flames which were to consume them.

But I wonder not that this Passion is so opinionated, since it is so daring; and I

think it not strange that it continues after death, since it hath made men resolute to lose their lives for love of revenge, and that it makes them finde some contentment in death, provided they see their enemies accompany them therein. For Hatred ceases to be true when it becomes discreet, and we may say a man is not wholly possessed therewithall, when to spare his own bloud he dares not shed the bloud of his adversary. When he hath given himself over to the tyranny thereof, he thinks he can never purchase the pleasures of revenge at too dear a rate. And propose whatever punishment you list unto him, he is well-pleased therewithall, provided his Passion may be satisfied. *Atreus* wisheth to be overwhelmed under the ruine of his Palace, provided it fall upon his brothers head, and so cruell a death seems pleasing to him, so as he be therein accompanied by *Theistes*. In short, Hatred is very puissant, since all torments are indured to give it satisfaction; and it useth strange tyranny upon such as it possesseth, since there is no fault which they are not ready to commit in obedience to it.

If the properties of Hatred be thus strange, the effects thereof are no less fatall. For as Love is the cause of all generous and gallant

gallant actions; Hatred is the rise of all base and tragicall actions. And those who are advised by so bad a Councellor, are capable of all the evill that can be imagined. Murder, and Parricide, are the ordinary effects of this unnaturall Passion. 'Twas this, that made us see in the day-break of the world, that a man might die in the flower of his age, and that one brother was not secure in the company of another. 'Twas this, that found out weapons to dispeople the world, and to ruinate Gods goodliest workmanship; 'Twas this, that making man forget the sweetness of his nature, taught him to mingle poyson in drinks, to shed humame bloud at Banquets, and to kill under pretence of hospitalitie; 'Twas this, that first instituted that fatall Art which teacheth us how to murther with method, how to kill men handsomly; and which forceth us to approve of Parricide, if it be done according to the laws of the world. 'Twas this in fine, and not avarice, which tore up the bosom of the earth, and which sought within the bowells thereof for that cruell metall wherewith it exerciseth its fury. And to describe in a few words all the evills it is cause of, it will suffice to say, that Anger is her first masterpiece, Envy her Councellor, Dispair her Officer,

Officer; and that after having pronounced bloody-sentences as Judge, its self puts them in execution as Hangman. 'Tis true, that Hatred never comes to these extremities, till it grow unruly; but this unrulinese is almost naturall thereunto; and unless Reason and grace labour joyntly how to moderate this Passion, it easily becomes excessive. The fierceness thereof is oft-times augmented by resistance; like an impetuous torrent it overthrows all the banks which oppose its fury, and when its forbidden any thing, it beleeves it may lawfully do all things; therefore the remedy which is ordained for Love, is no less necessary for Hatred; and to heal an evill which becomes incurable by time, early withstandings must be made, lest gaining strength it grow furious, and be the death of its Physitian, for having been negligent in its cure.

The fifth Discourse.

Of the bad use of Hatred.

THough the greatest part of effects produced by Hatred may pass for disorders; and that after having described the nature thereof, it may seem unprofitable to observe the ill use that may be made of it, yet that I may not fail in the laws that I have prescribed unto my self, I will employ all this discourse in discovering the injustice thereof, and I will make it appear to all the world, that of as many aversions as molest our quiet, there is hardly any one that is rationall. For as all creatures are the workmanship of God, and bear in their forheads the Character of him that produced them, they have qualities which render them lovely; and goodness, which is the principall object of Love, is so naturall unto them, as it is not to be seperated from the essence; to cease to be good, they must cease to be; and as long as they have a subsistance in nature, we are oblieged to confess, that there remains some tincture

tincture of goodness in them, which cannot be taken from them without an absolute annihilation. Thus God gave them his approbation when they were first made; he made their Panegyrick after they were created: and to obliege us to make much of them, he hath taught us by his own mouth that they were exceeding good; so as the belief of their goodness, is an Article of faith in our Religion; whatsoever opposition they may have to our humors, or our inclinations, we ought to beleeve that they have nothing of evill in them, and that their very qualities which hurt us, have their imployments, and their use; Poysons are serviceable for Physick; and there are certain maladies which are not to be cured but by prepared poyson; Monsters which seem to be errors of nature, or ordained by Providence which cannot do amiss; they do not only contribute, by their uglineſs, to heighten the beauty of other creatures; but are presages, which advertise us of our misfortunes, and which invite us to bewail our sins; the very devils themselves, have lost nothing of their naturall advantages; and the malice of their will, hath not been able to destroy the goodness of their essence; and though they are compleated in evill,

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they ceaſe not to poſſeſſe all the good which purely appertains unto their nature; they have yet that beauty which they did Idolatrize; they enjoy all their lights which they received at the firſt moment of their creation; they have yet that vigor, which makes a part of their being; and were they not reſtrained by the power of God, they would form thunder, raiſe ſtorms, ſpread abroad contagions, and confound all the elements; 'tis true, that theſe their advantages contribute to their puniſhments, and that divine juſtice makes uſe of their enlightnings and beauties, to make them the more miſerable; but this conſideration, hinders not that their nature be not good, and that God ſee not in the ground-work of their being, qualities which he loveth and conſerveth, as he ſees in the ground-work of their wils, qualities which he deteſts and puniſheth. Therefore 'tis that hatred ſeemed uſeleſs, and that to exerciſe it, a man muſt go out of this world to ſeek for creatures which may be the object of his indignation; for there is nothing, neither in Heaven nor in Earth, which is not lovely; if we meet with any thing which croſſes our inclinations, we muſt attribute it to our ill humor; or els we muſt blame

Nulla pugna eſt ſine malo, cum enim pugnatur, aut bonum pugnat & malum, aut malum & malum: aut ſi duo bona pugnant inter ſe, ipſa pugna eſt magnum malum. Auguſt. lib 5. contra Julianum .cap. 5.

blame sin for it, which having disordered our will, hath given it irrational antipathies, and forceth it to hate the workmanship of God. I know there are naturall aversions between insensible creatures, and that it is no little wonder, that the worlds peace is caused by the discord of the elements; If their bodies of which all other bodies are compounded, had not some difference amongst them, nature could not subsist; and 'tis Gods will that their warfare, be the worlds quiet; but to boot, that their quarrels are innocent, and that they set not upon one another, to destroy, but to preserve themselves; their combats are caused through their defaults, and their bad intelligence proceeds from their being imperfect: for those other bodies which are more noble, and which natural *Philosophers* call *perfectè mixta*, do not wage war, they cease not to love; though they have different inclinations, and they oft-times use violence upon themselves, that they may not trouble the worlds tranquility; whence I infer, that if a man bear a dislike unto his neighbour, he ought to blame his own misery; and confess that his hatred is an evident proof of his defaults; for if he could reconcile the particular differences of others, he would

would love in them, what he should finde in himself; and he could not hate that in their persons, which he should observe to be in his own; but he cannot tolerate their advantages, because he himself is not master thereof; the bonds which nature hath prescribed unto him, close him in within himself, and seperate him from all others. Self-he were an universal good, he would love every particular good; and if he were indued with all the perfections that are found in all men, he would finde none that would contrary him; but he is unjust because he is poor, and his aversion takes its original from his poverty; God suffers not these unfortunate divisions, his infinite love cannot be bounded; as he is the *summum bonum*, he loves all things that bear any badg of goodness; as he gathers up within himself all these perfections, which are dispersed abroad in his workmanship; he cherisheth them all together; and he hath no aversion, because he hath no defaults. Hatred is then a weakness in our nature; a proof of our indigence; and a Passion which a man cannot with reason imploy against the handy-works of God.

Diligis enim omnia quæ sunt, & nihil odisti eorum quæ fecisti. Sap. cap. 11.

Self-love is the second cause of its disorder

order; for if we were more regulate in our affections, we should be more moderate in our aversions; and not consulting with our own interests, we should hate nothing but what is truly odious: but we are so unjust, as we judg of things only by the credit we bear them; we condemn them when they displease us; we approve of them when they like us; and by a strange blindness, we esteem them good or evil, only by the satisfaction or displeasure which they cause in us; we would have them change qualities according to our humours; that like camelions, they should assume our colours, and accommodate themselves to our desires; we would be the center of the world, and that all creatures had no other inclinations, then what we have. The fairest seem ugly to us, because they are not pleasing to us; we are offended with the brightness of the Sun, because the weakness of our eyes cannot tolerate it; the beams of vertue dazle us, because that vertue condemns our defaults & truth (which is the second object of love) becomes the object of our indignation, because she censures our offences: there is nothing of truly glittering, but her light; she discovers all the beauties of nature, which would

would to no use have produced so many rare master-pieces, had not truth taught us how to know them. Truth hath more lovers (saith Saint Austin) then *Hellen* of *Greece*; all *Philosophers* court her; she is the subject of all their contestations, she infuseth jealousies into them, and they dispute with as much heat to possesse her, as do two rivals to enjoy a mistris; every one seeks her out by several ways: Divines in her fountains head, which is divinity; naturalists in the bowels of the earth; Alchymists, in the bosome of metals; painters and Poets, under colours and fables: yet this beauty, which causeth so much love to the whole world, ceaseth not to have enemies, she angers those she would obliege, she loseth her friends in thinking to preserve them; if she make her self be beloved of them by instructing them, she makes her self be hated by reprehending them; and she then becomes odious, when she ought to be most beloved. It is therefore extreamly dangerous to imploy a Passion, which assails vertue oftner then vice; and which contrary to the design of him that indued us therewithall, undertakes good, and wages war with it, because having some shadow of evil, it crosses our interests, or

Pulchrior est veritas Christianorum quàm fuerit Helena Græcorum: & pro illa fortius nostri martyres adversus Sodomam quàm pro illa illi tyrones adversus Trojam dimicaverunt. August. ac Hieronym.

Homines amant veritatem lucentem, oderunt eam redarguentem. August. lib. 10. Confess. cap. 28.

our delights. For remedy of this evil, I would advise, to consider well the things which we hate, and to look on them on that side which may render them agreeable unto us; for as they are good in their foundation, we shall always finde some quality in them, which will obliege us to love them; and we shall observe even in our enemies some advantages, which will force an estimation from us; the injuries they have done us, and whereupon we ground the justice of our resentments, will furnish us with reasons to excuse them, and if we will calmely examine them; we shall confess, that there is hardly any injury, which bears not with it its excuse; for (that I may make use of *Seneca's* words, and to confute Christians by infidels,) me thinks there can no outrage be done, which may not be sweetned, when a man shall consider the motive, or the quality thereof. Hath a woman offended you? you must pardon the weakness of her sex: and remember, that she is as subject to do amiss, as to change. Is it a child that hath injured you? you must excuse his age, which suffers him not yet to distinguish between what is good and bad. Hath your enemy used outrage to you? it may be you have oblieged him so

Puer est? ætati donetur, nescit an peccet: mulier est? errat. Iæsus est? non est injuria pati quod prior ipse feceris. Rex est? si nocentem punit, cede justitiæ; si innocentem, cede fortunæ. Bonus vir est qui injuriam fecit? noli credere. Malus est? noli mirari. Dabit pœnas alteri, quas debet sibi: & jam sibi dedit, quia peccavit. Senec. lib. 2. de ira cap. 30.

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to do; and in this case Reason wils that you suffer your turn about, for what you have made him suffer: is it your King that undertakes you? if he punish you, you must honour his Justice; if he oppress you, you must give way to his fortune: does a good man persecute you? disabuse your self, and forgo that error, and give him no longer a quality, which his fault hath made him lose. Is it a naughty man that hath offended you? wonder not at it; effects hold of their causes; you will finde some body that will revenge you; and without that wish, you are already revenged, and he is already punished, since he is faulty.

The sixth Discourse.

Of the good use of Hatred.

SInce nature makes nothing unuseful; and that of so many things that she produceth, there is not any one which hath not its imployment; Hatred must finde out its use; and this Passion which is born in us together with love,

must finde out some objects upon which it may innocently discharg its fury; but since nature loves her workmanship, since this common mother bears an affection to all her children and that she keeps them in so good a correspondency, as that those who violate it, pass for monsters; Hatred must likewise bear a respect unto them, and must go out of the world to finde a Subject which may provoke its indignation; it must fight with the disorders of our soul, and must charge such enemies, as would destroy vertue; yet must it take great heed lest it be deceived by appearances, and that thinking to do an act of justice, it commit not particide; for good lyes oft-tims hidden under the bark of evill, and things seem evill unto us, because they are contrary to us; their contrariety is notwithstanding a perfection: that which thwarts our humor, may agree with the humors of others; and what is not pleasing to our eyes, contributes to the beauty of the Universe; This difference of affection makes it appear, that the evill which we hate, is rather imaginary then true; and that we must rather lay the fault upon opinion, then upon nature. Sin is therefore the only object of hatred; to use it aright, we must govern our hatred according

according to Gods example; we must declare war against this monster, sin, which God hath chased out of Heaven; which he pursues upon the Earth, and which he punisheth in hell: for this Passion is the chastisement of the greatest crimes, it is the punishment of parricides, who defend themselves contrary to the justice of men; It besiegeth tyrants in their palaces, sets upon them in the midst of their guards, and maugre the fortune which protects them, it exacts reason for all the violences which they have committed; for they are not unpunished who are hated by all people, and sin is not without punishment, which draws publique hatred upon the Author thereof.

Inpunita tu credis esse quæ invisa sunt? aut ullum supplicium gravius existimas publico odio? Senec. l. ib. 3. benefic. cap. 17.

But as we are not made Iudges of other men, and that Gods Justice demands not an accompt of us for other mens sins, methinks our own sins are the only legitimate objects of our hatred; our neighbors sins may admit of some excuses; we ought to suspend our judgments, and withhold our aversions, since we know not their intentions; when they are become so publique, as they can be no longer dissembled, they should rather excite compassion in us, then hatred, and should rather draw tears from

our eyes, then reproaches from our mouths; since God excuses them, we ought not to condemn them, and since he hides them, we ought not to publish them. I should not notwithstanding blame a man, who preferring Gods glory before the creatures welfare, should wish that the guilty might be punished, or who not being able to tolerate them, should avoid their company, and make his indignation be thereby known; for the hatred of sin is an act of justice, and the zeal which makes us detest sinners, is an effect of charity. *David* gave over the praising of God, that he might make imprecations against the wicked; and thought to assure God of his love, by assuring him of the hatred which he bore unto his enemies; but that this aversion may be pleasing unto him, it must be perfect as was that of *David*; and to be perfect, it must have two conditions which his had; it must hate sin, and love nature; it must detest the work of the creature, and cherish the work of God; by reason of wisdome and justice, it must not love sin, for the mans sake neither must it hate the man for the sins sake; with these restrictions, a man may make good use of hatred; This guilty Passion becomes innocent, it takes part with two excellent vertues;

Perfecto odio oderam illos; & inimici facti sunt mihi. Psal. 138.

Perfectum odium est, quod nec justitiâ, nec scientia caret; at nec propter vitia oderis homines, nec vitia propter homines diligas. August. lib. de vera Innocent.

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and guided by grace, it is serviceable, at once, both to justice and charity. But it is much safelier exercised against our selves; and we run much less danger in hating our own imperfections, then in hating the like of our neighbours; for self-love, keeps us from exceeding therein, and notwithstanding any whatsoever holy fury charity inspires into us, it is moderated by the inclination which we have to love our selves. Therefore 'tis, that the Son of God wills, that the hatred of our selves be the foundation of his doctrine; He receiveth no Disciples into his School, whom he teacheth not this Maxime; he seems to have a design to banish self-love from off the earth, and to turn this irregular affection into an holy Aversion; He teacheth us, that we are criminal, and that entring into the zeal of divine justice, we should hate that which it hates, and punish that, which it chastiseth. He would have us to be all yce for what concerns our selves, and all fire for what concerns our friends. In fine, Hatred and Love, Aversion and Inclination, are the two vertues which we learn in his School; But he will have us husband them so, as that bestowing all love upon our neighbours, we reserve nothing but hatred

Quam verum est quod regnum cœlorum vim patitur, & qui vim faciunt, diripiant illud? Quantâ enim opus est, ut homo diligat inimicum, & oderit Seipsum? utrumque enim jubet, qui ad regnum cœlorum vocat. August. lib. 1. de sermon. Domini in monte cap. 25.

Qui amat animam suam, perdet eam; & qui odit animam suam in hoc mundo, in vitam æternam custodit eam. Joan. cap. 12.

for our selves ; 'Tis true, that this commandement is more rigorous in appearance, then in effect ; for what soever severity he witnesseth, he breaths nothing but sweetnes; He hides the name of love, under that of hatred ; and by obliegeing us to hate our selves, he ordaines us to love our selves well.

Magna & mira sententia, quemadmodum sic hominis in animam suam amor ut pereat, odium ne pereat : si malè amaveris tunc odisti : si benè oderis, tunc amasti. Fœlices, qui oderunt custodiendo, ne perdant amando. August. tract. 41. in Ioan.

But all people do not agree in the manner that must be held to observe this. I am offended to see that christians do not better explicate this Maxime, then prophane men do; and that they confound *Seneca's* doctrine, with that of Jesus *Christ* : for the greatest part of interpreters imagine, That the Son of God, presupposing that we are composed of two parts, which fight one against the other, will have us to take part with the more noble, against the more ignoble; that we prefer the inclinations of the soul, before those of the body ; and that living like Angels, and not like beasts, all the imaginations of our hearts be rational : certainly had he had no other design then this, we must avow, that he flies no higher a pitch, then does *Seneca*; and that bamshing only the love of the body, (which is the more grosse, and less faulty) He should have left the love of the soul, (which is the more delicate,

licate, and the more dangerous.) For this *Philosopher* pleads always for the soul against the body; All his gallant Maxims tend only to re-establish Reason in her empire, and to give her absolute power over the Passions; He cannot indure, that a Subject should become a Soveraign; and pride which enlivens all his doctrine, furnisheth him with strong reasons to oppose voluptuousness. He will have the soul to treat her body as her slave; that she grant unto it nothing but things necessary, and abridg it of all superfluities: He will have her nourish the body, to the end, that it may be serviceable to her; He will have her love it only as a faithful servant, that she imploy it to execute her designs; But he wills likewise, when Reason shall require it, she abandon it to the flames, expose it to savage beasts, and that she obliege it to undergo deaths as cruel as shameful. All these are bold cogitations; we must confess they proceed from a generously-minded man, and that he makes good use of the vanity of the soul, to overcome the delights of the body; but by curing one evil, he causeth a greater, by closing up a slight wound, he opens a deeper; by chasing self-love from the body, he drives it into the soul; and

Honestum ei vile est, cui corpus nimis charum est. Agatur ejus diligentissime cura: ita tamen ut cum exigit ratio, cum dignitas cum fides, in ignem mittendum sit. enec. Epist. 14. Major sum, & ad majora genitus, quam ut mancipium sim corporis mei: quod equidem non aliter aspicio quam vinculum aliquod libertati meæ circundatum. Nunquam me caro ista compellet ad metum, nunquam ad indignam bono viro simulationem, nunquam in honorem hujus corpusculi mentiar. Senec. Epist.

to 65.

Cum visum fuerit, distraham cum illo societatem; & nunc tamen cum hæremus, non erimus æquis partibus: Animus ad se omnejus ducet. Contemptus corporis sui certa libertas. Idem ibidem.

to prevent a man from becomming a beast, he endeavours to make him a devill: these who side with this Philosopher, are enforced to confess this truth, and if they who hold his Maxims would examine themselves well, they will confess, that they rather puffe up then heighten courage; and that they inspire the soul with more of vanity, then strength. But the doctrine of Jesus Christ produceth a clean contrary effect; for it subdues the body without making the soul insolent; it sets, at one and the same time, both upon pride and voluptuousness; and whilst it ordaines mortification, to submit the senses to Reason, it commands abnegation to subject the will unto God. Therefore (if it be lawfull for me to explain the intentions of Jesus Christ, and to serve him as an interpreter,) I beleeve that the Hatred which he requires from us, should pass from the body to the soul; and that to be perfect, it should extend it self to all the disorders that sin hath wrought in us; for nature hath lost her purity; and the two parts whereof we are composed, are become equally criminall; the inclinations of the soul are not more innocent then are those of the body, the one and the other of them have their weaknesses; & let Philoso-

Philosophi fuerunt Epicurei & Stoici: illi secundùm carnem, isti secundùm animam viventes; sed nec isti nec illi secundùm Deum viventes. Contulerunt illi cum Apostolo dum erat Athenis Dicebat Epicureus, mihi frui carne bonum est: dicebat Stoicus, mihi frui meâ mente, bonum est: dicebat Apostolus, mihi adhærere Deo, bonum est:

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phers say what they please, they are both corrupted; the understanding is clouded by darknesses; ignorance is naturall thereunto, it learns with difficulty, forgets easily; though truth be its object, it fogoes truth for falshood, and is enforced to acknowledg by the mouth of the wisest man in the world, that there are some errors, which is easilier perswaded unto then to some truths. Memory is not more happy, though she pass for a miracle of Nature, that she keeps depositted all the species she is trusted withall, that she boasts to represent them without confusion, and to be the enlivened treasure of all wise men; yet since our disobedience she is become unfaithfull, by reason of a contagion, which hath enfected all the faculties of the Soul; she fails us at our needs, and furnishes us rather with unusefull then with necessary things; the Will, as most absolute, is also most criminall; for, though it have so strong inclinations for the *Summum bonum*, as that sin hath not been able to eface it, yet she indifferently betakes her self to all objects that delight her; not listning to the advice of Reason, she follows the errors of opinion, and is guided by the report which the senses make, which are ignorant and unfaithfull

Errat Epicureus, fallitur & Stoicus; Beatus enim est cujus nomen Domini spes ejus. August. lib. de verbis Apostoli. Serm. 13.

Quid enim est, quod cum labore meminimus, sine labore obliviscimur; cum labore discimus, sine labore inertes sumus? Nonne hinc appareret in quid, velut pondere suo, proclivis sit vitiosa natura, & quantâ ope, ut hinc liberetur, indigeat? Aug. lib. 22. de civit. Dei. cap. 22.

full messengers; so as man is bound to make war as well against his soul, as his body, and to extend his hatred to both the parts which go to his composition, since they are equally corrupted; and to obey Jesus Christ, he must fight against the darkness of his understanding, the weakness of his memory, the wickedness of his will, the error of his imagination, the perfideousness of his senses, and the rebellion of all the parts of his body. These evill qualities which spoil the workmanship of God, are the true objects of our aversion; 'tis the evill we may hate with innocence, and with justice punish; 'tis the enemy we are oblieged to fight with, and to overcome; for to comprehend in few words the intentions of Jesus Christ, and the obligations of Christians, we must hate in our selves all those sins which disorder hath placed there, and which grace could not suffer there; we must destroy in our selves all that grace will have destroyed: but very well knowing that in this combate the victory is doubtfull, we must humbly intreat the Son of God, who prepares Crowns for the victor, to endue us with charity, to the end that thereby self-love may be diminished in us, and the detestation of our selves augmented.

Odit te Deus qualis es, sed amat te qualē vult te esse. Et tu debes te odisse qualises. Ægrum enim attende; Æger ægrotantem se odit qualis est: inde incipit concordare cum medico, quia & medicus odit eum qualis est. Nam ideo vult sanum esse, quia odit eum febricitantem; & est medicus febris persecutor, ut sit hominis liberator. Sic peccata tua febres sunt animæ tuæ, & ideo debes eas cum Deo medico odisse. August. lib. de decem chordis. cap. 8.

The

THE SECOND BOOK, OF Desire and Eschewing.

The first Discourse.

of the nature, proprieties, and effects of Desire.

AS good is the only object of Love, it never changeth form, but it obliegeth this Passion to undertake new customs; she depends so absolutely upon it, as she changeth names and offices, as oft as it changeth condition; when it is present, and discovers unto her all its beauties, she swims in pleasure; when it runs any hazard, she is seized on by fear; when

when it is assaulted by enemies, she takes up arms, and grows cholerick, to defend it; when it is parted from her, she is afflicted, and suffers her self to be over-born with grief; when it is absent, she consumes her self in wishes, and chargeth her desires to go finde out an object, the far distance whereof causeth all her anxieties (for Desire is nothing els but the motion of the soul towards a good which she already loveth, but doth not as yet possess; she extends her self, that she may arrive at it; she endeavors to forsake her body, and to separate her self from her self, that she may joyn her self to what she seeks after, she forgets her own delights, that she may not think of any thing save her beloved object; she forceth her self to overcome Nature and Fortune; and in spite of them, to render present the absent good which she desires.

By this definition, it is easie to observe the proprieties of Desire; the first whereof is restlesness, which will not suffer the soul, which hath conceived it, to taste any true contentment; for this soul is in a violent condition; she fights with the body which she inanimates, that she may unite her self to an object which she loveth; Nature detains her in the one, and Love carries her to

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the other; she is divided between these two powerfull Soveraigns, and she feels a torment little less rigorous then death. Thus have we seen men, who to free themselves thereof, have voluntarily condemned themselves to fearfull punishments; and who have esteemed all remedies pleasing, which could cure so vexatious a malady. Banishment is certainly one of the cruellest punishments, which Justice hath invented to chastise the guilty; it seperates us from all we love, and seems to be a long death, which leaves us a little life, only to make us the more miserable. Notwithstanding we have heard of a mother, who chose rather to suffer the rigor of this torment, then the violence of Desire; and who would accompany her son in his banishment, that she might not be necessitated to lament his absence, and wish for his return. Thus Nature which saw that Desire was an affliction, ordained hope to sweeten it; for whilst we are upon the earth, we make no wishes, whereof our minde doth not promise us the accomplishment; these two motions of our soul are only divided in hell, where divine Justice hath condemned her enemies to frame Desires void of hope, and to languish after a happiness which can never befall them.

Desideria occidunt pigrum. Prov. cap. 21.

Inventa est mulier, quæ pati maluit exilium, quàm desiderium. Senec. de Consolat. ad Helvetiam. cap. 18.

them. They long after the *Summũ bonum*, and whatever hatred they conceived against that God which punisheth them, they cease not, notwithstanding, to love him naturally; and to wish they might enjoy him, though they are not permitted to hope they shall: This Desire is cause of all their sufferings; and this languishment is a more unsufferable torment, then the scorching flames, then the company of the devills, and then the eternity of their prison; could they be without Desire, they should be without anguish; & all those others pains which astonish vulgar souls, would seem supportable to them, were they not adjudged to wish a happiness which they cannot hope for.

But it is not in hell only that this Passion is cruell, she afflicteth all men upon earth; and as she serves divine Justice, as a means wherewithall to punish the guilty, she is serviceable unto mercy, as an holy piece of cunning wherewithall to exercise the innocent; for Gods goodness causeth them to consume in desires; they are in a disquiet which cannot end but with their lives, they strive to get free from their bodies; they call in death into their succour, and say with the Apostle, *I desire to be dissolved, and to be with Christ*; Justice implies Desires to revenge

Desiderium habens dissolvi & esse cum Christo. Phil. cap. 1.

venge her self upon sinners; and by a no
leſs ſevere then rationall guidance, ſhe
gives them over to this Paſſion to torment
them; their deſires tend only to afflict
them, and their ſoul frames unruly wiſhes,
which failing of effects, leave them in a lan-
guiſhment which laſts as long as doth their
life. In fine, Divinity knowing that this
Paſſion is the cauſe of all our misfortunes,
hath thought, that ſhe could not deſcribe
Happineſs better unto us, then in teaching
us, it was the end of all Deſires. *Philoſophy*
would have ſaid, that it is the end of all our
evills, and the beginning of all our good;
that it makes us forget our miſeries by the
ſweets of her delights; but Divinity which
very well knows that deſires are the moſt
violent puniſhments which we ſuffer here
below, is content to ſay, that happineſs was
the period thereof, and that when we ſhould
begin to be happy, we ſhould ceaſe to wiſh;
we muſt alſo confeſs that Deſire faſtens it
ſelf to all the other Paſſions of our ſoul, and
that it either furniſheth them with weapons
wherewithall to fight, or with ſtrength to
afflict us; for thoſe Paſſions which make
moſt havock in our hearts, would be either
dead or languiſhing were they not animated
with Deſire. Love is only cruell becauſe it

Tradidit illos Deus in deſideria cordis eorum. Rom. 1.

Beatitudo deſideriorum quies. D. Thom.

coveteth the presence of what it loveth: Hatred gnaws not on our bowells, save only because it desireth revenge; Ambition is only angersome, because it aspires after Honor; Avarice tortures the Avaritious, only because it thirsts after riches; and all Passions are only insupportable, because they are accompanied by Desire, which like a contagious malady is shed abroad throughout all the affections of our soul to make us miserable.

If it be thus cruell, it is not much lesse shamefull; and we are oblieged to confess, that it is an evidence of our weakness and indigency; for we never have recourse to wishes but when our power fails us; our desires never do appear, but when we cannot effect them; they are marks of our impotency, as well as of our love; it teacheth Kings upon earth, that their will exceeds their power, and that they would do many things which they cannot. I know that desires inhartens them to proud undertakings, where difficulty is always mixt with glory; I know they excite their courage, and that they produce that generall heat, without which nothing of gallantry is either undertaken or effected; but they likewise teach them, that there is none but God alone

alone (who is able to do what he will) that maketh not fruitless wishes; and that it appertains to him to change when he pleaseth desires into effects; he rather wills then wishes; and doth rather resolve events then desire them: but amongst Princes their impotency hinders oft-times the execution of their desires; they are inforced to make vowes, and to implore aide from heaven, when they fail of help on earth; poor *Alexander* seeing his dear *Ephestion* die, could not witness his love unto him, but by his desires; He who distributed the Crowns of Kings that he had conquered, and who made Soveraigns slaves, could not restore health unto his Favorite; the vows which he offered up to heaven for his amendment, were as much evidences of his impotency as of his sorrow, and taught the whole world, that Princes wishes witness their weakness.

They are also publique marks in all men of hidden poverty, for every soul that desires, is necessitous; the soul that desires forgoes her self, to seek out in another what she finds missing in her; she discovers her misery by making her desires known, and teaches the whole world, that the felicity which she possesseth is but in appearance,

since it satisfieth not all her desires: Great *Tertullian* hath therefore worthily expresst the nature of this Passion, when he sayes, it is the glory of the thing desired, and the shame of him that doth desire; for a thing must be lovely to kindle our desires; it must have charms which may draw us, and perfections which may stay us; but for certain likewise, the will that doth desire must be indigent, and must stand in need of somewhat which makes it seek out a remedy. Desire then is the honor of beauty, and the shame of the unchaste; it is the glory of riches, and the Avaritious mans infamy; the praise of dignity, and the ambitious mans blame; and as oft as Princes are prone to this Passion, it gives us to know, that their fortune hath more of glittering in it then of reall truth; that she gives not all the contentments she promiseth, since they are constrained to descend from their Thrones, to quit their Palaces, and by shamefull prosecution to seek out a forraign good which they have not in themselves. The greatest praise which the holy Scripture gives to God is that, whereby they are taught that he is all-sufficient in himself; and that possessing all things in the immensitie of his Essence, he is not tied to wish for any thing, nor

Qui optat, honorat. Tertul. de pœnitent. Desiderium honor rei desideratæ, & dedecus desiderantis.

Dixi Domino, Deus meus es tu, quoniam bonorum meorum non eges. Psa. 16. Deus Passim in scripturis vocatur Sadai, id est, sibi sufficiens.

nor to forgo his repose, to seek for contentment in his creatures; the world contributes nothing to his greatness: if the worlds place should be supplied by a vacuity, and that there were no Angels nor men to know and love him, his felicity would be no whit the less intire; and all the praises which we now give him, add nothing to his glory; when we offer sacrifices unto him, when we make the earth resound with the noise of his praises, when we burn Incense upon his Altars, and enrich his Temples with the spoyls of our houses, we are bound to protest, that all our presents are of no use to him, that he obliegeth us in accepting them, and that we offer up nothing to his greatness, which we have not received from his liberality; Desire is then a mark of indigence, and whatsoever creature wisheth, declares its poverty.

But not to dishonor this Passion totally, we must confess it is also a proof of our dignity, for it extends it self to all things, and pretends some right to whatsoever can enter into our imagnination; it seeketh out effects in the bosom of their causes, perswades it self it may aspire unto whatsoever may be conceived, and that it may add unto the number of its riches, all the goods

which as yet it doth not possess; it is humored with whatsoever is possible; it is of so great a reach, as it imbraceth all that fortune promiseth; and nothing hath at any time happened to the most fortunate men in the world, which it thinks not it may with some sort of Justice expect. A Father of the Church hath therefore said, that the Apostles forgoing nothing, had yet forgone very much, since they had forgone their own desires; and that dispoyling themselves of a Passion, which in their greatest poverty gave them a right to all riches, they might boast to have forsaken all things for Jesus Christ; for the heart of man hath an infinite capacity, which can only be filled with the *Summum bonum*; It is always empty, till it possess him that made it, whatever els of good makes it the more hungry; and not being able to satisfie it, they irritate the desires thereof, but do not appease them; hence it is, that we cannot bound our desires, but that the accomplishment of one begets another, and that we run from one object to another to finde him out, of whom, the rest are all but shadows.

Ecce nos reliquimus omnia, & secuti sumus te, quid ergo erit nobis? Matth. c. 19.

Multum deseruit qui voluntatem habendi dereliquit. A sequantibus tanti relicta sunt, quanta a non sequentibus desiderari potuerunt. Greg. Magn. hom. 5. in Evang.

Infinitaâ concupiscentiâ existente, homines infinita desiderant. Arist. 1. Politi. cap. 6.

Hence proceed all the unruly desires which gnaw upon the hearts of the greatest Monarchs; hence did *Alexanders* ambition proceed

proceed, who thonght the earth too little, and who was offended, that his conquests should be bounded by the limits of the world: hence did *Cræsus* his avarice derive, who thought himself poor, though he were the richest of all the *Romans*, and that he passed over hideous deserts to war against a people whose riches were their sole fault. These disorders have no other rise, then the capacity of our heart, and the infinity of our desires, which pursuing the good which solicites them, and finding none that can satisfie them, go always in search for new ones, and never prescribes any bounds unto them; for though our understandings be not sufficiently enlightned to know the supreme truth in all his extent, and that our wills have not force enough to love the *Summum bonum*, as much as he is lovely, yet the one and the other of them cease not to have an infinite capacity, which all the things of the earth cannot fill: a naturall truth, how elevated soever it be, serves but as a step to our understandings, whereby to raise us up yet to an higher truth; and a created good, how rare soever it be, doth only enlarge our heart, and dilate our will to make it capable of what is yet more excellent; so do our desires perpetually change objects,

Cùm te habet anima, plenum est desiderium ejus: & jam nihil aliud quod desideretur, exterius restat. Dum autem aliquid exterius desiderat, manifestum est quòd te non habet interius; quo habito nihil est quod ultra desideret. Si autem creaturam desiderat, continuam famem habet, quia licet quod desiderat de creaturis adipiscatur, vacua tamen remanet, quia nihil est quod eam impleat nisi tu, ad cujus imaginem est creata. Aug. Soliloqu. cap. 30.

jects; they despise such as they formerly valued, and advancing still forwards, they become at last sensible that nothing can stop them, but he that can satisfie them. From these three proprieties which we have explained, it is easie to observe the effects which our desires produce in us, or forth of us; for since they separate the soul from the body, they cause all these extasies, and ravishments, which are attributed to the excess of Love; since they arise from indigence, they obliege us to demand, and consequently render us importunate to our friends; and since they suppose that our hearts are fathomless, we must not wonder if they be not satisfied with all that can be granted them, and if, after having pursued after so many different objects, they grow weary of pursuing, and seek for their rest in the *Summum bonum*, who is the end of all lawfull desires.

The

The second Discourse.

Of the bad use of Desires.

THose who would take the people for Judges in this affair, would doubtlesly imagine, that there is no more solid, nor more harmless pleasure in the world, then to see our desires changed into effects, since it is the ordinary wish which our friends make for us; and certainly, if all their wishes were well regulated, nothing would be more pleasing nor more usefull to us then their accomplishment, and we should have reason to think our selves happy, if after a long pursuance, we should at last accomplish them; but as they are almost always unjust, their successe is oft-times prejudiciall to us; and for my part, I am of *Seneca's* opinion, and hold with him, that the greatest part of our friends do innocently wish us ill, and make vowes in our behalf, which are more pernicious to us, then the imprecations of our enemies; If

Bonæ animæ malè precantur, & si vis fœlix esse, Deum ora, ne quid tibi ex his quæ optantur, eveniat. Senec.

we

we will be content, we must pray to God, that nothing may befall us that is wish'd unto us: our very Parents contribute to our misfortune through an excess of affection, and during our infancy, they draw down the anger of heaven upon us by the unjustness of their desires; so as we must not wonder, if when we are further advanced in years, so many misfortunes befall us, since those that love us best have been the causers of it.

Jam non admiror si omnia nos à prima pueritia mala sequuntur: Inter execrationes parentum crevimus. Senec. Epist. 60.

There are three causes for the irregularity of our desires; the first is self-love, which not being able to efface out of our souls, the inclination which we have to the *Summum bonum*, doth turn it aside after such good things as are perishable, and maketh them to be wish'd for, with as much fervencie as if they were eternall; for our heart longs always after God; though the good desires thereof be weakned, they are not quite stifled, they betake thēselves to what is good; and sin hath not been able to bereave them of an inclination which is naturall unto them; but Reason which ought to rule them, being clouded with darkness, they mistake, and fasten themselves to all objects that are pleasing to them. Man seeks after a beauty which time cannot alter, which age

cannot

cannot decay, nor death it self efface; assoon as he discovers the shadow thereof in a visage, he awakens his desires, and thinks it is the eternall beauty wherewith he ought to be satisfied. He longs after a good which puts an end to all his miseries, which frees him from all his cares, and which cures him of all the evills that oppress him; when he is falsly perswaded by opinion, that gold is a metall which assisteth us at all our needs, which opens the gate to honour, which facilitates the execution of our designs, and which makes us triumph over all difficulties, he commands his desires to purchase a good unto him, from whence he expects all his happiness: In fine, man seeks after a sollid and true glory, which serves as a recompence to vertue, and which satiates him with honor, which cannot be effaced by time, nor injured by back-biters; when error hath once perswaded him, that battells are Heroick actions, that conquests are the businesses of Soveraigns, he orders his desires to go in quest of these glorious occasions; and to undertake unjust wars, he forms designs to throw down Towns, to ruine States, and to carry horror and death into all the parts of the world, that he may look big in Story. The remedy to all these evills

Tantùm misscere vitia desideriis noli. Senec. Epist. 119.

evils is easie; and since the Will hath not lost all her good inclination, there needs no more then to cleer the understanding, and to fortifie it by solid reasons, which it may oppose to the false maximes of the world.

The second cause of the irregularity of our desires, is Imagination, which only makes use of its advantage to irritate them; for they would be regular enough, did not this imbroyling power put them in disorder. Nature seeks only how to free her self from incommodities that molest her, she requires not magnificence in buildings; and provided they save her from being injured by the ayr, all their adornments are of no use to her; she wisheth not for pomp in apparell, provided they hide her nakedness, and that that they fence her body from the rigor of the cold; she is yet innocent enough to blame the disorder; she seeks not after excessive pleasure, in what she eats or drinks, provided they sustain life, and allay hunger and thirst; she values not the delicacies which accompany them; but Imagination, which seems to have no other imployment, since the corruption of our nature, then to invent new delights, to defend us from our ancient misfortunes, adds dissoluteness to our desires, and makes our wishes

Ad legem Naturæ revertamur, divitiæ paratæ sunt: Aut gratuitum est quo egemus, aut vide, panem & aquam Natura desiderat; nemo ad hæc pauper est. Senec. Epist. 25.

wishes irregular; she adviseth us to enclose fields and rivers within our parks; she obliegeth us to build Palaces more glorious then our Temples, and greater then our forefathers Towns; she imployes all Artificers to cloath us, she makes whole nature labour to satisfie our pride, she dives into the inrals of the earth, and into the depths of the sea, to finde out diamonds and pearls to deck us withall. In fine, she seeks out delicates in food, she will have no viands which are not exquisite; she misprizeth what is common, and will try unknown cates; she awakens the appetite when it is asleep, she confounds the seasons to afford us pleasure, and maugre the heat of Summer, she preserves snow and ice, to mingle with our wine. In a word, Imagination makes us wise in our coveted delicates, she instructeth them to wish for things which they did not know; and putting our natural desires out of order, she makes them commit excuses, which they are only guilty of in being obedient to her. Thus our debaucheries arise from our advantages, and we are more irregular then beasts, only in that we are more enlightned; For *Aristotle*, distinguishing between our desires, terms (by a strange fashion of speech) the most modest

Luxuria ebore sustineri vult, purpurâ vestiri, auro tegi, terram transferer, maria concludere, flumina præcipitare, nemora suspendere. Senec. lib. 1. de Ira. cap. Ultimo.

Aristot, Ethic. cap. 11.

modest ones unreasonable, because they are common to us with Beasts; and the most insolent reasonable, because they are proper, and peculiar to our selves. In my opinion, 'tis for this cause, that *Philosophers* reduce us to the condition of beasts, and that they have propounded nature unto us for example, believing her to be less irregular or unruly then Reason; 'tis for the same reason, that they have divided our desires, into necessary and superfluous; and that they have affirmed the one to be bounded, the other infinite; that such as were necessary would finde wherewithall to content themselves in banishment, and solitarines; and that the superfluous would not finde wherewithall to content themselves in Towns and Palaces. Hunger is not ambitious, she requires only meat which may appease her; all those several services, in preparing whereof so much care is had, are the punishments of gluttony, which seeks out means how to provoke Appetite, after it is satisfied; for she complaineth, that the neck is not long enough to tast meats, that the stomack is not large enough to receive them, and that natural heat is not ready enough to digest them; she likes not wine, unless served in costly vessels; nor can she resolve to take it,

Ambitiosa non est fames, contenta desinere est, quò definat non nimis curat. Senec. epist. 119.

it, unless prepared by a fair hand. But natural desires are not accompanied with all these distasts; we are almost alwayes pleased with what is absolutely necessary for us. And nature which is a good mother, hath mingled pleasure with necessity, for our refreshment; let us make use then of a benefit, which we may number amongst the greatest; and let us believe, that she hath never more apparently oblieged us, then when she hath freed all our natural desires of distaste.

Inter reliqua, hoc nobis natura præstitit præcipuum, quòd necessitati fastidium excussit. Idem ibidem.

The third cause of their disorder is, our not sufficiently considering the quality of the things which we desire; for we oft-times corrupt the nature of desire, and by extream violence; we force it to seek out a thing which it ought to shun; We only look upon objects, as they appear; be betake our selves indiscreetly unto them, not considering their defaults; and make our desires be succeeded by sorrow; and grief to bethe sequel of our delights; We wish for reall evills, because they have some shadow of good, and when after a long pursuit, we possesse them, they begin to be unsupportable; changing opinion we change our desires, and accuse Heaven of having been too easy to us in granting them; We know by

by experience, that there be vows, which God doth not exact at our hands, unless he be angry, and that we make wishes, the accomplishment whereof is fatal to us; We are like the Prince who repented his having wished for riches, and who was afflicted for having obtained them, his desire becomes his punishment, he abhorred that which he desired, and finding himself poor in the midst of plenty, he prayed to be delivered from an evil, which he himself had procured; Absence puts a valuation upon almost all we have of good, and their presence makes us despise them; they appear great unto our Imagination when far off, but when they draw neerer, they lose their false greatness, all their advantages vanish away, as shadows before the Sun, and we turn our valuation into disesteem, our love into hatred, and our desires into detestation.

Attonitus novitate mali, diversque metu, Effugere optat opes, & quæ modo voverat, odit. Ovid. Metamorph. 11. de Mida.

Cui enim assecuto satis fuit, quod optanti nimium videbatur? Senec. Epist. 118.

Prophane *Philosophy*, desirous to finde out a remedy to so many evils, gives us counsel which makes us dispair; For she will have us to moderate our desires, without reforming our soul, she inhibits us the use of wishes, as if the mischief lay onely in them, and adviseth us to wish for nothing, if we would be happy; she builds her felicity

in

in the cutting off of this Passion. She thinks to have pronounced an oracle, when by the mouth of *Seneca*, she says, that he who hath bounded his desires, is as happy as *Jupiter*; and that without increase of riches, or addition to delight If we would finde a solid contentment, we need onely lessen our desires. But certainly in flattering us, she abuseth us; and promising us an Imagnary happiness, she breaves us of the means how to come by a true one; For she leaves us in the indigency wherein sin hath plac'd us, and forbids us the use of desires: she leaves us with the Inclination which nature hath endowed us withall, for the *Summum bonum*; and will not suffer us to seek after it: she will have us to be poor, and yet to have no feeling thereof; and that to the misfortune of poverty, we adde the like of insolence and pride. When we shall raign in heaven, and shall finde our perfect happiness in the fruition of the *summum bonum*, we shall banish all wishes. But as long as we grovel upon earth, and that we suffer evils which inforce us to seek for remedies, we shall conceive just desires; and shall learn from religion, how to make use of them, to the glory of Jesus *Christ*, and the salvation of our own souls.

Qui desiderium suum clausit, cum Jove de felicitate contendit. Senec.

The third Discourse.

Of the good use of Desire.

THough there be nothing more common then Desires, there is nothing more rare then the good use thereof; and of as many as make wishes, there are but very few that know how to rule them well; for this Passion is as free as Love; and as she is in her first production, she cannot endure to be constrained; she is so glorious as that she receives no Laws but from the *Summum bonum*; she sets not by the authority of Princes; and knowing that she holds not of their Empire, she is not affrighted at their threats, nor is she moved by their promises.

Therefore Kings, who sufficiently know the extent of their power, offer not to intrench upon her liberty; they punish actions, forbid words, but they leave thoughts and desires to his guidance, who seeing them in the bottom of the heart can eternally recompence or punish them: they make

make no laws to retain them; they confess God is only able to suppress them, and that he is the only Soveraign, whose prerogative it is to say unto his Subjects, you shall not covet: They therefore are to be esteemed insolent, who undertake to reform desires unassisted by his grace; and all the advices we can give to regulate them, do necessarily presuppose his assistance; but after having rendred this acknowledgment to him from whom we receive whatsoever we have of good, methinks we may prescribe certain conditions to the use of this Passion, which may make it glorious, and usefull to us.

Non concupisces. Exod. 20.

Nature hath endowed us with desires, only to come by the good which we have not, and which is necessary for us; they are helps in our need, they are the hands of our will; as those parts of the body labour for all the rest, our desires take pains for all the Passions of our soul, and by their care oblieg our Love and Hatred: but this advantage would be prejudiciall to us, if, being given us to assist our poverty, we should make use thereof to increase it: Therefore before we ingage our selves in the pursuit of a good, we must be well assured, whether it be great enough, or no, to inrich us; and if

the enjoyment thereof will cause those desires to die, to which the want thereof gave birth: for if it do only irritate, and if in lieu of healing our evills it make them worse, a man must be mad to continue the desire. I would then only desire those reall good things which may free me from my miseries; and to the end that my Passion may be rationall, I would only wish them as far forward as they ought to be wished; I would weigh their qualities, and I would fit my wishes to their merits; I would endeavor riches, not to serve my vaine-glory, but to supply my wants; I would endeavor meat for sustenance, not to provok appetite; I would endeavor honor as an aid to vertue in its birth, and which hath need of some forraign help to defend it against vice; yea, I would endeavor harmless pleasures, but I would shun their excess; and I would remember that they are of the nature of those fruits that are pleasing in taste, but are harmfull to the body; thus moderated, our desires would be rationall; if they fix us to things on earth, necessity will serve us for excuse, and we shall esteem the servitude glorious, which will be common to us with Saints.

Magnus ille est qui fictilibus sic utitur, quemadmodum argento: nec ille minor est qui sic argento utitur, quemadmodum fictilibus. Infirmi animi est, pati non posse divitias. Senec. Epist. 5.

Idem sentias de voluptatibus & honoribus.

We must have a care likewise to have only

only weak desires for things perishable, and to hold a hanck in such desires as may be violently taken from us. The *Stoicks* Philosophy is too austere to be listned unto, their maxims tend more to make us despair, then to instruct us; for it absolutely inhibits us the desire of such things as we may be bereft of; and it imployeth all its sophisticall reasons to perswade us, that the good which we come by by our desires, cannot be a true good: Christian Philosophy which knows very well that our felicity is not within us, and that we must forgo our selves ere we fasten to the *Summum bonum*, blames this maxim; but as she is not likewise ignorant that we may be bereft of other goods, she ordains us to desire them without anxietie, and to consider we are not so sure of their possession, but that it may sometimes meet with interruption; she prepares us for their losse, when she permits us to seek after them; she teacheth us that the desire of things perishable, ought not to be eternall; and that we must possess, without too much of addition, what ought to be forgone without sorrow; she teacheth us that the goods of Fortune, and of Nature, depend upon divine Providence, which doth not give us, but lend us them; which refuseth them to

Alienum est quicquid optando venit. Senec.

Hoc est propositum Deo, ostendere hæc quæ vulgus appetit, quæ reformidat, nec bona esse, nec mala: apparebunt autem bona esse, si illa non nisi bonis viris tribuerit, & mali tantùm irrogaverit. Senec. de Provid. cap. 5.

her friends, and grants them to her enemies; and which doth so bestow them, as if they be not marks of hatred, neither are they testimonies of her love by these good reasons she fairly perswads us, that they ought not to be the principal objects of our desires; and that to follow our Soveraigns intentions, we must love them with coolness, desire them with moderation, possess them with indifferency, and contentedly forgo them.

But the chief use we ought to make of so noble a Passion, is, thereby to raise us up to God, and to make thereof a glorious chain to fasten us inseperably to him; as he is *the* only object of Love, he is also the only object of desires: they miss of their end when they keep aloof from him; they lose themselves, when they seek not him; and they stop in the midst of their course, when they come not full home to him. He is the Spring-head of all perfections; and as they are without mixture of default, there is nothing in them which is not perfectly wishable: we see some creatures which have certain charms which make them be desired; but then they have imperfections to make them be undervalued: the Sun is so full of glory and beauty, as it hath made

Idolaters,

Idolaters; one part of the world doth yet worship it, and Christian Religion, which is spread over the whole earth, hath not been able to dis-deceive all Infidels; yet hath it weaknesses; which teacheth Philosophers that it is but a creature; the light thereof is bounded, and cannot at one and the same time inlighten the two halves of the world; it suffers Eclipses, nor can it shun them; it grows faint, and sees it self obscured by a constellation, not so great nor glorious as it self; it hath benign influences, it hath also malignant ones; if it concur with the birth of man, it doth the like to his death; if it be the father of flowers, it is also their parricide; if the brightness thereof serve to light us, it doth also dazle us; if the heat thereof warm *Europe*, it scorcheth *Africa*; so as the noblest of all constellations hath its defaults; and if it cause desire in us, it is also cause of aversions & under-valuations; but God hath nothing that is not lovely innumerable numbers of Angels see all his perfections, and are destin'd to honor them; they have immortall lovers which adore them from the beginning of the world; men who know them, desire them, and wish death unto themselves that they may enjoy them: this *Summum bonum* is that

Clamat Sol. quid me colis ut Deum, quem vides ortu occasu que concludi? Deus nec ortum habet nec occasum; sed illum declarendo magnum incucurristi casum: Cùm autem calor & splendor meus tibi differiant, quomodo me propo Deo colendum ducis, nisi quia Deum verum colere nescis? Aug. lib. de symbolo. tract. 3.

which we ought to seek after; for him it is that our wishes were given us; our heart is sinfull when it devides its love, and gives but one part thereof to him that deserves the whole; Gods abundance and mans indigence are the first lincks of alliance which we contract with him. He is all, and we are nothing; He is a depth of mercy, and we are a depth of misery; He hath infinite perfections, and we faults without number; He possesseth no greatness which is not to be wisht for, and we suffer no want which obliegeth us not to make wishes; He is all desirable, and we are all desire: and to express our nature aright, it will suffice to say, that we are only a meer capacity of good; there is no part of our body, nor faculty of our soul, which doth not obliege us to seek him; we make inrodes in the world by our desires, we wander in our affections, but after having considered the beauty of heaven, and the riches of the earth, we are constrained to return again unto our selves, to fix our selves on him who is the groundwork of our being, and to confess that none but God alone is able to fill the capacity of our heart. Let us draw these advantages from our misery, and let us rejoyce that Nature hath endowed us with so many desires,

Abyssus abyssum invocat. Psa 41.

Deus totus desiderabilis, homo totus desiderium.

sires, since they have wings which raise us up to God, and chains which fasten us to him. Upon all other occasions desires are useless, and after having made us Long, a long time, they furnish us not with what they made us hope for; they torment us whilst they possess us; and when despair causes them to die, they leave us only shame and sorrow, for having listned to so evill Councellors. I know very well that they awaken the soul, and that they endue it with vigor to compass the good which it wishes for: but the good success of our undertakings depends not upon their efficacy; and should the things that we love cost us nothing but desires, all ambitious men would be Kings; all covetous men rich; and we should hear no Lovers complain of the rigors of their Mistresses, or of their infidelity; women would take their husbands from their graves, mothers would cure their sick children, and captives would regain their liberty: we should do as many miracles as make wishes, and all mischief would be banisht from off the earth, since men can wish: but experience shews us, they are for the most part impotent, and that their accomplishment depends upon the supream providence, which at

at its pleasure can turn them into effects; those that concern our souls health, are never useless; fervency in wishing is sufficient to make a man good; our conversion depends only upon our will; our desire animated by grace, blots out all our sins; and though God be so great, he hath only cost them wishes that possesse him; this Passion dilates our soul, and makes us capable of the good we wish for; she extends our heart, and prepares us to receive the happiness which she procures us. In fine, she gets audience of God, makes her self be understood without speaking, and she hath such power in heaven, as nothing is denied to her demands; she glorifieth Jesus Christ and the Saints; Christ takes from them the most ancient of his names; and before he was known by that of Saviour of the world, he was already known by that, of the desired of all the people. His Prophets honored him with this title before he was born: He who shewed us the time of his comming, took his title from his wishes, and merited to be called, by an an Angell, the man of desires; His vows did advance the mystery of the Incarnation; the like of the Virgin did obtain the accomplishment thereof, and ours will taste the effect thereof, if

Vas desideriorum ipsa infusione crescit. Chrysost.

Apud Deum voces non faciunt verba sed desideria. Greg. Magn.

Desideratus cunctis gentibus. Aggæi cap. 2.

Vir desideriorum. Dan. c. 9.

if they grow not weary in begging them at Gods hands.

The fourth Discourse.

Of the Nature, Proprieties, and Effects of the good and evill use of Eschewing.

NAture would have failed us at our need, if having endued us with Love to good things, she had not furnished us with desire to seek after them. These good things which now are cause of our happiness, would cause all our punishments, if being permitted to love them, we should be forbidden to wish for them: the *Summum bonum* would only serve to make us miserable, and the vertue which it hath to attract hearts would contribute to our misery, if we wanted a capacity of atchieving it. We should have equall reason to complain of her charity, if having imprinted in our hearts the hatred of evill, she had not likewise engraven therein that Passion which we call Shunning, or Eschewing, to mak us keep aloof from it; for we should

should see our enemy, and not have the power to defend our selves from him; we should have an aversion from vice, yet should be enforced to tollerate it; and by an unfortunate necessity, we must give lodging to a guest we should not be able to love: but Nature hath well provided for this, and her providence, which always watches over her children, hath given us a Passion which eschews evill with as much impetuosity, as desire seeks after good. This keeps at distance from all that can hurt us; and following the inclinations of hatred, whereof she is either the daughter or slave, she flies from all objects that displease her; and fights to defend it self against her enemies: 'tis the first succour we have received against evills; 'tis the first violence, the first salley which the concupiscible appetite makes to free us from them.

Though this Passion be almost always blameless, and that she cannot be made criminall but by surprizall; yet ceaseth she not to have her ill use, and to be every day employ'd against the design of Nature. Those therefore that would make use of her, are bound to consider, whether that which they endeavor to eschew, be truly so, or be but so in appearance; and whether opinion, which easily

easily seizeth upon the understanding, hath not perswaded them unto falshoods insteed of truths. For it is apparent, that of two things that bear the name of evill in the world, there is but one of them which may properly be said to deserve it. Sin and Punishment are the two most ordinary objects of eschewing; and most men do so confound them, as we know not which of them is most odious. Punishment being more sensible then Sin, it is more carefully shunned; and there are not many people who do not love rather to be faulty then unfortunate. We shun the plague and seek out sin; we keep far from all infected places, the bad air whereof may work an alteration in our health, and we draw neer to evill company which may rob us of our innocency: Religion obliegeth us notwithstanding to believe that Punishments are the effects of Divine Justice; that they have beauties which though austere ought not to be the less pleasing; that God honors himself by punishing of his enemies, and that he findes as much satisfaction in chastening the guilty, as in recompencing the just. The greatest Saints have known that our punishments were favours, which did no less contribute to the welfare of man, then to the glory

Homines flagella sua dolent, peccata sua non dolent propter quæ flagellantur. Greg. Magn.

glory of his Creator; they have confessed that we must adore the arm which hurts us, love the wounds because of the arm that made them; and teach all the world that heavens thunders are just, since those who are therewith struck, adore them: but sin is a true evill, which hath nothing in it which is not odious: its object is a soveraign good which it offendeth; and if in the behalf of the committer the malice thereof be bounded, on his behalf against whom it is committed, it is infinite. Sin violates all the laws of Nature, dishonoreth men and Angels; and all the evills which we suffer are the just punishments of its disorders. 'Twas then for this dreadfull evill that we were endued with aversion; and this aversion cannot be more justly employed, then in keeping us far from a Monster, the abode whereof will be hell, and death the eternall punishment.

Justissima scias esse illa fulmina, quæ percussi etiam colunt. Senec. consolat. ad Polyb.

Next to sin, nothing ought to be more carefully eschewed, then those that do defend it; and who to enlarge the empire thereof, endeavor to make it appear lovely and glorious. As Nature is the pure workmanship of God, she cannot tollerate sin; and that she may banish it from the earth, she hath laden it with confusion, and fear;

Omne malum aut timore aut pudore Natura perfudit. Tertul. in Apologet.

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it dares not appear in full day; it hides it self in darkness, and seeks out solitary places, where it hath none but such as are complices with it, for witnesses. But its partakers raise it up upon a throne, and play all their cunning to win it glory: they cover it with the cloak of Vertue; and if it hath any thing of affinity with its enemy, they strive to make it pass for Vertue. They change their names, and by one and the same action committing two faults, they bereave Vertue of her honor, that they may give it to Sin: they terme Revenge, greatness of courage; Ambition, a generous Passion; Uncleanness, an innocent pleasure: and consequently they term Humility, lowness of spirit; the forgiving of injuries, faintheartedness; and continency, a savage humor. They spread abroad these false maxims; they turn evills into contagious diseases, and their errors into heresies; they seduce simple souls; and presenting poyson in chrystall vessells, they make it be swallow'd down by innocent people. Those who are most couragious have much ado to defend themselves from them; the best wits suffer themselves to be perswaded by their lewd reasons: we are therefore bound to have recourse to the succour that Nature hath

Sunt virtutibus vitia confinia, & perditis quæque ac turpibus recti similitudo est. Sic mentitur prodigus liberalem: cùm plurimùm interfit, utrum quis dare sciat, an servare nesciat. Senec. Epistola. 120.

hath given us, to excite this Passion, which keeps us aloof from what is evill, and furnisheth us with forces to fight against it.

But her chief employment ought to be against Incontinence; and the Heavens seem to have given a being to Aversion, only to rid our hands of an enemy which cannot be overcome but by Eschewing All Passions come in to the aid of Vertue when she undertakes a war against Vice: Choler grows hot in her quarrell; Audacity furnisheth her with weapons; Hope promiseth her victory; and Joy, which always follows generous actions, serves in stead of Recompence: but when she is to set upon Incontinency, she dares not employ all these faithfull souldiers; and knowing very well that the enemy, she is to fight withall, is as crafty as puissant, she fears lest he may seduce them, and by his cunning draw them over to his side. In truth, Choler agrees easily with Love; and Lovers quarrels serve only to re-kindle their extinct flames; Hope entertains their Affections; and Joy oft-times takes its rise from their displeasures: so as Vertue can only make use of Eschewing, to defend her self; and of so many Passions which assist her in her other designs, she is only seconded by eschewing, in her combat against

Omina in Christianorum pia certamina, sola dura sunt prælia castitatis, ubi quotidiana pugna & rara victoria: Gravem castitas sortita est inimicum, cui semper resistitur, & semper timetur. Nemo ergo se falsa securitate decipiat, nec de suis viribus periculose præsumat, nec cum mulieribus habitans, putet continentiæ obtinere triumphum. Aug. lib. de honestate mulier. cap. 2.

gainst Impurity. But she thinks her self strong enough if succour'd therewithall; and there is no such charming beauty, no so strong inclination, nor so dangerous occasion which she doth not promise her self to overcome; provided she be accompanied by this faithfull passion: she is the cause why Chastity raigns in the world; 'tis by reason of her wisdom that men do imitate Angels, and triumph over evill spirits in the frailty of the flesh.

But the greatest miracle which she produceth, is, when being subservient to Charity, she separateth us from our selves; and when preventing the violence of death, she divideth the soul from the body: for man hath no greatet enemy then himself he is the cause of all his own evills; and Christian Religion agrees with the Sect of the *Stoicks*, that man can receive no true displeasure, save what he himself procures: he is therefore bound to keep at distance from himself, and to hold no commerce with his body, lest it take part with the frailties thereof: he ought to shun its company, if he would preserve himself in his innocency; and by the assistance of eschewing, the soul must loosen her self from what she inanimates. Men forbid solitarines to such as

Lugentem timentemque custodire solemus, ne solitudine male utatur: Nemo est ex imprudentibus qui relinqui sibi debeat. Tunc quicquid aut metu aut pudore celebat animus expromit: Tunc audaciam acuit, libidinem irritat, iracundiam instigat. Senec. Epist. 10.

are affected, because it nourisheth their sorrow; and endeavour to divert them, to make them forget their displeasures. So is solitarines forbidden unto sinners; men dare not abandon them to their own thoughts, lest they entertain themselves therewithall, and be therewith too much possest; and a thousand tricks are made use of to take them from themselves, lest they finish their own ruine: for 'tis well known that they take nothing but evill counsells in solitarines; that they study how to lay traps for Chastitie, that they meditate on Revenge, that they excite their choler; and that losing that shame and fear which withheld them when in company, they give freedom to all their Passions when they are drawn aside. To cure them of so many evills, 'tis endeavoured to part them from themselves; and to lead on this design with succes, the charge is giving to Eschewing; which by harmles cunning, seperates the soul from the body, and keeps men aloof from what may hurt them.

Since then we are so much oblieged to this Pasion of Eschewing; and that we owe our welfare to her; it will become us to employ the rest of this Discourse in the consideration of her Proprieties; that we may

may the better know a Passion which doth us so many good Offices. She is the same to Hatred, which Desire is to Love: though she seem to consider Evill only, to the intent she may keep aloof from it; yet seeketh she after good in all parts; and like to Watermen, she turns her back towards the place where she would be: her effects are as powerfull as are those of Desire; and those unfortunate people who keep far from a great danger, have no less trouble in so doing, then those who seek after a great good fortune. As Desire calls in Hope to her succour, to compass the good which she esteems too difficult; Eschewing imployes the aid of Fear, to acquit her self of an evill which surpasseth her power. As Desire is a mark of our indigence, Eschewing is a proof of our weakness: and as in Desiring, we obtain that which we want; by Eschewing we overcome that which sets upon us. In fine, as Desire doth dilate our heart, and makes it capable of the good which it endeavoureth; Eschewing by a clean contrary effect, doth close up our soul, and shuts the door upon the enemy which would force her. So as these two Passions are the faithfull handmaids of Hatred and Love; and as Love undertaketh nothing of

generous, without the assistance of Desire; Hatred doth nothing of memorable, unassisted by Eschewing: and as we owe the possession of good to Desire, which sought after it; we owe our escaping of evil, to eschewing, which hath given it the Repulse.

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THE THIRD TREATISE, OF HOPE and of DESPAIR.

The first Discourse.

Of the Nature, Proprieties, and Effects of HOPE.

THat Art which riseth from the Earth to consider the Heavens, and neglects all the worlds beauties, that it may admire those of the Stars, teacheth us that the Sun changeth Influences as she changeth Houses: for though he lose nothing of Vertue in his course; though the Eclipses which rob us of his sight, take not from him that brightness which they hide from us, and his being

ing the farther off doth not diminish his heat; yet are there certain parts in the heavens where his aspects are more favorable, and his influences more benign: there be constellations which he cherisheth, and in which he delighteth to obliege whole Nature: they seem to heighten his lustre, to augment his force, and he appears never to be more powerfull, then when he communicates with them. Morality, which knows no other Sun then Love, confesseth that he takes new force as he takes new countenances: for though he be always hinself, and that the different names that we give him do not change his Essence, yet he accommodates himself to the apprehensions of our soul which he employeth, and doth with them produce more extraordinary, or more common effects. He is is cloudy in sorrowfulness, violent in choler, ready in desire, undertaking in boldness, calm in joy, and droopes in despair: but certainly, he is is never more pleasing, then in Hope. 'Tis the throne wherein he appears with most pompe; 'tis the affection wherein he works most strongly; 'tis the Passion wherein he most smoothly flattereth us: so is it also the most generous motion of our soul. Nature seems to have ordain'd it to assist great men

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in their highest enterprises; and that nothing of memorable can be effected without the assistance of this Passion. 'Twas at her solicitation that *Alexander* undertook the conquest of *Asia*; distributing all the wealth that he had received from his father, he only reserved her for his Patrimony: and he who found the world too little, contented himself with the promises which Hope gave him. *Cæsar* consulted only with her, when he resolved to change the state of the *Roman* Common-wealth, and to make himself master of that haughty Queen which gave Kings to all the people of the earth; all Conquerors have been her slaves; and Ambition which commanded over them, neither drew forth forces, nor took advice but from Hope, which augmented their courage.

But she is not so appropriated unto Princes, as not to communicate her self unto their subjects; for her care extends even to the meanest condition of men: she preserveth the worlds society; and all that give her entertainments are only guided by her motions. The Husbandman doth not cultivate the ground, Merchants put not to sea, nor do Souldiers give battell, but when solicited by the sweets of Hope. Though she

Omne hac via procedit officium. Sic seriemus, sic militamur, sic uxores ducimus, sic liberos collimus; Cùm omnium horum incertus sit eventus. Senec benefic. lib 4. cap. 33.

have no warrant, and that all her promises be uncertain, she sees a thousand people follow her orders, and attend her recompences. She hath more subjects then all the Kings of the earth put together: and she may boast, that neither the one nor the other do any thing but by her advice. 'Tis she alone that contents all men, and who in the difference of their conditions makes them expect the same success. 'Tis she that promiseth the labourer a happy harvest, favourable winds to Mariners, victory to Souldiers, and to Parents obedient children. Every one is ready to engage himself upon her word; and that which is yet more strange, men believe her though they have tane her in a lye: she gives so many colours to her new promises, as upon the assurance thereof men form new enterprises, and throw themselves into new dangers. The Labourer plows the ground after an ill year, and endeavoreth to overcome the sterility of the soile by the unweariesomness of his labour: Mariners remount their vessells after a shipwrack, and cozened by Hope, forget the horrour of tempests, and the seas perfideousness: Souldiers return to the fight after a defeat, by the strength of Hope; they charge enemies that have beaten them, and

Ad ea accedimus, de quibus bene sperandum esse credimus. Qui enim pollicetur serenti proventum, naviganti portum, militanti victoriam, marito pudicam uxorem, patri pios liberos? Idem, ibidem.

and promise unto themselves that Fortune will grow weary of always favouring one side. In fine, there is no so unfortunate condition, which receives not comfort from this Passion: though she be a Cheater, she will appear to be faithfull; and even in her lightness she gives proofs of her constancy: for she accompanies her slave, even to death; she follows Gally-slaves to the Galleys; she enters Prison with the Prisoners, she goes upon the Scaffold with the guilty, and with what bad success soever she may have paid our desires, no man can resolve to abandon her.

But as there is no advantage in the world which is not mingled with some defaults, Hope wants not hers; and if she flatter men by her sweetness, she astonisheth them by the fear which accompanieth it. For the good which she purchaseth is absent and difficult; the absence thereof disquieteth her, and the difficulty astonisheth her: She knows very well that what she seeks after, is doubtfull; her very name teacheth her, that the event of her undertakings is uncertain; and as oft as she considers the dangers that threaten her, she grows pale, as well as fear: she seems to be of the humor of that great Commander, who always trembled when

Spes incerti boni nomen est. Senec. epi. 10.

when he began to give battell; as if he apprehended the hazards whereinto his courage was like to throw him: she fears her own endeavour; and her boldness is the chiefest cause of her fearfulness. This maxime is so true, as that a certain Philosopher was of opinion, that our apprehensions sprung from our hopes; and that to cease to fear, we must cease to hope: for, though these two Passions seem to have a contrariety, and that the soul which hopeth is full of assurance, yet doth the one of them arise from the other; and, notwithstanding their ill intelligence, they go hand in hand, and seldom part: they march together as do the prisoners with their guards, who are fastned with the same chain, and almost brought to the same servitude. But I wonder not that they have so much affinity, since they relate so much one to another; and that the one and the other of them is the Passion which holds a man in suspence, whom the expectation of what is to come, continually disquiets.

Quemadmodum eadem catena & custodem & militem copulat, sic ista quæ tam dissimilia sunt, pariter incedunt: Spem metus sequitur; Nec miror ista sic ire, utrumque pendentis animi est, utrumque futuri expectatione solliciti. Senec. Epist. 5.

When she hath not this unhappiness, and that the knowledg of her strength assures her of good success in what she takes in hand, she falls into another extremity; and furnisheth our enemies with means to surprize

prize us: for she is naturally inconsiderate, what ever good advice be given her; she hath an eye unto the good which attracts her, and considers not the evill which environs her: she throwes her self indiscretly into danger, and guiding her self only by appearances which deceive her, she engageth her liberty to satisfie her inclination. Thus we see fishes swallow the hook, because 'tis cover'd with some bait; thus we see wild beasts give against the toiles, thinking to finde some prey there; and Souldiers fall into an ambush, thinking to get some advantage. So as, Hope is a rash Counsellor, which in the obscurity of what's to come, sees only false lights, and discovers no apparent good, save only to throw us into hidden and reall evills: Therefore do Polititians always distrust her advices; and those great men who govern States, do not easily believe a Passion which hath more heat then light, and more courage then wisdom. But say she should make good all that she promiseth us, and that the good fortune which she makes us expect, should not be mingled with any displeasure; yet should we have reason to complain of her; since that in feeding us with what is to come, she makes us forget what is past, and obliegeth

Et fera & piscis, spe aliqua oblectante decipitur. Senec. Epist. 8.

Memoriæ minimum tribuit, quisquis spei plurimum. Senec. benefic. lib. 3. cap. 4.

obliegeth us to build our contentment on the most uncertain part of our life.

Time, which measureth all things, hath three differences; the Past, the Present, and the Future: the Present is but *punctum* (a point;) it runs away so fast as there is no staying of it; we are tane in a lye whensoever we speak of it: it never understands the beginning and ending of the same discourse: when we think to make use of it for a witness, or to alledge it for an Example, it escapes our hands; we finde it is no longer Present, and that it is already Past. The Future succeeds it; but it is so hidden, as the wisest men of the world cannot discover the first moments thereof; the darkness of it is so thick, as that the light of wisdom cannot dissipate it: the success of things are shut up in the Abyss thereof; and one cannot come to the knowledg of them upon smaller terms then entring into eternity: a man must be a Prophet to penetrate its secrets; and all is there (in respect of us) so doubtfull and so confused, as the days which we destine for triumph, are oft-times destin'd for our defeat; and we reserve for our Pastime, those which heaven hath ordained for our punishment. The time Past is no more; it flys us, and we fly it;

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our wishes, which have somewhat of claim to what is to come, pretend none to this; they cannot dispose of that which hath no further a being: and that soveraign power which all things obey, will undertake nothing upon this part of Time, save when the said power will new-mould the world; and drawing our bodies from out the dust, will render unto the Present that which the Past had taken from it. 'Tis true, our Memory hath some jurisdiction over it: she makes use thereof for our comfort; she calls back our good days Past to recreate us, & by a harmless piece of art she makes Present happiness of our Past evills; she raises our friends from their graves that we may entertain our selves with them; she converseth with the dead without horrour; and maugre the necessary laws of Time, she revives what is Past, and restores unto us all the contentments which Time had bereft us of. It is likewise that part of our life which Philosophers love best; 'tis that over which Fortune hath no more power, and which cannot be incommodiated by Poverty, tormented by Fear, nor abused by Hope. 'Tis a sacred time, which accidents dare not touch; 'tis a treasure which cannot be taken from us; and Tyrants, who have power o-

Hæc est pars temporis nostri sacra ac dedicata, omnes humanos casus supergressa, extra fortunæ regnum subducta: quem non inopia, non metus, non morborum incursus exagitat. Hæc nec turbari, nec eripi potest: perpetua ejus & intrepida possessio est. Senec. de brevit. vitæ. cap. 10.

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ver the remainder of our life, have none at all over that which is Past: the Passion thereof is peacefull; and let the Destinies do what they please, they cannot rob us of a good which we enjoy only by remembrance; yet Hope deprives us of these harmless riches; and busying her self only about what is to come, she hinders us from thinking upon what is Past: she makes us poor, to enrich us; she takes from us a certainty, to feed us with uncertainty; and by an unjust extremity she draws us out of a calm, to engage us in a storm.

I confess that Wisdom and Religion have an eye to what is to come, but they consider it not as doth Hope: for Religion doth not ground her self upon that uncertain futurity which amuseth most men, but upon an assured futurity which we are promised in the holy Scriptures; she labours to compass it, she employs all her reasons to perswade us, that it ought to be the chief object of our desires; she despises that deceitfull futurity which humane hope seeks after, and makes so small esteem thereof, as she will not have us to esteem it a part of our life: she forbids us to think of to Morrow, and even condemns the false wisdom of men, who heap up riches, and build Palaces, as if they were sure

Nolite ergo soliciti esse in crastinum. Crastinus enim dies solicitus erit sibi ipsi: sufficit diei malitia sua. Matth. cap. 6.

sure to live to eternity: she will not have us defer the execution of our good resolutions to that unknown time; and by a profound knowledg which she hath of the uncertainty of all things, she forbids us to defer our repentance, and commands us to look upon the present day as the last of our life. True wisdom considers the time to come, rather as a well-spring of evill then of good; and when she will seek into the obscurity thereof, she takes advice rather of Fear then of Hope: she defies all that depends upon Fortune; and knowing that the best conjunctures are always doubtfull, she impatiently expects the time to come: as she knows that good success is out of our power, she leaves the ordering thereof to divine Providence; and is not troubled when she sees the wisest counsels succeed ill. So that Hope is to blame to engage us in a time which is not in our dispossall, and to ground all our good fortunes upon moments and houres, which peradventure the course of our life will not arrive unto. I know very well that the condition of our nature obliegeth us to pretend some right to futurity; that there being none, but God alone, which possesseth all his good together, we must allow something to the succession of Time; and that having

Quàm stultum est ætatem disponere! ne crastino quidem dominamur. O quanta dementia est spes longas inchoantium! Edam, ædificabo, credam, exigam, honores geram, tum demum lassam & plenam senectutem, in otium referam. Omnia mihi, crede, etiam felicibus dubia sunt: Nihil sibi quisquam de futuro debet promittere, Senec. Epi. 101.

having so few present advantages, we may entertain our selves with those which futurity promiseth us: but we must not build our welfare thereupon; and 'tis a high piece of folly to forgo the present, to forget what is past, and only feed upon what is to come.

By all these good and bad effects of Hope 'tis easy to know her nature, and to make an exact definition thereof. 'Tis then a motion of the irascible appetite, which with fervency seeks after an absent, difficult, possible good. She hath this of common with all Passions, that she is a motion of the soul; but she differs from fear, in that she considers only what is good, not what is bad; from joy, in that she looks upon an absent, not a present good; from Desire, in that she seeks not absolutly after good, but after such as is difficult. All these qualities teach us, that she may have her good and her bad uses; that if young people abuse her in their pleasures, old men make good use thereof in their affairs; and if she be pernicious to Wisdom, when she leaneth indiscreetly upon the uncertainty of what is to come, she is usefull to Religion, when she grounds her self upon Eternity. We shall see the proofs of these truths in the ensuing Discourses.

The

The second Discourse.

Of the evill use of Hope.

PAssions cannot be more insolently abused, then when they are employed contrary to the design of Nature; or when, thwarting their principall proprieties, they are made to serve unworthy Masters, who either by cunning or violence, make them forgo Vertues part. I cannot therefore more evidently shew the ill use which most men make of Hope, then in letting them see that they give against her inclinations; and that diverting her from her legitimate object, they propose others unto her which are not so fit for her. For according to the reason of all Philosophers, this Passion ought to respect a good which is Absent, Difficult, and Possible: whence I conclude, that the riches, honors, or pleasures of life, cannot be her true objects since they have only an appearance of good; and that it is Opinion, which knows not well how to name things, that hath ho-

nor'd them with a title which they deserve not: for Reason teacheth us, that all these things have no other valuation then what either Ignorance or Falshood gives them. Before such time as Avarice had rent gold from out the entralls of the earth, and that by a thousand tortures which she had made it suffer, she had given it the colour that dazles our eyes, it past only for an useless sand. Honor depends so strongly upon Opinion, as it is her meer workmanship: and Vertue would be thought to be very miserable, had she no other Recompence, then what is most commonly given to such crimes as have either good success or lustre. The Pleasures of life are not innocent enough, and they are too pernicious to man, to be numbred among his good things: Shame and sorrow accompany them; Sorrow which they so carefully eschew, findes them always out, and makes them bear the punishment of all the excess which they have committed. 'Tis peradventure this which made the Wise-man term these imaginary goods, deceitfull Pictures, which are in effect nothing less then what they appear unto our senses: for those who judge of the workmanship of Pictures only by the eye, think they see birds flying in the ayr, Plaines,

Aurum nomen terræ in igni relinquit, atque exinde de tormentis in ornamenta, de supplicijs in delicias, de ignominiis in honores, metalli refuga muratur. Tertul de habitu mulieb.

Umbra picturæ, labor sine fructu. Sapient. 15.

Plaines at such a length, as the eye reacheth not their extent, and Personages which stand at distance from the cloth; yet when they draw neerer, they finde them but as stroaks of a Pencill which deceive their sences, and which makes them see things that are not. It fares thus with all those perishable goods which Opinion hath cry'd up, and which owe all their valuation either to the weakness or to the ignorance of men. They are but the shadow of good, which having nothing of solidity cannot be the objects of Hope: the wisest men have therefore dismist them; and there have been Philosophers, who have never better known the vanity thereof then in their pomp and greatness.

The example which *Seneca* gives us of this, is too usefull not to be observed; he tells us, that *Attalus* had a secret affection to Riches; and that though he profest Philosophy, he thought that their goodness was answerable to their beauty, and that there was as much of sweetness in them, as of lustre: It fell out fortunately one day, that he saw a Triumph, wherein all the magnificences of *Rome* were exposed to sight; he saw vessells of gold and chrystall, the workmanship thereof augmented their price;

ſtately habits, the colours whereof were more precious then the ſtuffe; multitudes of children and women, whoſe different beauties did equally charm the eyes; ſlaves laden with chains, who had formerly born Crowns and Scepters: he ſaw all the booty of the Eaſt, and thoſe vaſt treaſures which ſo many Kings in proceſs of ſo many ages had gather'd together: he ſaw, in fine, all of rare that the *Roman* power had purchas'd ſince her Ambition gave place to her Avarice. Notwithſtanding all this, this Philoſopher found a cure for his malady, where it was thought he ſhould have increas'd it; he grew to know the vanity of riches in the midſt of their triumph; for reflecting upon all that he had ſeen, and finding that thoſe things were no leſs uſeleſs then deceitfull, he generouſly deſpiſed them; this pomp (ſaith he) could endure, but ſome few hours; one afternoon hath ſeen the beginning and the end thereof; and though the chariots that carried all this treaſure, marcht but ſoftly, they were quickly gone: what likelyhood is then that that which could not entertain us one whole day, ſhould poſſeſs us all our life-time? and that we ſhould ſuffer long puniſhment for a thing which is not able to give a long contentment? Thus did this

Vidiſtine, quàm intra paucas horas ille ordo, quamvis lentus diſpoſituſque, tranſierit? Hoc totam vitam occupabit, quod totum diem occupare non potuit? Senec. Epiſt. 100.

this Philosopher learn Vertue, where others reaped nothing but Vanity; and as oft as any object presented it self before his eyes, the appearance whereof might deceive him, he would say: *What doest thou admire (O my soul?) that which thou seest is a triumphant pomp, where we see things, but are not suffer'd to possess them; and where, whilst we are therewithall delighted, they pass away and vanish.*

Quid mirari? quid stupes? Pompa est: Ostenduntur istæ res, non possidentur; & dum placent transeunt. Senec. ibid.

If riches, not being a reall good, cannot be the object of our hope, whatsoever else the world promiseth, us cannot satisfie it, since they are not far enough off. For this Passion looks far into what is to come: she neglects present things, and longs after what is absent, and builds her felicity upon a happiness which is not as yet come. It seems she would teach us, that the world is not her resting place, and that all those contentments which smooth our sences, and which charm our eyes or ears, are not those which she seeks after. She raiseth her self up to heaven, and pretending to eternity, she thinks not that absent which is closed up in the un-intermitted course of Time; she, by a generosity which cannot sufficiently be praised, doth undervalue all those greatnesses, of which imaginat on may form an

Quod oculus non vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit, quæ præparavit Deus iis qui diliguntillum. 1 Cor. cap. 2.

Idea, and aspires only to that supream happiness which eye hath not seen, neither ear heard, neither hath it entred into the heart of man. Those then injure her who force her to fasten her self to all that we esteem good, and to languish for objects, which have not any one of those conditions that hers ought to have. For to boot, that her object ought to be absent, it must be difficult, and such as may cause trouble to those that will seek after it. This epithete will cause an error to arise in most mindes, and men finding difficulties in the pursuit of such things as they wish for, will imagine that they deserve to be hoped for: the Covetous man, who crosseth the Seas, who goes to discover unknown lands, and to seek out new maladies under new climats, will perswade himself that riches are very well worth the wishing, since they are so hard to come by: the Ambitious man, who enjoyes not one hour of content, and who findes a thousand reall hells in the imaginary Paradise which he frames unto himself, will think that Honor is the only object of Hope. But Philosophy pretends to fix difficulty to greatness; she confounds the name of difficult, with that of noble and generous, she blames all those that labour after

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an infamous good; and who forgetting the nobleness of their birth, have desires only after such things as are despicable. Hope is too couragious to value smoak or dirt; and she pitties all those mean souls, which take such mighty pains to compass riches or honors. 'Tis true, they cause trouble enough to those who seek after them; but they are not the more to be wished for, for their difficulty: the pain which they are accompanied with makes them not the more glorious; they resemble the punishment of the guilty, which cease not to be infamous, though severe.

In fine, all that the most part of men desire, is not Hopes end, because it is, for the most part, impossible. For though this Passion be bold, yet is she wise; she measures her strength; and though she engage her self in glorious enterprises, she will have some assurance of success: she aspires only to what she may obtain, and she quits the pursuit assoon as she findes they surpass her power; she loves to be esteemed Reserved rather then Rash; and to confess her impotency, rather then to shew her vanity. Notwithstanding, all those that hope exceed those bounds; and bereaving this Passion of her naturall wisdom, they raise their desires

beyond their merits, and do oft-times labour after things equally unjust and impossible: a slave in irons promiseth himself liberty; a guilty person under the Hangmans hand hopes yet for pardon; a man that is banisht from the Court, pretends yet to government; and you shall hardly finde any so miserable, who do not indiscreetly feed themselves with some imaginary happiness: they perswade themselves that the heavens will do miracles for their sakes, and that they will change the order of the Universe, to fulfill their desires.

Spes est ultimum adversarum rerum solatium. Senec. 5. controvers. 1.

But of all these mad mad men, there are none more to be pitied then old men; who seeing death already portray'd in their faces, do yet promise unto themselves a long life: they lose every day the use of some part of their body; they see not but by art, they hear not without difficulty, they walk not without pain, and in every thing that they do, they have new proofs of their weakness, yet they hope to live; and because our Forfathers lived many ages, they believe that in having a care of themselves, they may fence themselves against death; and after so many sins that they have committed, taste a favour which hath not been granted save to such as had not as yet lost all Innocence.

A man must renounce his judgement to conceive so irrationall a thought, and not know the grievances which do inseparably accompany old age: for all sorts of death are mingled with some hope; a Feaver leaves us after a certain number of fits, their heates lessen as they increased; the Sea throws on shore those whom it had swallow'd up, and a storm hurles ships into the Haven; and a souldier struck with pitty, gives life to his conquer'd enemy: but he whom old age leades to death, hath no more reason to hope; he is incapable of pardon; and Kings who prolong the lives of such as are condemn'd, cannot do the like to old men: their death is with less pain, but it is more certain; and as they ought not to fear death, so they ought not to hope for life. But we have sufficiently consider'd the out-rages done unto Hope: let us see the good offices that may be done unto her, employing her according to her own inclinations, and our need.

Alia genera mortis spei mixta sunt. Desinit morbus, incendium extinguitur, ruina quos videbatur oppressura, deposuit; mare quos hauserit, eâdem vi quâ sorbebat, ejecit incolumes: gladium miles ab ipsâ perituri cervice revocavit. Nihil habet quod speret, quem senectus ducit ad mortem. Senec Epist. 30.

The

The third Discourse.

Of the good use of Hope.

CHristian Religion is wholly built upon Hope; and as she neglects present happiness, we must not wonder if she long after a felicity to come: she confesseth she is not of this world, and she thinks it not strange if she be persecuted in an enemies countrey: she knows very well that she is called from this miserable world to another more happy; and that having nothing to possesse on earth, she ought to hope for all in heaven. All Christians who are instructed in her School, do with a holy impatience expect the happy day wherein the Son of God will punish his enemies, and crown his Subjects. They think themselves already saved, because they are so in Hope; and amongst so many evills that afflict them, they solace themselves in this vertue which promiseth much, but gives more: for it never confounded any body; and though she suffer such as lay claim to her to be

Scit se peregrinam in terris agere, inter extraneos facile inimicos invenire; Cæturùm genus, sedem, spem, gratiam, dignitatem, in cœlis habere. Tertul. in Apol.

be persecuted, she inspires them with so much courage, as that far from resenting their sorrows, they cast the happiness of Angels amidst their punishments, and laugh at the cruelty of Tyrants and Hang-men: let whatsoever accidents befall them, they are always secure; and knowing that Jesus Christ is the foundation of their Hope, they look upon all the changes of the earth, with calmness of mind.

Spes non confundit, quia infundit certitudinem; per hanc enim ipse spiritus testimonium perhibet spiritui nostro quòd sumus filii Dei. Bernard. in Cant. 37.

But whatsoever advantage Christians may draw from the vertue, we must confess that she hath nothing to do with that Passion which considers the time to come, and which seeks out a good which is possible and difficult: for the one is a Christian Vertue which resides in the Will; and the other is a Passion which resides in the sensitive appetite; the one is a meer effect of Nature, the other is the pure work of Grace: the one by its own strength can extend but to some ages, the other by its proper vigour mounts even to eternitie; the one, in brief, makes not good all that it promiseth, and failing in her word, leaves her lovers in confusion and sorrow; but the other is so faithfull in her promises, as those who have fought under her banners, confess, that her recompences surpass all their services: yet

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in these their differences nothing hinders them from agreeing: the best use of humane Hope is to assubject it to divine Hope, and to make it aspire, by her assistance, to the Possession of eternall happiness: for though Passion know no eternity, and that being engaged in the body, she raiseth her self not much higher then the Sences, she hath yet some inclination to follow after Grace, and to suffer her self to be guided by her motions: as she obeys Reason, she may obey Godliness; as she is usefull to Morall Vertue, she may be usefull to Christian Vertue; and (if it be not to give her too much advantage) I should think, that as she intermeddles with Patience and Fortitude to frame morall habits; she may do the like with Hope and Charity, to form super-naturall habits. But without engaging my self in a Shool-dispute, it shall suffice me to say, that if all our Passions may be sanctified by Grace, Hope being of no worse condition then the rest, may pretend unto the same favour, and contribute to all the good works of a Christian.

Fortitudinem Gentilium mundana cupiditas, fortitudinem christianorum Dei charitas facit, quæ diffusa est in cordibus nostris, non per voluntatis arbitrium, sed per spiritum sanctum qui datus est nobis. August. li. 1. oper. imperfect. contr. Jul.

Neither do I doubt but that the Saints have made good use thereof, and that enlightned by Faith, they have placed all that hope in Jesus Christ, which they placed in their

their Kings, or in their gods, whilest they lived in Paganism. I doubt not but that this generous Passion which encouraged them in dangers for the glory of their Princes, did animate them amidst flames for the quarrell of the Son of God; and I am firmly of opinion, that as by her own forces she made them good souldiers, so assisted from above, she made them couragious Martyrs: for Nature is the groundwork of Grace; and as Faith presupposeth Reason, the fortitude of a Martyr did presuppose the hope of a man; and it behoved that Passion should work in the hearts of those generous champions, whilest Grace wrought in their Wills. God makes daily use of the mouthes of his Prophets to explain his mysteries; when he discovers to them secrets to come, he makes use of their words to declare them unto his people; and he accords Nature with Grace in them, to execute his designes.

I therefore think that the best use a man can make of Hope, is to assubject it to three Christian vertues, which may make good use of her heat: the first is that which bears her name, and which by a harmless piece of cunning, loosens her from the earth, and gives her desires for heaven: for though humane

humane Hope be so generous, yet cannot she pretend to the happiness of eternity; and though in the souls of *Alexander* and *Cæsar* she aspired to divine honours, it hath not proceeded so much from any motion of her own, as from the like of vaine-glory; but when she is instructed by faith; when she knows that God hath chosen us to be his children, and that Jesus Christ hath made us his brethren, that we may be coheires with him, she wisheth with Humility, for what the others wisht for out of Ambition. The second Vertue which she may be serviceable unto, is Patience; which in all the evills she undergoes hath no other comfort, then what Hope furnisheth her withall: for while she fights with grief and pain, she would be a thousand times oppresst by their violence, did not this glorious Passion point out unto her the Rewards which are prepared for her; and if she did not sweeten the present evill by future happiness which Hope promiseth her. To understand this, you must know that Patience is a vertue as mild as close; she hath nothing of lustre; and though she undertake great matters, she spares Pomp and the Theater: darkness and the desarts are pleasing unto her, and she is content to fight in his presence,

Vultus illi tranquillus & placidus, frons pura, oculis humilitate non infœlicitate dejectis, os taciturnitatis honore signatum, color qualis securis & innoxiis. Tertul. de patientia.

sence, by whom she expects to be crown'd: neither is she any ways given to use violence; and, though her enemies be so powerfull, she defends her self by suffering, and makes us win the victory by the loss of our lives: she hardly takes the liberty to complain, and she shews so little feeling of outrages done unto her, or of her sufferings, as those who do not know her, accuse her of stupidity. So great a coldness ought to be animated by the heat of Hope; and so mild a vertue requires the assistance of an active Passion. During all her displeasures, the recompences which are promised her do only possesse her, and in the sorrows which she suffers, she raiseth her self up to heaven upon the wings of Hope; and with the eye of Faith, seeth the happiness which is prepared for her.

Spes patientiæ anima. unde B. Jacob illas confundit dum dicit, patientes estote fratres usque ad adventum Domini: Ecce Agricola expectat pretiosum fructum terræ &c. Jacob: cap. 5.

But the chief use which we ought to make of this Passion is, when Fortitude grapples with grief, and when she sets upon these dreadfull enemies, which endeavour to triumph over her courage. For there is this difference between Patience and Fortitude: the first is content to suffer; the second will be doing; the one, out of modesty, hides her self; the other, out of generosity, shews it self; the one expects till michiefs

Quæ quidem patientia spei admixta aut potius imitata videtur.

come,

come, the other goes to seek them out: the one is mild, the other severe; the one (to speak properly) suffers paines which she cannot shun; the other endures torments which she easily might eschew. But amongst all these differences, they have this of common, that they cannot subsist without Hope: 'tis the soul which gives them life, and these two beautifull vertues would not attract the eyes of men and Angels, were they not encouraged by this Passion which regards futurity For vaine-glory is not able to inspire us with the contempt of sorrow; and the Sect of the *Stoicks*, as proud as it is, hath been able to make but few Philosophers generously suffer the violence of tortures, and the Hang-mans cruelty: but Christian Religion hath produced multitude of martyrs, who have overcome flames, and savage beasts, and triumphed over Pagan Emperours. Their fortitude was grounded upon the vertue of Hope; and whil'st men went about to corrupt them with promises, to affright them with threats, and to vanquish them with torments, they raised up their spirits to heaven, and considered the recompences which God prepares for those that serve him faithfully.

Tolle spem hominibus, nemo victus retentabit arma; nemo infæliciter expertus negotiationem alios appetet quæstus: nemo naufragus vivet. Senec. 5. controvers. 1.

Finis spei, fælicitas æterna. August.

'Tis

'Tis doubtless out of this reason that the great Apostle hath given such glorious titles to Hope, and that he employs all his divine eloquence to express the wonderfull effects thereof: for sometimes he calls it an Anchor, which stops our vessell in the sea, which makes us finde tranquility in the midst of a storm, and which fixeth our desires on heaven, and not on earth: somtimes he termes it a Buckler, under the shelter whereof we beat down the blows which our enraged adversary makes against us: sometimes he calls it our Glory, and represents it unto us as an honorable title, which blotting out our shame, makes us hope, that after having been Gods enemies, we shall become his children, and that in this acception we shall share in his inheritance. By all these praises he teaches us that we have need of Hope in all manner of conditions; and that we may usefully employ her in all the occurrences of our life: that it is our security in storms, our defence in combats, and our glory in affronts. But let us observe that she is not of this world, that she forbids us the love thereof, and that she promiseth unto us another more glorious and innocent, to be the object of our desires. Let us neglect such a good as is perishable, that we may

Quam spem sicut anchoram habemus animæ tutam ac firmam. Hebr. cap 6.

In omnibus sumentes scutum fidei, in quo possitis omnia tela nequissimi ignea extinguere. Ephes. cap. 6.

Non est spes nostra de hoc sæculo; ab amore hujus sæculi vocati sumus, ut aliud sæculum speremus. Aug. lib. 3. de verbis Domini, Serm. 2.

acquire that which is eternall: let us remember that it is hard to have pretences at the same time both to heaven and earth, and that we must set at naught the promises of the world, if we will obtain those of Jesus Christ.

The fourth Discourse.

Of the Nature, Proprieties, and Effects, and of the good and evill use of Despair.

OF all the Passions of man, Despair is that which hath been most honour'd, and most blam'd by Antiquity: for she hath past for the last proof of courage in those famous men, who have made use of sword or poyson, to free themselves from the insolence of a victorious enemy. Poets and Orators never appeared more eloquent, then when they describe the death of *Cato*; and they do so artificially disguise that furious action, that did not faith perswade us that it is an execrable attempt, we should take it for an Heroick action. *Seneca* never praised Vertue so much, as this

this crime; he seems by the high encomium's he gives it, to perswade all men to Despair; and to obliege all unfortunate people to commit Parricide: he imagines that all the gods descended into *Vtica* to consider this spectacle; & that they would honour a *Stoick* Philosopher with their presence, who not able to endure *Cæsars* government, though he had born with the like in *Pompey*, plung'd his dagger into his breast, tore his entrailes; and that he might taste death, rent his soul from his body with his own hands. But truely I do not wonder that *Seneca* would make a murder pass for a sacrifice, since he hath approved of drunkenness, and that he hath made it a vertue, that he might not be constrained to blame *Cato*, who was accused thereof. Others have absolutely condemn'd Despair; and becaus some men, giving themselves over unto fury, have dipt their hands in their own bloud, they have been of opinion that this Passion ought to be banisht from out our soul; and that nothing could befall us in this life, wherein it was lawfull to follow the motions thereof.

Liquet mihi cum magno spectasse gaudio Deos, cùm vir ille, acerrimus sui vindex, gladium sacro pectori infigit, dum viscera spargit, & animam manu educit. Senec. de Provident. cap. 2.

Catoni ebrietas objecta est: ac facilius efficiet, quisquis objecerit, hoc crimen honestum, quàm tarpem catonem. Senec. de tranquil. animi. cap. 15.

Both these opinions are equally unjust, and do violate the Sence of Nature; for let the disaster be what it please, which Fortune threatens us withall, and whatsoever

great mishap she prepareth for us, we never may attempt against our own life: our birth and our death depend only upon our Lord God, and none but he who hath brought us into the world, can take us out of it he hath left unto us the dispossall of all the conditions of our life, and hath only reserved to himself the beginning, and the end: we are born when he pleaseth, and we die when he ordaineth it: to hasten the hour of our death, is to intrench upon his rights; and he is so jealous of it, as he oft-times doth miracles, to teach us that it belongeth unto him. But if Despair be forbidden us upon this occasion, there are many others wherein it is permitted; and I am of opinion, that Nature did never more evidently shew her care over man, then in enduing him with a Passion which may free him from all the evills for which Philosophy hath no remedy.

For though Good be a pleasing object, and that by its charm it powerfully attracts the Will, yet is it sometimes environed with so many difficulties, that the Will cannot come nigh it: its beauty makes her languish, she consumes away in desire, and hope, which eggeth her on, obliegeth her to do her utmost in vain: the more she hath of

Love,

Love, the more she hath of Sorrow; and the more excellent the good which she seeks after, is, the more miserable is she: that which ought to cause her Happiness, occasioneth her punishment: and to speak it in few words, she is unfortunate, for that she cannot forbear loving an object which she cannot compass. This torment would last as long as her Love, did not Despair come in to her succour, and by a naturall wisdom obliege her to forgo the search of an impossibility; and to stifle such desires as seem only to afflict her.

As this Passion takes us off from the pursuit of a difficult good which surpasseth our power, so are there a thousand occasions met withall in mans life, wherein she may be advantageously made use of; and there is no condition how great soever in the world, which needs not her assistance. For mens powers are limited, and the greater part of their designs are impossible; Hope and Boldness which animate them, have more of heat then government; led on by these blinde guides they would throw themselves headlong into *præcipices*, did not Despair withhold them; & did not she by her knowledg of their weakness, divert them from their rash enterprizes: she is also a faith-

full Councellour which never doth deceive us, and which deserves not to be blamed, if, not being sent for till our affairs be in a sad condition, she gives us more wholsome then honorable advice: we must accuse Hope, which engageth us too easily in a danger; and praise Despair, which finds a means to free us from it.

The greatest Princes are only unhappy, for not having listned unto her; for would they measure their forces before they undertake a war, they would not be enforced to make a dishonorable peace, and to take the law from their victorious enemy: but the mischief is, they never implore Despairs assistance, but when she cannot give it them; and they never advise with this Passion, till all things be reduced to an extremity: yet is she not unusefull at such a time, and her councells cease not to be profitable, though precipitate. For when Princes know that their forces are inferior to those of their enemies, and that all the advantage lies on the enemies side, Despair wisely managed causeth them to retreat; and this Passion repairing the faults of Hope and Audacity, makes them keep their souldiers till another time, when they may assuredly promise themselves the victory:

for

for Despair is more cautious then courageous, and aims more at the safety then glory of a Kingdom; it makes use of the evills which it hath observed, and thinks it self glorious enough, if it can escape the fury of him that doth pursue it. 'Tis true, that when it sees all ways of safety barred up, and that it is on all sides environed by death, it chuseth the most honorable; and recalling Hope which it had chased away, resolveth either to die or overcome. Therefore 'tis, that good Commanders do never put the vanquished to Despair; but knowing that this Passion becomes valiant when provoked, they make her bridges of gold, open all passages to her; and suffer this torrent to disperse it self abroad in the open champion, lest her fury swelling by resistance, overbear such works as are opposed to her impetuosity. Herein the nature of Despair is strange; for it ariseth from Fear; and its greatest wisdome consisteth in its timorousness; in the good which offers it self, it rather considereth the difficulty which may astonish, then the glory which may attract; and be it, that it be more cold, or less courageous then Hope, it hath not so much an eye to good as to bad events: yet when the danger is extream, and that the mischief is

Animus ex ... sâ desperat ... ne sumitur ... ignaviſſima animalia, ... natura ad ... gam genu ... ubi exitus ... patet, ten ... fugam co ... re imbelli. Nullus per ... cior hostis ... quàm quem ... audacem a ... gustiæ fac ... Majora, at ... certè pari ... conatur ar ... mus magnu ... ac perditu ... Senec. Q ... natur. l. c.

so great as it cannot be evaded; it makes vertue of necessity, and gives battell to an enemy, which Hope it self durst not assail: it oftentimes plucks the Lawrell from out the Conquerors hand; and performing actions which may pass for miracles, it exceeds Nature, it preserves mens lives in making them contemn them, and wins the victory by seeking after an honourable death.

By all these effects it is easie to judge of the nature of Despair, and to know that it is a violent motion by which the soul keeps aloof from a difficult good, which it thinks it cannot compass, and by which likewise it sometimes draws neer unto it; rather to shun the evil which threatens it, then to possess the difficult good: for in its birth Despair is fearfull, and hath no other design, then to divert the soul from the vain seeking after an impossible good; but in its progress it becomes bold; and when it sees that by keeping aloof from a difficult good, it engageth it self in an infamous evill, it resumes courage, and imploys all its power to gain a thing which it thought assuredly to have lost: so as this is not a single Passion; & to explain the nature thereof well, we must say, that she is mixt, of Fear and Hope; and that, as in the beginning she is more faint-

hearted

hearted then the former, she is in the end more generous then the later. But at both these times she hath need of government; and that she may be serviceable to Vertue, she must shun two dangerous extreams which bear her name, and stain her glory; the one may be called Faint-heartedness, the other foolhardiness: she falls into the former, when not knowing her own strength, she keeps at distance from a good which she might compass; she falls into the second, when not regarding her own imbecillity, or the greatness of the danger, she undertakes an impossibility, and engageth her self in a design which cannot have any good success. It belongs to Reason to govern her, and to see when she may eschew without infamy, and when she may charge without rashness: if it be a lawfull good, which may with Justice be expected, it must seldome or never be despaired of; upon such an occasion Opiniatrecy is commendable; and a man is not to be blamed who attempts even an impossibility, to purchase a happiness which his duty requires him to seek after: but if that which he wisheth for, be hard to come by, and perishable, he must cure himself of his vain desires, and foolish hopes, by a rationall Despair. But he must beware, that though this

this Passion be in Nature oft-times innocent, she is always guilty in relation to grace: for naturall hope being grounded upon our proper forces, it is lawfull to forgo her, to embrace Despair; and there is nothing of inconvenience, that man whose misery is so well known, do quit his designs when he cannot compass them: but supernaturall hope being grounded upon divine power, we must not forgo her; and it is a capitall fault to suspect God of falshood or of weakness. Those therefore who despair of their souls health, justle his highest perfections, and make themselves unworthy to receive pardon of their sins, from the time they cease to hope: for since the holy Scripture teacheth us, that God is good, and all-powerfull, those who perswade themselves, that he either will not, or cannot save them, commit outrage against his Power and Goodness; and by one and the same fault give against his two most excellent qualities: and if we will believe St. *Austin*, they who despair imitate proud people, and make themselves equall with God, by losing the hope of their salvation; for when they fall into despair, they imagine that Gods mercy is not so great as their sin is, and by an injurious preferrence, they raise

their

their wickedness above his goodness; they prescribe bounds to an infinite Love, and bereave him of perfections, who possesseth more then our souls can imagine.

Adhuc cùm diffidit, & suam nequitiam comparat Dei benignitati, finem imponit virtuti Dei, dans finem infinitio, & perfectionem auferens Deo, cui nihil deest, etiam quod cogitari non potest. Aug. li. de vera & falsa pœnitent. cap. 5.

True it is, that if Despair be faulty in relation to Grace, there is an excess of Hope which is not much less dangerous; and there are certain Christians in the Church, who are opinionated in their sins, only out of a confidence they have of Gods mercy: they make use of his goodness only to injure him; they think not of his favours to sinners, save to abuse them; and by irrationall consequences, which Philosophy cannot have taught them, they conclude that they ought to be wicked, because God is good, and that we ought to offend him, because he doth not punish his enemies: had not these shameless sinners lost their judgement together with their Piety, they would argue after another manner, and say; That since God is good, man must be obedient; that since he is prone to forgive, man ought to have a care how to offend him; and that since he loves the welfare of man, man ought to love his Honour. But certainly, if they had not these just considerations, Gods mercy should not maintain in them their foolish confidence; for to boot, that his mercy

Mercy agrees with his Justice, and that the one doth not intrench upon the others rights, he hath so temper'd his Promises with his Threats in the holy Scripture, as they banish from out the soul of man both Despair and Presumption: to assure those that despair, he hath proposed penitency unto them, the gate whereof is open to all those that repent; and to terrifie the presumptuous, who through their delays despise his mercy, he hath made the day of death uncertain, and hath reduced them to a necessity of fearing a moment, which as being unknown may surprize the whole world.

Propter illos qui desperatione periclitantur, proposuit indulgentiæ portum; propter eos vero qui spe periclitantur, & dilationibus illuduntur, fecit diem mortis incertum. Aug. lib. 3. de verbis Domi. Sermo. 10.

THE

THE FOURTH TREATISE, OF AUDACITY and FEAR.

The first Discourse.

Of the Nature, Properties and Effects of Audacity, and Fear.

IF Vertues be the more to be valued by reason of the difficulties which accompany them; if such as are most painfull be most beautiful; we must confess that among Passions, Audacity ought to be esteemed the most glorious, since it is the most difficult; and that it undertakes to fight

fight against whatsoever is most terrible in the world: for though Hope be generous, and that she be not pleased with what is good, unless it be austere; yet doth the beauty thereof invite her to seek after it, and the charms thereof endue her with strength to overcome the difficulties which surround it: but Audacity wants this assistance, and considers an object which hath nothing in it of lovely: she sets upon evill, and comming in to the aid of Hope, she denounceth war to her enemies, and proposeth no other recompence in the combat, but glory: she is of the humour of conquerors, who leave all the booty to their souldiers, reserving only the honor to themselves.

For all those that describe her nature, agree in this, that she is a Passion of the soul which goes in quest of dangers, to grapple with them, and overcome them; she may therefore be termed a naturall Fortitude, and a disposition to that generous Vertue which triumphs in sorrow, and in death: as she undertakes nothing but what is difficult, she is more severe then pleasing; a certain severity may be seen in their countenances whom she inanimates, which sufficiently shews, that her delight lies in troubles, and that she hath no other pastime, then what she

takes

takes in overcomming Sorrows: nothing comforts her but Glory: nor doth any thing nouriſh her but Hope; with this weak ſuccour ſhe aſſails all her enemies, and gains almoſt as many victories as ſhe fights battells.

But to afford this Diſcourſe more light, we muſt know, that Good and Evill are the two objects of all our Paſsions: Love conſiders Good, and employes Deſire and Hope, to obtain it: ſometimes the Good proves ſo hard to be come by, that Love through Deſpair forgoes it, thinking it a piece of wiſdom, to renounce a happineſs which cannot be obtained. Hatred deteſts Evill, and to withſtand an enemy which declares perpetuall war with it, ſhe employs ſuch Paſsions as hold of her empire; ſhe makes uſe of Fear, and of Eſchewing, to keep from it; and ſometimes ſhe employs Boldneſs and Choler, to fight with it and overcome it: but as Deſpair would never forgo a difficult Good, did not Fear perſwade that the difficulties which attend it cannot be overcome; Audacity would never undertake to ſet upon a dreadfull evill, did not Hope promiſe her the victory: ſo as theſe two Paſsions ceaſe not to be of one minde, though they have different objects: though the

Qui ſunt bonæ ſpei, ſunt audaces. Ariſt. lib. Ethic. cap. 8.

the one seek after what is good, and the other provoke what is evill, they both labour for the quiet of the minde; and by severall ways endeavour the same end. The truth is, the condition of the one is much more sweet then is that of the other; for Hope hath only a respect to the good which she desires; if sometimes she cast her eye upon the difficulties which surround it, 'tis rather out of necessity then inclination; and if she hazard her self upon some danger, 'tis not so much out of glory, as out of profit: but boldness considers only what is evill, and by a certain confidence which accompanies her in all her designes, promiseth her self to overcome it by her own strength. Hope doth easily engage her self; and being as light as vain, she undertakes all enterprizes which she judgeth to be glorious and feasible; but she would thereby reap nothing but confusion, did not Audacity come in to her aid; and by the greatness of that courage which is naturall to her, happily execute that which her companion had rashly undertaken: Hope resembles the Trumpets which sound the charge, but never enter into the scuffle; Audacity contrariwise, is of the nature of those souldiers who are silent, and keep all their forces to

fight

fight with the enemy: Hope promiseth all things, and gives nothing, and abuseth men with fair words which are not always follow'd by good effects; but Audacity promiseth nothing and performeth much she attempts even impossibilities to make good hopes promises: and endeavours to overcome the difficulties which hinder the execution thereof. In fine, she is so generous, that her designs, though they be difficult, cease not to be fortunate; and she is so accustomed to overcome, as the Poets, to give some colour to her victories which she wins contrary to the laws of war, have feigned that she hath a divinity which encourageth her, and that her deeds are rather miraculous then Naturall.

But to the end that these differing qualities may the more evidently appear, I will add Examples to Reasons, and make it known by certain remarkable Histories, how much Daring is more considerable then Hope. No monarch was ever more powerfull then *Xerxes*, and his power never appeared more then when he framed the design of conquering *Greece*: his army was composed of two millions of men, the field-room was too little to receive a body of men, the parts whereof were monstrous;

the earth groaned under the weight of the Engines which he caused to be carried about, to batter towns which should resist him. This dreadful number of foot and horse drained up rivers, the hail of arrows shot from so many hands darkned the Sun: those who would flatter this Prince, said, that the sea was not large enough to bear his shipping; and that *Greece* was not great enough to quarter his troopes. This mean while *Leonidas* seized upon the streights of *Thermopilæ*, and intrenching himself in those mountains resolved to give him battel with three hundred men as he should pass by. Hope and Audacity enflamed the heart of this noble Captain, and those two Passions encouraged him to an enterprize as difficult as glorious: Hope laid before him the glory which he should receive in opposing the common enemy of *Greece*, in preserving the liberties of his Countrey, in saving the Temples from being burnt, in defending Towns from being pillaged, and in keeping the women from the insolence of a victorious Barbarian: she forgot not to point out unto him all the honours which the *Lacedemonians* would give him; the Statues which would be erected in memory of his name, the praises which should be given him

Alius illi vix rerum naturam sufficere, angusta esse classibus maria, militi castra, explicandis equestribus copiis campestria, vix patet cœlum ad emittenda omni manu tela. Senec.

Laconas tibi ostendo in ipsis Thermopylarum angustiis positos, nec victoriam sperantes, nec reditum: Ille locus istis sepulchrum futurus est. Senec. Ep. 82.

him by all the people, and the magnifique titles which Historians would give him in their Writings: it may be she would flatter him with an impossible victory and perswade him that a disorder falling out in an Army wherein were many men, but few souldiers, he might easily defeat it. But Courage, fuller of Truth then Hope, knew the greatness of the danger, and not abusing this Commander laid open before his eyes, that though his death were certain, he was not to quit the passage which he had taken; that there was no need of conquering, but of dying; and that he should do enough for the welfare of *Greece*, if, by losing his life, he should make his enemies lose their resolution. He gave belief to the advice of this generous Passion; he resolved to stand the shock of an Army which he could not stay, and invited his souldiers to fight and die at the same time. By this example it is easie to judge, that Hope considers only the good which doth solicite her; and that Audacity respects only the evil that threatens her; that the one entertains her self only with the glory which she promiseth to her self; and that the other is only taken up with the danger which she withstands: that the one feeds her self with an imaginary pleasure,

Quàm fortiter Leonidas militeș allocutus est? Sic commilitones prandete, tanquam apud inferos cœnaturi. Senec. ibid.

and that the other nouriſheth her ſelf with reall pain: 'Tis true, the later findes her contentment in her duty, and ſings triumphantly in the midſt of her defeat; for though ſhe bear not away the victory over the Perſians in the perſon of *Leonidas*, ſhe carries it ſheer away over the fear of death; and ſhe is ſufficiently contented to have overcome the violenteſt of all her enemies: ſhe is not troubled for being beaten by men, provided ſhe may overcome Fortune; and good ſucceſs is to her indifferent, ſo ſhe may vanquiſh the apprehenſion of danger.

Non eſt quòd me victum, te victorem credas, vicit fortuna tua fortunam meam. Senec. de conſt. ſap. cap. 6.

If it be permitted to add Fiction to Hiſtory, we ſhall ſee the divers motions of thoſe two Paſsions, in the perſon of *Jaſon*. The purchaſe of the golden Fleece is the ſubject of his journey: Hope makes him put to ſea, and promiſeth him fair winds which ſhall fill his ſails, and bring him in deſpite of tempeſt, to the coaſt of *Colchis*: ſhe ſhews him how all *Greece* have their eys fixed upon him: and that ſhe hath no commander who in this expedition will not fight under his enſign: that in ſo noble an enterprize profit is joyn'd to glory, and that the recompence which he may expect, is as rich as honorable: but Audacity which cannot flatter, lays before him Souldiers which he hath to overcome,

come, Monsters to tame, and a Serpent which always waketh to surprize: yet he accepts of all these conditions, and undertakes to assail all these enemies upon confidence of his own forces: he is not sure to overcome the Bulls and Serpents which he shall meet withall; but he is very well assured to overcome Fear; he knows that success depends upon Fortune, but he knows also that Boldness depends only upon Courage: it sufficeth him to set at naught all these Monsters, which present themselves before him under such dreadful visages, and without any further recompence, thinks himself glorious enough, if he can triumph over Fear.

By these two examples, the advantages which Audacity hath over Hope, are easily discerned; but in their oppositions somewhat of resemblance may be found; and the same causes that make us hope for good, seem to make us despise evill: for youth, which abounds in heat, imagines nothing impossible and because her vigour gives her assurance, she easily engageth her self in difficult and glorious designs: good success doth likewise feed this Passion; and when Fortune smiles upon Commanders, they do not greatly refuse to fight; though their

forces be inferiour to those of the enemy, they perswade themselves that their very name is able to affright them; and being accustomed to overcome, they cannot fear a misfortune which hath not yet befallen them. Power contributes no less then good success to make men bold; for when a Prince commands over a great State; when every town furnisheth him with an Army; when the revenews are such as will afford him to entertain them divers years; when his neighbours fear him, and that he hath no more to do to make them his subjects, but to march into the fields; he shuns not the undertakings of any war, nor ever despaires of Victory. But of all things in the world, nothing makes a man more bold then innocence: for though the enemy that assails him be powerfull, and that the earth fight in favour of him, he imagines that God ought to take his part, and that he who protects the innocent, being interessed in his Cause, is bound to defend him; so as he marcheth undauntedly amidst dangers, dreads no ill success; and expecting help from heaven promiseth unto himself assured victory. The one and the other of these Passions may be mistaken; and as they become glorious vertues, when they are guided

Qui bené se habent ad divina, audaciores sunt. Arist. lib. 2. Retoric. cap. 5.

ded by Prudence; they may degenerate into shamefull vices, when they suffer themselves to be govern'd by Indiscretion: this is that we will examine in the ensuing Discourses.

The second Discourse.

Of the bad use of Audacity or Boldness.

AUdacity having no other guide then Hope, we must not wonder if she undertake enemies which she cannot vanquish; and if her designs have, for the most part, ill success: 'tis not likely that rash enterprizes should be fortunate, and that actions which are not govern'd by Wisdom, should be accompanied by good success: Fortune grows weary of favouring the Audacious; and having oft-times kept them out of danger, wherein they had indiscreetly engaged themselves, she forsakes them with some seeming Justice, and punishes their fool-hardiness, to remedy the like in others. All men are therefore bound to weigh well the councells which Hope

giveth them, and to consider their strength, before they follow the motions of Audacity: for though they be full of Gallantry, and that most souldiers confound them with the motions of valour, they cease not notwithstanding to be fatall, and to be daily the cause of the loss of Armies, and ruine of States. But to finde the Spring-head of this evill, we must know that the Passions reside in the inferior part of the soul, and cannot discourse; they only consider their object, and by a blinde impetuositie they either draw neer unto it, or keep far from it; they do not mark so much as the circumstances which accompany it; and not comparing the difficulties with their strengths, they engage themselves indiscreetly in a war, or shamefully run away: their judgement is so ready, as it is almost precipitate; for after having listned to what the sences say, they advise with their inclination; and not expecting orders from Reason, they bear away the whole man, and inforce him to follow their motions. Hence it comes, that he oft-times repents him of his designs, condemns what he formerly approved, and cannot end what he had begun.

Nec audacem quidem timoris absolvimus, nec prodigum cu dem avaritiâ liberamus. Senec. lib 4. benefic. cap. 25.

But of all Passions, none is more unfortunate then Audacity; for she betakes her self

to

to powerfull enemies, and she grapples with Pain and Death: Fighting is her ordinary exercise, and she oft-times bathes her self in tears or blood: she is always encompassed with dangers; and on what side soever she turns, she sees nothing but ghastly images, and fearfull apparitions; this mean while she borrows no aid, nor takes no councell, save only of Hope; and the same that hurries her into danger, is she that councells her; she who sets her on work, is she who puts weapons into her hands; and who under vain promises engageth her in extream difficulties: she also often sees the greatest part of her designs prove abortive, and reapes nothing of all her useless endeavours, but sorrow for having followed evill counsell; oft-times she discourageth her self, and seeing that her undertakings do exceed her strength, she suffers her self to be astonished by Fear, beat down by Despair, and consumed by Sadness; for these Passions do almost always succeed her; and experience teacheth us that those who at the beginning of a fight have been more courageous then men, have at the end thereof been found more fearfull then women. The fewell of Boldness soon takes fire, but it is as soon extinguished; and as the fury of waves turns

Audaces temeritate provecti, ante cupiunt adire pericula quàm instant: cùm adsunt, ea defugiunt. Arist. lib. 3. Ethic. cap. 2.

turns into foam, the violence of the Audacious turns into Fearfulness; and for all the confidence they shewed in their designs, all that remains unto them, is Weaknesses, as full of shame as of guilt.

'Tis true, that Choler sometimes sides with Boldness, and furnisheth it with new forces, when the danger hath made it lose its own: but this assistance is not always sure: the souldier that engages himself in battell upon her weak succours, is in as great danger of losing the victory, as he who puts his hope in Despair; and is no more assured of conquest, then he that fights, only because he cannot retire. Desperate men have been seen to die with their weapons in their hands, and if sometimes they have revenged their deaths, they have not always preserved their lives: Bold men have also often been seen, who for being cholerick, have not more luckily evaded the danger whereinto they had precipitated themselves. Cholers forces are as well limited as are those of Boldness; and unless the one and the other of them be guided by Prudence, they ought not to expect any thing but dreadfull consequences: that which hath happened upon one occasion, will not happen upon many others; and the Heavens are not oblieged to

Vides fortitudinis matrem esse prudentiam nec fortitudinem sed temeritatem esse quemlibet ausum quem non parturivit prudentia. Bern. de consider. lib. 1.

to give the same success to all rash enterprises. *Alexanders* example ought not to serve for a rule to all Conquerors; he lived not long enough to be certainly imitated: the fortune which followed him in his youth, would peradventure have forsaken him in his age; his rashness would not always have been so fortunate; and if he had begun his conquests in Europe, he might not, perhaps, have carried them so far as *Asia*: the birth of *Rome* would have staid the course of his victories; and she that shut up *Pyrrhus* in his dominions, would have driven him back into *Macedonia*.

For my part, I am of *Seneca's* opinion, and believe that this Prince had more courage then wisdom, and more rashness then courage: in effect, his fortune did oftner preserve him then his valour; and if the Heavens had not made choice of him to punish the pride of the *Persians*, he had been stopt in the first battell: he would not take those advantages which the greatest Commanders do commonly make use of, when their forces are not equall to those of their enemy: he would not set upon *Darius* his army whilst favoured by the night, but with a piece of rashness, which deserved more blame then it hath received praises, he would

Alexandro ea erat pro virtute felix temeritas. Senec. Benefic. lib. 1. cap. 13.

would tarry till it were day, and have the Sun for witness of his victory: he thought he should have stoln a victory, if he should have won it by night; and though *Parmenio* advised him to prefer his Souldiers safety before the glory of Armes, he contemned that advice; and to shew that he owed all his advantages to Fortune, he rejected all the maxims of Prudence: I do also firmely believe, that his confidence hath been the undoing of as many Princes as have imitated him, and that his guidance is more fatall to Conquerors, then rocks and tempests unto Mariners. I know very well, that *Cæsar* adventur'd much; and that he could not undertake the ruine of the *Roman* Commonwealth without having conceived a great good opinion of his good Fortune, which he was able to guide by Wrath and Vertue: and we are bound to acknowledg that his victories were no less the workmanship of his Wisdom, then of his Fortune: he shewed no Audacity but upon such occasions where advice was useless; and he boasted not of his good Fortune, but to conjure down the tempests, and put confidence in his Pilot: In fine, he made use of Hope in all his enterprizes, he submitted it to Prudence, and taught all Commanders, that to be valiant, a man must be more wise then rash. The

—Medijs prorumpe procellas, Tutela secure mei.—Lucan.

The third Discourse.

Of the good use of Audacity or Boldness.

THough Passions be more faulty then innocent, and that, by reason of the irregularity of our nature, they lean more to Vice then Vertue, yet with a little help a man may make them vertuous: their inclinations are good, but their judgments precipitate; they always seek for good, and withstand evill, but this is most commonly with a little too much ardency: they imitate such Orators as defend a good Cause with bad Reasons; or are like those unfortunate Innocents, who when tortured, and wanting perseverance, confess faults which they never committed: for in effect, they become guilty through want of Patience; and grow vicious by not being able to endure the absence of Good, nor presence of Evill. Did not Hope pursue Honors which she cannot compass, never would she bring the Ambitious to Despair; and did not Boldness engage her self

to fight against mischiefs which she cannot overcome, she would never be accused of Rashness: but the fault is not without remedy; for, if she will listen to Reason, if (after having calmed the fury of her first motion) she will suffer her self to be guided by Wisdom, she will alter her nature; and of a simple Passion, she will become a glorious Vertue: Audacity and Fortitude consider the same object, and their inclinations are so like, as one may say, that Fortitude is a rationall Audacity, and that Audacity is a naturall Fortitude; their enemis are common, and they summon all their forces to fight with them: they are agitated by the same motives, and seek the same end.

Fortitudo est scientia periculorum excipiendorum, repellendorum, & provocandorum. Senec. Benific. lib. 2. cap. 34.

For, Fortitude, according to her truest definition, is a Science which teacheth us either to suffer, or to beat back, or to provok injuries: she constantly endures all the evills which Nature is subject to; she will not be dispenced withall in generall rules; and knowing that the necessity of death is a sentence pronounced against all men, she never appeals from it: with calmness of spirit she sees sickness approach; the first remedy which she applies to cure them, is to think that they arise from our constitution, and that they make up a part of us; contagion doth

doth not astonish her; & be it either for that she looks upon it as a punishment offin, or that she considers it as an effect of Nature, she accuseth not the stars of it, and pretends not to be exempt from an evill which doth not pardon Princes: with a noble neglect she beats back all such disasters as take all their strength from error; and which do not offend our bodies, but as they hurt our imagination: she defends her self against Poverty, by desiring only necessary things; she despiseth Honours, considering that they are oftner the recompence of Vice, then of Vertue; she laughs at Voluptuousnes, knowing that it is pleasing only in appearance, and that under a specious name it hideth shamefull and reall pains: she provokes sorrow, to trie her courage; she seeks for calamity, as an occasion to exercise her Vertue; and if she had not tasted the disasters of life, she would think her self ignorant of the better half of what she ought to know: she hath rather a greedines then a desire after dangers, and since the evill she undergoes contributes unto her glory, she fore-runs it, thinking it a point of baseness to tarry expecting it. In fine, she hath overcome death in his most ghastly hue; nor hath the cruelty of tyrants invented punisments over which

Singula vicere jam multi, ignem Mutius, crucem Regulus, venenum Socrates, exilium Camillus, mortem ferri adactā Cato: & nos vincamus aliquid. Senec. Epist. 38.

Fortitude

Fortitude hath not triumphed. *Scævola* derided the flames, and witnessed more constancy in seeing his hand burn, then his enemies did in beholding it: *Regulus* was an honour to the Rack whereon he died; *Socrates* turn'd his Prison into a School, his Executioners became his Disciples; and the poyson which he swallow'd, made his innocence glorious: *Camillus* suffer'd banishment calmely; and *Rome* had remained captive, had not this famous exile restored unto her her liberty. *Cato* slue himself, and though he suffer'd himself to be overcome by impatience, he may at least boast of having preserved his liberty. But without making use of prophane examples, where Vertue is always mingled with Vice, we have no martyr which hath not overcome some tyrant, and in the severity of their sufferings given many proofs of their courage. The *Ignatii* have provoked wild beasts; and as if that death had been a courtesie, they sought after it with eagerness, and endured it with pleasure: the *Laurences* have vanquisht the flames, and while their bodies distilled drop by drop upon the fire-brands, their tongues reproached their Judges, and gave praises to Jesus Christ: the *Clements* and *Agathaes* have wearied their Executioners,

ners; their martyrdom endured thirty years; the famouseſt cities of the world have ſerved for Theaters to their ſufferings; all the earth hath been water'd with their bloud; and Heaven hath ſhewn a thouſand miracles to prolong their lives, and to make their Triumphs more famous. But if Fortitude encouraged by Charity hath held out all theſe brunts, and had the better of all theſe enemies, Audacity may claim to a great ſhare in the glory: for it is ſhe that maketh Martyrs; and though Grace be more powerfull then Nature, yet doth ſhe not deſpiſe the aſſiſtance thereof: as the ſoul and body conſpire together to practiſe Vertue; Nature agrees with Grace to beat down ſin. Boldneſs is the ground-work of all glorious actions; and had not this noble Paſſion fill'd the heart of the firſt Chriſtians, Fortitude had not gotten ſuch glorious victories: they have ſo much of affinity between them, as they cannot ſubſiſt aſunder: Fortitude languiſheth without Audacity; and Audacity without Fortitude is raſh. Vertue would be ſuccor'd by Paſſion, and Paſſion guided by Vertue. Audacity is the beginning of Fortitude, and Fortitude is Audacities perfection: or to ſpeak more clearly, Audacity is an imperfect Vertue,

and Fortitude is an accomplisht Passion.

But to arrive at this perfection she must have three or four remarkable circumstances; the first is, that she be accompanied by Justice and Prudence; for he that takes up arms to ruine his Countrey, deserves not to be stiled Courageous; his design dishonors his Passion, and his Audacity becomes faulty, for his not having chosen a lawfull end. Let *Cataline* take up arms, let him encourage his souldiers to the bartell by his examples, let him be besmear'd with his own bloud mixt with that of his enemies, let him die with his sword in his hand well advanced in the scuffle, and let fury and choler be seen in his visage even after death; he shall never pass for a courageous man: his Audacity was not discreet, since trespassing against all the laws of Discretion, he had undertaken so pernicious a design: neither was it temperate, since he won his souldiers good will, only by satisfying their avarice or uncleanness of life: it was not just, because he had conspired against his Countrey; and it was rather an obdurateness then a greatness of courage; since to compass glory, he committed Parricide. The second is, that the motive of Audacity be generous, and that the daring man expose not his life upon a slight

Catalina præditus fortitudine videbatur, sed fortitudo non erat; Nam prudens non erat: mala enim pro bonis eligebat: temperans non erat, e truptelis enim turpissimis fœdabatur: Justus non erat, nam contra patriam conjuraverat; ideo non fortitudo, sed audatia, cui fortitudinis nomen, ut stultos falleret, imponebat. Aug. lib. de sententia Jacobi ad Hieron.

slight consideration; for he very well knows his own worth, and not born away with vain-glory, he knows his life is precious: he hath preserved it with much care, and if he endanger it, it must be for a subject that deserves it.

There is a great deal of difference between a valiant man, and one that is desperate: the latter seeks out death to free himself from misery; but the other pursues it only to discharge his duty, and content his inclination: he will not then engage himself in danger to purchase a little honor; he will not be guided by the example of the Rash; he values not those maximes which are authorized by Folly and Indiscretion; but he will go whithersoever the Trumpet summons him, and will throw himself, though single, upon a body of horse, if he have order so to do; he will die a thousand times rather then forgo the station given him in charge; and he will cover the place with his body which he is not able to defend with his sword. The third is to try his own strength, before he set upon the enemy; for Vertue is too rationall to engage us in an impossibility: she exacts nothing from us, but what is in our power, and she will have us in all our enterprizes, to observe whether

Magnum est discrimen inter eum qui virtutem magni facit, aut qui vitam parvi estimat: Nam semet in vitæ discrimen conjicere, aut in fœlicium est aut belluarum. Cicer. in Caton.

our means be answerable to the end endeavoured. There is nothing more glorious then conquest of the Holy Land; and if the greatness of our Monarch might be increas'd by wishes, we would desire, that to his other August titles, that of *The deliverer of the Land of Palestine* might be added; but he who should engage himself in that design would be more rash then courageous, if before putting to sea, he had not quieted all his own Dominions, if he had not raised forces enough to fight with those of the Infidells; and if he had not by his Intelligences caused an insurrection in the Eastern parts, thereby to work a powerfull diversion. To boot with all these conditions, Christian Audacity ought to have two more; the first is Humility, which agrees very well with greatness of Courage, since her enemy Vain-glory, is always accompanied with Faint-heartedness: The second is Hatred of our selves, for he that hath not overcome his own inclinations, must not expect to overcome his delights; and he who hath not warred against his own body, is but ill prepar'd to denounce war against Sorrow. Let us then use our strength against our selves, that we may employ it to purpose against our enemies, and let us vanquish

Omnis fortitudo in humilitate sita est, quia fragilis est omnis superbia. Aug. in Ps. 92.

Re vera fortis pugnat, qui contra se pugnat. Aug. serm. 6. de Nativit. Domini.

quish Self-love, if we will overcome the fear of death.

The fourth Discourse.

Of the Nature, Proprieties, and Effects, of Fear.

THere are some Passions whose Names bely their Natures, and are nothing less inwardly then what they outwardly appear to be. The name of Hope is pleasing, but her humour is violent; and she is cause of as much evill as she promiseth contentment: the name of Despair is odious, but her nature corresponds with Reason: and we are oblieged unto it, when it makes us forgo the pursuit of a good which we cannot compass. The name of Boldness is glorious; we no sooner hear thereof but we conceive a greatness of Courage, which despiseth Pain, and seeketh out Death; but the inclination thereof is Savage; and if it be not withheld by Wisdom, it engageth us in dangers which cause much mischief to us, and little glory. The name of

Fear is contemptible; and error hath so cried down this Passion, as 'tis taken for the mark of a Coward; but her humor is wise, and if she warn us of our misfortunes, it is to free us from them. For Nature seems to have given us two Passions to our Counsellours in the divers adventures of our life; Hope and Fear; the first is doubtless the more pleasing, but the second is the more faithfull; the first flatters us to deceive us; the second frightens us to secure us; the first imitates those interessed Counsellours, who in all their advices have respect rather to the Fortune then person of their Prince, and who by a dangerous flattery prefer his contentment before the welfare of his State; the second resembles those faithfull State-Ministers which discover a mischief that they may cure it, and who stick not to anger their King a little, to purchase him a great deal of glory. In fine, the first is oft-times useless; and the number of what is good being small enough, she hath not many employments; and if she undertakes any thing which belongs not to her, she makes us lose our labour and our time; the second is almost always busied; and the number of evills being infinite, she is never out of exercise: she looks far into what

Ne cum fortuna principis potius loquantur quàm cum ipso. Tacit. 1. histor.

what is to come, and seeks out the evill which may happen, not to make us miserable before the time, as she is unjustly accused, but to secure our happiness, and to disperse all the disasters which may bereave us of it.

For Fear is a naturall Wisdom which ofttimes frees us from danger, by making us apprehensive thereof; she spreads her self over all the actions of our life, and is no less usefull to Religion then to a Commonwealth: if we will believe prophane Authors, 'tis she that made the gods; and though there be some impiety in this maxime, a man may notwithstanding observe some shadow of Truth in it: for 'tis the fear of eternall punishment which perswaded men they were to appease the incensed gods: 'tis she that hath made Sacrifices, builded Temples, set up Altars, and immolated Victimes; 'tis she that keeps the Just within their duties, and which after a fault committed makes them lift up their hands to heaven, and witness their sorrow for it. Though men talk of generosity in Religion, and boast that they are won rather by Promises then by Threats; yet it must be confest, that Fear hath saved more guilty people then Hope: so is she termed in the holy

Primus in orbe deos fecit timor.--Stati.

Scripture, the beginning of Wisdom; that is to say, the prop of Vertue, & the foundation of Piety. Sin would grow insolent, were it not suppreſt with this Passion; and all laws would be unusefull, had not Nature imprinted Fear in the soul of offendors; she is therein engraven in characters which Time cannot deface; they apprehend the punishment of a secret sin; and though they know the Judges can punish only such as they come to the knowledge of, they tremble in the midst of their friends, they awake affrighted; and this faithfull minister of Gods Justice suffers them not to finde assurance, neither in Towns, nor yet in Desarts. 'Tis a proof that Nature is not wholly corrupted, since there remains in it horrour for sin, and dread for the punishment thereof; for let a sinner hide himself in what part he pleaseth, he carries Fear about with him; and this uncorruptible Passion teacheth him, that there is a Divinity which sees our secret faults, whilst we live, and punisheth them when we are dead. Often doth she convert Libertines; and by an unconceiveable miracle, she perswades them unto truths, which they would not have believed, lest they should be oblieged to fear them. She stings even the most opinionated; and

Malè de nobis actum erat quòd multa scelera legem & judicem effugiunt, & scripta supplicia, nisi illa naturalia & gravia de præsentibus solverent, & in locum pœnitentiæ timor cederet. Senec. Epist. 97.

Epicuri argumentum, naturâ nos à scelere abhorrere. quòd omnibus malis etiam inter tuta timor est. Senec. epi. 98.

and of as many as acknowledg Jesus Christ, there are few that owe not their Love to their Fear; they endeavour not to gain heaven, save to free themselves from hell; and they love Gods goodness only because they fear his Justice. I very well know that this resentment is not pure, and that a man who should stop at Fear would be in danger never to aquire Charity: but it is much that she opens the gate of Salvation to Infidells, and shews the way of Vertue unto sinners.

If she be profitable to Religion, she is no less necessary to a Common-wealth; which could not subsist by Recompences, if it did not terrifie the guilty with Punishments: we live not now in those innocent times, wherein the people were united by friendship, which renders the use of Laws bootless; every one loved his Neighbor as himself; and Love banished Injustice from off the earth; there was no need to inhibite Vice, nor to recommend Vertue: but since corruption hath crept into Nature, and that man, out of too much love to himself, began to hate his Neighbor, it was necessary to have recourse unto Laws, and to reduce those by Fear, which were not to be gain'd by Love. Gallowses were erected to frighten

ten the guilty; punishments were invented to make death the more terrible; and that which was a tribute due to Nature, was made the chastisement for sin. All of innocence that remains in us, is an effect of Fear: all inclination to Good, and aversion from Evill, would be razed out of our Will, did not this Passion by her threats detain them there; and all rights, Divine and Humane, would be violated, did not she preserve the Innocent by punishing the guilty: In fine, she is the greatest occasioner of our quiet; and though she be timorous, all Polititians acknowledg her for the Mother of Security.

Timor securitatis mater.

I know very well, that the *Stoicks* have cry'd her down; but what Passion hath ever been able to defend it self against their calumnies? they will have us banish Love from off the earth, because it makes some unclean; and consider not, that being the ligament of Society, a man must cease to live, if he were forbidden to love: Religion is preserved only by Charity, which is a kinde of love; and God would never have made men, had he not meant to make them lovers of him. The same Philosophers will stifle Desires, because they cannot moderate them; and are like to those who out of Despair,

spair, kill themselves to cure a malady. They condemn Hope; and to perswade us that they possesse all things, they will hope for nothing: they are of the humour of that poor *Athenian*, who was only rich in that he was fooliſh; and who cared not to heap up wealth, because he thought all the ships in the Haven belong'd to him. They flatter themselves with a vain Soveraignty, which the Wiseman claims over the world; and as they think to have gotten wisdom, they think that all her portion too belongs to them. They laugh at Fear, and to their Reasons add Reproaches, to make her contemptible or ridiculous: they make her the enemy of our quiet; and to hear them speak of this harmless Passion, one would think they painted out a monster to us, so dreadfull do they make her: they say, she is ingenuous for our misery; that by nature she is impatient, and that she will not tarry till the evill do happen, that she may make us suffer it; that she hath a maligne fore-sight, and which penetrates into the secrets of Futuritie, only to make us therein to meet with our torment: that she contents not her self with present evills, but that, to obliege all the differences of Time to conspire mischief against us, she calls to minde what is past, she

Quid dementius quàm angi futuris, nec se tormento reservare, sed accersere sibi miserias, & admovere, quas optimum est differre si discutere non possis. Senec. Epist. 74. in fine.

she vexes her self with what is to come, and unites pains together, which all the cruelty of Tyrants could not bring to a contract. They add, that as she laboureth to forestall our misfortunes, she takes delight in increasing them, and never representeth them unto us, but when she hath made them greater then they are, to astonish us; that if she threaten us with death, 'tis always with that which is most full of horrour; that if she make us apprehend a malady, 'tis always the most cruell; and that, if she make us expect any displeasure, 'tis always the most angersom; so as we finde, that she is more insupportable then the evill which she foresees; and that of all imaginable torments, that which she makes us suffer is always the the most rigorous: that also there are not many that would not rather once die, then always fear death, and who do not prefer a violent punishment before a languishing apprehension.

Nemo tam timidus est ut malit semper pendere quàm semel cadere. Senec. Epi. 22.

I know not whether the *Stoicks* Fear be so fierce as they make it, but I know very well that there is a more moderate sort of Fear, and that this Passion in the purity of its nature doth more good then harm: 'tis true she seeks out evill, but 'tis that she may shun it; and she is so far from delighting to increase

creaſe it, that on the contrary ſhe qualifies it by anticipating it: and leſſens the rigour thereof by giving us notice of its arrivall. Do not the *Stoicks* confeſs with us that blows fore-ſeen hurt not ſo much as do others? and that the greateſt part of our ſufferings comes from being ſurpriz'd by evill? wherefore do they then blame foreſight in Fear? wherefore do they condemn that in this Paſſion, which they approve of in Wiſdom? and wherefore do they make that paſs for a fault which ſhe hath in common with ſo noble a Vertue? Nature gives us to underſtand, that ſhe hath not endued us with Fear to torment us, ſince her pleaſure is not that the evill which Fear conſiders, be inevitable: for thoſe who have well ponder'd the humour of Fear, confeſs that ſhe is always accompanied by Hope, and that ſhe never fore-ſees other then ſuch great evills from which ſhe may defend her ſelf: if they be common, ſhe is ſo noble-minded as ſhe deigns not to buſie her ſelf about them; but leaving them to Eſchewing, to be kept aloof from, ſhe remains quiet: if they be inevitable, and ſuch as Wiſdom it ſelf knows not how to evade, ſhe troubles not her ſelf with thinking how to withſtand them; and knowing that uſeleſs means are blame-

Tela prævisa minus ferimus.

blameable, she adviseth Sadness to bear them, but if they be of such a nature, as they may be overcome, she advertiseth us of them; and though Audacity intrenchest upon her rights, she forbears to awaken her, and to crave succour from her to beat back the enemy which presents it self. Who will not judg by these conditions, that Fear is a friend to our Quiet? that she labours for our security, that being far from procuring what may dislike us, she takes notice of our misfortunes, only to chase them away; & gives the allarm, only that we may bear away the victory? I confess, there are evils which are so great & so soddain, as they put the soul into disorder, and hinder Fear from foreseeing or evading of them: the first raise astonishment, the second bring an agony upon us: both the one and the other of them throw us into Despair, if they be not readily repals'd: but since there are mischiefs which Wisdom cannot divine, and which Valour it self cannot overcome, we must not wonder if there be some which surprize Fear, and bear down a Passion, after having triumphed over two Vertues. Mans power is limited, and though no disaster happen which he may not make use of, yet his naturall weakness needs the assistance of Grace; and she must

must inanimate Passion, and Vertue, to make them victorious. But it may suffice us, to know that Fear is not unprofitable; and it remains that we consider, what sins she may favour in her disorder, and what Vertues she may be serviceable unto, if well used.

The fifth Discourse.

Of the ill use of Fear.

SInce the Nature of man is out of order, and that she stands in need of Grace to recover the innocence which she hath lost, we must not wonder if Passions, not succour'd by Vertue, become criminall; and if by their proper inclination they degenerate into some sins. Effects are always answerable to their Causes; the fruit holds of the tree; and men, for all their freedom, draw their humors from the Sun that lightens them, and from the earth that nourisheth them; whatsoever can be taken to correct their defaults, some marks thereof remain

Sucoque similima corda.

remain always; and education is never powerful enough wholly to change Nature. This is evidently seen in Fear, for she leans so much toward disorder, as it is very hard to stay her; and she is so giddy a humour, that she oftner sides with Vice then with Vertue: she is so unconstant, that she produceth rather contrary then different effects; and she takes upon her so many severall shapes, as it is hard to know her. Sometimes she bereaves us of our strength, and brings us to a condition of not defending our selves; sometimes she infuseth a chilness throughout all our members; and detaining the bloud about the heart, she makes the image of Death appear in our faces; anon she takes our speech away from us, and leaves us only sighs to implore aid from our friends; sometimes she fastens wings to our feet, and makes us overcame them by our swiftness, who overcome us by their courage: sometimes she imitates Despair, and paints out the danger so hideous to us on all parts, as she makes us resolve to change a fearfull flight into an honourable resistance: she is sometimes so indiscreet, as thinking to shun an evill, she runs headlong upon it; and oftentimes out of a strange fantasticallness, she engageth her self in a certain death, to shun a doubtfull one.

Obstupui, steteruntque comæ, vox faucibus hæsit. Vir.

--Pedibus timor addidit alas.

Audacem fecerat ipse timor.

Hic, rogo, non furor est, ne moriare, mori? Myrt.

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If her effects be extravagant, her inclinations are not more rational; for unless she be guided by wisedome, she easily degenerates into hatred, despaire or loathfulness: we do not much love what we fear; and as love is so free that it cannot endure constraint; it is so noble, as it cannot tolerate an outrage; all that doth affright it, irritates it; when men will by violence overcome it, it turneth to Aversion; and changeth all its gentleness into choler: hence it is that tyrants have no friends; for being bound to make themselves dreaded, they cannot make themselves be beloved; and their government being grounded upon rigour, it cannot produce love: those who are neerest them, hate them; the praises which men give them, are false; and of so many Passions which they endeavour to excite, Fear and Hatred are the only true ones: likewise, seeing that the mischief of their condition obliegeth them to cruelty, they renounce Love, and care not though they be hated, so they be feared: God alone can accord the two Passions; it is only he that can make himself to be feared of those that love him, and loved of those that fear him; yet do Divines confess, that perfect Charity banisheth Fear; and that those who love

Adijce nunc quòd qui timetur timeri nemo potuit; esse terribilis securè. Senec. Epist. 109.

him best, are those who fear him least. But though it be usuall for this Passion to turn it self into Hatred, yet is she not always permitted so to do, and this change is a sign of her ill nature: there are some whom we ought to fear, and cannot hate, their greatness obliegeth us to respect them, and their justice forbids us to hate them; that Majesty which environs them, produceth fear; but the protection which we draw from thence, ought to make us love them: so as the propensity to Hatred is a disorder in Fear; and to follow her irrationall inclination, is to abuse this Passion.

She also easily changeth her self into Despair: and though she march differing ways, she falls into the same *precipice*; for she paints out dangers in so horrid a manner unto Hope, as she makes her lose all her courage; and this generous Passion suffers her self to be so far perswaded by her enemy, that keeping aloof from the good which she did pursue, they both of them turn to an infamous Faint-heartedness. But of all the monsters which Fear doth produce, none is more dangerous then Slothfulness; for though this vice be not so active as others, and that her nature, which is remiss, suffers her not to frame any great designs against Vertue, yet

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is it guilty of all the outrages that are done thereunto, and seems to be found in all the counsells which are plotted to her prejudice: it hath such an aversion to labour, as it cannot endure Innocence, because she is laborious; and we may say, that if it, be not one of her most violent enemies, it is the most dangerous, & most opinionated enemy, that Innocence hath: it produceth all the sins which cover themselves with darkness; and to make them cease, it would be only requisite to kill this their Father, which gives them their birth: 'tis this that nourisheth uncleaness; and Love would have no vigour, were it not for it; 'tis this that entertains Voluptuousness; and who to amuse her, doth furnish her with shamefull entertainments: 'tis this that authorizeth Poormindedness, and which diverts it from those glorious labours that make men famous. 'Tis this, in fine, which loseth States, which corrupteth Manners, which banisheth Vertues, and is the cause of all vices: mean while, it assumes to it self a venerable name; and to colour its lazines, it causeth it self to be called honest Vacancy; but certainly there is a great deal of difference between the rest of Philosophers, and the idleness of the Voluptuous; the former are always a

doing; when they seem to do least, they are most busied, and when men think they are unserviceable, they obliege the whole world to their labours. For they make Panegyricks on Vertue, they compose Invectives against Vice, they dicover the secrets of Nature, or they describe the perfections of her Author: but the later are always languishing: if their minde labour, 'tis for the service of the body; if they keep from the noise of the world, 'tis that they may taste pleasure with the more freedom, and if they banish themselves from the company of men, 'tis that they may be with lewd women: these wretches know how to conceal themselves, but they know not how to live; their Palaces are their Sepulchres, and their useless rest is a shamefull death. The leasure-times of good men must be rationall, they must not withdraw themselves to solitarinesse, but when they can be no longer serviceable to the State; they must leave the world, but not abandon it; they must remember that they make a part of it; and that whither soever they retire themselves, the Publique hath always a right in them: those are not Solitary, but Savage, who forgo society, because they cannot endure it; who keep far from the Court, because they cannot endure to see their enemies prosperity; or that hide

Multùm prodest qui docet quid sit justitia, quid fortitudo, quid mortis contemptas, quid deorum intellectus, quantum bonum sit bona conscientia. Ergo si tempus ad studia cóferas, non deseruveris, nec manus detr ctaveris. Senec. de tranquill. animæ. c. 3.

Otium sine literis mors est & hominis viva sepultura. Senec. Epi. 83.

hide themselves in obscurity, because they cannot tolerate the brightness of Vertue. Rest, that it may be laudable, ought to have a just motive; and he that hath neither Occupation, nor studious employment, is the Tombe of a living man. Now Fear out of a naturall propensity turns her self into this infamous sin, and becomes lazie if she be not moderated: she apprehends labour; and excusing her self upon her weakness, she perswads her self, there is no exercise which doth not exceed her strength; she imagineth difficulties in the easiest things; and to be released from an honest occupation, she makes it pass for a punishment: she finds nothing that doth not astonish her; and the holy Scripture which knows very well the humour of fearfull men, teacheth us that when they want pretences to hide themselves, they go to seek them out in the Forrests, and to feign to themselves that Lyons that will come out of their dens to surprize them by the way: she never parts timorousness from Sloth; & knowing what Affinity there is between these two Vices, she makes one and the same picture of them, and sets them forth in the same colours.

Nam qui res & homines fugit, quem cupiditatum suarum infœlicitas relegavit, qui alios fœliciores videre non potuit, qui velut timidum atque inersanimal metu obstituit, ille non sibi vivit, sed ventri, somno, libidini. Senec. Epist. 59.

Dicit piger leo est in via, & leona in itineribus; sicut ostium vertitur in cardine suo, ita piger in lectulo suo. Prov. 26.

Pigrum dejicit timor. Pro. 18.

To all these defects we may add Imprudence, which is not much less naturall to

Fear, then Sloth; for though Natures intention was, to make her serviceable unto Prudence; and by her care to prevent the evills which threaten us; yet it so falls out by a mischievous irregularity, as she that ought to free us from evill, engageth us therein; and that the Passion which ought to give us counsell, hinders us from taking it: for Reason wills, that we consult as often as any important affair happens, the success whereof depends not absolutely upon our power; and the evills which Fear considers being of this nature, it seems she would move us maturely to deliberate, and to seek out the means how to defend our selves from the enemies that assail us; and yet she puts so much confusion into our minde, that she makes us incapable of consultation; and she deciphers forth dangers so dreadfull to us, as banishing wisdom, she hurries us into Despair: so, by two contrary effects, she obliegeth us to aske councell, and will not suffer us to receive it: she makes us know our indigence, and will not permit us to seek out a Remedy. We must therefore be carefull, how we make use of so strange a Passion, and which contrary to the design of Nature, offers us her light to discover the evills that are to come, and yet refuseth it

Pavor sapientiam omnem mihi expectoral, Terent.

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us to shun them: Wisdom will amend this fault, and the following discourse will shew us what means we must use to deal with Fear.

The third Discourse.

Of the good use of Fear.

WE must not think it strange, that Passion may be criminall, since she is indifferent: and we ought not to complain that she neighbours upon Vice, since Vertues self is thereby besieged: for all morality confesseth, that there is no vertue which is not environed by sins, and wch sees not an enemy threatning heron either side. Clemency, which may be termed the ornament of Princes, and the happiness of States, stands in the midst between Indulgence and Severity; let her step never so little awry, she lights upon one of these two Monsters: and assuming some one of their qualities, she unluckily loseth all her own. Fortitude, or that valour which encourageth conquerors to glorious enterpri-

zes, is placed between Rashness and Remisnes; if she expose her self unadvisedly, she becomes Rash; and if she too carefully preserve her self, she is suspected to be cowardly: Liberality which wins the heart, after Power hath conquer'd the body, is quarter'd between Avarice and Profuseness; if she husband her goods more carefully then decency permits, she is accused of Avariciousness, if she indiscreetly lavish them, of Prodigality; but the Passions seem to me to be more happily quarter'd; for if they be assailed by a Vice, they have a Vertue to defend them; and if they prove faulty, they may also prove Innocent: this is evidently seen in Fear; which being serviceable to Sloth and Despair, may be the like to Wisdom and Shamefastness; and by means of these two may preserve all other Vertues.

Though Fear be shie, and affrightned with the evills which she discovers, yet doth she much resemble Wisdom, that a little aid may make her take her nature upon her: this Vertues chief employment, according to the judgement of all Philosophers, is to consider things Past, to govern things Present, and to foresee things Future: but she is more taken up with what is to come, then

Prudentia præsentia ordinat, futura prævidet, præterita recordatur. Vitruv.

with

with what is present, or what is past: for to boot, that the present is but a Moment, and that it comprehends but a small number of Accidents, it is sensible, and our eyes are only requisite to judge thereof; the time that is past is no longer in our power; all the wisdom of the world hath no jurisdiction over it; it is not hard to be known, and our memory (if it be not very faithless) represents unto us the events which it hath produced: but the time to come is as doubtfull as concealed; it is environ'd with darkness which cannot be dissipated; it draws along with it a prodigious train of Adventures, which cause a thousand alterations in Individuall men, and in Common-wealths; so as Futurity is the chief object of Wisdom, which considers the other differences of time, only that she may the better judge of this: she studies not what is past, save only to know what is to come; and she governs the present time, only to assure her self of the Future. Great Politicians have therefore believed, that Wisdom was a Divine Vertue; that one could not consult the event of things without assistance from heaven; and that to be a happy Councellour, a man must be a true Prophet: now Fear is of the nature of Wisdom; for though she call

Consiliari quoddam divinum est. Aristot.

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to minde Past evills, though she busie her self about the Present, her particular entertainment is in Future evills, and she useth all her best means, either to keep them far off, or to withstand them: 'tis true, she implores help of Hope, and makes use of the courage thereof to rid her of her enemies; but she more resembles Wisdom, which after having foreseen a danger, useth the valour of souldiers to repell it: for men are not so happy, as to possess these two Vertues both together; they require different tempers; and though they mutually assist one another, they seem to have protested never to meet in one and the same person: Wisdom is the portion of those old men that are grown white-hair'd in business, and who have spent all their lives in observing the humours of People, the revolutions of States, and the divers changes of Fortune; Valour on the contrary, is the Portion of young men, who having more Vigour then Experience, are fitter to Execute then to Deliberate; and succeed better in Combats, then in Counsells. It appertains only to the eternall Word, to be at once both Wisdom and Power; the Arm and the *Idea* of his Father: but amongst the creatures these qualities are separated; and who hath much strength,

strength, hath but little knowledg; to make these two incompatible advantages meet, Heaven must do a miracle; and it is not more difficult to agree Fire and Water, then to unite Wisdom and Fortitude: It must also be confess'd, that as Fear is fuller of Advisedness then of Generosity, she hath likewise more Light then Heat, and is far fitter for Councell then for Combat. In fine, she is accused in taking things always in the worst sence, and of making evills greater then they are; She resembles (say they) those faint-hearted Spies, which *Moses* sent to discover the land of *Palestine*; who thought by their false reports to have turned the *Jews* from so noble a conquest: she makes a Mountain of a Mole-hill; all beasts appear Monsters to her, and she thinks all dangers which shee sees, inevitable. 'Tis true, she doth almost always judge the worst; and that she may be abused, doth paint out evill in its proper deformity; but surely, in so doing she remembreth Wisdom the more, which never adviseth of what is to come, without fore-casting all the difficulties that may arrive, & without preparing forces to fight with such enemies as may assail her: she doth not consider only what is done, but what may be done; when she

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sees an evill, she will know the progress thereof; and takes some little trouble to procure assured quiet. The *Stoicks* have no better expedient to defend themselves against an evill that threatens them, then to imagine it will happen, and to withstand it in their minds, that they may have the better of it in effect; so as by the judgement of our enemies, wisdom hath no other maxime then Fear; and this faithfull servant moves not, but as her Soveraign doth.

Si vis omnem sollicitudinem exuere, quicquid vereris ne eveniat, eventurum utique propone; & quodcunque illud malum est, tecum metire. Senec. Epist. 24.

'Tis true, that as she neighbours upon the Sences, and reside in that part of the soul wherein combustions are framed, she always apprehends trouble; and her judgements are almost always accompanied with commotion: but the understanding may easily disabuse her; and by the brightness of its fire, may dissipate the Foggs which rise from the Imagination; it must binde her to consider such objects as she is afraid of, and make her the bolder by making her view the cause of her astonishment at a neerer distance: she must take away that Solemnitie from Punishments which makes them so dreadfull, and those complaints from Grief which make her so eloquent; it must teach her, that under those deceitfull appearances, there is but a common death which children

Tolle istam pompam sub qua latet, & stultos territas: Mors est quam nuper servus meus, quam ancilla contempsit.

children have endured, which Souldiers have overcome, & which Slaves have contemned: the most appearing torments are not always the most violent; a stopping of the urine is more painfull then being broken upon a wheel; one troubled with the Gout, suffers many times more pain in his bed, then an offender doth on the Rack; and a man whose head is cut off, endures not so much as he that dies of a Feaver: it belongs then to the understanding to perswade Fear, that all those things which affright us, are not those which harm us; that the greatest appearing evills are not the most sensible; and that those which appear least, are oft-times cause of greatest pain. Thus will she be fixt against evills; and suffering her self to be guided by Reason, she will have no more apprehensions, then what shall be necessary to keep her from being surprized.

But if Fear may be serviceable to us in withstanding Vice, she may be made use of to defend Vertue; and this seems to be the chief end for which Nature hath ordained her: for Shame is nothing but a Fear of Infamy: and this innocent Passion, is the protectress of all Vertues: 'tis to her that Judges owe their Integrities Souldiers their Courage; and Women their Chastity: 'tis by her

her care that Piety is preserved; and and all the world must confess, that not any affection of our soul is more delectable, or usefull, then is Shame. Since we owe so much unto her, 'tis reason that we acknowledg it, and that we give her the honour she deserves: she carries the colour of Vertue; and that blush which spreads it self over her face, is a mark of her Innocence: but she is so very nice, that the least thing in the world may corrupt her; she is like those Fruits new gather'd, whose verdure is lost assoon as they are handled: she her self destroys her self; she is offended at the praises that are given her; and women are made to lose her by being reproached for her: If she be easie to be Lost, she is as hard to be Regain'd; for though she be of a milde nature, yet she is Stately; and being once banish'd, she is very hardly recalled. Hope doth oftimes succeed Despair; Joy resumes the place which Sorrow had possest, and sometimes Hatred turnes to Love; but Shame never appears upon a face, when once it is driven thence by Insolence and Impudence: as this Passion is a companion to Purity, so is she of her Disposition; the losse of either is irreparable; she so loathes Sin, as she cannot endure the sight thereof; she blushes at the very

Et qui redire nescit ut periit pudor. Senec. in Agamemn.

very Name of it, and she summons in all the bloud of her heart, to succour her in defence of her self against her enemy. But she is never of more might, then when she fights in the defence of Vertue: for she doth such mighty things in her behalf, as she always procures her glorious victories; she obliegeth all the Passions to second her; she sets out guiltiness in so ghastly a manner to them, as she augments their hatred thereof; and so presents Innocence to them so beautifull, as she augments their love thereof: she awakens Hope, encourages Audacity, irritates Desire, and inflames Choler; so as it is a Passion that disperseth it self into all other Passions, and which endueth them with new strength to maintain Vertues quarrell: though she be timerous, she encourageth Souldiers; they are only valiant in being Ashamed: and if they despise Danger, 'tis only because they fear Infamy; one fear drives out another: and those who give not way to Valour, suffer themselves to be overcome by Shame: Though she be indulgent, she makes Judges severe: and when men go about to corrupt them with bribes, or to frighten them with threats, she keeps them within their bounds by fear of Dishonour: though she be Weak, she makes

women

Quam peccare pudet Cynthia, tuta sat est. Propert.

women courageous; and whilst she displays her blush upon their visages, she scatters a secret vertue into their hearts, which makes them triumph over those dangerous enemies that pursue them. This Sex hath no other strength then what it borrows from this innocent Passion; it preserves it self only by the fear of Infamy: and who should take this defence from it, would easily bereave it of all its other advantages. Nature it self, which very well knows it loves Beauty as much as Vertue, hath perswaded it, that Shame makes it more approved of: in effect, Shamefac'dness is an innocent paint; women never seem fairer then when they are somewhat shamefac'd; and there is no face, how taking so ever, which receiveth not a fresh lustre from the innocent blush which accompanies Shamefac'dness; she is so appropriated to Vertue, as men have a good opinion of all them that have her; and she defends the interests of Reason with so much fervency, that the empire thereof would ere this have been overthrown, if this Passion had been banished from off the earth.

Plures pudore peccandi quàm bonâ voluntate prohibitis abstinent. Senec. Epi. 83.

For experience teacheth us, that more men abstain from sin for Shame, then for Duty; and that the Fear of Infamy hath more

more power over mens mindes then the love of Innocence. The divell therefore very well knowing that this Passion is averse to his designs; and that to make us lose it, our nature must be destroyed; endeavours to perswade us that Vertue is criminall, to the end that it being thought infamous by us, Shame, which always defends her, may be enforced to abandon her: He thought it was easier to take from Vertue her estimation, then Innocence from Shame: not being able to corrupt Shame, he hath gone about to deceive her; and to make her lose her Aversion to sin, he hath made her believe sin to be glorious. This error is so generally dispers'd throughout the whole world, as there are now adays some Vertues which are esteemed Infamous, and some Vices, Honorable; Revenge passeth for greatness of Courage, and forgetting of Injuries for meanness of Spirit; Ambition is illustrious; and because it sets upon Crowns, means to be no longer ashamed: Modesty and Humility are despised; and because they delight in Solitariness and Silence, they have lost all their glory. Opiniatricy in a fault, is the mark of a stout spirit; Penitence and Change of life, an argument of Weakness: thus all

things are confounded, and Shame suffering her self to be seduced by Opinion, sides with Vice, not thinking of it, and forgoes Vertue: wicked men who hid themselves, now shew themselves upon the Stage; and being no more ashamed (which was the only good that remain'd among all their evills) they become Insolent, and boast of their misdemeanors; the way of salvation is blockt up unto them; and since they have given titles of Honor to infamous things, we cannot hope that Shame should convert them, or reduce them to their duties. To shun this evill, this innocent Passion must be disabused, and giving to every Object the name that it deserves, she must be withdrawn from the error wherein she hath indiscreetly engaged her self; she must be perswaded that the humblest vertues are most profitable; and that those vices which are the most Honorable, are the most dangerous: upon these good maxims she will side with Innocence again; and repenting for having suffer'd her self to be deceived, she will so much the more hotly pursue her enemies, by how much her hatred is augmented by their injurious dealing; and for that by defending Vertues interests, she shall likewise revenge her self of her own particular injuries.

Itaque quod unum habebant in malis, bonum perdunt, peccandi verecundiam: laudant enim ea quibus erubescubant, & vitio gloriantur: idcoque nec resurgere quidem adolescentiæ licet, cùm honestus turpi desidiæ titulus accessit. Senec. de vita beata, cap. 12.

THE

THE FIFTH TREATISE, OF CHOLER.

The first Discourse.

Of the Nature, Proprieties, and Effects of CHOLER.

THe Vertues are so streightly united one to another, as they are not to be parted without using of violence: oft-times also they mingle one with another; and these noble habitudes are blended together, that they may make up one single Vertue. Clemency, which makes Kings raign happily, borrows

her beauties from two or three of her companions: she ows her good Government to Prudence; her Mildness to Mercy; and her Glory to Generosity: Valour, which makes Conquerors triumph, holds all her riches from the liberality of all other Vertues; and he that should take from her the statelines which she derives from Magnanimity, the address which she takes from Discretion, and the Moderation which she receives from Justice, would leave her but a vain shadow of all her reall greatness. Though the passions hold not so good Intelligence as do the Vertues, yet are there some of them which never forsake one another; and there are some others which live wholly upon borrowing; and which would be poor, should the rest forgoe them. Hope is of this nature, for she hath no other goods then what are given her; and were she forsaken by Desire, which eggs her on; by Fear which holds her in, and by Audacity which encourageth her, nothing but a bare name would remain unto her.

Choler is of the same condition; though she make so much noise, she draws all her force from the Passions which compose her; and she appears not to be courageous, save only that she is well accompanied: she

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is never raised in our souls uncalled by Sorrow; she endeavours not satisfaction for injuries done unto her, unless sollicited by Desire, provoked by Hope, and encouraged by Audacity: for he that is irritated, promiseth himself revenge of his enemy; but when he is so weak, as he cannot hope for it, his Choler turns to Sadness; and wanting the Passions which did feed it, it loseth both Name and Nature.

Ira, si ut & ultio, doloris confessio est. Senec. de ira lib. 3. cap. 5.

From all this Discourse 'tis easie to gather, that Choler is nothing else but a Motion of the Sensitive appetite, which seeks Revenge for an injury. *Aristotle* therefore thought she was Rationall, and that even in her Fury, she had some shadow of Justice; the truth is, she is never moved, but when she imagines she hath received some injury; and if she take up arms, 'tis to revenge wrongs which she thinks have been done unto her; herein she is much less faulty, then Hatred; for this later wisheth evill directly unto its enemy; and without seeking any pretence or excuse for its fury, desires the ruine of the party persecuted; but the other wisheth him only punishment for his fault, and looks not upon Revenge, as an irrationall Excess, but as a just chastisement: the later is hardly ever pacified, but dischargeth its

Nulli irascenti sua ira videtur injusta. Aug. lib. de vera innocent. cap. 3. 19.

its cruelty upon the Innocent, and pursues the dead even to their graves: if we may believe Poets, it descends into Hell, to torment the damned there; and would mount into Heaven, if it could, there to afflict the blessed: but the other is satisfied when she is Revenged; when she thinks that the punishment equalls or exceeds the injury, she is appeased, and by a providence of Nature, turns to Pitty; she spares the faultless, and when even the faulty become distressed, she loseth her desire of Revenge: I confess she grows greater when withstood; and that when she hath the better of her enemies, she delights in their defeat: but she seeks not that infamous content which Tyrants feel in the death of their subjects; for they seek not so much to revenge themselves of an Injury, as to content their brutish Cruelty; and in punishing Innocents, are guided more by the motions of Fury, then of Choler: In fine, all the Philosophers have had so good an opinion of Choler, as *Aristotle* was perswaded, she sided always with Vertue against Vice; that it was she, that encouraged us to gallant actions; and that the high enterprizes, of Princes were no less the effects of this Passion, then of Vertue; he believed, that all the

Iram saepe misericordia retroegit. Senec. lib. 1. de ira; cap. 16.

Hæc non est ira, feritas est; nec illi verbera, in ultionem petuntur, sed in voluptatem. Senec. li. 1. de ira. ca. 5.

Calcar est virturis, hac erepta, inermis, animus, & ad conatus magnos piger ineresque. Ari. in Senec. lib. 3. de ira. cap. 3.

diforders

disorders of our soul, which contributed to Voluptuousness, were not to be tamed but by Choler; and that the concupiscible appetite would pervert Reason, were it not withstood by the Irascible: one would think to hear him speak that all great men are Cholerick; that this Passion is not only the mark of a good Nature, but of an excellent Courage; and that a mans minde can conceive nothing of Generous, if it be not a little irritated.

I believe, with him, that this resentment of our soul may be profitably employed in the service of Vertue, when it is moderated by Reason and Grace; but certainly it stands in more need of their guidance, then do the rest; and as it is extreamly violent, so causeth it great disorders, if it be not carefully suppres'd: for let it have what inclination it pleaseth to Good, it is too sodain to be regulated; and though it seem to love Justice and Reason, yet is yet too furious to be just or reasonable: we should be undone, were Choler as opinionated, as it is sodain; and the earth would be but one desart, if this Passion were as lasting, as it is hot: Nature could not better shew the care she hath of our preservation, then in giving narrow bounds to the wildest of our Pasions; and

Naturæ curis debemus quòd hanc furorem contraxerit. actum esset de hominibus si pertinax ira fuisset: adhuc cùm brevi duret, quid peju

since the love she beareth us, hath oblieged her to make Monsters barren, and to allot but short lives to the most furious beasts, she was bound to affix brevity to Choler, and to allow a short term of time to so dangerous a Passion: nor doth her short time of duration keep her from causing much mischief; she employs to her utmost those moments which Nature hath given her, and in a few houres commits many outrages: for to boot, that she troubles the mindes of men, that she changes their colour, that she seems to play with their bloud, (making it sometimes withdraw it self to the Heart, sometimes disperse it self over the Face) that she sets the Eyes on Fire, that she fills the mouth with Threats, and that she arms the Hands of as many as she meets withall, she produceth much more strange effects in the world: she hath, since its birth, changed the face thereof a thousand times; there is no Province wherein she hath not committed some spoils; nor is there any Kingdom which doth not bewail her violence: those ruines which have formerly been the foundations of some goodly City, are the remainders of Choler; those Monarchies, thatwhilome gave Laws to all the earth, and which we know only by Story,

Story, complain not so much of Fortune, as of Choler: those great Princes, whose pride is reduced to ashes, sigh in their graves; and accuse only Choler for the loss of their lives, and ruine of their States; some of them have been assassinated in their Beds, others like sacrifices offer'd up at the Altars; some have unfortunately ended their days in the midst of their Armies, when all their souldiers that environed them could not defend them from death: others have lost their lives in their Thrones; the majesty that shines in the faces of Kings, not being able to frighten their murderers: some have seen their own children make attempts upon their persons; others have seen their bloud shed by the hands of their Slaves: but not complaining of the Parricides, they complain only of Choler; and forgetting all their particular disasters, they only condemn this Passion, which is the plentifull and the unfortunate Spring-head thereof.

Aspice nobilissimarum civitatum fundamenta vix notabilia; has ira dejecit. Aspice solitudines per multa millia fine habitatione desertas: has ira exhausit. Aspice tot memoriæ proditos duces, mali exempla fati, alium ira in cubili suo confodit, alium inter sacra mensæ percussit, alium filii parricidio dare sanguinem jussit. Senec. lib. 1. de ira. cap. 2.

And certainly, they have reason for their complaining, since of all the disorders of our soul, there is none more savage, nor more irrationall, then this. I know not why *Aristotle* imagined it was serviceable to Reason, and that it always moved as she did, unless

unless it be that it had a design to teach us, that this Passion being more Ambitious then the rest, would seem Rationall in her Excess; and by an execrable attempt obliege Reason her Soveraign, to defend her Slaves injustice: for she always seeks Excuses for her faults; though she shed humane bloud, though she offer up Innocents in sacrifice, beat down whole Towns, and bury their Inhabitants under their ruines; she will be thought to be Rationall: she sometimes knows well enough the vanity of her resentments, yet she without reason perseveres in them, lest men should think she had no reason to begin: Her injustice makes her opinionated; she grows hot upon design, she will have her Excess to be an argument of her Injustice, and all the world to imagine, that she hath punished her enemies justly, because she hath punish'd them severely. See then what she borrows of Reason, and how much more insolent she is in other Passions, which are blinde in their unrulines, and only offend their Soveraign, because they know not his Authority: but this Passion doth impudently abuse her, and by a fearfull tyranny employes her Soveraign to excuse her faults, after having made use of her to commit them.

Perseveramus ne videamur cœpisse sine causa; pertinaciores nos facit iniquitas iræ, & augemus; quasi argumentum sit justè irascendi graviter irasci. Senec. lib. 3. de ira. cap. 29.

I

I therefore think, *Seneca* had great reason to say that she is more faulty then the vices themselves, and that she commits injustice, whereof they are not guilty. Avarice heapeth goods together, and Choler dissipateth them; the former only hurts her self, and obliegeth her heires that are to succeed her; but the latter hurts all the world; and, as if she were a publike contagion, she puts divisions in Families, divorceth Marriages, and engageth Kingdoms in War: Uncleanness seeks a shamful delight, but such as only hurts the parties in Fault; and Choler seeks an unjust one, which is prejudiciall to Innocents: Envy, as malicious as she is, contents her self in Wishing ill unto another; she leaves the execution thereof to Fortune, and remits to her the accomplishing of her desire. but Choler is so impatient, she cannot attend this blind Power; but preventing the rigour thereof, she takes delight in making men miserable. In fine, she is the cause of all evills, and there is no fault committed, wherein she hath not a hand: there is nothing more obnoxious then Duells; 'tis Choler that entertains them: there is nothing more cruell then Murder; 'tis Choler that adviseth to it; there is nothing more fatall then war; 'tis Choller that causeth it: when

Ira patri luctum, marito divortium, attulit, magistratui odium, candidato repulsam. Senec. 3. de ira. cap.

Nihil est simultatibus gravius: has ira conciliat. Nihil est bello funestius: in hoc potentium ira prorumpit. Senec. 3. de ira. cap. 5.

when she reigns in a soul, she stifles all other Passions, and is so absolute in her tyranny, as she turns Love into Hatred, and Pitty into Fury; for there have been Lovers, who in the height of their Choler have buried the same dagger in their own bosoms, which they had just before plunged in their Mistresses bosome, committing two reall murders, to revenge one imaginary injurie: Avaritious men have been seen to betray their own inclinations, to content their Choler, throwing all their riches into the water, or into the fire, to obey the impetuosity thereof; Ambitious have been known, who have refused profer'd Honours, trampled Diadems under foot, because Choler, which wholly posses'd their souls, had driven thence the desire of Glory.

Nullam transit ætatem, nullum hominum genus excipit, tam inter Graios quàm Barbaros potens: non minus pernicioſa leges metuentibus, quàm quibus jura distinguit modus virium. Senec. 3. de ira, cap. 2.

Nevertheless, though she be so pernicious, yet there is no Passion more common; and it seems that Nature, to punish all our faults, hath intended that she should persecute all men, as a revengefull Fury; there is no Nation which hath not felt her Rage; and of as many people as there are, differing in Customs, Apparell, and Language, there hath not as yet been any found exempt from this cruell Passion: we have seen whole Nations that have defended themselves

selves against Riot, favour'd by Poverty; and who have preserved their Innocence through their never knowing riches: we have seen of them that having no abiding place, have kept in perpetuall motion; and banish'd Sloth, for not having known the art of building houses; we have seen others, who have gone naked, and whom neither Shame, nor Necessity hath been able to instruct, to make themselves clothes; we see some which possessing all in common, cannot dispute for a part; and who not having lost all their naturall purity, are ignorant of the injustice which Avarice causeth to arise amongst us; but there hath not yet any been known which have been exempt from Choler: she reigns as well among people that are civilliz'd, as among *Barbarians*; she commands in all parts of the earth; and where she hath not yet introduced the use of Musket and Sword, she employs Bows and Arrows in her revenge.

In fine, one only Passion hath never been seen to agitate a whole Province, or to possess a whole Army: Love, though it be the master of Passions, was never able to make a whole town in love with one woman; *Helena* had but a few lovers; and of so many Captains as fought for her at the siege of *Troy*,

Cætera vitia singulos homines corripiunt: Hic unus affectus est qui interdum publicè concipitur. Senec. 3. de ira. cap. 2.

Troy, none but her Adulterer and her Husband were taken with her beauty: Avarice makes not all men sordid; and if some heap up riches, other-some squander them away; all men are not troubled with Ambition: if some seek after Honours, others shun them as much; if some are forward to shew themselves, others will hide themselves: and amongst so many guilty people, some are always found that are Innocent; Envy is no publike Malady; and if Vertue hath her enemies, she hath also her admirers: but Choler is a contagion which spreads it self through a whole town in a moment; one Oration hath made a whole Nation take up Armes; and men, women, and children, agitated with this Passion, have been seen confusedly to kill their own Citizens, or declare war against their enemies; Subjects have revolted against their Princes, Souldiers have conspired against their Commanders; the common people have bandied against the Nobility, Children have risen up against their Parents, and all the rights of Nature have been violated at the solicitation of Choler.

But that which is most vexatious in this so strange malady, is, that it takes its beginning from all things; for though it be so great

great, and that it enlargeth it self like fire, a very small spark is sufficient to kindle it; 'tis so easie to be moved, as that which ought to appease it, doth oft-times provoke it, and what might satisfie it, offends it; a servants negligence sets it on foot, the freedom of a friend makes it stark mad, and the scoffing of an enemy ingageth it in a Combat, Notwithstanding all these mischiefs, Choler would be to be born withal, if it were capable of councell; but she is so violent even in her birth, as she cannot receive the advice that is given her: for she grows not by degrees like other Passions; she doth not increase with Time, she needs not moneths to get root in our hearts, a moment suffereth her to form her self: she marcheth not a slow pace, as doth envy, or Sorrow; she is of full force at the beginning; at her birth she is at her full growth; and if other Passions in their heat thrust us forward, this in her fury doth precipitate us. As she is so suddain we must not wonder if she be inconsiderate; and if she make us hazard our lives to revenge an injury: for she listens only to her own desires, she only follows her own motions, and she acknowledgeth no other laws but those of her own violence; she never sets upon her enemy without discovery of her self,

Non paulatim procedit, sed dum incipit tota est: cætera vitia impellunt animos, ira præcipitat. Senec. 3. de ira. cap. 1.

In armis ira obliviscitur martem esse communem, venitque in alienam potestatem dum non est in sua. Senec. 3. de ira cap. 12.

self; she gives him never a blow without running the hazard to receive a greater; she loseth the victory, by being too eager in the pursuit thereof, and falls into the power of her enemy, because she is not in her own. Though all these evill qualities make us see clear enongh, how easie it is to abuse Choler, and how hard it is to make good use thereof, yet will I not forbear to pursue the order I have prescrib'd unto my self, and to employ the two remaining Discourses, in making appear what Vices, and what Vertues she may take part withall: but for the present I confess, that so violent a Passion doth not yeeld much to Reason, and that if we be not the more strongly assisted by Grace, to resist her, she is very hardly to be overcome.

The

The second Discourse.

Of the evill use of Choler.

SInce Choler is nothing else but a naturall Revenge, and that the one and the other of these do boast of Justice, and greatness of Courage, I can finde no better way to discover the evill use thereof, then by making the Injustice and Pusillanimity thereof appear. For most men persist not in their disorders; but for the esteem they have thereof, and those who are incens'd, continue their desire of Revenge, only because they think it reasonable: the Incontinent excuse themselves upon their weakness; and if they be not blinde, they approve not of a sin, which Reason and Nature do condemn; the Envious, and Detractors seek pretences for their calumnies; and knowing that their fault is accompanied with unworthiness, they cunningly disguise it, and strive to give it some colour of Justice: but Revenge and Choler believing themselves to be grounded upon Reason,

demean themselves insolently, and would perswade us that all their Excesses are as just as courageous: mean while they have nothing of what they think they have: and of all the motions of our soul, there is none more unjust, nor more pusillanimous. Men imagine it is Generous, because it is usefull among great ones; and perswade themselves it is Noble, because its takes up its abode in the hearts of Kings; but certainly Choler is not so much a proof of their Greatness, as of their Weakness: had not Voluptuousness mollified them, and had not that tenderness which accompanies good successes, made them so sensible of the least injuries, they would not so easily fly out into Passion, they would contemn outrages; and knowing that their own dignity raiseth them out of the reach of Storms, they would laugh at the vain endevours of those that go about to offend them; but the slavery they require of their subjects, and the shamefull obsequiousness render'd to all their desires, makes them be offended with a just liberty. They take good advice for neglect, and rationall Counsells for an undermining of their Authority: they cannot endure a Truth; and Fortune hath made them so tender, as suspitions serve them for proofs

Ne illud quidem judicandum est, aliquid iram ad animi magnitudinem conferre, non est enim illa magnitudo, tumor est: tantumque abest à magnitudine animi, quantum a fortitudine audacia, à fiducia insolentia, a severitate crudelitas. Senec. 1. de ira cap. 16.

Nulla res magis iracundiam alit quàm luxuria Senec. 2. de ira. cap. 26.

proofs to condemn the innocent: they are like to those that having not a perfect health, cannot endure a clear air, nor the light of the Sunne, the least exercise disquieteth them; and what would be but a Diversion to one in health, doth trouble and incommodate them: thus the most part of great personages cannot bear with Fidelity in their domesticks; Truth must be corrupted, if you will have them to receive it; and the temper of their mindes is so weak, that sincerity in a servant is able to offend them: the Remedies which men present unto them seem to them poysons; they think men aim at their Honour, while they reprehend their Faults; and let them express themselves therein, in never so mild termes, they always take it for an injury. Who sees not, that this greatness is meer weakness; and that the Choler which transports them, is a mark of the infirmity which accompanies them?

Thus the holy Scripture, which very well knows the originall of all our disorders, teacheth us, that the malice of women is not more violent then that of men, save only because their nature is more infirm, and that they have not strength enough to sustain the impetuosity of this

Non est caput nequius super caput colubri, & non est ira supra iram mulieris Ecclesiast. c. 35.

Passion: for when she finds resistance, or cannot easily work her end, she presently slackens; and losing her rage, suffers her self to be guided by Reason; but when she meets with any one that gives himself over to her power, who suffers himself to be born away by her motions; and who hath not strength enough to oppose her violence, she takes the freedom to fly at all; and believes that she may promise her self any thing from a slave, who can refuse her nothing: if she possess the soul of a King, who hath not courage enough to defend himself against her tyranny; she makes use of the weakness of his minde, and of the strength of his Fortune to execute all her designs; she perswades him, that Revenge is glorious; that a Prince is never more absolute then when he is dreaded; and that of all the marks of Soveraignty, there is none more certain, then the death of enemies: then States become Tyrannies, towns are overflown with the bloud of Subjects, the number of Executioners is greater then that of the Offenders; and all things are in a deplorable condition, because Choler abuseth the power of a Prince, who cannot resist her. What hath not she undertaken, when she hath had Kings for her slaves, and made use

Perierunt omnia, ubi quantum suadetira, fortuna permittit. Senec. 3. de ira cap. 16.

use of their Power to execute her Fury? What marks of Cruelty hath she left in the world, when she hath reigned in the hearts of Monarchs? What Champaigns hath she strew'd over with dead carkasses? And what Provinces hath she made desolate?

Cambyses, to satifie his choler, made the noses of all the Inhabitants of *Syria* be cut off; and judging that Death was too common, and too honorable a punishment, he would invent another which should be as strange as shamefull. He had dealt more ignominiously with all the people of *Ethiopia*, had not a happy accident withstood the execution of so damnable a design; for he was surpris'd by a Famine in the deserts, which forced him to return to his own State: but before he put on this resolution, he follow'd the mad counsell of his choler, and suffer'd the best part of his Army to perish by Famine: when his souldiers wanted victualls, they fed upon the leaves of trees, and such herbs as the uncultivated earth brought forth: when they were engaged in the Desarts, and that the scorching sands afforded them no further nourishment, they ate the leather of their bucklers, and all such other things as necessity enforceth men to make food of: but when they could see no end of

Perperciſſe illum judicas quòd non tota capita præcidit? novo genere pœnæ delectatus est. Senec. 3. de ira. cap. 20.

this their forlorn condition, this unnaturall Prince provided them a food more cruell then the Famine; he made them be decimated, and forced them to eat one another; his Passion govern'd in him amidst so many misfortunes; and after he had lost one part of his forces, and eaten up another, he had not resolved to retreat, had he not feared that the lot might at last have fallen upon himself, and so have made him try the excess of that cruelty which he had commanded: but, to shew that Unworthiness is inseparable from Choler, this savage monster made exquisite cates be carried upon the backs of his Cammells, whil'st his miserable souldiers committed murders to defend themselves from famine; and left posterity in dispute, who were the most to be commiserated, those who lived in so much misery, or those that died with so much cruelty. In fine, Choler never goes unaccompanied with weakness; and if sometimes a generous word escape her mouth, it always proceeds from a base soul; and which affects Greatness, only to cover its Baseness.

Agebat adhuc ira regem præcipitem; cum partem exercitus amisisset, partem comedisset; Donec timuit, ne & ipse vocaretur in sortem; tum demum signum receptui dedit. Senec. de ira, cap. 20.

Caligula is reported to have been offended with the Heavens, when their Thunder hindered his Sports; that he challenged his gods to fight with him; and that using the words

words of a Poet; he said to them, *Either take me out of the world, or I will take you out of it*. Into what degree of madness had his choler thrown him? For he must not only imagine, that his gods could not hurt him, but that their fortune, as well as that of men, depended upon his will. *Seneca* was of opinion, that this insolence cost him his life, and made his subjects conspire against him: for they thought it past Patience, to tolerate a man that could not tolerate the gods. Choler then hath nothing in it of Greatness; and even then when she seems to contemn both Heaven and Earth, she discovers her unworthiness; or if you take her Excesses for marks of her Greatness, confess, that Riot is magnificent, because it builds thrones of gold, decks it self with purple, cuts through mountains, turns the Channells of streams, encloses Rivers within Parks, makes Gardens in the Aire, and findes inventions to remove Forrests: confess, that Avarice is a glorious crime, since it rolleth it self on Mountains of gold, it possesseth Territories as large as Provinces; and that her Farmers have more ground to cultivate, then the first Consuls of *Rome* had to manage; acknowledg, that Incontinence is Courageous, since she passeth the seas to seek out what she loves,

Ultimæ enim patientiæ visum est, eum ferre, qui Jovem non ferret. Senec. de ira, lib. 1. cap. ultimo.

that she fights either to come by it, or to keep it; since women who are possess'd with this passion, despise death, to satisfie their desires; and expose themselves to the fury of their Husbands, to please their Adulterers: Lastly, confess, that Ambition is generous, since she findes not any honour that contents her, will have all years bear her name, and that all Pens be employ'd in writing her praises: but certainly all these Passions are Pusillanimous: what shadow soever they have of Greatness, they are in truth mean, and poor; and there is nothing great which bears not Reason with it: or, to speak more like a Christian, there is nothing August but what is enlivened by the Grace of Jesus Christ.

But to the end you may not believe, I seek out hatefull examples, to take from Choler that greatness of courage which she boasteth of, I will examine the reasons that are alledged in her defence, and consider her in a condition wherein she may challenge either praises or excuses. Ought we not to be angry when all Laws, Divine as Humane, are violated? may not one give himself over to Choler, when she perswades us to revenge our Parents? and is it not an action of Piety to be incensed against an impious

wretch

wretch who prophanes Altars, and dishonors Churches? I confess, this Passion cannot have fairer pretexts; and that she is in her glory, when she is irritated for so rationall subjects: but you will finde, that those who have been moved for the defence of their Countrey, will have the same resentments for the preservation of their pleasures; that they will be as angry for the loss of a horse, as for the loss of a friend; and that they will make it as great a business to correct a servant, as to beat back an enemy: it is not Piety, but Weakness, that excites this Choler; and since she is highly mov'd as well for a word as for a murder, we must conclude, she is neither Courageous nor Rationall: the greatest part, likewise, of our Revenges, are Injuries; and we run hazard of committing a fault, as oft as we will be Judges in our own cause: our Interests blinde us, and our Self-love perswades us, that the slightest injuries cannot be repaired but by the death of the guilty: we are of the humour of Kings, though we be not of their condition; and imagine that all the wrongs that are done to us, are as many High-treasons: we would have neither Fire nor Gallows used, save to punish our enemies; and are unjust enough, to desire to engage the Justice of

Non pietas iram movet, sed infirmitas: sicut pueri, qui tam parentibus amissis flebunt, quàm nucibus: iracundi pro suis non est pii animi sed infirmi. Senec. 1. de ira. cap. 12.

of God in our Interests: we could wish she would let no thunder fall, but upon the heads of such as have offended us; and out of a height of impiety, we would that the Heavens were always in Arms in our quarrell.

In humanum verbum est & quidem pro justo receptum, ultio; & a contumelia non differt nisi ordine; qui dolorem regerit, tantùm excusatiùs peccat. Senec. 2. de ira. cap. 32.

But though we made no such wishes, yet would our Revenge be still irrationall; her very name sheweth us, that she is faulty; and though she seem so pleasing to those that cheerish her; there is nothing more cruell, nor more pusillanimous: for she differs from Injury, only, in Time; and if he that provoketh be Faulty, he that Revengeth is not innocent: the one begins the fault, the other ends it; the one makes the Challenge, the other Accepts of it: and the second is not more just then the first; save that the injury he hath received, serves for a pretence to do another. Therefore is it, that our Religion forbids Revenge, as well as Injury: and very well knowing, we cannot keep the Rules of Justice in punishing our wrongs; she commands us to remit them into the hands of God; and to leave the punishment thereof to him, whose judgements are never unjust: she teacheth us, that to Revenge affronts done unto us, is to intrench upon his Rights; and that, as all glory is due to him, because

becauſe he is our Soveraign Lord; ſo all Revenge belongs to him, becauſe he is our Judge: but that which is yet more admirable in her Doctrine, and which ſurpaſſeth as well the weakneſs of our Vertue, as of our minde, is, that ſhe will have us loſe the deſire of Revenge; and that ſtifling this reſentment which Nature thinks ſo juſt, we change our Hatred into Love, and our Fury into Mercy: he will have us imitate His Goodneſs; and that, raiſed to a more than mortall condition, we wiſh well to thoſe that do us miſchief: he will have us pray to him for their Converſion; and that (according to the example of his only Son, who obtained Salvation for thoſe that butcher'd him) we ask pardon of him for our enemies: he reſerves his higheſt rewards for Charity; and teacheth us, that we cannot hope for forgiveneſs, unleſs we ſhew mercy; he raiſeth this Vertue above all others; and reverſing the worlds maxims, he will have us to believe, that greatneſs of Courage conſiſteth only in the forgetting of injuries; all his endeavours are to blot out of our ſouls the memory of offences, and hatred of our enemies: to hear him ſpeak, you would think his State were grounded on this Law only; and that we cannot claim ſhare in his Glory

Orandum eſt pro inimicis, ut aut obtineatur ipſorum converſio, aut in nobis divinæ bonitatis inveniatur imitatio. Aug. lib. de vera innocent.

Glory, if we do not imitate his Clemency.

Humane Philosophy hath not been able to attain to this degree of perfection; yet she hath observed, that Hatred was unjust, and that Revenge was poorly condition'd; she hath made use of weak reasons, to perswade us to rare Vertues; and when she hath not been able quite to abolish Choler, she hath endevour'd to asswage it: she hath shew'd us, that the world is a Republique, whereof all men are citizens; that if the body were holy, the members thereof were sacred; and that, if it were forbidden to conspire against the State, it was not lawfull to attempt any thing against a man, who made a part thereof: that it would be a strange disorder, if the Eyes should fight against the Hands, or that the Hands should declare war against the Eyes; that Nature, which had united them in one and the same body, had inanimated them with one and the same spirit; and that, contributing to the publike good, they should mutually assist one another, lest the ruine of one part might draw on that of the whole: that, thus men were bound reciprocally to preserve themselves for the welfare of the State, knowing that Society subsists only by Love, and that

Sanctæ partes sunt, si universum venerabile est: Ergo & homo homini sacer est, nam hic in majore tibi urbe civis est. Senec. 2. de ira, cap. 31.

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a body cannot live, when the mẽbers therof are at discord. All these maxims condemn Revenge; Nature, as corrupt as she is, teacheth us by the mouthes of Philosophers, that Jesus Christ hath commanded us nothing which is not reasonable; and if we need his Grace to keep his Commandements, it is not so much an argument of their difficulty, as a mark of our unrulinesse: as we ought to adore his Justice, that punisheth us; we ought to adore his Mercy which fortifieth our weakness, and acknowledg, that he imposeth no Laws upon us, but that at the same time he gives us strength to observe them.

The third Discourse.

Of the good use of Choler.

THe Poet had reason to say, That the way to hell lay open to all the world, and that all men were indifferently permitted to descend thither: but that, to get from thence when one was once entred there, and to see the light again after

after one had been in darkness, was a favour which the Heavens granted only to those Grandees that had merited it by their glorious labours: there is nothing more easie then to abuse Choler, and engage ones self in the unjust resentments of Revenge: corrupt Nature hath taught us these disorders, and without other instructors then our own desires, we finde means every day how to content this Passion: but assuredly, there is nothing more difficult then to make good use thereof, and she is so hair-braind, as it is easier, totally to extinguish her, then to regulate her; and to banish her out of our soul, then to moderate her. For she is so violent, that she is not to be with-held; and so sodain, that she cannot be prevented; her first motions are not in our power; and being once on the wing, she hath already acted most part of her outrages: the other Passions are to be dreaded in their Progress; like Scorpions which carry their Poyson in their tayls, they reserve all their fury to the last; and are never more dangerous, then when oldest: a budding hatred may be cured; but, being increas'd with time, it is past remedy: an Envy which is not yet throughly shap'd, may be effaced; but when it hath gotten all its strength, the Heavens must

In voluptates & vitia descenditur; in res asperas & duras subeundum est, hic impellamus animos, illic refrænemus. Senec. Epist. 123.

must work wonders, to stifle it: a love which hath not yet past from the Eyes to the Heart, and which is rather a Complacency then a Passion, is as soon quench'd as set on fire; but when 'tis once gotten into the bottom of our soul, that it hath brought its flames into our Will, a long time is required to mortifie it: and unless Hatred, Despite, and Jealousie come in to the aid of Reason, she will be perplex'd to triumph over so puissant an enemy: but Choler hath all her forces in her cradle, she is at full growth as soone as formed; and as if she were of the nature of Spirits, she stands not in need of Time to grow in; so as she is hard to overcome, even from the time she begins to fight; and contrary to the humour of other Passions, she is more to be feared in her Cradle, then in her Saddle: she carries her poyson in her Head, as Vipers do; if you think to stifle her when we is once on foot, you augment her fury; and this monster is so wild, that the next way to appease her violence, is, to resolve to bear with her.

I should therefore counsell all those that would make her serviceable to Vertue, to to prevent her birth, and to allay her before she be formed: It must be consider'd, that whatsoever it be that puts us in Choler, it ought

Nihil ex his quæ tristes agimus, serium est, nihil magnum: Inde vobis ira & insania est, quòd exigua magni æstimatis. Senec. lib. 3. de ira. cap. 34.

ought not so much as to disquiet us; that we take offence at things, only because we know them not; that Riches and Honour attract their greatness from our ignorance; that the chances of Fortune, and our enemies injuries take their strength from our weakness: as for such things which waken our desires, we must perswade our selves that they are not worth the wishing for; that their loss is more advantageous to us, then their possession; that they are not what they appear to be; and that under a false shew of pleasure, they hide real griefs; we cannot yet give them the names they deserve; and out of a strange blindness we term our Punishments, Felicities: our Troubles proceed only from our Ignorance; and we should never be surprized by Choler, if we did know, that it is Vertue which makes us rich and honorable; all the good things that Fortune can bereave us of, are not ours; though she suffer us to make use of them, she keeps the Soveraignty thereof to her self; and oft-times she takes them from us, to teach us, that she doth but lend, not give us them: as they are rather Favours of her Liberality, then effects of our industery; 'tis fit, that after her Prodigality, she should be covetous of them. In fine, all things that she

she disposeth of, are too mean for us to busie our selves about; and we must not think it strange, that they put Division between people who desire to enjoy them, and cannot endure the dividing of them.

Quod vinculum amoris esse debebat, seditionis atque odii causa est, idem velle. Senec. 3. de ira. cap 34.

As for unthought of Accidents; we must remember, that being in the world, we are subject to the Laws thereof: that we should be too nice, to pretend to dispensations which Kings have not obtained; that nothing hath hapn'd in former ages which may not happen in this; that our fortune is not better grounded, then that of so many Monarchs, who have lost their lives and their Kingdoms in one and the same day; that our health is no more setled then other mens; and that being compounded of the same element, others suffer no maladies which may not happen unto us: that our riches are not in safety, for their being well come by; that Fire may devour them, Theeves may rob us of them, Strangers may purloin them: that the power of a great Man, the malice of a Judge, and violence of an Enemy, are accidents which may well be fore-seen, but cannot always be shunn'd.

As for Injuries; if they be slight ones, we must despise them; if bitter ones, we must

sweeten them; they will never do us so much harm, as they do their Authors; and if they be unjust, they will be glorious to us: nothing doth exalt Innocence so much as Injustice; had not *Socrates* and *Regulus* had their Persecutors, they never had been praised; they are only Famous, for that they have been unfortunate; and they owe the greatest part of their Glory, to their enemies cruelty: Tyrants are requisite for the making of Martyrs; and the ones rigour is no less necessary then the others constancie; we must not be troubled if our enemies intention be unjust, so that their actions may be advantageous to us: *Joseph* was obliged to his brethren, their hatred made him glorious; had he not lost his liberty, he had never reigned in *Egypt*; and had he not been imprison'd, he had never sate upon the Throne: what imports it us, that mens designs be evill, so long as he that manageth them by his Providence, makes them serviceable to us? And if we would not refuse to lose our Liberty to purchase a Kingdom, wherefore should we not bear with an Injury, to gain an eternall Crown? When these reasons often thought upon, shall have made any impression in us, it will be very hard for Choler to surprize us; she will

Non est magnus animus, quem incurvat injuria: Aut potentior te, aut imbecillio. læsit; si imbecillior, parce illi, si potentior, parce tibi. Senec. 3. de ira, cap. 5. in fine.

Dat Joseph fratribus munera, quasi vellet solvere beneficium venditionis, proditionis, ejectionis in cisternam: non enim regnasset nisi venisset Philo Judæ.

will be tractable in her birth if we be prepared against her assaults; for her violence proceeds rather from our weakness, then her own strength; and me thinks, we are fuller of Remisness, then she of Impetuosity.

With these precautions, I suppose, we may make some good use of Choler; and that Kings and Judges may advantage themselves thereby, in the behalf of Justice: she should banish out of their hearts, Fear, and Lenity, when they indiscreetly oppose themselves against the severity of the Laws: she should fill with her noble fire their mindes, which suffer themselves to be corrupted by Promises, or terrified with Threats: In fine, she should succeed Clemency, and fill the mouthes of Kings with such awfull words, as keep Subjects in obedience. Thus we see, the ingenious Poet gives *Jupiter* some Choler, as oft as he puts Thunder into his hand; teaching Soveraigns, by this example, to have recourse to this generous Passion, when they have in vain employ'd Mercy: 'tis true, that this argument is not convincing; and we must not wonder, if this prophane Poet attribute the motions of our souls to his gods, since he imputes its disorders to them; and that, after having described to us their Murders,

Precibusque minas regaliter addit. Ovid. 2. Metamorph.

he acquaints us with their Adulteries: but, the holy Scripture, which was dictated by the Spirit of Truth, teacheth us, that the true God grows angry; and that there are some faults which cannot be sufficiently punish'd, unless Justice borrow heart from Choler. Therefore 'tis, that the Wiseman, when he represents unto us that dreadfull day, wherein God shall revenge himself on his Enemies; he gives him weapons, wherewith to terrifie and punish them: he stirs him up with Zeal and Jealousie; he clothes him with Justice, as with a Cuirasse; he puts Judgment upon his head, as a Corslet; he puts Severity in his left hand, as a Buckler; and Choler in his right, as a Lance; and makes him descend upon the earth in this furious equipage, to punish the Rebels of his Kingdom. I very well know, that the Prophet in this eloquent description, fits himself to our Weakness and his meaning is not to perswade us, that Gods Choler is of the same nature, as is ours: nor that this Passion doth trouble his rest, which is not interrupted in hell it self, by the chastisements of Devills: but, we must confess, that Jesus Christ made use thereof, to revenge himself of the wrongs done to his Father; that he armed with whips and cords, those adored

Accipiet armaturam zelus illius, induet pro thorace justitiam, & accipiet pro galea judicium certum, sumet scutum inexpugnabile æquitatem, acuet autem duram iram in lanceam, & pugnabit cum illo orbis terrarum contra insensatos. Sapiant. cap. 5.

hand

hands which were to be pierced with nailes; that he suffered his just anger to be seen in his Countenance; and did, in this condition, whatsoever Wise men use to do when they punish crimes, or defend Innocence.

In fine, the wisest of Kings doth not believe, that Kingdoms can be well govern'd without Choler; he will have Princes sensible of their Injuries, that the Sword which they bear be as well employ'd in punishing Offenders, as in defeating Enemies; and that they shew as much indignation when their Subjects violate their Laws, as when their Frontiers are seized on by their Neighbours: he is of opinion, that the Choler and Mildness of a King ought to maintain the peace of his Kingdome; and using an excellent comparison, sayes, The one is as the roaring of a Lyon, whereat all the wilde beasts of the Forrest tremble; the other, as the dew upon the Grass, which defends it from the heat of the Sun. But in all these just commotions which accompany the correction of Offenders the Prince must remember, that Punishments are Remedies, and that the Death it self which he ordains, is a kinde of mercy which he shews to the Faulty: he banisheth some, lest their conversation may augment the number of the wicked:

Sicut fremitus leonis ita & Regis ira, & sicut ros super herbam, ita & hilaritas ejus. Proverb. 19.

Interim optimum est misericordiæ genus, occidere. Senec. 1. de ira. cap. 16.

wicked: from others he takes their wealth, lest they abuse it; he deprives others of their liberty, for fear they would employ it against the State: he takes their life from them, when he thinks their mischief incurable; and he thinks to do them a favour, when he condemns them to death. He therefore is oblieged to divide himself, between the relation of a Judge and a Physitian, to deal with the same person, as with one that is guilty and sick; and to mingle Mildness with Severity, lest his Choler prove more pernitious then profitable to his State.

If Kings are bound to be so cautious in the punishing of Rebells, private men may judge, what a hand they ought to hold over their Passions, and how milde their Choler ought to be, that it may be reasonable; for their power is not equall to that of Kings; they cannot be so highly injured, and their resentment is not so excuseable. I will likewise advise them to stifle a Passion, the use whereof is so dangerous; and to dry up the Spring, that they may drain the Current: when it is naturall to us, and makes up the chief part of our temperature, 'tis very hard to subdue it: and it is not in our power to change the Elements whereof we are

Salubrius est iræ etiam justè pulsanti, non aperire penetralia cordis, quàm admittere non facile recludendam, & perventuram de furculo in trabem. Aug. Epi. ad Profutur.

are compounded, or to mend the faults which Nature hath committed: yet this mischief is not without its Remedy; and if it cannot be totally cured, it may at least be much qualified; wine which sets it on fire must be cut off; and as *Plato* saith, *One fire must not be added to another*: Choler must not be nourished with delicious viands, lest the minde swell according as the body is strengthened; it must be held in Exercise by moderate labour, which may diminish the heat therof without extinguishing it, and which may turn all the fervency into scum: Pastimes will be of good use to her, provided they be not excessive; and harmless pleasures, provided they be moderate, will allay her fury: but when she is more Accidentall, then Naturall, and that she proceeds either from Sickness, which may have changed our constitution, or from immoderate Watchings which may have heated it, or from Debauchery which may have dried it up; or from those other Disorders which wound both soul and body, it will be no hard matter to drive out an enemy, which holds no Intelligence in the place; and which is only entertained in our hearts, by reason of our wretchedness.

Plato vetat igne ignem excitare. Senec. 2. de ira, cap. 20.

But without seeking for so many reme-

dies; we may boldly use Choler against our selves; and suffer this Passion to punish those faults whereof we alone are guilty. Self-love will hinder the excess thereof well enough; and without consulting with so many Masters, the care we have of preserving our selves, will fence us from the violence of this Passion: it is against our selves, that we may with Reason use her, since we have so many just motives that invite us to it: we must make use of her Fury to satisfie Jesus Christ, who demands of us reparation for injuries done unto him, and revenge for his death: we may lawfully employ her in our Repentance, without any fear, that her excess may make us lose Mildness, or her Violence make us forget Charity: for this Vertue which punisheth faults, seems to be but Choler allay'd; and the Penitent, who makes war upon Himself, is but a man incens'd; Love and Sorrow encourage him to Revenge; he cannot behold his sins without vexation; and believes, that without violating the Laws of Nature, or of Grace, he may be his own Judge, and his own Client, his own Witness, and his own Executioner; & that without offence to Justice, he may execute the sentence which he hath pronounced against Himself: Thrice happy

Volo vos irasci ut non peccetis; quibus habetis irasci nisi vobis? August. hom. 4. ex. 20.

happy Choler, which only offends man, to appease God; which by her Teares washeth away her sins; which by Self-accusing gets Absolution; and which by slight punishments, frees her self from the pains of hell, and prepares for her self the joyes of heaven.

THE

THE SIXTH TREATISE, OF DELIGHT and SORROW.

The first Discourse.

Of the Nature, Proprieties, and Effects of Delight or Pleasure.

THough Hope be so much praised by men, and that of all the Passions which flatter the Sences, she is one of the most Taking; yet must she give place to Pleasure, and confess that Pleasure is a Sun, whose presence defaces all her beauty: for if she promiseth ought that is good, this other giveth it us; if

if the one hath Flowers, the other bears Fruit; and if the one content us in Word, the other makes us happy in Effect. Delight is the period of all the motions of our soul; and as Love is the beginning thereof, Pleasure is the end; it stoppeth the violence of our desires, and forceth those fickle Passions to taste Rest, to which they seem to profess Enmity: it sweetens Choler, and takes from her that forward humour which accompanieth her in all her designs; it payes Boldness for all her good services; and is it self the recompence of those glorious labours which she hath undergon to compass it; it drives away Fear, and banishes all those vain terrors which disquiets us, it kills Despair, which seems to have conspired the death of it; it banisheth Sadness at first sight; and if it retain Teares and Sighes, they are the spoils which publish the Victory, and honour the Triumph thereof. Love is content, when after having tane so much pains, it can rest in Pleasure: of as many shapes as Love puts on, this is that it most delights in, and doth not forgo it to assume another, without Violence: Love is unquiet when it Desires, and its wishes are shamefull and true proofs of its indigency; when it hopes, it is not without Fear; and those

Ad summa pervenit, qui scit quo gaudeat, & qui fœlicitatem suam in aliena potestate non posuit. Senec. Epist. 23.

Non est oblectamentum super cordis gaudium. Eccles. cap. 30.

two

two keep it so faithfull company, as they never leave it but it costs them their life; for Fear becomes Sadness when 'tis destitute of Hope; and Hope is changed into Despair, when it is parted from Fear: Love is not satisfied with Revenge; and though revenge be sweet, yet is it accompanied with Pain: in Boldness, it is cover'd with Sweat and Dirt; Glory flatters it, and threatning danger astonisheth it; in Hatred, it is tormented; and the evill which it wisheth to its enemy, is a Viper that lies gnawing upon it: in Eschewing, it wants strength; and it shuns not him that pursues it, save only because it cannot defend it self from him: in Despair, it is vanquish'd; and yeelding up its weapons to the Conquerour, suffers it self to be led in Triumph: in Sadness it is miserable; and the remembrance of its fore-past happiness, serves only to augment its present sorrow: but in Pleasure, it is at once both victorious, Triumphant, and Happy; all its Races are stopt, all its Desires are accomplish'd, and all its designs at an end. And surely, we must not wonder if it be in so deep a Tranquillity, since it enjoyes the happiness it sought for, and is luckily arrived at the end of all its labours: for Pleasure is nothing else, but the enjoying

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of a pleasing Good, which renders the soul content, and which interdicts it the use of Desire, as well as that of Sadness and Fear.

This definition excludes all such delights as spring only from Remembrance, or from Hope, and which make us happy only in that which we have been, or hope to be: Memory doth not always entertain us with our misfortunes: though she be more faithfull in retaining a displeasure then a contentment; and busies her self oftner about things which offend us, then about such as we are well pleased withall; yet doth not she forbear to represent unto us past felicities; and by a pleasing Remembrance thereof sweeten our present miseries: to serve us, she triumphs over the Laws of Time; to favour us, she recalls what is no more; and seeks out in by-gon ages divertisments, to recreate us: but let her do her utmost endeavour, she cannot beguil our soul, nor give it true contentment in entertaining it only with a Falshood; things that are past, are but so many shadows; and if they make any Impression in us, it is rather of Sorrow then of Joy; Good, when far distant from us, makes it self be desired; but when past, it makes it self to be bewailed:

Habet præteriti doloris recordatio delectationem. Cicer. lib. 5. Epist.

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its Presence engenders our Happiness, and its Absence causeth our Desires, or our Regrett: Loss, and Fruition, of one and the same thing, cannot be pleasing; and let Memory use what cunning she can, she cannot call to our minds a good which hath no more a being, without awakening our Wishes, and refreshing our Sorrows. Hope is not much more favorable to us; for though she fore-run our good fortune, that she anticipate the birth thereof, and that she feeds us with a contentment which is not yet happen'd; though by an impatience which is advantageous to us, she seeks out present felicities in Futurity, and that, precipitating the course of years, she advanceth our Contentment; yet a man need not be over-wise, to observe that she deceives us; and that she often makes us miserable, out of a desire of making us too soon Happy: she is found false in her Promises; and after having long expected their effects, all we reape thereby, is Shame, for having been too credulous; and Sorrow, for having grounded our happiness upon an uncertain good: Solid pleasure requires the presence of its object; and though, in Morality, the end hath so much power over our Wills, yet can it not make them happy, but by possession;

Omne opus leve fieri solet, cùm ejus pretium cogitatur, & spes præmii solatium fit laboris. Hieron. in Epist.

possession; therefore is it, that the Covetous and Ambitious, who forgo a present good, only to entertain themselves with a Future; and who consider not so much what they have, as what they want, cannot be esteemed happy; since in the very Fruition of honour or riches, they are languishing; and contrary to the nature of Pleasure, they seek for what they have not, and value not what they have.

By the same definition, we exclude all those sensualities, which spring from Indigence, or which produce sorrow: for to boot, that they are desired with so much Anxiety as doth exceed the Pleasure which they promise us; they are such enemies to our quiet, as it is impossible to taste thereof, without becomming miserable and faulty; they wound at once both the soul and the body; they weaken the one, and corrupt the other; they are Remedies worse then the Evills which they would cure; their disorder causeth always the like in our health; and their excess is so pernicious thereunto, that we must take them moderately, if we intend to receive satisfaction thereby: true Delight is never more pleasing, then when in extreams; the greater it is, the more it doth ravish us; and being agreeable

Ipsæ voluptates in tormenta vertuntur. Senec. epist. 24.

Voluptas vergit ad dolorem, nisi modum teneat, veri autem boni aviditas tuta est; Senec. Epist. 23.

able to our nature, it never makes us more happy, then when it most abundantly communicateth it self; but Sensualities are poysons, which must be prepar'd, if we will reap profit thereby; and since the irregularity of Sin, we had need of Grace to fence our selves against their disorder: what ever Pleasure they promise us, they have so great affinity with Sorrow, that their words and effects resemble each other: they have their Groans, and their Sighes, as well as Sorrow; when they are extream, they dissolve into tears; and to shew us that they are enemies to our Nature, their excess doth oftentimes cause our death: but say, they should not produce all these mischiefs? 'Twil be sufficient to undeceive us, to know that they are always follow'd by Repentance, Sorrow, and Shame: they dare not appear in Publike; and very well perceiving that they contribute not to the Glory of man, they seek out Shade, Solitarines, and Silence: they would blush, were they enforced to shew themselves; and the confusion which would cover their faces, would trouble their contentment: Maladies are the pennance of their excess; and Physitians would be useless, could pleasure be regulated; as long as man was content with such

In profuso gaudio lachrymæ erumpunt. Tert.

Voluptas fragilis est & brevis, cujus subinde necesse est, aut nos pœniteat aut pudeat. Senec. Benefic. lib. 7. cap. 2.

such fruits as the earth yielded him; and that without provoking his appetite with much-sought for viands, he did only eat to satisfie his hunger; he had no superfluous humours to dry up, no Defluctions to divert, nor Fevers to cure. Abstinence was all his remedy; and the diet that he used dreined off the source of all his diseases: but, since he hath dispeopled both Sea and Land, to nourish him; that he hath made the monsters of Nature his food; that he would know what taste Tortoises, and other creeping things had, which the simplicity of our Ancestours confounded with Serpents; since he would refresh Wine with Snow, accord those elements in his body, which wage war with one another in the world; mingle fishes with birds, and place in one and the same stomack, things to which Nature hath appointed such different habitations; sicknesses have assailed him in crowds; and the unrulines of his minde, hath caused the disorders of his body; the Gout hath stung his Nerve; the Stone is formed in his Reines, the Windes have committed a thousand outrages in his Bowells, and as if the Elements were sensible of the confusion he makes of their qualities in his debaucheries, they for revenge

Nunc verò quã longe processerunt mala valetudinis? has usuras voluptatum pendimus, ultra modum fasque concupitarum. Innumerabiles esse morbos miraris? coquos numera. Senec. Epist. 95.

have corrupted themselves, and (as the utmost which hate can produce) they ruine themselves, to kill their Enemy.

In fine, by this definition, we condemn all such pleasures as Nature requireth not, unless seduced by Opinion; for her contentments are as regular as her Desires; and without looking after things unprofitable, she is contented with what is necessary; she wisheth for such good things only, as she cannot be without: as Necessity serves her for a Law; so doth she consult with it in all her occasions, and makes no wishes without the approbation thereof: hence is it, that they are not many; and that she is contented with a little: water of the Fountain sufficeth to quench her thirst: fruits of the earth satisfie her hunger; Sheeps wooll furnisheth her clothing: and before Luxury bound him to make war upon all the creatures. I know not but that the trees did furnish her with Apparell: and those that fed her with their fruits, clothed her with their barks; but this at least I know, that in those innocent times men committed no murthers, to adorn themselves, neither acted any pranks of Injustice, to enrich themselves; nor did they violate Nature, to procure to themselves sinfull delicacies: their houses were built without

out Curiosity, and he that was the Contriver of them, was also the Carpenter and the Mason: the earth cover'd with moss served him for a bed; and, as he never lay down uninvited by sleep, he slept without disturbance, and awaked with content: he knew no other perfume then that of Flowers, which being more pure then ours, was more pleasing: he was not acquainted with the use of Coaches; his journeys not being long, he made use only of such aides as Nature had given him: War being hatefull to him, and trafique useless, he permitted horses to enjoy their liberty, and employed not that noble creature, which Fury and Avarice have render'd necessary to us; whethersoever he went, the earth was sufficiently fruitfull to nourish and to clothe him he found in the Desarts wherewith to satisfie his desires; and that which we want in cities, he wanted not in places uninhabited. In his happy age all delights were innocent, and no man tasted any pleasure which was not true: but now, since they are no longer Naturall, they are no longer Rationall; they weaken the Body and destroy the Soul: and experience teacheth us, that the use of them is as pernitious, as the want of them is profitable.

—Tunc juvit aut amnis vagi Pressisse ripas, cespite aut nudo leves Duxisse somnos— Excussa sylvis poma compescunt famem, Et fraga parvis vulsa dumetis cibos Faciles ministrant— Senec. in Hippol.

But lest I be accus'd to be an enemy to Pleasure, and that I would bereave man of the remedies which Nature hath given him to sweeten his misfortunes; I will say, that the solid contentments are those of the Minde; aud that man cannot be satisfi'd, unless the noblest part, whereof he is compósed, be happy: the knowledg of Truth, and practice of Vertue ought to be his chiefest Diversions; he must follow his holiest inclinations, and be more carefull, in his own person, to please an Angell then a Beast: he must remember that the body is but the souls slave; and that in the choice of Pleasures, it is just that the Soveraign keep her precedency; besides, those which the soul relisheth, are the truest; and if any man be of another opinion, we must believe, that sin which hath bereft him of Grace, hath likwise bereft him of Reason. For the pleasures of the Senses are limited, whereas those of the soul have no bounds; the pleasures of the body are strangers, those of the soul are naturall; the former may be taken from us without any great ado, Death it self cannot bereave us of the latter; which though it rob us of our riches, cannot rob us of our vertues: the one sort are in a perpetuall succession; as they hold of Time, they

Quæris quid sit hominis bonum? animus, & ratio in animo perfecta. Rationale enim animal est homo: consummatur itaque ejus bonum, si id adimplevit cui natus est. Senec. Epist. 41.

they cannot hold together; and by a necessary law, those that are Past, give place to them that are Present; and the Present to the Future: so as the body never enjoys its contentment, but in part; it is Poor amidst its riches; whilst it thrives well on the one side, it languisheth on the other; and by a misfortune which is inseperable from its condition, it finds no contentment, which gives satisfaction to all its senses; but those of the soul are never divided, they present themselves all at once; and the same thought which enlightens the Understanding, heats the Will, and fills the Memory: her joy is universall; one faculty is never sad whil'st the other are satisfied; and, as if there were a community amongst them in their contentments; that which pleaseth the one, delighteth all the rest. In fine, Spirituall pleasures are much more intimate then those of the Senses; for the soul is wholly fill'd therewithall; the blessing she enjoys, penetrates her Essence; as she changeth into her Self that which she knows, so she transformeth her Self into that which she loves; and by an admirable metamorphosis she becomes her own Felicity; but the Sences are joyn'd to their objects only by Accident; they see the colours of things, and know not their

Quid ex Idæ Platonicis traham, quod cupiditates meas comprimat? vel hoc ipsum, quòd omnia ista quæ sensibus serviunt, quæ nos accendunt & irritant, negat Plato ex ijs esse quæ vere sint. Igitur ista imaginaria sunt, & ad tempus aliquam faciem ferunt, nihil horum stabile nec solidum est. Senec. Epist. 58.

their Essences; they understand the sound of words, and conceive not the meaning of them: so as the body is only content in *Effigie*; its Blisse is but a shadow, and its Felicity is but a false appearance: but the minde is really happy, the contentment thereof is solid, and the goods it possesseth, essentiall.

The second Discourse.

Of the bad use of Pleasure.

OF so many severall ways that Sin hath invented to abuse Pleasure; there are four which I undertake to discover, and enter combat with, because they have been approved of by famous men; and some honest men have taken upon them their defence. The first is, Voluptuousness, which seems to derive her name from Pleasures Self, and pretends to be enemy to Vertue: for though there be great difference between them; and that to preserve the one, we are oft-times enforced to abandon the other; yet heretofore there

there arose up a Sect of Philosophers that would reconcile them, and who out of a good intent did much injure Vertue: for finding, that the Difficulty which did accompany her, made her odious to faint and lazie souls; and that the labour that went to the acquisition thereof, made them lose the longing after her, they strove to perswade them that she was delightsome; and that under a severe countenance she did hide a pleasing humor: upon their word, men began to court her, and thinking to finde Voluptuousness in her train, they made love to the Mistresse, hoping to enjoy her Waiting-woman: but when they were aware that this Pleasure was as severe as Vertues Self; and that, remaining in the bottom of the soul, it made no impression upon the Sences; they changed their design, and made open love to Voluptuousness: In fine, a height of impudencie they would make use of Philosophy, to authorize their Injustice; and gave a glorious name to a base Rebellion: they endeavour'd to make men beleeve, that Vertue did never forgo Voluptuousness, and that they were not to be parted without Violence: their cousenage was soon discover'd, and the true Philosophers loaded them with so many Reproaches,

Apud Epicureos virtus voluptatum ministra est, illis paret, illis deservit, illas supra se videt. Primæ autem partes ejus sunt, ducere debet, imperare, summo loco stare: hi verò jubent illam signum petere. Senec. benefic. lib. 4. cap. 2.

that poor *Epicurus* could never acquit himself of: for though his design was excuseable, and that he never would have proposed Voluptuousness to men, but to make them in love with Vertue; yet because the success was unhappy, he could not avoid Calumny; and the zeal of his adversaries confounded his Opinion with his Disciples error: yet was not he in fault, save only in seeming to endeavour to equall Voluptuousness to Vertue; and to make the Soveraign and the Slave sit upon the same Throne; he deserved publick indignation, only for distrusting the power of Vertue; and because, to procure her Lovers, he had adorned her with the trims of Voluptuousness: if his Opinion, innocent as it is, hath not escaped blame, that of his Disciples is too guilty to keep me from arguing against it: 'tis enough that it is condemn'd by the whole world; and that the Abettors thereof dare not publickly defend it: it is sufficiently punish'd since 'tis ashamed, and seeks out Obscurity, as well to hide it self, as to take its pastime: it may suffice to know, that no honest man did ever take upon him to defend it; and that even the most shameless amongst men took not its part, till they had forgot Reason.

Qui Epicureũ sequitur bonum malæ rei quærit authorem, & dum ille venit blando nomine inductus, sequitur voluptatem, non quam audit, sed quam attulit, & vitia sua cum cœpit putare similia præceptis, indulget illis non timidè nec obscurè. Senec. de vita beat. cap. 13.

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The divel perceiving that this piece of cunning was smelt out, and that it would seduce none but such souls, as not staying for Suggestions; would lose themselves of their own proper motions; bethought himself of a wile, which was so much the more dangerous, as being cover'd with a Fair Pretence: For he would perswade men, that true pleasure consisted in Honour, and that there was nothing Glorious, which was not Pleasing in perfection; he made them believe, that glory was the recompence of vertue; that the peoples approbation, was the Kings happiness; that, if conquerours did at any time endeavour to win upon the liberty of strangers, it was to deserve praise; and if they did them any mischief, it was to get honour thereby: All the great ones follow'd this faction; and perswaded by Reason, which had more of shew, then of solidity, they courted glory, they became her Martyrs, and engaged their lives and liberties, to purchase reputation. From this pernitious Maxime, arose a great mischief; for men preferring Honour before vertue, divided two things, which ought to be inseparably vnited, and through the malice of the divel, they became proud, and ceased to be vertuous; they

Qui virtutem suam publicari vult, non virtuti laborat sed gloriæ. Non vis esse justus sine gloria? ac Sæpe justus esse debebas cum infamia. Senec. epist. 113.

they rann after glorious sins, they neglected Bashful Vertues; and with an injustice which merited exemplary chastisement, they forsook a Soveraign, to court her slave: assuredly, they were ignorant of her height of merit, since they sought after another recompence, then what they finde that enjoy her; and they differ much from the humour of her true lovers, who forgo Glory to preserve Vertue; and who are never more faithful to her, then when they are proffer'd preferment, to corrupt them, or laden with reproaches, to affrighten them: But not to engage my self, in the defence of a party so reasonable; I will argue with them that gainsay it, out of their own interests: I will make them confess, that that which men call Honour, cannot cause a true Pleasure; and that he who is Rich in Glory, is Poor in Contentment: For how can he finde his happiness, in a thing he possesseth not? How can he build his Felicity upon a Good, which is distributed with so much injustice; and which is oftener given to vice, then to vertue: What satisfaction shall he enjoy, when his conscience shall give the lye to his reputation? And that he shall blame those actio s, which the world doth not approve of, save only because

Malè agit qui famæ non conscientiæ gratus est. Senec. benefic. cap. 42.

cause it knows not their motives? How can he finde rest, in the diversity of mens opinions which do not agree, even in those things that are most certain; and who, according to the Passions wherewith their minds are agitated, condemn a vertue which they have formerly valued, and value a vice which they have formerly condemned? Pleasure, to be Solid, ought to be constant; and, if any glory can be the reward of a good action, it is not that which we expect from the people; but what we receive from our own conscience: 'Tis then an Abuse to Vertue, to place her in so frail a thing; and to seek a happiness in Mens Mouthes, which ought to reside in our heart, is to preferr an Appearance before a truth.

Gloriam qui spreverit veram habebit. Livius, decad. 3. lib. 2.

Philosophers, who thought to finde her in Science, seem to have gon upon better Ground; for besides, that the desire of Knowledg is more Natural to us, then is that of glory; and, that truth makes much stronger impression on our soul, then doth Honour; it is a benefit we cannot be rob'd of, as being Intrinsecal to us: Tyrants, who take our lives from us, cannot bereave us of our knowledg; and Calumnie, which may stain our Reputation, cannot obscure

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our Understanding : We are learned in despight of our enemies ; these precious riches accompany us in Prison ; follow us in Exile, and leave us not till death : We carry them with us, whereever we go ; and Fortune which ravisheth Honour from Conquerours, which bereaves the incontinent of their voluptuousnes, cannot rob Philosophers of their science. But let her pretend what advantage she can over her Rivals, mans Felicity cannot consist therein : For to boot, that she is mixt with ignorance, that her lights are mingled with obscurities, that there is more of doubt, then of certainty, more of errour then of truth, in her ; she is oftentimes either unprofitable or faulty, in the most part of her inployments : for, as St. Bernard says, some study out of a delight to be knowing ; and this is a frivolous curiosity ; others, that men may know, that they are knowing ; and this is a shameful Vaine-glory : Others, out of a desire to sell their knowledg ; and this is a Sordid Commerce : 'Tis true, there are some that study, that they may edifie, and this is a laudable Charity ; and others study to edifie themselves, and this is a discreet point of wisdome. Of all these, there are only the two last, who do not abuse

Sunt qui scire volunt tantùm ut sciant ; et turpis curiositas est. Sunt qui scire volunt, ut Scientiam suam vendant, et turpis quæstus est. Et sunt qui scire volunt ut sciantur ipsi, et turpis vanitas est. Et sunt qui scire volunt, ut ædificent, & charitas est. Et sunt qui scire volunt ut ædificentur, & prudentia est. Bernard. in cantic. n. 35.

abuse Knowledg ; since they procure her only, to employ her in the service of vertue; but in this very occasion, she hath her troubles, and her defects ; and if she be not accompanied with Humility, she puffes us up with Vain-glory, and self-love. After all, we must acknowledg, with the wise man, that 'tis a troublesome occupation, which God hath given men for their punishment : and that it is rather an effect of his Justice, then a mark of his Love. If the use of all these pleasures be not innocent, that of Riches is most Faulty ; for let us give them what praises we please, they are enemies to vertue : and if they be serviceable to magnificence and liberality, they are prejudiciall to continence and justice : all vices imploy them, to satisfie their unjust desires ; and he that would take them from Avarice, Pride, and Obscenity, would reduce them to a happy incapacity of doing harm: The greatest Philosophers have likewise acknowledged, that they were the ruine of families, and loss of estates : that the despising of them, was Safer then their Possession : and that, from the time they enter into a house, they drive thence all vertue: they Irritate our Desires, Awaken our Hopes, Increase our Feares, and obliege us to confess,

Infælix homo qui ista scit omnia, te autem nescit : beatus autem qui te scit, etiamsi illa nesciat; qui vero te et illa novit, non propter illa beatior, sed propter te solùm beatus est. August. 5. Confes. cap. 4.

fess, that there is more anxiety in keeping them, then in acquiring of them. In fine, Rich men are of so unhappy a condition, that if they will therein taste any delight, they must imitate the condition of poor men, and seek for that in poverty, which they could not finde out in abundance.

Majore tormento pecunia possidetur quám quæritur. Senec. Epist. 116.

But where then will you place Pleasure, if it be neither to be found in Voluptuousness nor in glory? And where will you lodge her, if she agree, not well neither with Knowledg nor Riches? I confess, there are Rational Delights, Lawful honours, modest Sciences, and innocent Riches: but certainly the common use thereof is out of order, and by a just judgment of God, every one findes his Trouble, where he seeks his Felicity: The incontinent are sad amidst their contentments: Iealousy and Suspicion revenge violated Chastity, and diseases make them pay use for their infamous pleasures; the ambitious are the victimes of vanity: they have this of evil, in their best fortune; that they are tormented with a two-fold envy; for they cannot endure their equals, and their inferiours cannot abide them; They despise Honours, as soon as they Enjoy them; and valuing none, but such as they have not, they mingle disquiet with enjoying; and molest

Laborat invidia, et quidem duplici: vides autem quám sit miser is cui invidetur, et qui invidet. Senec. Epist. 4.

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an Assured Happiness, with desire of an Uncertain Contentment: The learned are not much more happy; they are tormented with the Passions, which lost the first man; The fathers fault is made the childrens punishment; and the same knowledg which thrust him out of Paradise, persecutes them in the world; they consume all their days in learning things, either Ridiculous or unprofitable: They fight for defaced letters; and the inscription of Tombes, which is also the reward of conquerours, causeth, almost, all the dispute of Criticks; they boast themselves, that 'tis by these glorious pathes, that men mount up to heaven; they seek for immortality, and they treat with the dead, that they may raign with the Gods; they know how to Speak, not how to Live; they are Learned, and not Vertuous; and through a strange blindness, they see not that their knowledg being Proud, is as Boundless as Ambition; and that her desires being irregular, she is as Intemperate as Voluptuousness. The Avaritious are in pain, for all their riches; they possesse them, they do not enjoy them; they worship their wealth, and dare not touch it; they teach us, that they are slaves thereunto, not masters thereof;

Plus scire velle quàm sit satis, intemperantiæ genus est. Senec. Epist. 88.

thereof; and their only contentment lyes in hindering others from enjoying them. But lest it be objected, that I discover an evil, without applying the remedy; I intend in my next discourse, to defend innocent and Lawful Pleasures.

The third Discourse.

Of the good use of Pleasure.

Voluptas naturâ divinum quiddam est insitum mortalibus. Aristot. lib. 7. Ethic. cap. 13.

THose who condemn Pleasure, must consequently condemn Nature, and accuse her of having committed faults in all her works: for this wise mother hath dispersed delight throughout all our actions; and by an admirable piece of wisdom hath order'd, that as those which are most necessary were the meanest, they should be the most pleasing: and certainly, had she not found out this innocent Sleight, the world would have perish'd long ago; and men, who are the noblest part thereof, neglecting their own preservation, would have left it for a prey to wild beasts: for who would trouble himself with Eating, were he not invited thereunto, as well by Delight, as by Necessity? who would ever endure

endure that sleep should benum his sences, take from him the use of Reason, and make him change Life with the shadow of Death, did not the sweetness of her poppys, make this remedy as charming, as it is shamefull: as Pleasure is profitable to the body, it is no less necessary for the minde; which as ambitious as it is, would never undertake the atchievement of Vertues, and the defeat of Vices, were not the Glory mingled with Joy; and did not these two make up the recompence of her labours: who would toyl to overcome shamefull and sinfull pleasures, were they not thereunto incited by innocent delights? Who would dare to assail death, and to fight with a Monster, which triumpheth over both the victorious and the vanquished, were not his constancy animated by the contentment which the victory promiseth him? Who were able to overcome the difficulties which accompany all Sciences, were they not seasoned with Sweetness? and who would ever contrive any famous design, were he not thereunto invited by the hope of Pleasure? But though Nature hath shed it abroad in all actions, whether necessary or difficult; she will have it be rather a help, then a motive to us; and that it serve us rather for a refreshing

Perficit actionem voluptas, & in omni sensu quædam delectatio versatur. Aristot. lib. 10. Ethic. cap. 41.

freshing then for a recompence: she will have us to look upon it as an Assistance which she hath given us whereby to acquire Vertue, and that we use it as a remedy found out by her to moderate our discontents: for mans life is full of misery; and had not the heavens sweetned them by Joy, all Passions would end in Grief or in Despair: we should be pres'd to death, under the burthen of our misfortunes; and losing the hope of Vanquishing our enemies, we should lose the desire of Fighting with them. To heighten our courage, this wise mother sollicites us by Pleasure; and equally mingling it with things that are Difficult and Shamefull, she obliegeth us not to Despise the one, nor to Fear the other: but what ever contentment she propounds to us; 'tis always with this caution, that it shall not be the end, but that it shall serve us for a pleasing means to arrive the more contentedly thereat: so that, we are bound to taste of it with the same reservedness, as Travellers look upon the goodly fields which lye in their way: they serve to unweary them; they admire their largeness, praise their Fertility, value their Riches, but they stay not to gather in the crop; and knowing, it is not lawfull for them to enjoy them,

Rerum actiones undique absolutas, voluptas efficit, vitam etiam cujus cupiditate incensi sumus omnes. Arist. lib. 10. Ethic. c. 4.

Docetur amare meliora per amaritudinem, ne viator tendens in patriam, stabulum amet pro domo. August.

them, they are contented with such Recreation as thereby they receive, which whil'st they do, they hasten their Pace, and continue on their journey: so earthly Pleasures may well solace us; but they are not totally to possess us. When Nature intermingled them with our actions, she meant them not for our Felicity, but our Consolation; and she intends not, that they should stay us on Earth, but that they should raise us to Heaven: 'Tis brutish to seek for nothing but Delight in Eating, and to make that a Contentment, which is nothing but a Remedy: to love Sleep, because it is accompanied with some sweetness; and to place the happiness of Life in the image of Death, is to be void of Reason: we must take it because it is necessary, and thank divine Providence, which, being more lucky and powerfull then Physick, hath provided pleasing Remedies for us, and cures our maladies without exercising our Patience: to court Vertue only for Pleasures sake, is to be unjust, and not to value her; she is too noble to be any thing but our end; to seek out any other motive, or hope for any other Recopence, then the Possession of her, is to injure her: Pleasure which accompanies her, is only for mean and poor souls, which

Hocme docuisti ut quemadmodum medicamenta, sic alimenta sumpturus accedam. Aug. 10. Confess. cap. 31.

Interrogas quid petam ex virtute? ipsam; nihil enim est melius, ipsa pretium sui est. An hoc sparum magnum est? Quid mihi voluptatem nominas? hominis bonum quæro non pecoris, Senec. de vita beata. cap. 9.

have not courage enough to follow her, and her Difficulties; she is never more glorious, then when most difficult; and her faithfull lovers never think her more beautifull, then when she is crown'd with Thorns: yet doth not Nature forbid us to taste this sweetness, which accompanieth the searching after her; provided, we look upon it as a succour to our weakness; and that we take not that for a consummated felicity, which is given us only for a refreshment: this is, notwithstanding, the fault of all men; and so generall is this disorder, that there is hardly any one who doth not seek after Pleasure, and despise Vertue: Every one will make his utmost end of a mean which is not honorable, save only because necessary; and all the world will have, that a Passion which Nature hath placed in our soul, only to sweeten our misfortunes, should be the height of our felicity; men now respect nothing, but what Delights; Glory gives place to pleasure; and vertues self, by a high injustice, hath no more lovers, unless she promise them delight; insomuch as, of all Passions, not any one doth more prejudice her, then joy doth: For Desires are noble, Hopes are Generous, Audacity and Choler, assaile vice; Hatred

Cum salus sit causa edendi ac bibendi, adjungit se tanquam pedisequa periculosa jucunditas, & plerumque præire conatur, ut ejus causa fiat quod salutis causâ mé facere vel dico vel volo Aug. 10. Conf. cap. 31.

tred and Fear, defend themselves from it; but Joy is of a soft Nature, and suffers it self to be corrupted, when sollicited by Delights: Other Passions are in perpetuall motion; and being always upon the Speed, they never fix themselves so strongly on an Object, but they may be staved off, but Joy is at Rest, and making the good which she possesseth, her Center; she must be fought withall, before we will part with it. Therefore the Son of God, knowing how hard it is to conquer this Passion when it is grounded in a soul, forbids us to give it entertainment, and counsels us to reserve it for such contentments as never shall have end: He distinguisheth his Disciples from those of the world, as well by Joy as by Love: he employs all his reasons to perswade us, that temporall Joy cannot agree with Joy eternall; and that to be happy in Heaven, a man must be miserable on Earth; he mingles Pain with our Pleasures; sows Thorns amongst the Roses, and pours bitterness upon our Delights, to make us distaste them. He instructeth us, that Pleasures are not only fading but painfull; and that they are not only unprofitable but Faulty. In fine, they are the daughters and mothers of Sorrow; and all those which

Modò gaudium nostrum, fratres mei, in spe sit, nemo gaudeat quasi in re presenti, ne hæreat in via: Totum gaudium de spe futura sit. Aug. tract. in Ioan.

Miscet tribulationes gaudiis terrenis, ut sentientes amaritudinem, discamus æternam desiderare dulcedinem. Aug. in Psal. 127.

promise us the greatest contentment, subsist only by the Pain which precedes them. Monarchs triumph not till after the victory; they had not defeated their enemies, had they not fought with them; and Joy measureth it self so justly by Sorrow; that the beauty of the Triumph depends upon the greatness of the Combat; when it hath not been throughly disputed, the Pleasure is less, and the glory is not so splendid: Mariners never taste the sweetness of life more, then when they have escaped Shipwrack; and they are never more sensible of contentment then, when after Despair of safety, a Tempest drives them upon the shore: an only son is never so dear to his mother, as when he hath run great hazards, and hath cost her many a tear; she thinks she hath been brought a bed with him, as many times as she hath wept for him; her joy ariseth from her sorrow; and the contentment of enjoying him would not be so great, had she not fear'd to have lost him: one must be hungry before he take delight in eating; and, as nothing sets forth Light better then Darkness; so there is nothing adds more to Pleasure, then the Pain that hath gon before it. But out of another cõsequence, as necessary, & more vexatious, Pleasure turns to Sorrow;

Triumphat victor imperator; non vicisset nisi pugnasset, & quanto maju· periculum fuit in prælio, tanto majus est gaudium in triumpho. Aug. lib. 8. cap. 3.

Edendi & bibendi voluptas nulla est, nisi præcedat esuri endi & sitiendi molestia. Idem ibidem.

Sorrow; and that wherewith we were at first delighted, in process of time, becomes painful: Too long sleep degenerates into a Lethargy; and the remedy which nature had found out to repair our strength, when it is continual, ruinates it. Excess of meat suffocates the natural heart; too violent exercise, weakens our vigour; and the innocentest Pleasures become Punishments, when they are immoderate.

Temperance might cure us of these disorders, if they went no farther; but experience teacheth us, that what passeth for a Pleasure, in the world, is a sin before God; and that the greatest part of our joys, cause sorrow in the saints. A Souldier rejoyceth in the murthers he hath committed; and men, in this corrupt age, call that Valour, which, in more innocent times, would have been tearmed Cruelty. A lustful person rejoyceth, in having stolen away her that he loves: and if he content his ambition, by satisfying his incontinence, the more sins he commits, the more pleasures he tastes: A tyrant rejoyceth in his Usurpation; and if he reapes Glory by his Injustice, he thinks himself more happy, then a Lawful prince: A Cholerick man rejoyceth in Revenge: though to obey his

Passion, he hath violated all the Laws of Charity; he findes Contentment in his Crime; and strangely blind, the more faulty he is, the more happy he thinks himself: So that worldly joy is nothing else, but wickedness unpunish'd, or a glorious sin. Therefore, when this Passion becomes once Faulty, no less then a Miracle is required, to restore it to its innocence: For though such desires, as rise up contrary to the Laws of God, are unjust; and that there are punishments ordained in his kingdome, for the chastisement of irregular thoughts, yet are these but begun offences; and which have not, as yet, all their mischief: though fond hopes be punishable, and entertain our vanity, yet are they not alwaies follow'd by effects; and oft-times by a fortunate Impotence, they do not all the evil which they had promised unto themselves; our boldness is fuller of inconsideration, then of wickedness; and an ill event makes it lose all its Fervour: Our Sorrows, and our Griefs, are not obstinate; they are healed by any, the lest help, that is given them; and as they are not well pleas'd with themselves, they are easily changed to their contraryes: Our Fears are flitting; the evil which caused them being

Sæculi lætitia est impunita nequitia. Augustin.

ing once withdrawn, they leave us at liberty; and to conclude, in a word, there is no Passion incurable, but joy: But since it hath mingled it self with sin, and that, corrupting all the faculties of nature, it takes delight in evil; Morality hath no remedyes more, to cure it with; 'Tis a great disorder, when a man glories in his sin; and that, as the Apostle sayes, he draws his Glory from his own Confusion: 'Tis a deplorable mischief, when together with Shame, he hath lost Fear; and that the punishments, ordained by the laws, cannot hold him in to his duty; but a strange irregularity is it, when his sins have made him blind; or that he knows them not, save only to defend them; but certainly, when he takes delight in his sin, when he grounds his felicity upon injustice, and that he thinks himself Happy, because he is Sinful; this is the height of evil: To punish this impiety, it is, that the Heavens dart forth Thunders; The earth grows barren, for the punishment of this horrid disorder: when war is kindled in a nation, or, that the Plague hath dispeopled Cities, and turned Kingdoms into desolate places; we ought to believe, that these judgments are the punishments of men, who

Nullum quodlibet scelus coram Deo tam abominabile sit quàm de peccatis gaudere, atque in eis semper jacere. August lib. de salutar. docum. cap. 12.

Omnibus crimen suum voluptati est; lætatur ille adulterio, lætatur ille furto. Senec.

who place their contentment in their offences; and who, violating all the laws of nature, do unjustly mingle joy with sin.

Now because this mischief, as great as it is, ceaseth not to be common; and that it is very hard, to taste any innocent pleasure; *Jesus Christ* adviseth us, to forsake all the pleasure of the world; and henceforth to ground our felicity in Heaven: He bids us, by the mouth of his Apostle, not to open the doors of our hearts: save to those pure consolations, whereof the Holy Ghost is the Spring-head: and arguing out of our own interests, he obliegeth us to seek only after that Joy, which, being founded on himself, cannot be molested by the injuries of men, nor the insolence of fortune: For, if any think to place it in our Riches, we are bound to fear the Loss thereof; if we lodg it in reputation, we shall apprehend Calumny: And, if like beasts we put it in those infamous delights which flatter the sences, and corrupt the minde, we shall have as many subjects of fear, as we shall see chances that may bereave us of them. Therefore, following St. *Augustines* counsel, (which we cannot suspect, since in the flower of his age, he had tasted the delights of

Si gaudes de nummo, times furem; si autem gaudes de deo, quid times? ne tibi quisquam auferat Deum? Deum tibi nemo aufert, si tu eum non dimiseris. August. in Psal. 37.

of the world;) We should take care to lessen all sinfull pleasures, till such time as they may wholly end, by our death; and to increase all innocent pleasure, till such time, as they be perfectly consummated in Glory. But you will peradventure say, that our sences are not capable, of these holy delights: and that Joy, which is but a Passion of the Soul, cannot raise it self up to such pure contentments: that it must have some sensible thing, to busy it self about; and that, whileſt it is engaged in the body, 'tis an unjust thing, to propound to it the felicitie of Angels: This exception is current, only, among such as think the Passions of men to be no nobler then those of Beasts: The affinitie which they have with Reason, makes them capable of all her Benefits; when they are illuminated by her lights, they may be set on fire by her Flames: When grace sheddeth her influences into that part of the soul, where they reside, they labour after Eternity; and forestalling the advantages of Glory, they elevate the body, and communicate unto it Spiritual feelings: They make us say, with the Prophet; *My body and my soul, rejoyce in the living God*; And neglecting perishable delights, they long after such, only, as are Eternal. The

Vincat gaudium in Domino, donec finiatur gaudium in Sæculo; gaudium in Domino semper augeatur, gaudium in sæculo semper minuatur donec finiatur. Auguſt. lib. 2. de verbis Domini. Serm. 14.

The fourth Discourse.

Of the Nature, Proprieties, and Effects of Griefe and Sorrow.

IF nature could not extract good out of evil, and did not her Providence turn our miseries into Felicities, we might with Reason blame her, for having made the most troublesome of our Passions, the most Common: For, sadness seems to be Natural to us, and Joy a stranger: All the parts of our body may taste Sorrow and Pain; and but very few of them are Sensible of Pleasure: Paines come in throngs, and assail us by Troops; they agree to afflict us; and though they be at discord among themselves; they joyn in a confederacy, to conspire our undoing; but pleasures justle one another, when they meet; and, as if they were jealous of good fortune, the one of them destroys the other; Our Body is the Stage, whereon they fight; the miseries thereof arise from their differences;

Homo animal querulum cupidè suis incumbens miseriis, Apul.

rences ; and man is never more unhappy, then when he is divided by his delights: Griefes continue long; and as if nature took pleasure in prolonging our punishment, she endues us with strength, to undergo them ; and makes us only, so far, Courageous, or so far Patient, as may render us, so much the more miserable. Pleasures, especially those of the body, endure but for a moment ; their death is never far off ; and when a man will make them of longer durance, by art, they occasion either torment, or loathing. But to make good all these reasons, and to shew that Griefe is more Familiar to man, then Pleasure, we need only consider the deplorable condition of our life ; where for one vain contentment, we meet with a thousands reall sorrows : For these come uncalled, they present themselves of their own proper motion, they are linkt one to another ; and like Hydra's heads, they either never die, or after death, spring up again : But pleasures are sought for with pain ; and we are oft-times enforced to pay more for them, then they are worth : Sorrows are sometimes entirely pure, and touch us to the quick, as they make us incapable of consolation ; but Pleasures are never without some

Voluptas tunc cum maxime delectat extinguitur, nec multum loci habet, itaque cito inplet, et tædio est, et post primum impetum marcet. Senec. de vita beat. cap. 7.

Scio rem non esse in nostra potestate, nec ullum affectum servire, maxime vero eum qui ex dolore nascitur. Senec. consol. ad Helviam. cap. 5.

some Mixture of Sorrow: They are alwaies dipt in bitterness; and, as we see no Roses which are not environed with Prickles, we taste no delights, which are not accompanied with Torments: but that which makes the misery of our condition evidently appear, is, that we are much more sensible of Pain then of pleasure; for a sleight malady troubleth all our most solid contentments; a Feaver is able to make Conquerors forget their Victories; and to blot out of their minds all the pomp of their Triumphs. Yet is it the truest of all our Passions; and, if we believe *Aristotle*, it makes the greatest alterations in our souls: the rest subsist only by our imagination; and were it not for the intelligence we hold with this faculty, they would make no impression upon our Sences: Desires and Hopes are but deceitful good things; and he very well knew their nature, who termed them, the Dreames of Waking men: Love and Hatred are the diversions of idle souls: Fear is but a shadow, and it is hard for the Effect to be true, when the Cause is imaginary: Boldness and Choler form monsters to themselves, that they may defeat them; and we must not wonder, if they so easily engage themselves in the Combat,

Proba istas quæ voluptates vocantur, ubi transcenderint modum, pœnas esse. Senec. Epist. 8.

Combat, since their enemies weakness assures thē of the victory: but Grief is a Reall evill, which sets upon the soul, and body both at once, and make two wounds at one blow. I know, there are some sorrows that wound only the minde, and exercise all their might upon the Noblest part of man; but if they be Violent, they work upon the body; and by a secret contagion; the pains of the Mistress, become the diseases of the Slave: the chains that binde them together, art so streight, that all their good and bad estate is shared between them; a contented soul cures her body; and a sick body afflicts its soul: this noble captive patiently endures all other incommodities which befall her; and, provided that her prison be exempted from pain, she findes reasons enough to cheer up her self with: She despises the loss of Riches; and bounding her Desires, she findes contentment in Poverty; she neglects Honor; and knowing that it only depends upon Opinion, she will not ground her happiness upon so frail a good: she passeth by Pleasures; and the shame which accompanies them, lesseneth the sorrow which their loss brings her; as she is not tied to these adventitious goods, she easily forgoes them; and when Fortune hath robbed

Corpus hoc animi pondus ac pœna est: premente illo urgetur, in vinculis est. Senec. Epist. 65.

bed her of them, she thinks her self more at Liberty, and thinks her self not the poorer; but when the Body is assaulted, and that it suffers either excessive heat, or the injuries of the Season, or the rage of Sickness, she is constrained to sigh with it; and the cords which fasten them together, make their miseries common; she apprehends Death, though she be Immortall; she fears wounds, though she be Invulnerable; and she resents all the evills suffer'd by the Prison which she gives life to, though she be Spirituall.

Quid faciet animus ut non doleat cum corpus vulneratur aut uritur, cui tanto implicatur consortio ut pati possit, non dolere non possit. Aug. de gratia novi testam. quæst. 2.

The *Stoicks* Philosophy, which valueth not a glorious enterprize, unless it be impossible, would have interdicted the commerce between the soul and the body; and in a strange madness, hath endeavour'd to seperate two parts, whereof one and the same whole are compounded: she forbad her disciples the use of tears; and breaking the holiest of all Friendships, she would have the soul to be insensible of the bodies sufferings; and that whil'st the body was burning in the midst of flames, the soul should mount up to heaven, there to contemplate the beauty of Vertue, or the wonders of Nature. This barbarous Philosophy had some Admirers, but she never had

O Philosophia, tyrannica sunt præcepta tua: amare jubes, & si quis amiserit quod amabat, dolere prohibes. Stob. Serm. 97.

had any true Disciples: her Counsels made them despair; all that would follow her Maxims suffer'd themselves to be mis-led by Vanity, and could not fence themselves against Grief. Since the soul hath contracted so straight a society with the body, she must suffer with it; and since she is shed abroad into all the parts thereof, she must complain with the mouth, weep with the eys, and sigh with the heart: Mercy was never forbidden but by Tyrants; and this Vertue will be praised, as long as there be any that are miserable; yet the evills which afflict her, are strangers to her; and those whom she assists, are, for the most part, to her unknown: wherefore then shall we blame the soul, if she have compassion on her own body? Wherefore shall we accuse her of Abjectness, if she share in the sorrows that assail it: and which, not being able to hurt her in her own substance, set upon her in her Mansion-house, and revenge themselves on her, in that thing which, of all the world, she loves best? For while she is in the body, she seems to renounce her Nobility; and that ceasing to be a pure spirit, she interesses her self in all the Delights, and all the Vexations of her Hoste: his health causeth contentment in her; and his sickness

Si egregium est hostem decipere, non minus tamen laudabile infælicis scire misereri. Val. max. l. 5.

is grievous to her; the most worthy part suffers in the less worthy; and by a troublesome necessity, the soul is unhappy in the miseries of her body. They say, that Magick is so powerfull, that it hath found out a secret, how to torment men in their absence, and to make them feel in their own Persons, all the cruelties which she exerciseth upon their Images: these miserable men burn with fire, which toucheth nothing but their Picture; they feel blows which they do not receive: and the distance of place cannot free them from the fury of their enemies: Love which is as powerfull, and not much less cruell than Magick, doth this miracle every day; when it joyns two souls together, it findes a way to make their sufferings common: men cannot offend the one, but the other resents it, & each of them suffers as well in the body which it loves, as in that which it inanimates: Since Love and Magick work these wonders, we must not marvell, if Nature, having fastned the soul to the body, do make the miseries common; and if by one onely woe, she makes two parties miserable the participation of each others Good and Bad, is a consequence of their Marriage; and the Heavens must do a miracle, to give them a Dispen-

Devovet absentes, simulachraque cærea fingit: Et miserum tenues in jecur urget acus. Ovid. in Epist.

Dolores qui dicuntur carnis, animæ sunt in carne & ex carne: quid enim caro per seipsam? sine anima vel dolet vel concupiscit? August. l. 14. de civit. Dei. cap. 15.

Dispensation from this necessity. The joy of Martyrs was no meer effect of Reason; when they tasted any Pleasure amidst their Torments, it must needs be Grace that sweetened the rigour thereof; and he that in the fiery Furnace changed Flames into pleasing gales of Winde, must have turned their Torments into Delights: or if he did them not this favour, he did them a greater; and by making the soul not sensible of the bodies sufferings, he taught the whole world, that he was the Soveraign Lord of Nature. But howsoever, all Philosophers agree, that the soul cannot be happy in a miserable body; and that she cannot endue it with life, without sharing in the miseries thereof: if her noblest part be touched with Joy, while the body languisheth with Pain; that which inanimates it, must be sensible thereof; and to pay interests for the services she gets thence, she must be miserable for company: Even the Soul of Jesus Christ, thrice-happy as it was, failed not to be afflicted; and a miracle was done in the order of Glory, that the society might not be broken, which Nature hath put between the soul and the body; it is then agreed upon, that these two parts that compose man, cannot be separated in their suffering; and

that the torment of the one, must of necessity be the others punishment: they love too well, to forsake one another in their afflictions; and unless the violence of pain break the chaines wherewith they are linked together, their miseries must be common: I should moreover think, that the condition of the soul is more deplorable, then that of the body; for besides, that to make her subject to sufferings, be to injure her worth; and that it is a peece of injustice to force her to feel evills, from which by Nature she is exempted; she sentenceth her self to new sufferings: and the love which she beareth to her body, obliegeth her to resent with sorrow the pains which it endureth: she together with it is sensible thereof, seeing that she is the Originall of Sence: and as if this torment were not sufficient, she drawes another upon her self by compassion, and afflicts her self with the Thought of all that which really torments it: she makes much of its maladies after she hath shared in the suffering of them; she grows sad with the conceit of them; and of a single grief makes double martyrdom: true it is, that this faculty hath so much commerce with the Sences, as she cannot resent their evils, without communicating her pains unto them;

Dolet anima cum corpore, cùm eo loco dolet ubi læditur corpus: dolet sola in corpore cùm tristis est; dolet extra corpus, ut anima divitis in inferno; corpus autem nec exanime dolet, nec animatum sine anima dolet. August. l. 21. de civit. Dei. cap. 3.

them; her trouble disquieteth them: and as the sufferings of the body are cause of the like in the soul, by a law as just as necessary, the pain of the soul produceth the like of the body. This feeling is, in my Opinion, true Sadness, which is nothing else but a dislike which is formed in the inferior part of the soul, by the sight of Objects which are displeasing to her.

Very strange are the effects of so melancholick a Passion; for when she is but in a mean, she makes them eloquent without Rhetorick; she teacheth them Figurative speeches, to exaggerate their Discontents: and to hear them speak, the greatest pains seem to be less, then what they suffer: but when she is Extream, by a clean contrary effect, she astonisheth the Spirit: she interdicts the use of the Sences: she dries up Tears, stifles Sighes; and making men stupid, she affords Poets the liberty of feigning, that she changeth them into Rocks: when she is of long continuance, she frees us from the earth, and raiseth us up to heaven: for it is very hard for a man in misery to covet Life, when it is full of Pain and Sorrow; and when the soul hath great conflicts for a body, which doth continually exercise her patience. All men are not so

Curæ leves loquuntur, ingentes stupent. Senec. traged.

poorly spirited, as was that Favorite of *Augustus*, who did so much covet life, that Torments could not make him forgo the desire thereof; who gloried in his Verses, that he would have loved life amidst tortures, that he would have been a Votary for the prolonging of it upon the Rack; and that the cruellest sufferings that might be, would have seemed swift to him; so as he might therein have found life. I well beleeve, that excess of pain would have made him be of another minde; and that he would have confess'd, that to die quickly, is better then to live long in Pain: or had he persisted in his first Opinion, we should be bound to confess, that poorly-spirited men are more wilful, then are those that are couragious: and that the desire of Glory makes not so great impression in us, as the desire of life. But to return to my subject; when Grief is violent, it looseneth the soul from the body, and causeth the death of the man: for Sadness and Joy have this of resemblance in their difference, that both of them attempt upon our lives, when they are in extreams: The heart dilates it self by Joy; it opens it self to receive the good which is offer'd, & tastes it with such excess of pleasure, as it faints under the weight thereof,

Debilem facite manu, debilem pede, coxâ, lubricos quate dentes: vita dum superest bene est, hanc mihi, vel acuta si sedeam cruce, sustine macer.

thereof, and meets with death in the midst of its Happiness: It shuts it self up by Sorrow; claps to the door upon the evill that besiegeth it; and very improvidently delivers it self into the hands of a Domestick enemy, to free it self from one that is a stranger: for its Violence causeth its anguish, and the care he takes to defend it self, augments its Pain, and hastens its Death. Oft-times also, its Negligence makes it miserable; it suffers it self to be surpris'd by Sorrow, for not having foreseen it; and being no longer in a condition to defend it self, when Sorrow arriveth, it is forced to give way therunto. In fine, Sadness makes us weep; when it hath seiz'd on our heart, it wageth war with our Eyes; it evaporateth by Sighes; it glides down by Tears, and weakens it self in the production thereof; for a man that weeps, easeth himself, and comforts himself whilest he complains; he findes somewhat of Delight in his lamentations; and if they be signs of his sufferings, they are likewise the cure thereof: As Choler discharageth it self by Railing, Sorrow being more innocent, drops away by Tears; and abandons the Heart, when it gets up into the Face. Having seen its effects, it remains that we consider what use may be

—Est quædam flere voluptas: Expletur Lachrymis, egeritur q; dolor. Ovid. 4. Trist.

made thereof, and in what conditions it may become Innocent or offensive.

The fifth Discourse.

Of the bad use of Pain and Sorrow.

THose who believe that Delight is Vertues most dangerous enemy, will never think that Sorrow can side with Vice; and we shall have much a-do to perswade them, that there be some Sadnesses which are faulty; yet we see but few of them that are innocent: and most of those that draw tears from us, are either unjust, or unreasonable: for man is become so effeminate, that every thing hurts him. Sin hath made him so wretched, that he numbers the privation of Pleasures amongst his Pains; and thinks he hath just cause to afflict himself, when he possesseth not all that he desires: the number of his evills is increased by his abjectedness; and he that in the first ages knew no other pain, but Sickness

Homo adest dolori suo, nec tantum quantum sentit, sed quantum concipit, eo afficitur. Senec. consol. ad Marc. c. 7.

sickness and death, now vexeth himself for Disgrace and Poverty: The witness of his Conscience is not sufficient, for his Vertue; and if he have not applause on Earth, joyned to the approbation of Heaven, he imagineth himself to be infamous: the riches of Nature do not satisfie his Desires; and though he have all things that are Necessary, he thinks himself Poor if he have not somewhat that is Superfluous. Thus every one findes his Misfortune, even in his Felicity; and the happiest are so nice to please, as Fortune who tires her self out in their service, cannot take from them pretences of Complaint: The best successes are accompanied with circumstances which afflict them; they are displeased with a Victory, because the chief of the Enemy hath saved himself by flight; and that together with his Honor, he hath not lost both Life and Liberty: They are not pleased with the taking in of a Town, because it hath not drawn along with it, the Revolt of a whole Province; and they are so ingenious in causing pain unto themselves, as their desires cannot be satisfied, nor can a period be put to their complaints by the greatest Prosperity: Amongst such as these, methinks Sorrow is a slave to Pleasure; and that

Potest quidem eloquentia tua quæ parva sunt approbare pro magnis, sed alio ista vires servet suas, nunc se tota in solatium tuum conferat. Noli contra te ingenio tuo uti, noli adesse dolori tuo. Senec. ad Polyb. c. 37.

that to revenge her self of her Servitude, she makes her Mistress sigh, and renders her miserable amidst all her delights: These men deserve no consolation, their sufferings are too unjust to obliege Philosophy to finde them a Remedy; it is reasonable, that their Rechlesness should be their Punishment, and that they should languish in Misery, since they know not how to live Happily. There are others who Glory in their Misfortunes, and make the sincerest of our Passions serve their Ambition: they bewail the loss of their friends in whatsoever Companies they come; they will have their Grief to be a mark of their Love, and that men should beleeve that they know how to Love well, since they know so well how to Lament; they never dry their eyes, but when they are in their Closet; they think their tears should not be well employed, if they wanted Witnesses; and they teach us, that they are not sincere, since they seek out such as may approve of them. Sorrow which is lodged in our Hearts, accompanyeth us in all places, and giveth freedom to her Sighes, and comforts her self in her Complaints in Solitary places, where nothing can divert her: But the sincerity thereof, makes

Plerique Lachrymas fundunt ut ostendant, & toties siccos oculos habent, quoties spectator defuit: Adeo penitus hoc se malum fixit, ut in simulationem, etiam simplicissima res dolor veniat. Senec. de tranquil. c. 15.

it

it not be the less unjust, since it ofttimes produceth effects contrary to our desires, and makes us forget those which it enforceth us to bewail; for there is nothing which we are sooner tyred with, then Grief: Having nothing lovely in it, it becomes quickly Odious, it wearies them that serve it; and to free themselves from it, they endeavor to quit themselves of the Love that did occasion it: they blot out of their memory the Remembrance of their friends, that they may be no longer bound to Lament them; and with an Ingratitude which always follows Immoderate Grief, they renounce Friendship to cure themselvs of Sorrow. I know very well, we are permitted to bewail the loss of our Friends; and that Tears are the prime Duties that Nature hath oblieged us to render them; but the current thereof must be quickly stopt: and calling in Reason to our assistance, we must make their memory Delightful to us, if we will have it be Immortal. Men do not willingly think much upon that which torments them; and when once they have given over those sad delights which Nature hath placed in Tears, they look upon them as punishments, and shun all occasions which may make them shed them.

Nulla res citius venit in odium, quàm dolor. Senec. Epist. 63.

Id agamus, ut jucunda fiat nobis amissorum recordatio. Nemo libenter ad id redit, quod non sine tormento cogitaturus est. Senec. Epist. 63.

But

But certainly of all Discontents which causelesly prejudice our Souls, methinks there is none more infamous then that of Envy; for Sorrow caused by the Privation of Pleasures, is not so unjust, but that it may have some Pretences to defend it Self; if it exceed the bounds of Reason, it findes Excuses; and we see some who finde not so much trouble in withstanding Sorrow, as in abstaining from Delight: They are better fitted for Fortitude, then for Temperance; and may be sooner made Martyrs, then Continent. The death of Friends is a loss sufficient to be lamented; and Friendship is a Vertue beautiful enough to have the glory thereof sought after, either by counterfeit or real Tears. All these Sorrows have Evil for their Object; and if their Excess be unjust, their Causes may admit of Excuse; but Envy is a Sorrow as unworthy as unjust; and look upon it on what side you please, it can neither have Pretence nor Colour: It gives against all the Vertues, and maliciously declares war with all those Noble Habits which make up the purest Glory of our Souls. I know that all Vices are Enemies to Vertue, and that they are not to be reconciled by Morality. Nature accords the Elements; and tempering their

Virtutis comes invidia est, plerunque bonos sectatur. Cic. 4. ad Heren.

their qualities, employs them in the composure of all her Works; but humane Wisdom, with all its cunning, cannot reconcile the differences between Vice and Vertue, nor lodg them together in the same Person: yet is the Hatred of other Vertues regulated; they onely undertake every one its contrary Vertue; and when by an unjust Victory, they have triumphed over this noble Enemy, their fury is appeased, and they leave the man in some sort of quiet. Avarice persecutes onely Liberality; Ambition pursues onely Modesty; and Falshood, for all its Impudence, opposes Truth onely: but Envy, more furious then all these Monsters, makes war against all the Vertues; and as if she were a poyson compounded of all the rest, she at the same time sets upon Charity, Justice, Mercy, and Humility: For if Charity make all things common, Envy appropriates them; and takes not so much pleasure in the enjoying of them her self, as in the bereaving others of them: if Justice give every one that which appertains to him, Envy keeps all for her self; and not willing to acknowledg any other merit then her own, she thinks all rewards are due to her: if Mercy be afflicted at other mens harms, Envy rejoyceth at them; and out of an

Mala cætera habent terminum: Invidia autem est malum jugiter perseverans, & sine fine peccatum: Hinc vultus minax, pallor in facie, stridor in dentibus, manus ad cædem promptæ, etiamsi à gladio interim vacuæ, odio tamen furiatæ mentis armatæ. Cyprian. ser. de Livore.

an Excess of Malice, makes them her Felicity: if Humility despise Nothing, Envy findes fault with All things, and endeavors to raise her Reputation upon the Ruines of Vertue; so that she is an Universal Evil; and this detestable mischief is composed all at Once of Avarice, Pride and Cruelty: But though she be animated against all Vertues, she keeps her chief endeavors against the Noblest, and assails them with most Fervor, which have most lustre in them: she is like those troublesome Flies which betake themselves to the fairest Flowers in the Garden; or is like to thunder which chuseth out the greatest Trees, and dischargeth its fury upon the fairest Mountains: her courage appears onely in the worth of the Enemy she undertakes; she will be thought generous, because she is Insolent, and she glories in the Greatness of her fault.

Nunquam eminentia invidia carent: Assidua est eminentis fortunæ comes invidia, altissimisq; semper adhæret. Vel. Patercul. lib. 1.

From this lewd quality proceeds another, which is not much less troublesome; for as she hates Vertue, she cannot endure any Vertuous Person: Her Hatred perswades her to Revenge; when her Calumny cannot prevail over the Glory of the Innocent, she attempts their Life; after having made a tryal by Backbiting, she makes

Murder

Murder her main Work, and sheds their Blood, whose Reputation she could not blemish: No Parricide was ever committed without her counsel; and of as many Cruelties as are imputed to Hatred or Choler, the most Famous are the Works of Envy.

In the beginning of the world, she armed *Cains* hand against his Brother; she furnished him with weapons, before she had forced Iron from out the bowels of the Earth. In the age which succeeded next to that of Innocence, she taught him to commit the first Murther; and Death, which was but the punishment of sin, through her Counsels, became a Crime: she stirred up the children of *Jacob* against their brother *Joseph*; his future glory made them Jealous; and that they might withstand the Designes of Heaven, they made him a Slave, whom Heaven had ordained to be a King: she set on *Saul* against *David*, and in a blinde fury perswaded him, That nothing is more pernicious to Kings, then the Greatness of their Subjects; and that the Power of a Forraigner is not so dreadful to them, as the Worth of a Domestick.

Invidia pestiferum malum, hominem in Dæmonem convertit, per eam mors venit in mundum, propter ipsam Abel est interemptus, David cædis periculum subiit, & Judæi Christum interfecerunt. Chrys. in hom.

But to go higher yet, and come even to the

the rise of all mischief: it was she that animated the Devil against men; that inspired him with the means how to be their ruine before they were borne, and to slay them in the person of their Father. If she work thus much evil to her Enemies, she is cause of no less to her self; and she is as well her own punishment, as Vertues; for she sees no prosperity which doth not afflict her: Her neighbors good fortune causeth her misery; she bewails their good success; and there needs but a happy man, to make her eternally wretched: She confounds the Nature of good and evil, to augment her dislikes; and out of an irregularity, which is just onely because it is harmful to her, she rejoyceth at mischief, and afflicts her self at that which is good: She sheds rivers of Tears, when others make bonefires; and in publike calamities, findes occasions for her self to Rejoyce, for her self to Triumph: She is pleased with her own loss, so it draw along with it that of her Enemy; and it is so natural to her to do unjust things, as she buyes the pleasure of Revenge at the cost of her own Life; she is angry with Fortune, complains of her own times; and when she cannot hinder her Enemies good success, Despair confines her to Solitary places,

Invidia vitium diabolicum, quo solo Diabolus reus est: Non enim ei dicitur, ut damnetur, adulterium commisisti, furtum fecisti: villam alienâ rapuisti, sed homini stanti invidisti. Aug. lib. 1. de doctrina Christi.

Obiratscens Fortunæ invidus, & de sæculo querens, & in angulos se retrahens, pœnæ incubat suæ. Senec. de tranquil. c. 2.

places; or else entertaining her self with her own Discontents, she suffers the punishment due to all the faults she hath committed. To comfort her self in her Misery, she flatters her self with Nobleness; and would perswade the World, That if she blame other mens Vertues, it is because she observes some Faults therein: To hear her speak, you would think that she hath derived her pedigree from Heaven; and that the Earth hath not Crowns nor Scepters enough to honor her: She believes that all honors are due to her, and that she is robed of all the respects that are not given her. In fine, she is as Insolent, as Vertue is Modest; and her Language is as Impudent, as that of her enemy is reserved: Nevertheless, there is nothing more Poor and Mean then her Courage; she is always in the dust; and if blinde Fortune sometimes raise her up, she immediately abaseth her self, and humbleth her self, even beneath those things which she cryes down: For it is an approved maxime, that whatsoever causeth Envy, is Above us: By our own judgment, we give the advantage to our Equals, when their merit raiseth Jealousie in us. A Prince becomes a slave to his Subjects, when he begins to grow fearful of

Invidia, quæ semper sibi est inimica: nam qui invidet sibi quidem ignominiam facit, illi autem cui invidet, gloriam parit, Chrys. sup. Matth.

their Prosperity; he descends from his Throne, and falls from his greatness, assoon as ever he wishes for what they possess; when he conceives a Jealousie at their good Fortune, he judgeth theirs, in his opinion, to be better then his own: Therefore 'tis, that that famous man, who made himself Illustrious by his Misfortunes, and whose Innocence was exercised by so many heavy Visitations, hath observed, that Envy was the Passion of Abject souls; and that she consumes onely such poor-spirited men, as can undertake nothing of Generous: For had they a more noble heart, and had Vertue given them a share of that Satisfaction that she always bears about her, they would be content with their Condition, and would not frame such Wishes, as should discover their Misery: If they observed any rare Perfection in their Equals, they would give it such praises, as it deserves; or in a noble Emulation, strive to attain thereunto: But as the vice which tyrannizeth over them, creeps upon the Ground; they conceive none but poor desires, nay, when they force themselves to look higher, they do the more abase themselves; and we finde by experience, that their appearing Greatness, is but an effect of their real misery.

Invidia parvulum occidit. Job. cap. 5. Si non invideris, major eris: nam qui invider, minor est. Senec. in Proverb.

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To all these mischiefs, we may yet adde that of Poverty, which is not Envies least punishment; for she hath this of Common with Avarice, That her riches never content her: She hath a thousand eyes to see her Neighbors prosperity, but is blinde to see her own; she onely considers such Goods as may afflict her, and weighs not those which may comfort her; she thinks she wants whatsoever another doth possess; and ingenious to her pain, she augments anothers felicity, to adde unto her own misery: So as to punish the Envious, you need onely leave them to their own Fury; without going about to chastise their Insolence, it will suffice to leave them to themselves; and to suffer the Devil that possesseth them, to take vengeance for their fault. These are the Excesses which Grief is capable of, when not well guided: Let us see now, to what Vertues it may be Serviceable, when she is Obedient to Reason; and that following the motions of Grace, she is afflicted for the sins of the Wicked, or for the miseries of Good men.

Nostra nos sine comparatione delectent: nunquam erit fœlix, quem torquebit fœlicior. Senec. lib. 3. de ira, cap. 30.

The sixth Discourse.

Of the Good use of Grief.

WE must not wonder if the *Stoicks* condemn Grief, since they approve not of those Vertues which it produceth; and that they will have their wise man to taste so pure a Joy, as shall not be mingled with the least dislike: For they raise him above Storms, and endevor to perswade us, that he sees all Tempests formed under his feet, and is not at all therewith agitated; they assure us that upon the Sacking of a Town, or Ruine of a State, he is no more moved, then is their *Jupiter* at the Dissolution of the World; and that placing all his Happiness in Himself, he looks upon all the bad events of Fortune with an equal eye: If he shed some tears upon the Tomb of his Ancestors, or chance to sigh for his Perishing Countrey, his Soul is no whit moved; and he beholds all those disasters without any Disquiet. Let this severe Philosophy say what it will, I do

---Lachrymæ volvuntur inanes; Mens immota manet. Virgil. Æneid. 4.

do not beleeve that her doctrine can destroy Nature; nor that she ever made a Wise man of one from whom she takes the Feelings of man. Wisdom is no enemy to Nature; and Heaven had never united the soul to the body, had it had a purpose to hinder their communication: These Philosophers when they made their proud boasts, have, in my opinion, imitated those Orators, who making Hyperboles, lead us to Truth, by Falshood; and assure us of that which is Impossible, that they may perswade us to that which is Difficult: They did (certainly) beleeve, that the Minde ought to have some commerce with the Body, and that the sufferings of the one ought to cause Grief in the other; but lest the Nobler part should become slave to the less noble, they have endeavored to preserve her Liberty by Rigor; and to make her insensible, to the end that she might always keep up her Soveraignty: For who could imagine that men so judicious in all things, should lose their Judgment in this; and that to defend Vertue, they should abandon Reason? All the Glory of their Discourse tended onely to maintain the Soul in her Empire; and lest she might faint under the Weakenesses of the Body, they have

In hoc omnis hyperbole extenditur, ut ad verum mendacio veniat. Nunquam tantum sperat quantum audet; sed incredibilia affirmat, ut ad credibilia perveniat. Senec. benef. lib. 7. c. 23.

authorised her Power by terms, more Eloquent then True: They conceited, that to reduce us to Reason, we must be raised a little above it; and that to afford nothing of Superfluous to our Senses, we must deny them what is Necessary. They believe then, with us, That Grief may accord with Reason, and that there are occasions, wherein not to be afflicted is to be Impious: But I know not, whether or no, we can perswade them, that Repentance and Mercy are glorious Vertues; and that after having bewayled our own Offences, we are bound to lament our neighbors Miseries.

Maxima est peccati pœna, fecisse: nec quisquam gravius afficitur, quàm qui ad supplicium pœnitentiæ traditur. Senec. lib. 3. de ira. cap. 26.

These Philosophers are austere, onely because they are too Vertuous; they condemn not Penitency, save onely because they love Fidelity; and if they blame Repentance, 'tis because it presupposeth a Fault: they would have us never to forsake Vertue, and that we should deal more severely with vitious men, then with those who desert the Discipline of War: their zeal deserves some excuse; but not being accompanied with Wisdom, it produceth an effect contrary to their intent; for it augmenteth the number of the Guilty, whilest it thinks to diminish them: it makes the weak wilful; and taking away the Remedy,

Remedy, it changeth their Infirmities into incurable Diseases. Man is not so constant as the Angels; and when he loves what is good, he is not so firmly fixed thereunto, but that he may be made to forgo it; neither is he so opinionated as is the Devil; and when he affects evil, he is not so strongly engaged thereto, but that he may be taken off from it. If his Inconstancy be cause of his sin, 'tis also the Remedy thereof; and if it assist to make him Guilty, it contributes also to the making of him Innocent: He is nauseated with sin, he is weary of Impiety, and he ows these good effects to the weakness of his Nature: Had he more Strength, he would be more Obstinate; and Grace which converts him, would finde more Resistance, were he more firm in his Resolutions: Heaven makes this Defect serve for our Advantage; and its Providence husbandeth our Weakness, to work our Welfare thereby; for when it hath touched the hearts of sinners, and that preventing their Will by its Grace, it makes them detest their wickedness; they end the work of their Conversion, by the ayd of Penitence; and in Sorrow seek out means to appease divine Justice: they punish their Bodies, to afflict their Souls; they

Scit Deus noster non semper hominem integrum stare, sed frequenter aut peccare corpore, aut vacillare Sermone: Ideo Pœnitentia viam docuit, per quam possit & destructa corrigere, & lapsa reparare. Aug. de Pœnit.

sentence the slave to bewayl the sin of his Master, because he is accessary thereunto; and knowing that all the harm, which either the Master or the Slave do to themselves, proceeds from the too much love they bear unto themselves; they obliege them, for their own good, to hate themselves; they oft-times punish them both with the same punishment, because their offences are Reciprocal; and do justly conjoyn those in the suffering, which were not separated in the Fault. Thus the whole man satisfieth God; and the two parts whereof he is composed, do by Sorrow finde pardon for their sins. I am not ignorant, that Libertines laugh at these duties; and that they place Repentance in the number of those remedies which are as shameful as unprofitable; for, wherefore (say they) do you afflict your self for an evil that hath no more a Being? wherefore do you revive it by your Sorrow? wherefore with a greater piece of Imprudence would you change what is past, and wish in vain, that what is already done, had not been done? These bad Reasons will not divert sinners from Repentance; and if wicked men have no better weapons wherewithal to fight against Piety, they will never have much

Non separentur in mercede & in pœna, anima & caro, quas opera conjungit. Tertul. l. de Resurrect. carn. cap. 15.

Nunquam sapientem facti sui pœnitere, nunquam emendare quod fecerit, nec mutare consilium jactant Stoici. Senec. benefic. lib. 4. cap. 34.

much advantage over her: Nature authoriseth daily the tears we shed for misfortunes past; a sad remembrance draws sighs from us; and we cannot think upon the evils which we have either escaped or undergone, without some sence, either of Delight or Sorrow: As the time that is past, makes the most certain part of our life, so doth it likewise awaken the truest Passions, and afford us the most sensible motions: Time to come is too uncertain to vex ones self much about it; and the events which it produceth are too hidden to make any great Impression upon our desires: Time past is the source of our Sorrows; and we have reason to afflict our selves for a thing which we cannot help; if it did onely threaten us, we should endeavor to defend our selves from it; and if it hung over our heads, we should imploy our Wisdom to divert it; but when it hath once happened, we have no more to do, but to be sorry for it; and of as many Passions as may serve to comfort us in present evils, or such as are to come, There is none but this, from whence we can draw consolation in our past afflictions. Could we recal our friends from their Graves, and revive their ashes by our cares, we would not consume our selves in our

Calamitosus est animus futuri anxius, & ante miserias miser qui futuro torquetur. Senec. Epist 98.

our bootless Sorrows; but since there is no cure for death, and that Physick which can preserve life, cannot restore it when it is lost; we have so much the more reason to complain, as our loss is more certain; and our tears appear to be so much the more just, as the evil which we suffer, is the less capable of remedy. Thus Penitence is not to be blamed, if not being able to remedy a fault already committed, she yield her self up to Sorrow; and if finding no means how to repair her offence, she witness her sensibleness thereof by sighes: she is the better grounded in this belief, for that she knows, Tears are not unprofitable for her; and that mingled with the Blood of *Jesus Christ*, they may wash away all her offences: Upon other occasions, they do no miracles; if they comfort the living, they do not raise up the dead again; if they assure the afflicted of our love, they do not free them from their troubles; by thinking to aid the miserable, they augment their number; and insteed of curing the malady, they serve onely to make it the more contagious: But those of Repentance drown sins, save sinners, and appease Gods just anger; for he is so good, as he is pacified with a little sorrow: He takes the dislike

Quid luges quem suscitare non potes? non lugerem, si suscitare possem. Cynic.

like of an offence for satisfaction; and knowing that we cannot alter things that are past, he is contented with our repenting for them: As he reads mens hearts, and understands the Tears which flow from a real Grief, he never denies them pardon; and before his throne it is sufficient, for an offender to get absolution, if he confess his wickedness: At the tribunal of Judges, men oft-times confound Guilt with Innocence; they absolve a man who defends his sin by a Falshood; and let him but deny a murder, of which there is no proof, he forceth the Judg to give sentence on his side; but if he yields under the violence of tortures, or is surprised in his answers, his Tears do not blot out his sins, nor will his confession preserve his life. In Repentance, a man need but acknowledg his Fault, and he is sure to obtain pardon for it; the Laws thereof are so milde, as God forgets all the injuries done unto him, provided, sinners mingle a little love with their Repentance, and that the fear of punishment be not the onely motive of their Sorrow. Our own Interests do therefore obliege us to defend a Passion which is so advantageous to us; and since the hope of our Salvation is grounded upon a Vertue, which ows its Birth

Cum igitur pœnitentia provolvit hominem, magis relevat: cum squallidum facit, magis mundatum reddit: cum accusat, excusat: cum condemnat, absolvit. Tert. de Pœnit. c. 9.

Birth to Sorrow, we ought to uphold her cause, and to employ our best Reasons to authorise her, who doth help to justifie us.

Mercy will finde no less credit among men, then Repentance; and as there is none so happy, but he may become miserable, I perswade my self, she will not want Advocates: The *Stoicks* calumnies will not be able to banish her from off the Earth; the weaknesses which men impute to her, will not stain her glory: If Injustice beat down her Altars, Piety will erect others to her; and if her Temples of Stone and Marble, be thrown to the ground, men will build up living and reasonable Temples to her. They accuse her of being Unjust, and that she rather considers the Misfortune, then the sin of Offenders: they blame her for bestowing Tears on persons that deserve them not; and that she would break open prisons, that she might confusedly let loose from thence, as well the Guilty as the Innocent: But whatsoever these inhumane Philosophers say, 'tis the best employment we can make of Sorrow; it is the most sanctified use of Grief; it is that feeling of the Soul, which is most Universally approved of; and men must have proceeded from

Misericordia vitium est animorum nimis miseriæ faventium. Senec. l. 2. de Clem. c. 6.

Bonum est dolere de malis aliorum, & pia est illa tristitia, &, si dici potest, beata miseria August. ad Sebast. epist. 145.

from Rocks, or lived amongst Tygers, if they condemn so reasonable a Passion: She takes her Birth from Misery; she imitates her Mother; and she is so like unto her, as she her self is another Misery: She makes her self master of the Heart by the Eyes; and coming forth by the way she entred at, she disperseth her self in Tears, and evaporates in sighes: Though she be accused of Weakness, she stirs our desires; and interessing us in the afflictions of the miserable, she endues us with strength to assist them: After she hath witnessed her fellow-feeling of them by her Sorrow, she gives them testimony of her power by the Effects; and giving out her orders from the Throne where she is seated, she engageth the Eyes to shed Tears for them, the Mouth to comfort them, and the Hands to relieve them: She descends into Dungeons with Prisoners; she mounts up to the Scaffold with Malefactors; she assisteth the afflicted with her Counsels; she distributes her Goods amongst the Poor; and not seeking any other motive then Misery, it sufficeth her that a man be unfortunate, to take him into her protection.

Quid est autem misericordia, nisi alienæ miseriæ quædam in nostro corde compassio, qua utique, si possimus, subvenire compellimur? Aug. lib. 9. de Civitate Dei, cap. 5.

All these high endevors proceed onely from Sorrow; and were not Grief mingled with

with Mercy, she would not operate with so much Vigor; for Self-love hath put us so much out of order, that divine Providence hath been fain to make us miserable by Pity, so to interess us in the Miseries of others; did not she touch us, we should not seek out a remedy for them; neither should we ever dream of curing a malady, which were Indifferent to us; but because Mercy is a sanctified Contagion, which makes us sensible of our Neighbors sufferings; we ayd him to comfort our selves: and we help him at his need, to free our selves from the Grief we feel.

Nihil ad misericordiam sic inclinat, atque proprii periculi cogitatio. Aug. ad Gal.

Thus Misery teacheth us Mercy; and our own evil teacheth us to cure that of others: Who can condemn so just a Resentment? and who dares blame a Passion, to which we ow our Innocence? If the miserable are sacred Persons, are the merciful prophane? if we respect them whom Fortune hath set upon, shall we censure those that assist them? if we admire Patience, shall we despise Compassion? if Misery draw Tears from our Eyes, shall not Mercy draw praises from our Mouths? and shall not we adore a Vertue, which *Jesus Christ* hath pleased to consecrate in his own Person? Before the Mystery of the

Misericordia virtus tanta est, ut sine illa, cætera etsi esse possint, prodesse tamen non possint: Quamvis enim aliquis sit castus & sobrius, si misericors tamen non est, misericordiam non meretur. D. Leo. in Serm.

the Incarnation, he had onely that mercy which delivers the unfortunate, without tasting their Misfortunes; which cures the disease, without taking it upon her; and which comforts the afflicted, without adding to their number: He saw our Miseries, but had no Feeling of them; his goodness making use of his Power, succor'd the miserable, and was not afflicted with them: But since he hath vouchsafed to make himself Man, he hath mingled his Tears with ours; he hath suffered our Sorrows to wound his Soul; and was willing to suffer our Miseries, that he might learn Mercy. We may then lawfully exercise a Vertue which *Jesus Christ* hath practised; and may well become miserable, without any stain to our Honor; since the *Son* of *God*, in whose Person the least shadow of Defect cannot be found, would be sensible of his friends Afflictions, and shed Tears to bemoan them, before he would work Miracles to relieve them.

All the Philosophers do also honor this Passion; and to exalt her merit which the *Stoicks* have in vain labored to debase, they give her a glorious Title, and admit her into the company of the Vertues; they acknowledg, she may be serviceable to Reason in

Servit autem iste motus rationi, quando ita præbetur Misericordia, ut Justitia conservetur: sive cùm indigenti tribuitur, sive cùm ignoscitur Pœnitenti, Aug. l. 9. de civit. Dei. cap. 5.

in all the chances of Life; and that, provided she agree with Justice, a man must be Barbarous, not to reverence her, when she helps the poor, and pardons the guilty.

From all these Discourses, 'tis easie to gather, that there is no Passion in our Soul, which may not profitably be husbanded by Reason, and by Grace: For to sum up, in a few words, all which hath been said in this Work, Love may be changed into a Holy Friendship, and Hatred may become a Just Indignation: Desires moderated, are helps to acquire all the Vertues; and Eschewing is Chastities chief Defence: Hope encourageth us to gallant Actions, and Despair divers us from Rash Enterprises. Fear is serviceable to Wisdom, and Audacity to Valor: Choler, as Furious as it is, takes part with Justice: Innocent Joy is a foretasting of Felicity; and Grief is a short pain, which frees us from Eternal torments; so as, our Welfare depends onely upon the Use of the Passions; and Vertue subsists onely by the good employment of our Souls Motions.

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